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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the financial aspects of climate change relating to the private
sector's capacity to manage climate risks and finance carbon neutral energy infrastructure. The
dissertation examines (a) potential risks posed by climate change to private sector investment in
critical infrastructure, (b) the potential effectiveness of standard private contractual methods for
mitigating risks posed by climate change, (c) the capacity of private capital markets to finance carbon
neutral energy infrastructure, and (d) the potential for market failure in developing carbon neutral
energy infrastructure.
The dissertation first identifies climate risks to infrastructure by examining scientific
evidence concerning climate change from studies and atmospheric models. Based on this data, it
modifies a framework widely used by practitioners in the finance field for purposes of evaluating
financial risks in infrastructure projects. Using the modified risk assessment framework, the
dissertation identifies financial risks posed by climate change to financing and developing
infrastructure.
The dissertation then assesses whether these climate risks can be mitigated and managed by
employing private contractual methods typically used in infrastructure finance, such as insurance,
derivatives, and carbon offsets. Each contract is evaluated based on the following six criteria:
(a) scope of risk covered, (b) geographic coverage, (c) contract duration, (d) availability, (e) price,
and (f) market capacity. Based on these criteria, the potential for these private contractual methods to
address long-term climate change risks is assessed.
The evaluation of climate risk and methods to address these risks are similar to the
identification, allocation, and mitigation of risks that is commonly preformed by banks and project
sponsors in order to evaluate the risks of an infrastructure investment.
The conclusion of the dissertation's analysis is that climate risks will pose fundamental
problems for infrastructure finance, including that no party may be best positioned to accept and
mitigate climate risks, and that private contractual methods typically used by the private sector will be
inadequate to address climate risks in a comprehensive and cost-effective manner. If this is true,
climate risks should reduce the private sector's willingness or ability to invest in or develop
infrastructure.
The risk assessment analysis will be supplemented by three case studies focusing on different
financial aspects of climate change in sectors of the economy that are critical to developing carbon
neutral energy infrastructure: (i) the capacity of capital markets to supply adequate investment capital
to develop a portfolio of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure providing 10-15 TW of power within
a 50-year period, (ii) the financial effects of increasingly intense storms on the electric utility industry
in the Eastern United States from 1990 to 2005, and (iii) the financial effects of the increasing
frequency and intensity of natural catastrophic events on the insurance industry from the 1970's to
2005, especially in connection with underwriting risks for energy infrastructure.
The research is supported by a survey of the insurance, derivatives, banking, and energy
industries with respect to their use of private contractual risk management methods and an
examination of the models used to price these contractual instruments.
This dissertation is intended to contribute to economic and policy literature concerning
climate change by providing an analysis of how the financial aspects of climate change might
influence the capacity and willingness of the private sector to invest in carbon neutral energy
infrastructure.
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1 Introduction
This dissertation examines the private sector's capacity to manage financial risks relating to
climate change and to finance carbon neutral energy infrastructure. It poses three specific
questions concerning (a) how climate risks might impair the private sector's ability to finance
and develop infrastructure, (b) whether private contractual methods relied upon by the private
sector to mitigate risk can be effective in addressing climate risks, and (c) what kinds of
government policies are suggested by the foregoing analysis to prevent potential market failure.
The purpose of the inquiry is to assess the private sector's ability to transform our current
fossil fuel infrastructure to a carbon neutral energy infrastructure. The importance of the
question was recognized by the U.S. National Academy of Science in a 1992 report on the policy
implications of climate change when it stated: "Even though inventions and their adoption may
occur quickly, we must ask whether the broad spectrum of current capital investments could be
changed fast enough to match a change in climate in 50 to 100 years." Based on anecdotal
evidence, but without engaging in any systematic analysis, the report concluded that putting in
place "technology that is adjusted to a changing climate" "can be done without extraordinary
measures given reasonably accurate information about the future" (US NAS 1992).
This dissertation concludes that developing carbon neutral infrastructure will be a
difficult task that cannot be accomplished by the private sector within a single lifetime of the
longest duration infrastructures we currently employ. To support this conclusion, the
dissertation reviews evidence from climate change science concerning the financial risks
posed by climate change to infrastructure. Based on the scientific evidence, the dissertation
develops a framework to assess infrastructure finance risks in the context of climate change.
The framework is used both to identify specific risks posed by climate change and to
evaluate commonly used private contractual methods for addressing risks based on a set of
criteria that shows the extent to which these methods can be effective in mitigating climate
change risks. The framework focuses on the financial aspects of infrastructure development
and can be used by the private sector to make investment decisions as well as by
policymakers to identify areas where government policy is necessary or desirable to avoid
potential market failure.
Following the risk assessment, the dissertation presents three case studies examining
different aspects of the financial implications of climate change for energy infrastructure:
(i) the capacity of capital markets to supply adequate investment capital to develop a
portfolio of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure providing 10-15 TW of power generation
within a 50-year period, (ii) the financial effects of storms on the utility industry in the East
Coast of the United States, and (iii) the financial effects of natural catastrophes on the
insurance industry, especially in relation to insuring utility and energy infrastructure.
The framework, analysis of private contractual methods to manage risk, and the case
studies are relevant to assessing capital-intensive approaches to addressing climate change,
and support the dissertation's conclusion that financing and developing carbon neutral energy
infrastructure poses significant challenges for the private sector.
1.1 Dissertation Questions and Hypothesis
This dissertation addresses three questions with respect to climate risk and
infrastructure development:
(a) What risks does climate change pose to infrastructure, and how might those risks
impair the private sector's ability to finance infrastructure?
(b) To what extent can private contractual methods mitigate risks posed by climate
change?
(c) What kinds of government policies are suggested by the foregoing analysis to
prevent potential market failure?
The dissertation's major hypothesis is that private firms and capital markets will
experience difficulty financing and developing physical infrastructure under conditions of
heightened climate risks. Specifically, climate change may pose a fundamental problem for
private infrastructure finance in that no one project party appears well positioned to accept
and mitigate climate risks. Climate risks are beyond the scope of traditional operational and
financial risk analysis methods employed by industry and financial institutions. Currently
available contractual risk management techniques are inadequate to measure and protect
against climate risks on a long-term basis. Without adequate methods to measure and protect
against climate risks, climate risks could reduce the private sector's willingness or ability to
finance or develop infrastructure, including carbon neutral infrastructure.
The climate risk analysis conducted in this in dissertation is applicable to all kinds of
large-scale physical infrastructure, however the dissertation focuses on infrastructure in the
energy sector because of its direct relationship to greenhouse gas emissions and its
contribution to climate change.
1.2 Note on Terminology
This term "carbon neutral" means that energy systems emit no more greenhouse gases
to the atmosphere than they remove from the atmosphere over a period of time matched to
the life of the infrastructure. As used here, the term does not reflect a full cradle-to-grave
environmental life cycle analysis of energy infrastructure and technology, but rather focuses
on emissions from fuel conversion during the operational phase of energy infrastructure.1
The term "infrastructure" as used here means physical facilities that provide basic
services to a country and its citizens, which make economic and social activities possible.
1 The analysis also does not take into account incidental releases of greenhouse gases, such as
from the use of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) as a dielectric fluid for electricity generation and
transmission systems.
The term includes transportation, energy and power systems, communications, water, and
sewage systems. A broader definition of physical infrastructure might also include housing,
health, and education. As noted above, this dissertation focuses on large-scale physical
infrastructure in the energy sector because of its direct relationship to greenhouse gas
emissions and its contribution to climate change.
The term "infrastructure finance" means the financing of infrastructure projects,
typically on a non-recourse basis. The term is synonymous with "project finance". The
significance of infrastructure finance is that it demands that a project be financiallyjustified
on a stand-alone basis and proscribes that all project risks must be carefully identified,
allocated, and addressed. This risk analysis informs investment decisions concerning large
infrastructure projects, particularly those financed with private sector resources.
Significantly, the same risk analysis can be applied to infrastructure projects financed using
government funds or on a corporate finance basis. Nevitt and Fabozzi (2000), Tinsley
(2000), and Hoffman (2001) are authoritative references on infrastructure finance.
The term "climate risk" refers to several kinds of weather-related risks that are caused
by or correlated with an increase in the frequency and/or severity of weather events beyond
their normal ranges as a result of anthropogenically-induced climate change. These risks can
be categorized as follows: (a) greater volatility in short term weather patterns, such as
variation in heat and precipitation; (b) increased severity and likelihood of catastrophic risks,
such as storms, floods, and hurricanes; and (c) longer-term weather trends, such as gradual
warming, and their consequences, such as polar ice melt. The dissertation treats all three
kinds of risks under the term "climate risk" because they all have the potential to adversely
affect the financial results of firms, and therefore can be analyzed as financial risks under the
Climate Risk Assessment Matrix developed in this dissertation.
1.3 Overview of Dissertation and Methodology
This chapter presents the dissertation's primary research questions, its hypotheses, the
methodology that will be employed in testing them, and describes how this dissertation will
contribute to other areas of research.
Chapter 2 introduces the challenges faced by society in the 21st century in the areas of
energy and climate change. It reviews a critical variable concerning the timing of transition
away from petroleum resources and describes the magnitude of the challenge of developing
carbon neutral infrastructure in terms of cost and construction rates. It explains the rationale
for focusing on the private sector's role in financing and developing infrastructure in meeting
these challenges.
The dissertation's questions are addressed in chapters 3 through 7.
Chapter 3 identifies climate risks to infrastructure by examining scientific evidence
concerning climate change from studies and atmospheric models. Chapter 4 incorporates
these climate risks in a qualitative risk assessment framework commonly used in
infrastructure finance. The revised framework separately identifies and isolates each risk in
the context of climate change. The revised framework is then used to assess how climate
risks could affect the development of carbon neutral infrastructure.
Chapter 5 examines whether the risks defined and identified in the prior chapter
can be addressed through various private contractual methods. These contractual
methods include insurance, commodities and weather derivatives, carbon offset
contracts, and catastrophe bonds. These private contractual methods are evaluated
using six criteria: (a) scope of risk covered, (b) geographic coverage, (c) contract
duration, (d) availability, (e) price, and (f) market capacity. The analysis is supported
by a survey conducted by the author of brokers, dealers, and risk managers concerning
the use of these risk management methods.
The results of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are characterized in terms of a three-dimensional
Climate Risk Assessment Matrix, located in Appendix A to this dissertation. The Climate
Risk Assessment Matrix is in the shape of a cube, where the x, y and z axes are Climate
Risks, Methods to Mitigate Risks, and Criteria for Evaluating Methods, respectively. The
Matrix will be used as an analytical tool to conceptualize and summarize the dissertation's
results concerning climate risk.
Chapter 6 presents three case studies focusing on different financial aspects of climate
change in relation to energy infrastructure: (i) the capacity of capital markets to supply
adequate investment capital to develop a portfolio of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure
providing 10-15 TW of electricity generation within a 50-year period, (ii) the financial
effects of increasingly intense storms and hurricanes on the electric utility industry in the
Eastern United States from 1990 to 2005, and (iii) the financial effects of the increasing
frequency and severity of natural catastrophic events on the insurance industry from the
1970's to 2005, especially in connection with underwriting risks for energy infrastructure.
These cases present examples of how climate risk may affect industry's ability to
develop carbon neutral energy infrastructure. The capital markets case study examines the
ability of the private sector to finance the cost of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure over
a 50-year period in order stabilize electric utility sector greenhouse gas emissions. The
electric utility and insurance cases demonstrate how catastrophic risks can increase the cost
of operations and cause curtailment of insurance coverage for high-risk areas, making the
financing of infrastructure difficult. All three cases show the immediacy of climate change
and the challenges it poses for the private sector to finance and develop infrastructure.
Chapter 7 concludes by proposing government policies that may prevent potential
private sector failure in infrastructure finance and development due to climate risk. The
analysis focuses specifically on government policy that supports private sector initiatives to
finance and develop carbon neutral infrastructure based on the risk analysis and case studies
presented in the dissertation.
1.4 Contributions to Knowledge
This dissertation contributes to knowledge in three distinct but closely related areas of
research: (a) the development of carbon neutral infrastructure, (b) the financial risks of
climate change, and (c) the institutional literature concerning the private sector's role in
addressing climate change.
The literature concerning developing carbon neutral infrastructure is varied and has
addressed issues such as the historical development of infrastructure (Grubler 1990, 1998;
Smil 2003), problems of carbon-path dependency due to infrastructure (Unruh 2000, 2002;
Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006), and the impact of climate change on infrastructure
(Revelle 1983; Cogan 1989). There is a distinct literature on climate-driven innovation and
technology diffusion, which encompasses but does not typically focus exclusively on
infrastructure (Grubler et al. 2002; Nakicenovic and Grubler 1989). The IPCC has
contributed to the literature, specifically linking technology adoption as part of a long-term
development strategy that necessarily affects choices of infrastructure to address climate
change (IPCC 1995). Another strand of thought within this area focuses on the magnitude of
the transformation and the timeframe necessary to preclude or prepare for a change in climate
in the next 50 to 100 years (Lewis 2005; Hoffert et al. 2002). Contributions to this line of
inquiry include research motivated by the goal of escaping dependence on petroleum that
involves rigorous engineering assessments of the infrastructure necessary (US NAS 1979), as
well as conceptual research motivated by climate change (Pacala and Socolow 2004).
Research in this area has not addressed the financial aspects of large-scale
infrastructure transformation or the magnitude of the challenge in relation to the private
sector's ability to develop carbon neutral infrastructure. Financial cost, time and physical
resources are threshold issues for proposals to address energy infrastructure and climate
change. Yet, these issues are commonly ignored, assumed to be outside the scope of the
inquiry, or assumed to be within the financial and management capacity of the private sector
based on past examples of private sector technology innovation (Wood 1999; US NAS
1992). This dissertation is an effort to address several fundamental questions regarding
technology innovation in response to climate change, which are motivated by the scale of the
transformation required, the long time horizons, the changing risks associated with
developing infrastructure due to climate change, and the financial and management capacity
of the private sector to implement such a transformation.
The second area where this dissertation contributes is analysis of the financial risks of
climate change. The financial risks of climate change are a relatively new area of research.
This dissertation contributes to this area by analyzing the financial risks associated with
climate change and the private sector's capacity to finance and develop critical infrastructure
in the context of climate change.
Most economic studies of climate change are focused on the macroeconomic effects
of policies designed to address climate change. This literature often uses top-down
macroeconomic or bottom-up engineering cost models linked to climate system models to
analyze the costs of public policy, such as taxes or emissions trading programs and their
effect on technology adoption and emissions reductions. These models necessarily rely on
generalized assumptions about technology adoption and investment (see, e.g., Weyant 1999;
Weyant and Hill 1999; Reilly and Paltsev 2006; Clarke and Weyant 2002). The
macroeconomic literature typically does not explicitly address the financial capacity of the
private sector or government to finance and develop the infrastructure needed to address
climate change. Rather, these studies often assume these issues will be addressed through
market adjustment.
A new literature is emerging that focuses on the financial cost of climate change to
firms, industries, cities, and countries. An example of research focusing on municipalities is
a study sponsored by EPA on the effects of sea level rise and other climate changes on the
Boston metropolitan area (Kirshen et al. 2004). The UNEP Finance Initiative and the Carbon
Disclosure Project promote planning among financial institutions, including banks, insurance
companies, and institutional investors on the potential effects of climate change on
companies and investment (Cogan 1989; Innovest Strategic Value Advisors 2005; Whittaker
2003). Research on insurance and climate change was advanced by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the IPCC Third Assessment Report, which conducted
analysis of the potential effects of climate change on the financial sector, focusing largely on
the insurance industry. The major insurance and reinsurance companies have also devoted
significant resources to studying climate change and have produced their own reports on the
subject (CERES 2005a).
The literature concerning the financial risks of climate change and its implications for
infrastructure development is limited. Notable research in this area includes work on
financing renewable energy technologies (Olivier 2003), risks posed by climate change to
investment (Olivier 2003; Tang 2005), and a World Bank position paper calling for
development of an investment framework for clean energy with the purpose of addressing
climate change (World Bank 2006a). In addition, the Equator Principles, a set of voluntary
guidelines adopted by banks to promote socially responsible investment in project finance,
focus on the effects of infrastructure projects on the natural environment.
This dissertation expands on the existing literature by examining the financial risks of
climate change for critical infrastructure, especially in the energy industry. This is an
important and understudied area of research. According to the World Bank, of the over five
hundred infrastructure projects developed by the bank during the past ten years, only 2% of
these projects considered climate change in the approval process (Mirza 2006a). Yet, in
developed countries, an estimated 40% of damage caused by weather is to infrastructure,
while in developing countries, this percentage increases to an estimated 70% to 80% (Mirza
2006b).
There is a need to further develop this literature because the financial community
presently lacks the tools to evaluate and manage long-term climate change risks within its
traditional financial and operational risk frameworks. Without appropriate methods to
analyze and mitigate climate risks, it is not clear how the private sector will manage climate
risks and pursue sustainability objectives.
There is considerable interest in the potential use of financial instruments to manage
climate risk, but very little critical work has been done in this area. To fill this gap, this
dissertation identifies the risks posed by climate change and evaluates the limits of private
contractual methods to address them. This dissertation first critically appraises the traditional
infrastructure finance approach, which has assumed climate to be largely static, and revises
the risk analysis framework to incorporate climate and energy issues based on recent
scientific research. The dissertation then examines the risk management markets (e.g.,
insurance, derivatives) that are essential for managing risk and financing modern
infrastructure. It evaluates these risk management methods based on a set of criteria that
shows the extent to which these methods can be effective in mitigating climate change risk.
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the growing body of literature concerning the
role of private sector institutions in addressing climate change. Specifically, it focuses on the
increasingly important role of the private sector in developing carbon neutral infrastructure.
This particular topic has not been adequately addressed by the existing literature. A few
researchers have focused on the private sector role in financing infrastructure (Miller and
Lessard 2000; Scholte and Schnabel 2002), and several have focused on the relationship
between infrastructure and climate change (see, e.g., Unruh 2000, 2002; Unruh and Carrillo-
Hermosilla 2006; Grubler 1998; Smil 2003; Schrattenholzer et al. 2005). Others have
addressed the role of private institutions in solving collective action problems (see, e.g.,
Ostrom 1990; Dolsak and Ostrom 2003), and the private sector's role in financing sustainable
development in light of climate change (Schmidheiny et al. 1996; Schmidheiny et al. 1992).
However, to my knowledge, no research has been published on the role of the private sector
in developing infrastructure in the context of climate change.
This dissertation seeks to fill that gap by examining the private sector's capacity to
manage climate risk and to develop carbon neutral infrastructure from the perspectives of
financial and management capacity. This is a critical area of research because the
government plays a limited role in most market economies, and the financial and
management capacity of the private sector will be essential to successfully addressing climate
change. As described in Chapter 2, trends during the last half of the 20th century suggest that
the role of the private sector in infrastructure development and finance is increasing, whereas
the government's role and capacity to finance and develop infrastructure is diminishing.
1.5 Note on Sources and Citations
Proprietary datasets were provided courtesy of Dealogic, Institute of International
Finance, Standard & Poor's, State Street Bank, Thomson Financial, and VC Experts. These
datasets are cited in the text and referenced in the bibliography. The datasets are on file with
the author. Graphs and other information obtained from the Internet are cited and listed in
the bibliography with the link and date accessed.
2 Energy and Climate Change Challenges of the 21st Century
One of the 21st century's greatest challenges is to meet society's increasing demand
for energy in order to support human and economic development, while stabilizing
atmospheric greenhouse gas levels in an effort to prevent dangerous climate change. Global
development patterns, population growth, and dependence on fossil fuels are of such a
magnitude that the transition is unprecedented in human history. The quickening pace of
global economic growth further increases the magnitude of the required transition and
decreases the time available for society to successfully transition to a sustainable path.
This chapter introduces the challenges faced by industrial society in the 21st century
in the areas of energy and climate change and explains the rationale for focusing on the
private sector's role in developing infrastructure in meeting these challenges. Central to this
chapter is the concept of carbon neutral infrastructure, defined earlier as energy systems that
emit no more greenhouse gases to the atmosphere than they remove from the atmosphere
over their operating life cycle.
2.1 Timing of Transition to Carbon Neutral Infrastructure and Petroleum Resources
The timing of the transition to carbon neutral infrastructure will likely be influenced
by the economic, political, and regulatory conditions surrounding the current fossil fuel
infrastructure. This section focuses on economic factors, specifically on the effects of
increasing costs of locating and exploiting petroleum resources. While economists generally
regard increasing petroleum prices as an appropriate market incentive to conserve resources
and to seek substitutes, if the transition to carbon neutral energy infrastructure is delayed or
we are unable to successfully develop substitutes on a scale necessary to support economic
development, society's ability to transition to a sustainable path may be adversely affected by
economic conditions associated with rising petroleum costs or even scarcity.
Whether society will deplete petroleum resources before deploying technologies that
depend on alternative resources at comparable prices to fossil fuels is actively debated among
geologists and technologists. The two sides of the debate are represented by those who
contend that economics and technological advances largely determine the petroleum resource
base, and those who emphasize the finite nature of the resource base (McCabe 1998).2 A
number of studies by geologists of the latter viewpoint have predicted that the peak of global
conventional petroleum production will occur within this century, depending upon global
economic growth rates, actual conventional petroleum resources, petroleum consumption
rates, and advances in petroleum exploration and production technology (Wood et al. 2004;
Campbell and Laherrere 1998; Deffeyes 2001). While future trends in resource depletion
have proven inherently difficult to predict, these estimates are nevertheless important for
purposes of anticipating the eventual transition to other sources of energy.
2 See Adelman (1995) for an explanation of the economics of the "cornucopian" viewpoint.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2.1 below presents the results of a 2004 U.S. Energy
Information Administration study using data from the most recent U.S. Geological Survey
global petroleum resource assessment in 2000. The study's assumptions are supported by a
large set of empirical observations of existing petroleum fields. The study incorporates
uncertainty into its analysis by modeling twelve scenarios using Monte Carlo techniques.
Based on assumptions of global annual GDP growth rates of 0%, 1%, 2% and 3%, and high,
mean, and low estimates for recovery of petroleum resources, the EIA presented twelve
potential scenarios for peak conventional petroleum production. Eleven of the twelve
scenarios predict global petroleum production will peak within the 21st century. The mean of
the distribution occurs between years 2030 to 2075 at a peak volume of 24.5 to 63.3 billion
barrels per year.
Figure 2.1: 12 EIA World Conventional Oil Production Scenarios
12 EIA World Conventional Oil Production Scenarios
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Sensitivity analysis performed by the EIA study's authors shows that demand rather
than the resource base largely determines the timing of the production peak. Increasing the
estimated mean resource base by 900 billion barrels, an amount of oil greater than the
amount produced from the discovery of oil to year 2003, only delays the estimated peak by
10 years in the 2% economic growth rate scenarios. In contrast, a 1% decrease in the pre-
peak economic growth rate is approximately equivalent to adding 900 billion barrels to the
estimated resource base (Wood et al. 2004).
Importantly, the EIA study shows that once petroleum production peaks, global
production is expected to rapidly decline. This aspect of the EIA study is consistent with
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recent data published by ExxonMobil and Wood Mackenzie. ExxonMobil published its own
graph showing peak oil production occurring by 2010, followed by a sharp decline
(ExxonMobil 2004). The authors of the EIA study compared the rate of decline in their
model against the rate of decline projected by ExxonMobil and confirmed that the two rates
are close approximations (Morehouse 2005). WoodMackenzie reports that petroleum
producers have been experiencing increasing exploration costs and declining production from
new investment, a phenomenon consistent with a peak production scenario (Wood
Mackenzie 2004).
The EIA study does not account for the anticipated growth of proven non-
conventional fossil fuels, such as heavy oils, tar sands, oil shale, and further reliance on gas
and coal using the Fischer-Tropsch process to develop gas-to-liquids and coal-to-liquids
technology. However, if EIA is correct that consumption rates now have a greater influence
on the timing of peak petroleum production rather than potential increases in the resource
base and that conventional production will decline rapidly following its peak, the late entry
or inadequate supply of non-conventional resources could have unprecedented adverse
economic effects. Further, the introduction of non-conventional fossil fuels without pollution
abatement measures will have adverse environmental consequences, which also could be
costly to address.
While the energy industry will benefit from increasing petroleum prices, most other
industries and consumers will suffer. Since the 1970's, recessions in the United States have
typically been preceded by increases in the relative price of oil. Combined with other factors
such as monetary policy, rapid increases in oil prices clearly have contributed to past
recessions (Hamilton 1983, 1996, 2003; Bernanke et al. 1997).
Figure 2.2: Real Price of Oil and U.S. Recessions, 1969-2005
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2005). Note: Price of petroleum imports divided by
the price index for personal consumption of expenditures. Gray bars denote recessions.
Generally, economic research on the effects of rising oil prices on GDP has focused
on incremental price increases, as opposed to peak oil conditions. For example, a recent
study compared results among several economic models for a $10 increase in the cost of oil
from $30 to $40. These models estimate that GDP would be reduced between 0.2% to 1.7%
over a two-year period, depending upon the state of the economy, expectations, and monetary
policy (EIA 2005a).
Post-peak economic conditions could produce larger price increases, greater
volatility, and produce an unfavorable investment environment. Little research has been
conducted on the economic effects of peak scenarios. The limited research that has been
conducted in this area, however, suggests that the economic effects of peak production
without an adequate transition planned in advance would be devastating to a fossil fuel
economy (Sterman 1980, 1981, 1982).
Typically, infrastructure is financed in anticipation of economic growth and
development, not in periods of economic contraction. If the transition is delayed and
resource depletion causes economic contraction, our society's ability to finance new
infrastructure could be adversely affected. Figure 2.3 below shows the close correlation
between capital spending and gross domestic product during the 1990 to 2005 period
(projections from 2006 to 2008).
Figure 2.3: Real GDP, Equipment and Technology Capital Spending, 1990-2008
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2.2 The Private Sector's Role in Developing Infrastructure
Much of the burden of financing and developing carbon neutral infrastructure is likely
to fall upon the private sector. Society increasingly relies upon the private sector for the
investment capital, and the planning, implementation and management capabilities for
developing infrastructure. The private sector's role in financing global infrastructure
probably began in Great Britain during the 1700's with the private financing of transportation
canals (Grubler 1990). Private infrastructure development experienced a renaissance in the
1970's in response to the inability of national governments to finance, build and manage
large infrastructure projects without private sector assistance.
The private sector's role in providing capital and know-how has become increasingly
important in both developing and OECD countries. Table 2.1 below shows the growth of
total public and private investment from 1990 to 2004 in 149 low and middle-income
countries for infrastructure projects that included private sector investment in the energy,
transportation, telecommunications and water sectors.
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Table 2.1: Private/Public Participation in Developing Country Infrastructure, 1990-2004
InvestmentYear (US$ millions)
1990 8,466.60
1991 13,720.40
1992 17,699.30
1993 27,957.10
1994 36,358.70
1995 46,755.00
1996 63,919.40
1997 111,141.50
1998 99,525.30
1999 66,679.00
2000 89,296.60
2001 70,605.50
2002 58,953.80
2003 55,904.50
2004 64,020.10
Total 831,002.60
Source: World Bank (2006b).
Private financing of infrastructure is even more significant in developed countries. In
2005, loan commitments to infrastructure projects worldwide reached approximately $121 to
$140.3 billion, reflecting a continuing trend toward increasing private investment in
infrastructure (Dealogic 2006b; Thomson Financial 2006a). 3 Borrowers domiciled in OECD
countries accounted for approximately 71% of private infrastructure loans (Thomson
Financial 2006b). Private lending, bonds and equity investments in infrastructure have all
increased during the past decade as shown in Table 2.2 below.
3 Industry categories include power, transportation, oil and gas, leisure and property,
telecommunications, petrochemicals, industry, water and sewage, mining, water and
recycling, agriculture, and forestry.
Table 2.2: Global Project Finance Transactions (US$ millions), 1994-2005
Loans Bonds Equity Total PF Amount Deals
1994 28,683 564 4,381 33,628 86
1995 59,365 3,921 14,048 77,335 322
1996 113,541 13,789 47,327 174,657 647
1997 136,863 18,654 53,527 209,044 557
1998 114,362 18,118 52,586 185,066 481
1999 112,552 23,635 32,636 168,824 436
2000 143,931 23,755 42,286 209,973 434
2001 95,041 14,719 27,585 137,345 310
2002 60,200 8,071 11,719 79,990 257
2003 75,366 19,583 18,375 113,325 354
2004 120,170 22,530 29,996 172,696 442
2005 120,989 22,155 30,645 173,790 483
Total 1,181,065 189,496 365,111 1,735,672 4,809
Source: Dealogic (2006b).
The increasingly important role of the private sector in global economic development
is demonstrated by comparing the volume of net private capital flows into emerging market
countries relative to the volume of net bilateral and multilateral lending. Table 2.3 below
shows the growth of private sector capital flows from 53.3% of total net flows in 1990 to
over 100% of total net flows since 2002 for twenty-nine emerging market countries in Asia,
Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Net private flows of over 100% indicate net
repayment of bilateral and multilateral loans, which are more than offset by increases in
private sector inflows.
Table 2.3: External Financing of Emerging Economies (US$ billions), 1990-2003
1990 1991 1992 1993 199 1995 1996 199 199 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Current account balance -162 1. 2 50. -1. -. -. 6 -1.5 9 266 12. . . L.
External financing, net:
rivate flows, net . . 119.3 1 9.5 1 . 229. 323.9 29 .6 13 .5 166. 203.0 5 J 2. 22 1
E uity investment, net 1 . 2 .9 6. 96.1 9 .9 105.5 125. 1 2.1 131. 166. 153.6 153.0 121. 133.5
Direct investment, net 13. 23.0 30.6 .0 65.3 5.5 92.6 11 .0 122.0 15 .1 136.2 1 0.5 121.5 96.
ortfolio investment, net 2.6 .9 15. 52.0 32.5 30.0 33.0 2 .1 9. 12. 1 . 12.5 0.3 36.
rivate creditors, net 2 .9 9.2 3.0 93. 0.9 12 .2 19 .2 152.5 2.6 -0. 9. 3.5 -9.5 91.6
Commercial banks, net 10.1 22.1 2 .6 2 .2 3 .5 91. 11 .9 61. -59.6 - 3. 3. -16.2 -13. 2 .
Nonbanks, net 1 . 2 .1 66.2 2. 32. 9.3 90. 62.2 3. 6.0 19. .3 63.9
fficial flows, net L.0 35. 350 30.2 39.1 _ . 55. 12. 2.0 10.6 - 20
IFls 11.2 12. . 9. 6.1 1 . .0 29.9 3 .1 3.2 1. 23.0 .2 -6.3
ilateral creditors 26. 22. 2 .2 19.2 2 .1 20.3 -2.5 1 .0 1 .5 9.6 -3. -12.3 -10.1 -1 .
Resident lending other, net' 36. -501 15.29 - . -92. -. -1 . -22. -1326 150.1 -13.5 -. -6. -3.6
Reserves (- increase) 2 - 3 - .5 -6 3 - .6 -96. -2.52U - .1 55 9.9 .3 0.1 -2 .9
rivate Flows as ercentage of Total 53.3% 6 . % .3% 6. % 5.6% 5. % 9 .6% .0% 0. % 92.9% 101.0% 93.6% 102. % 110.2%
e estimate, f IIF forecast
'Including net lending, monetary gold, and errors and omissions.
Emerging market countries are Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, hilippines, South orea, Ihailand Latin America: Argentina, ra il, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, eru, ruguay,
Venezuala; Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia. Turkey; and AfricalMiddle East: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco. South Africa, and Tunisia.
Source: Institute of International Finance (2006).
Comparing the relative magnitude of corporate net income and revenues against
government expenditures for energy R&D indicates the potential contribution the private
sector can make in transitioning society to a low-carbon economy. The tables below present
fiscal year 2005 net income and revenues of seven of the world's largest public petroleum
companies, and the 2005 energy R&D budgets of the seven top-spending countries.
Table 2.4: Net Income and Sales of Seven Largest Petroleum Companies, 2005
Company Net Income (US$ millions) Sales (US$ millions)
ExxonMobil 36,130 328,213
Royal Dutch/Shell Group 25,311 306,731
BP 26,785 295,242
Chevron 14,099 184,922
Total S.A. 14,525 169,439
ConocoPhillips 13,617 162,405
Occidental 5,281 15,208
Total $135,748 $1,462,160
Source: Hoover's Online (2006).
Table 2.5: Energy R&D Budgets of the Seven Top Spending Countries, 2005
Country Total R&D 2005 Budget (US$ millions)
Japan 3,905.3
United States 3,017.8
Germany 513.3
South Korea 412.9
Italy 320.5
Canada 298.9
Switzerland 155.5
7 Country Total $8,624.0
Est. Total R&D for all IEA Countries $9,586.3
Source: International Energy Agency (2006). Note: Energy R&D includes expenditures for energy
conservation, fossil fuels, nuclear, renewable, power and storage, and other energy technology
research. Data for France was unavailable.
A study of R&D budgets of the major U.S. oil companies found that R&D
expenditures were 0.41% to 0.95% of total revenues from 1970 to 1995 (Enos 2002). If this
rate of R&D spending is representative of current practice, combined R&D budgets of the
seven largest petroleum companies could be as high as approximately $13.9 billion, which is
1 3/4 times the energy R&D budgets of the seven top-spending countries. However, it should
be noted that oil and gas companies may define R&D differently than government, typically
devoting a greater portion of corporate R&D budgets to development or deployment costs
rather than basic research (Tester 2006).
The potential private sector investment in energy R&D could be much greater.
Aggregate annual net income of these seven companies was almost 16 times greater than the
seven countries' combined energy R&D budgets, and over 14 times the estimated combined
energy R&D budgets of all lEA member countries.
2.3 The Shrinking Role of Government in Infrastructure Development
At the same time that private sector investment in infrastructure has been increasing,
government expenditure on infrastructure has been decreasing as a percentage of GDP.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, U.S. federal capital expenditure on
transportation and water infrastructure decreased from almost 1% of U.S. GDP during the
1960's to less than 0.45% in the late 1990s. Combined federal and state capital expenditure
on transportation and water infrastructure similarly decreased from almost 2% of GDP during
the 1960's to approximately 1% in the 1990s (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 1999).
Canadian government infrastructure spending has followed a similar pattern, peaking at
4.95% of GDP in 1966 and then decreasing to 2.32% of GDP during the 5-year period 1998
to 2002 (Kovacs 2006). Thus, in North America during the latter part of the 20t century,
government capital expenditure on infrastructure has decreased by about half as a percentage
of GDP. Table 2.6 below presents U.S. federal and state investment in infrastructure in the
highway, mass transit, rail, aviation, water treatment, drinking water, and wastewater areas.
In contrast to the transportation and water infrastructure areas where government
plays a dominant role, government expenditure in energy infrastructure is limited. In the
United States, energy infrastructure is generally financed, owned and operated by the private
sector. Private firms account for 66.4% of U.S. power generation (U.S. Congressional
Budget Office 1997). The U.S. federal government owns and operates the Tennessee Valley
Authority and five power-marketing associations, which together produce approximately
8.2% of the nation's electricity. With the exception of the Tennessee Valley Authority,
revenues from sales of power generally exceed expenditures for operations, new construction
and interest repayment. Thus, U.S. federal capital expenditures for energy infrastructure are
negligible. In addition to federal power generation, municipally-owned power accounts for
another 9.6% of electricity generation (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 1997).
Table 2.6: U.S. Public Infrastructure Capital Expenditure (1997 US$ millions), 1956-1998
Federal State/Local Total Federal CombinedYear Capital Capital Capital CapitallGDP CapitallGDP
1956 7,969 32,686 40,654.7 0.31% 1.58%
1957 9,127 33,007 42,134.4 0.36% 1.66%
1958 13,236 33,697 46,933.5 0.52% 1.86%
1959 20,035 33,073 53,108.5 0.74% 1.97%
1960 22,449 29,618 52,066.9 0.78% 1.80%
1961 21,744 33,730 55,473.7 0.73% 1.86%
1962 22,763 35,163 57,926.5 0.73% 1.86%
1963 24,330 37,017 61,346.7 0.75% 1.89%
1964 27,335 36,152 63,486.9 0.80% 1.86%
1965 28,966 36,893 65,859.4 0.81% 1.83%
1966 28,421 38,402 66,822.2 0.75% 1.76%
1967 27,852 40,258 68,109.8 0.70% 1.71%
1968 27,726 40,098 67,823.5 0.68% 1.66%
1969 26,248 42,050 68,297.5 0.62% 1.61%
1970 24,868 40,534 65,402.2 0.60% 1.57%
1971 26,278 41,008 67,286.3 0.64% 1.64%
1972 25,836 42,318 68,153.7 0.61% 1.62%
1973 26,153 37,995 64,147.4 0.61% 1.49%
1974 26,613 34,015 60,628.1 0.62% 1.40%
1975 25,793 33,620 59,413.1 0.65% 1.50%
1976 31,484 29,275 60,758.9 0.76% 1.47%
1977 35,215 23,014 58,228.9 0.78% 1.29%
1978 33,028 24,899 57,927.2 0.69% 1.20%
1979 35,970 28,916 64,886.2 0.72% 1.30%
1980 38,561 28,946 67,507.4 0.79% 1.39%
1981 32,565 28,071 60,636.2 0.67% 1.24%
1982 28,272 26,297 54,569.4 0.60% 1.16%
1983 27,737 27,459 55,196.3 0.56% 1.12%
1984 30,382 28,392 58,773.6 0.55% 1.07%
1985 32,881 32,075 64,956.7 0.57% 1.13%
1986 34,385 35,185 69,570.1 0.57% 1.16%
1987 29,739 42,824 72,562.8 0.49% 1.20%
1988 30,608 45,299 75,906.8 0.49% 1.20%
1989 29,758 47,492 77,250.3 0.45% 1.16%
1990 31,093 48,741 79,833.9 0.46% 1.17%
1991 31,732 49,368 81,100.3 0.46% 1.18%
1992 32,667 49,621 82,288.2 0.45% 1.14%
1993 33,319 48,350 81,669.4 0.45% 1.09%
1994 33,795 48,764 82,559.3 0.44% 1.08%
1995 33,662 0.43%
1996 32,746 0.42%
1997 31,812 0.40%
1998* 33,323 0.42%
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1999). *Values for 1998 are estimated.
In the future, government capacity to invest in infrastructure is likely to be
constrained by budget considerations due to the growing volume of public debt. The
Congressional Budget Office projects that government spending on Medicare, Medicaid and
debt service will increase substantially relative to current expenditures. These projections are
partly influenced by an aging population, a trend that will be pervasive in all OECD countries
during the first part of the 21st century (OECD 2006).
Figure 2.4: U.S. Federal Outlays by Category (% of GDP), 1950-2075
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U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2002).
Figure 2.5: U.S. Federal Revenues and Outlays (% of GDP), 1950-2075
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If government spending and revenue trends follow these projections, the public
sector's capacity to develop carbon neutral energy and other types of infrastructure will
diminish. Unless there is a dramatic change in government spending priorities, the private
sector's role in infrastructure development will continue to increase in importance.
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2.4 Resources Required for Developing Carbon Neutral Energy Infrastructure
The time, capital and resources required to transform physical infrastructure are the
threshold requirements for the transition to meet the energy-climate change challenge. Each
energy technology that might be a substitute for petroleum or other fossil fuels requires
substantial investment in, and development of, carbon neutral infrastructure.
To place the magnitude of the energy-climate change transition into perspective,
consider that annual global production of primary energy from all sources in 2000 was 400
EJ or 13 TW (Tester et al. 2005; Lewis 2005). Demand for primary energy is expected to
grow to as much as 30 TW to 40 TW by 2050 (Hoffert et al. 1998). Stabilizing CO2 levels
below 550 ppm, 450 ppm, or 350 ppm are estimated to require emission-free energy of 15,
25, or 30+ TW by 2050 (Hoffert et al. 2002).
No single technology is capable of solving the energy-climate change challenge.
Transition to a carbon neutral energy system would require maximizing energy efficiency,
fuel switching to lower-carbon fuels, and adopting various renewable technologies such as
geothermal, nuclear, wind, solar, and biofuels, as these have the potential to supply large
volumes of energy on a carbon neutral basis. However, substantial advances in technology
and investment in infrastructure are needed before these technologies could make a
significant contribution to displacing fossil fuel. None of these technologies have yet been
deployed on the scale necessary to meet future demand for emission-free energy.
Tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 show the energy options available to society at the present
time and potential new technologies and resources that may become available during the first
half of the 2 1st century to meet the energy-climate change challenge.
Table 2.7: Current Non-Renewable Energy Technologies
Technology Total Cost of Carbon Global Global Mean Average
Breakeven Construction Dioxide Annual Annual Global Annual
Busbar Price $/kW Emissions Private Public Annual Global
Cents/kWh Investment R&D Generation Growth
Construction Constraints 2002 2004 Rate
(assumed fuel Time US$ US$1995-2002
cost) million
Oil 5.7-10.8 $800 *1,671 $92 billion $480* 4.52 TW 1.69%
3-5 Years Ib/mWh
($20-50/bbl)
Coal 3.9-7.3 $1,200 *2,191 $12 billion $569 2.96 TW 1.49%
3-5 years; Ib/mWh (estimate)
($15-100/ton) IGCC: *Land/Water
$1,890 Waste
5-7 years
Natural Gas 2.6-4.9 $600 '1,212 $95 billion $480* 2.7 TW 2.43%
1-2 years Ib/mWh
($1-4 Mbtu)
Nuclear 7.3 $2,400 *Waste $7 billion $3,115 0.828 TW 2.24%
Fission 3-6 years *Opposition (estimate)
*1 GW Limit
Tar Sand Profitable at $5-7 billion *5,580 6.2 billion $18 Negligible Not
and $30-45/bbl (50,000 lb/mWh Canadian Available
Oil Shale barrel/day *Land/Water Dollars
facility) Waste (2004)
Source: Lewis (2005); Tester et al. (2005); Rand (2005); International Energy Agency (2003, 2006); Herzog(2006); MIT (2006); Golay (2006); Geothermal Energy Association (2005); Woynillowicz et al. (2005); Bartsch
and Muller (2000). All costs assume new baseload capacity in 2003 US$. *Note: R&D for combined Oil and
Gas.
Table 2.8: Current Renewable Energy Technologies
Technology Electricity Cost of Constraints Global Global Global Mean Average
Cost Construction Annual Annual Annual Global Annual
Cents/kWh $/kW Private Public Technical Annual Growth Rate
Investment R&D Potential Contribution 2000-2004
2003 2004 1998
(unless US$
noted) million
Geothermal 4.7-26.7 $1,000-2,500 *Geology $720 $46 106 TW 0.3 TW 2.4% power
'Drilling million 13% heat
Hydro* 1.9-18.6 $1,000-6,500 *Erosion Large: $29 1.5 TW 0.286 TW 2% large
*Sediment $20-25 7% small
billion
Small: $4.5
billion(2005)
Solar PV 25-50 $1,500-4,000 'Land $12 billion $500 60 TW .000013 TW 61% grid
SIntermittent (10% 17% off-grid
*Storage conversion)
Wind 5-10 $1,500 *Land $8.8 billion $121 2 TW land .002 TW 29%
*Raptor kill (2005)
SI ntermittent
*Storage
Biomass** 5-12 $2,000 *Land $960 $231 5-12 TW 1.21 TW 2-3%
'Water million
Source: Lewis (2005); Tester et al. (2005); International Energy Agency (2003, 2006); Martinot (2006);
REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network (2005); Tester (2006). *Cost of electricity generated from
hydropower is calculated assuming the construction costs cited in the table, a capacity factor ranging from 60-
90%, and an annual fixed charge rate of 15%. **Note: Figures for biomass include non-renewable biomass.
Table 2.9: Speculative Energy Technologies
Technology Estimated Predicted Estimated Cost Other Constraints Estimated Estimated
Minimum Time Cost of of Plant and Required Global
to Electricity Infrastructure R&D R&D
Commercialize Cents/kWh Investment (millions)
(billions)
Carbon 10 years Additional Additional -Geology $4-6 $400-600
Capture and 1.5-3 $430-800/kW -Leak Rates
Sequestration cents/kWh (approximately 'Ocean
37% increase) -Regulation
S100 year capacity
Gas Hydrate 25+ years (ice), Unknown Unknown 'Ocean Unknown U.S. $9
Unknown *Mining (2003);
(ocean) 'Regulation Japan $65
(2004)
Nuclear 30-50 years 5.6-16.4 Unknown -Unproven $10-15 $707
Fusion 'Low Level (ITER (2004)
Nuclear Waste facility)
'Large Scale
'Public Perception
Source: Lewis
Tester (2006).
(2005); Tester et al. (2005); International Energy Agency (2003); IPCC (2005); Herzog (2006);
To illustrate the magnitude of the infrastructure change necessary to introduce these
technologies on the needed scale, it is useful to consider the construction and expenditure
rates to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure by 2050. To provide 10
TW of power from nuclear, the highest density fuel stock presently available, Lewis (2005)
estimates that it would be necessary to build over 10,000 new 1 GW nuclear plants over the
next 50 years, requiring a new nuclear plant to be built every other day for 50 years. At the
present cost of $1.5 to $2 billion per 1 GW capacity plant, each requiring approximately six
years to build (Golay 2006), such a program would cost $17.5 trillion, or approximately $1
billion each day for 50 years.
Achieving 10 TW of electricity using solar PV would require an even larger capital
investment and a similarly challenging construction schedule. Assuming average global
insolation of approximately 200 w/m 2, a system capacity factor of 15%, and solar PV panels
operating at 10% efficiency, the build-out would require installation of solar photovoltaic
panels covering a land mass of approximately 3.3 trillion m2, at an installation rate of 182.6
million m2 each day for 50 years. Cost estimates for such a project would be significantly
influenced by manufacturing learning curves, 4 advances in energy conversion efficiency of
4 Learning curves are based on the observation that repetition of the same operation results in
less time or cost expended on a particular operation. For various industries, it has been
shown that the time or cost required to complete a unit of production will decrease by a
constant percentage each time the production quantity is doubled. If the rate of improvement
is 20% between doubled quantities, then the learning curve percentage is 80% (100-20=80).
See Deutch and Lester (2004) for an overview of learning curves.
solar PV technology, costs of materials used in the solar panels, installation costs, and land
costs. Additional cost for energy storage would also be necessary.
To build 10 TW of generation over a 50 year period assuming a 90% learning curve,
the efficiency gain of 10% is first achieved with the initial doubling of production at two
million square meters of production,5 and a nameplate price of $8/w, the total cost is
estimated at $54.4 to $64.1 trillion in the aggregate, or an average of $3.0 to $3.5 billion per
day for materials and installation. If a learning curve of only 95% is assumed, the total costs
would increase to as much as $189.5 trillion, with average daily investment of $9 to $10
billion. These calculations do not take into account other costs such as for land, grid
interconnection, operation and maintenance, and storage.
Both the nuclear fission and the solar photovoltaic technology options are limited by
material constraints. We presently do not have the materials required for solar photovoltaic
on this scale. Global uranium resources are also limited. Uranium resources are sufficient to
operate 10,000 1 GW plants for approximately 6 to 30 years, assuming a once-through fuel
cycle (Hoffert et al. 2002).
Pacala and Socolow (2004) proposed that carbon dioxide emissions could be
stabilized over a 50-year period by dividing expected growth in carbon dioxide into seven
equal triangles, each representing a different technology or method of decarbonizing global
energy production. By dividing the 10 TW goal into equal pieces, the burden of meeting the
energy-climate change challenge is shared by a broad set of technologies, companies,
materials and supply chains.
Table 2.10 below presents seven carbon neutral technology wedges that might be
employed to produce 10 TW of electricity generation within 50 years: nuclear fission, solar
photovoltaic, wind, two wedges of coal with carbon capture and sequestration, geothermal,
and the introduction of more efficient technology. Each technology provides 1.43 TW of
energy.
5 The historic learning curve for solar photovoltaic has been approximately 82% (EPRI
2004). However, there is evidence that the learning curve is beginning to flatten. See Nemet
(2006a) for an evaluation of the factors contributing to learning effects and the limits of
learning curves in solar photovoltaic technology. Learning curve calculations in the text
were made using NASA's Learning Curve Calculator, available at
http://wwwl jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/learn.html.
Table 2.10: 10 TW Actual Generation Capacity: 50-Year Technology Wedge Scenario
Technology 50 Year Goal Construction Rate Expenditure Rate
Nuclear Fission 1,429 1 GW Plants 1 plant every 12 days $139 million/day
Solar PV 476.2 billion ml 26.1 million m /day $575-$1,738.9
million/day
Wind 794,444 3 MW 44 turbines/day $130.6 million/day
land turbines
595,833 3 MW 33 turbines/day $196 million/day
offshore turbines
Coal Plus Carbon 6,730 500 MW 1 plant every 2.5 days $348 million/day
Capture and IGCC Plants
Sequestration 692.8 billion Additional 543.3 $39.7-$1,071.7
metric tonne CO2  million metric tonne million/day*
sequestration CO2 capacity/year
capacity
Geothermal 21,200 75 MW 1.2 plants/day $87-$218 million/day
plants
Improved Efficiency 1.43 TW saved 0 0
Note: Nuclear estimates are based on Lewis (2005), described in the main text preceding this table. Solar
estimates are based on a 15% capacity factor (Connors 2006), and 10% peak efficiency panels rendering 20 w
per square meter starting at $8/w installed cost on a nameplate basis (Lewis 2006). Solar costs are average daily
cost over a 50-year period based on a learning curve of 90% to 95%, with the first doubling of production
occurring upon completion of the second million square meters of solar panels. Actual first day cost would start
at approximately $2.9 billion. Learning curve calculations were made using NASA's Learning Curve
Calculator, available at http://wwwl jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/learn.html. Wind installed cost is $1 million/MW
onshore (Lyons 2006) and $2 million/MW offshore; 30% capacity factor onshore and 40% capacity factor
offshore (Connors 2006). IGCC estimates assume an 85% capacity factor and $1,890/kWe capital costs
(Herzog 2006; and MIT 2006). Carbon sequestration capital costs are assumed to be $26.67/metric tonne based
on a $5/tonne annual levelized cost for oil or gas reservoir storage (Herzog 2006), 20% O&M costs and a 15%
capital charge factor (Herzog 2006; MIT 2006; Heddle et al. 2003); other sequestration data is from MIT
(2006). Geothermal estimates assume a 90% capacity factor, average plant size of 75 MW, and construction
costs of $1,000 to $2,500/kW. *Because the amount of carbon sequestered increases each year due to additions
of capture-ready generation facilities, daily sequestration cost figures range from $39.7 million at the beginning
of the 50-year period to $2.0 billion by the end of the 50-year period if reserves are not set aside to cover future
costs.
Developing 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity generation capacity will require
periodic replacement of equipment. Coal, nuclear and geothermal plants are assumed to have
50-year lifetimes and thus the rate of expenditure in Table 2.10 must be maintained for these
technologies in order to maintain their respective share of 10 TW of generation. This is a
conservative assumption with respect to cost estimates because all of these technologies
require substantial upgrades during their assumed operating life. Solar and wind technology
are assumed to have much shorter lifetimes, and thus the figures above must be augmented to
maintain their respective share of 10 TW of capacity. The average lifetime of a solar PV cell
is approximately 30 years (Moritz 2006); the average life of a wind turbine is approximately
20 to 30 years (Iowa Energy Center 2006). Table 2.11 sets forth the estimated construction
and investment rates for the solar and wind technology wedges once replacement of
equipment is necessary starting in years 31-50 for solar PV and years 21-50 for wind.
Table 2.11: Investment Rates with Replacement for Solar and Wind Technology Wedges
Technology Lifetime Construction Rate Expenditure Rate
(with replacement) (with replacement)
Solar PV 30 years 52.2 million m /day from $722.2-$2,748.5
years 31 to 50 million/day from years
31 to 50*
Wind 20 years 88 land turbines/day from $261.2 million/day from
years 21 to 40; years 21 to 40;
132 land turbines/day from $391.8 million/day from
years 41 to 50 years 41 to 50
66 offshore turbines/day $784 million/day from
from years 21 to 40; years 21 to 40;
99 offshore turbines/day $1,176 million/day from
from years 41 to 50 years 41 to 50
*Solar PV figures are based on the final unit of production costs for the 50-year build out, assuming 90% and 95%
learning curves.
Solar and wind power are intermittent sources. Sun is available 50% of the time at
best, with intensity varying with time of day and local conditions. A global capacity factor
is difficult to determine, but 15% can be used for purposes of estimation (Connors 2006).
Wind generation capacity factors are approximately 30% onshore and 40% offshore (Tester
et al. 2005; Connors 2006). Due to the intermittency of these sources, supporting storage
capacity is necessary to ensure supply. Table 2.12 below presents the estimated capital
cost and build-out of pumped hydropower and compressed air energy storage technologies
for 1 TW of global energy storage capacity, taking into consideration inefficiency losses.
The 50-year storage goal is intended to be illustrative only and would change depending on
actual usage patterns and advances in technology.
Table 2.12: 1 TW Global Energy Storage Capacity
Storage Technology 50 Year Goal Construction Rate Expenditure Rate
Pumped Hydropower 1,333 500 MW 1 system every 14 $29.2 million/day
systems to store days
0.5 TW
Compressed-Air 1,539 500 MW 1 system every 12 $33.7 million/day
Energy Storage systems to store days
0.5 TW
Note: Pumped hydropower assumes 75% net efficiency and $800/kWe capital costs. Compressed-air storage
assumes 65% net efficiency and $800/kWe capital costs (Tester et al. 2005). Net efficiency estimates include both
input and output efficiency losses.
Using the technology wedge approach, the material and capital required to meet a
10 TW goal of carbon neutral electricity is substantial. Required infrastructure investment
for generation starts at $1.5 to $2.8 billion per day. Replacement costs would increase
capital investment starting in year 21 from $2.2 to $3.5 billion per day, in year 31 from
$2.3 to $4.5 billion per day, and in year 41 from $2.9 to $5.0 billion per day. If reserves
are not set aside for future carbon sequestration costs, carbon sequestration capital costs
associated with coal-fired generation could grow from approximately $40 million per day
to $2.0 billion per day by 2050. Developing 1 TW of storage to supplement intermittent
wind and solar generation would add an additional $63 million investment per day.
Table 2.13: 10 TW Years 1-50 Daily Investment with CCS, Energy Storage, and Solar
and Wind Equipment Replacement (US$ millions)
Average
Generation Storage CarbonYearGeInvestment Capacity Carbon Total InvestmentInvestment Investment SequestrationInvestment Investment
1-20 1,475.7 - 2,770.5 416.8 1,955.4 - 3,250.2
21-30 2,194.3 - 3,489.1 1,012.2 3,269.4 - 4,564.2
31-40 2,341.4 - 4,498.7 1,409.1 3,813.4 - 5,970.7
41-50 2,864.0 - 5,021.3 1,806.1 4,733.0 - 6,890.3
Source: Author's calculations. See Table 2.10 through Table 2.12.
A number of points should be taken into consideration in relation to these estimates.
These estimates are for electricity generation only. Currently, approximately 4 TW of global
primary energy consumption is electricity generation (Tester 2006), which accounts for
approximately 25% of primary energy consumption in industrialized countries, and about
18% worldwide (Tester et al. 2005). Electricity demand is expected to double by 2025 (EIA
2005b; International Energy Agency 2003), and increase as a portion of primary energy
consumption within the earlier part of this century due to increased development (Connors
2006). Stabilizing CO2 levels below 550 ppm, 450 ppm, or 350 ppm are estimated to require
15, 25, and 30+ TW of emission-free power by 2050, respectively (Hoffert et al. 2002).
Demand for 10 TW of emission-free electricity with the goal of stabilizing emissions in the
electricity sector over a 50-year period is a reasonable projection. Because these estimates
focus exclusively on electricity generation, additional investment in infrastructure will be
necessary to address other energy demands, especially for liquid fuels and transportation.
The cost estimates presented in Table 2.10 through Table 2.13 do not include the cost
of maintaining or replacing existing and future conventional energy infrastructure. The
International Energy Agency estimates that global conventional energy investment from
2000 to 2030 will exceed $16 trillion. Of this amount, approximately $3 trillion is required
for each of oil and gas, $400 billion for coal, and $10 trillion for electricity infrastructure
(International Energy Agency 2003). This requires investment in fossil fuels and related
infrastructure of approximately $1.5 billion per day for the next 30 years. Of the IEA's total
$16 trillion estimate, more than half is to maintain infrastructure (International Energy
Agency 2003). Similarly, of the $10 trillion projected investment in electricity infrastructure,
over half of total investment will be to replace or maintain existing and future capacity
(International Energy Agency 2003).
These figures do not include operation and maintenance costs for carbon neutral
electricity generation, which can be considerable. Nor do these figures fully include capital
equipment upgrades and replacement. Replacement costs are included for solar and wind
plants, but are omitted for coal, geothermal, and nuclear plants. Although coal, geothermal,
and nuclear plants are assumed to have 50-year lifetimes, all of these plants require capital
equipment upgrades within that time frame.
Costs to connect to the grid or additional investment in reserve, transmission and
distribution infrastructure are not reflected in these estimates. Also additional investment in
resource extraction and supply infrastructure, such as for coal and uranium, are not included
in these estimates.
No analysis was performed to determine whether the selected technologies or other
technologies share common attributes with respect to supporting infrastructure that would
allow their integration on the most cost-efficient basis. A technology cluster analysis may
lead to selection of a different set of technologies with different direct and supporting
infrastructure cost characteristics (Schrattenholzer et al. 2005).
These estimates do not include the cost of land, which can add substantial costs,
particularly in the cases of solar and wind. Nor do these estimates include the cost and time
of conducting site surveys, site preparation, and obtaining approvals and meeting regulatory
requirements. All of the technologies require significant amounts of time to locate and verify
appropriate sites for plants and to obtain regulatory approvals. For example, carbon
sequestration and geothermal require extensive geologic surveys and site preparation.
Costs associated with protecting energy infrastructure from climate change or
adaptation to climate change are not included in these estimates. The World Bank estimates
that climate change could impose adaptation costs of $10 billion to $40 billion per year
world-wide, approximately two thirds of which would fall on the private sector (World Bank
2006a). Other estimates range from $61 to $335 billion (1990 dollars) per year for the
United States alone (Gallon 2002), and from $40 to $522 billion (with standard deviation
$150 billion) for the world, depending upon how losses to different countries are valued and
weighted (Tol 2002). The wide variability in these estimates reflects the range of different
assumptions used in producing these estimates, lack of data, and the difficulty of estimating
costs (Tol 2002).
These estimates are also subject to a number of important assumptions stated in the
notes to the respective tables. As demonstrated above in the case of solar, increasing
efficiency due to learning can significantly reduce technology costs. A learning curve was
assumed in the case of solar. No learning curve was attributed to any other technology.
With respect to carbon sequestration, economies of scale may be available to larger projects
(Herzog 2006), which are not reflected in the cost analysis.
The absence of learning effects is not a standard assumption. However, the
magnitude of learning effects is highly uncertain. The IEA's 2003 study of energy
infrastructure investment for the 2001-2030 period estimated a large learning curve for solar
technologies, and relatively small learning curves for other technologies (International
Energy Agency 2003). In some cases, such as in the case of wind technology, recent
increases in materials costs and market conditions have caused energy technologies to
increase in overall cost (Lyons 2006).
These estimates assume that each industry segment can meet demand, has adequate
supply of inputs, and can complete construction at the rates specified. Nuclear, solar, and
wind generation industries would have to grow exponentially to achieve these growth rates.
As described in Chapter 4, supply of raw materials and skilled labor are substantial risks to
the ability of the private sector to meet these targets.
Natural gas-fired generation technology was not selected as one of the technologies
because the long-term cost of electricity from coal with carbon capture and sequestration is
expected to be lower than electricity produced from natural gas with carbon capture and
sequestration (Connors 2006). This assumption is contrary to projections that reliance on
natural gas for electricity generation will increase substantially in the future. IEA estimates
that conventional gas-fired electricity generation without carbon capture will double in the
2001 to 2030 period (International Energy Agency 2003). Changing the energy mix to
include natural gas-fired generation would increase the cost estimates for carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure if carbon capture and sequestration technologies are implemented
with new natural gas-fired generation plants.
Finally, several of these technologies are not truly sustainable over extended periods
of time. Pacala and Socolow (2004) acknowledged that the technology wedge approach only
provides a 50-year bridge, and that new technologies must be identified and commercialized
during the latter part of this century to solve the energy-climate change challenge. Carbon
sequestration could provide approximately 100 years of storage based on an estimated 2,000
Gt of global carbon dioxide storage capacity and current emissions rates of approximately
23.5 Gt of carbon dioxide per year from fossil fuels (IPCC 2005; Herzog 2006). Given the
magnitude of nuclear technology adoption contemplated here, uranium resources are
probably adequate for approximately 40 to 300 years based on current projections (Hoffert et
al. 2002) and reprocessing would only be capable of extending uranium a matter of decades
on this scale. A build-out on the scale contemplated here would ultimately require a
transition to fast breeder nuclear reactor technology (Bunn 2006). Only a few fast-breeder
reactors are in operation today due to concerns over proliferation and their comparatively
high costs, however the future goal is to achieve costs that are equal to or approximately 20%
higher than light water reactors (Bunn 2006). Similarly, increased dependence on coal may
also be unsustainable during this century for certain countries. For example, at projected
rates of consumption, coal resources in China could provide less than 100 years of supply,
much less than historic estimates based on past consumption rates (Yu Bing 2006).
2.5 The Private Sector's Capacity to Transition to Carbon Neutral Infrastructure
It is important to consider the capacity of the private sector to undertake a transition
of this magnitude and its effects on private firms.
Some companies will benefit while others may face substantial risk. Suppliers of
materials and labor will clearly benefit. However, for the utilities that purchase these
materials, evidence suggests that an expansion of generation of the magnitude contemplated
here will have negative effects on firm profits, stretch debt capacity, and depress stock prices
due to the delay in recovering capital and return on investment. Further, the transformation
of infrastructure within a time frame designed to prevent the build up of potentially
dangerous concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere would likely require early
retirement of some existing energy infrastructure. Pre-mature retirement of capital
equipment results in losses on account of prior capital investment, places additional demands
on firms for new capital investment, and could adversely affect the financial stability and
competitiveness of firms.
Figure 2.6 below demonstrates the effect of increases in capital investment on the
price to book ratios of utilities from 1972 to 2005. In general, increases in capital investment
in the utilities industry are accompanied by lower industry performance as financial markets
anticipate that recovery of capital investment will occur many years in the future, increase
overall firm risk, and worsen key financial ratios measuring current performance, such as
return-on-assets.
Figure 2.6: Relative Price to Book Ratio - Utilities versus S&P 500, 1972-2005
Source: Lehman Brothers (2006).
The availability of capital will also likely be an important variable in developing
carbon neutral infrastructure. The magnitude of investment required to achieve 10 TW of
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carbon neutral electricity using the technology wedge approach is approximately $2 billion to
$5.2 billion per day for 50 years. To place this in perspective, current private investment in
all forms of infrastructure on a global project finance basis was estimated to be $120 billion
in 2005 (Dealogic 2006b).
The investment required to meet this challenge could strain capital markets and
companies. Capital investment on such a large scale will expose firms to greater risk from
increases in interest rates. Large capital investments also make these companies more
vulnerable to risks from economic downturn and competition.
Finally, this challenge will require an abrupt change in capital expenditure patterns.
Current capital and material flows must be redirected towards nuclear and renewable energy
technologies. As noted in Table 2.7, the majority of primary energy investment is for fossil
fuel and related infrastructure. Annual investment in oil and gas is $92 and $95 billion,
respectively. Approximately 850 conventional coal plants are under construction (Hoffert
2006). Annual coal industry investment is estimated at $12 billion per year. In addition,
conventional power generation, transmission and distribution is projected to require
investment of approximately $250 billion annually through 2030 (International Energy
Agency 2003).
In contrast, investment in nuclear and renewable energy are currently far behind
required levels for the development of a carbon neutral energy infrastructure. Today,
approximately twenty-four nuclear plants are under construction (Thomas 2005). With an
average construction time of six years, annual investment in nuclear is approximately $7
billion, representing 3.7% of aggregate annual investment in oil and gas.
Renewable energy technologies, while growing rapidly, are starting from a small base
and are similarly a small fraction of investment in oil and gas. From 2000 to 2004, solar PV
grew at an annual average growth rate of 60%, the largest percentage increase of any
renewable energy technology (REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network 2005). During the
same period, wind power grew at an average annual growth rate of 28% (REN21 Renewable
Energy Policy Network 2005). To place these investment levels in perspective, wind
generation investment was $8.8 billion in 2005, the largest of any renewable energy
technology (Dealogic 2006a), which represents only 4.5% of aggregate annual investment in
oil and gas. At the end of 2005, wind provided only approximately 17 GW of energy
globally (REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network 2005).
Figure 2.7: Global Annual Investment in Renewable Energy, 1995-2004
Source: REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network (2005). Note: includes wind, solar PV, solar
thermal, geothermal, small hydropower, biomass power and heat.
In light of current energy investment patterns, a 50-year time frame to achieve a
carbon neutral energy infrastructure appears unrealistic. Yet, the urgency of addressing
climate change is growing. Because of the long-time frame for implementing carbon neutral
infrastructure, we must now factor climate change risk into infrastructure investment
decisions. Transforming our energy infrastructure is preferably taken before irreversible
damage is done to the climate and while society has the capacity to implement these changes.
Importantly, waiting could mean transforming fossil fuel infrastructure to carbon neutral
infrastructure after the onset of increased climate risk or petroleum resources become
expensive or scarce. Thus, an early start to developing carbon neutral infrastructure is
essential if we are to ultimately succeed in making this transition.
2.6 Climate Risk and Development of Infrastructure
If society's transition to carbon neutral infrastructure starts after the effects of climate
change have begun to be felt, climate change itself may present significant risks to the private
sector's ability or willingness to develop physical infrastructure to meet this challenge.
Energy and other critical infrastructure play a profound role in the ability of a society
to develop towards a more sustainable carbon path. Critical infrastructure defines the
technology options available to society at any given time (Schrattenholzer, et al. 2005).
Further, the choice of energy infrastructure strongly influences society's carbon output
because energy systems convert, transport and consume fuel, and they are platforms for other
energy-intensive technologies.
In total, critical infrastructure and related technologies determine society's carbon
generation path for the period during which they are operational (Unruh 2000, 2002; Unruh
and Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006; Grubler 1998; Smil 2003). In the cases of buildings and
structures, energy conversion systems, and transportation infrastructure, the lifetime of
dominant infrastructure is typically measured in decades or centuries (Grubler 1998). Any
competing technology that requires the development of new infrastructure can be expected to
compete at a cost disadvantage to established fossil fuel technologies because the dominant
physical infrastructure favors incumbent technologies.
The private sector's ability to finance development of infrastructure may be adversely
affected by increased climate risk. Although the transition to a low-carbon economy and climate
change can be expected to encourage development of new technologies, it is not clear that they
will produce favorable conditions for investment in new infrastructure. This is partly due to the
longer time horizons and large capital commitments required for infrastructure investment."
Infrastructure development involves large engineering projects that often require ten to twenty
years from the planning stage to completion, and often that many additional years or more to
recover the original investment. The large capital commitments and long time frames for
recovery of investment exposes infrastructure to the longer-term risks posed by climate change.
Table 2.14: Expected Lifetimes of Selected Infrastructure
Infrastructure Phase Typical Expected Life
Buildings Alterations 15-20 years
Demolition 50-100 years
Bridges Maintenance Yearly
Resurface Concrete 20-25 years
Reconstruction 60-100 years
Seaports Major refurbishment 10-20 years
Reconstruction 50-100 years
Rail Major Refurbishment 10-20 years
Reconstruction 50-100 years
Hydropower plant Decommissioning 75+ years
Coal Plant Decommissioning 45+ years
Nuclear plant Decommissioning 30-60 years
Gas turbines Replacement 12-20 years
Adapted from: WBCSD (2005); Auld and Maclver (2005). Note: Estimates reflect rates at which
new technologies are expected to enter the economy.
6 A distinction should be made between infrastructure finance, which is the dominant model
for financing infrastructure, and venture finance, which is a method for financing technology.
In contrast to infrastructure finance, venture finance typically involves financing the
development of individual technologies, usually with the intention of commercializing a
technology within a 3-5 year period and then achieving a liquidity event for investors through
a public offering of equity or the sale of the company. Given these short time frames,
venture finance does not develop large infrastructure and climate risk does not play a
significant role for venture finance investment.
It is possible that the risks posed by climate change will make large capital
investments in new energy and other infrastructure more risky, thereby slowing transition to
carbon neutral energy infrastructure. For example, increasing climate risk couldjeopardize
the private sector's capacity to plan, finance, implement, and manage the development of
infrastructure. Climate risk could undermine the ability of firms to accurately evaluate and
allocate risk, and thus reduce their ability or willingness to invest in carbon neutral
infrastructure in a timely manner.
3 Climate Change Risks
The chapter reviews the state of climate change science and, based on models and
scientific literature, describes global changes that are expected to occur in this century.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a foundation for Chapter 4, which analyzes
how climate change may potentially increase financial risks for the development of
infrastructure.
This chapter first provides an overview of climate change science. It then analyzes
the expected primary physical effects of global warming that directly affect infrastructure:
Higher minimum and maximum daily temperatures;
More intense flooding and drought;
Increased summer drying and wildfires;
Increased storm intensity; and
Sea level rise.
The chapter concludes by summarizing climate risks and their potential effects on
infrastructure.
3.1 Overview of Climate Change Science
The basic science of global climate change was first developed in the 19th century.
In 1827, Jean Fourier, a French mathematician and physicist, discovered that heat from the
sun absorbed by the earth was reflected back to the Earth by its own atmosphere. Fourier
identified carbon dioxide as the gas responsible for trapping solar heat in the atmosphere and
coined the term "greenhouse effect". In 1860, John Tyndall, an English scientist, determined
that water vapor and carbon dioxide are the two most powerful heat-absorbing gases in the
atmosphere. In 1896, the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius predicted that our increasing
reliance on fossil fuels, particularly coal, would cause large quantities of carbon dioxide to be
released into the atmosphere. He predicted that if atmospheric carbon dioxide doubled, the
Earth would become warmer by as much as 5 to 6VC. Arrhenius was the first to identify
burning fossil fuels as a potential cause of climate change (King 2005).
Climate change science advanced rapidly during the latter half of the 20th century due
to data collection, experimentation, and the use of models to characterize the chemistry and
physics of the role of greenhouse gases in maintaining the climate of the atmosphere, oceans,
and terrestrial systems. In 1957, Roger Revelle and Hans Seuss, scientists at the Scripps
Institute of Oceanography, observed that the oceans do not absorb much of the carbon
dioxide emitted to the atmosphere, leaving significant amounts in the atmosphere, which
could eventually warm the Earth. In 1958 Revelle and Charles D. Keeling established the
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration's Mauna Loa Observatory, which was the
first center for monitoring carbon dioxide far from industrial sources. After only two years,
the Mauna Loa Observatory confirmed a trend of increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere. Plotted temporally, the data shows seasonal changes in carbon dioxide as plants
absorb and release carbon dioxide. This seasonal cycle is driven by the land-based
vegetation absorbing carbon dioxide during the summer and then releasing it through decay
in the fall and winter. With more land surface in the northern hemisphere, this leads to a
minimum during the northern hemisphere summer and a maximum in the northern
hemisphere winter.
Figure 3.1: Observed
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Source: NOAA Mauna Loa Observatory (2006).
Global mean temperature has also steadily increased during the 20th century.
Figure 3.2: Observed Global Average Temperature, 1880-2000
Source: GISS (2006).
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Consistent with Arrhenius's predictions, increasing carbon dioxide levels and global
average temperature correlate with carbon emissions from burning fossil fuels.
Figure 3.3: Global Fossil Carbon Emissions, 1800-2000
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Source: Marland, G., T.A. Boden, and R. J. Andres (2003).
In 1979, the First World Climate Conference was held in Geneva to study erratic
weather patterns during the prior decade (Northern Territory University 2006). The U.S.
National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency soon thereafter
completed their own studies concluding that anthropogenic sources of carbon dioxide were
likely responsible for observed changes in carbon dioxide levels and that waiting to take action
on climate change could result in permanent damage to the environment and potential
disruption to society. The National Academy reported that a doubling of atmospheric carbon
dioxide from pre-industrial times would eventually warm the Earth by 3°C +/- 1.5°C (Ad Hoc
Study Group on Carbon Dioxide and Climate 1979). In 1988, the United Nations established
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), bringing together scientists from a
broad range of disciplines to study climate change. According to the IPCC, carbon dioxide
concentrations in the atmosphere have increased from the pre-industrial level of 280 ppm and
now exceed 377 ppm, methane (CH4) has increased from 700 ppb to 1745 ppb, and nitrous
oxide (N20) has increased from approximately 270 ppb to about 314 ppb (IPCC 2001; Biasing
and Smith 2006). There is evidence that carbon dioxide levels in excess of 450 ppm may pose a
"dangerous" level of interference with the climate system (O'Neill and Oppenheimer 2002).
With the exception of water vapor, the Kyoto Protocol regulates the emission of the
six most significant greenhouse gases. In addition, the Montreal Protocol regulates the
production of chlorofluorocarbons.
Table 3.1: Regulated Greenhouse Gases
Global Pre-Industrial Concentration Lifetime PrimaryGas Warming Concentration in 1998 (years) Sources
Potential
Carbon Dioxide 1 278,000 ppb 377,300 ppb 5-200 *Fossil fuels
(CO 2) (2004) *Land use
-Cement
production
Methane (CH4) 23 700 ppb 1,745 ppb 12 -Fossil fuels
(varies with -Rice paddies
local *Waste dumps
atmospheric -Livestock
pollution)
Nitrous Oxide 296 270 ppb 314 ppb 120 *Fertilizer
(N20) *Combustion
*Industrial
processes
CFC-12 6,200-7,100 0 0.503 ppb 102 .Coolants
*Foams
Hydrofluorocarbons 12-12,000 0 0.105 ppb 12, 1 -Coolants
(HFCs)
Perfluorocarbons 5,700- 0 0.070 ppb 50,000 -Aluminum
(PFCs) 11,900 production
Sulphurhexafluoride 22,000 0 0.032 ppb 3,200 *Dielectric
(SF6) I I I I I fluid
Source: IPCC (2001); Biasing and Smith (2006). Note: ppb is parts per billion by volume.
The Earth, its oceans, and atmosphere are characterized by a carbon cycle, in which
carbon is trapped by land, ocean, or atmosphere. Land sinks include vegetation, geologic
formations, and living organisms. Ocean sinks include both living organisms and chemical
interaction with surface waters. A balanced carbon cycle releases carbon to the atmosphere
(through decay or combustion) at a rate equal to carbon absorbed by vegetation or ocean
mixing, or destroyed through chemical interactions in the atmosphere.
Because land and oceans absorb and release carbon gradually, the rapid introduction
of large-scale carbon-emitting industry can overwhelm nature's ability to maintain the carbon
balance. Today, approximately 3 gigatons of carbon (or carbon equivalent) released into the
atmosphere each year are not absorbed by land or ocean sinks (University of Washington
2002).
Figure 3.4: The Present Carbon Cycle
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Although there is near unanimity in the scientific community that global warming is
occurring primarily as a result of carbon dioxide building up in the atmosphere, there is
considerable debate and uncertainty over the magnitude of the risks presented by climate
change and their timing (Oreskes 2004). Uncertainty persists for several reasons. First,
climate change data remains incomplete and subject to significant measurement error.
Second, we still possess a limited understanding of the complexity of interactions among
oceans, atmosphere and terrestrial sinks, and the effects of clouds, aerosols, and the transport
and interactions among gases. As a result, our ability to accurately predict the extent of
future temperature change is subject to error. Further, recent research suggests that many
models have underestimated the future potential increase in temperature change due to gaps
in our scientific understanding of climate interactions (Forest et al. 2006). Finally, evaluating
the potential physical and economic effects of climate change is difficult. Physical and
economic damage estimates are further complicated by the fact that climate change will
affect different areas in unique ways, and have uncertain effects on agriculture.
Figure 3.5: Radiative Forcing and Level of Scientific Understanding
Source: Schwartz, S.E. (2004)
To manage the complexity of climate interactions, researchers have developed
computer models to estimate emissions of greenhouse gases and other relevant substances
from human activities, the resulting atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, and associated global
temperature change. These models range in methodology and complexity, but all of them are
limited in their utility by lack of observational data and their output is subject to the accuracy
of assumptions that were made in their design. Current models are either too complex to
provide calibrated predictions or too general to provide information relevant for local effects.
Models that include an economic component often lack or possess only a rudimentary
method for calculating damages to the environment and economy due to climate change.
Despite these shortcomings, climate models represent our best understanding of climate
science and are valuable tools to characterize the relationships between the various natural
and anthropogenic factors that affect global climate and to analyze potential carbon emission
trajectories and policies. Figure 3.6 below summarizes projections for global average
temperature increases from several leading climate systems models assuming six illustrative
emissions scenarios. These scenarios range from reductions in carbon intensity and the
introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies, to a scenario featuring high energy
and carbon intensity and correspondingly high greenhouse gas emissions.
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Figure 3.6: Predicted Global Warming under Six SRES Emissions Scenarios
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Climate systems models that estimate future carbon uptake of the Earth's atmosphere,
ocean, and terrestrial systems show that stabi lizing atmospheric carbon dioxide levels
requires greenhouse gas emissions to decrease to close to zero emissions (Sarofim et al.
2004; Hoffert et al. 2002). The MIT Integrated Global System Model (MIT IGSM) predicts
a 95% probability that global mean temperature will increase from 1 to 5°C by 2100 if no
climate policy is implemented (Webster et al. 2003).
Figure 3.7: Stabilization Scenario for CO 2at 550 ppm, 2000-2300
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Source: Sarofim et al. (2004). Note: Annual average uptake, emissions and concentrations are shown based on
restricting carbon dioxide emissions only. Because other greenhouse gases emissions continue, the pictured
scenario does not stabilize radiative forcing.
Based on results from the MIT IGSM, stabilizing carbon concentrations at 550 ppm
by 2300 requires reducing carbon emissions to less than 2 Pg/year by 2200 (Sarofim et al.
2004). Experiments with a simplified version of the MIT IGSM show that these reductions
require an almost 100% shift to non-fossil energy sources by all major industrialized nations
and large developing countries or the ability to sequester carbon emissions on a global scale
(Hart 2004). Such a transition is not realistic in the near future from either a political or
technical point of view given current trends. Emissions of the United States, China, India,
and Brazil are presently not subject to any limits and all are expected to increase substantially
in the future. By 2020, carbon emissions are projected to double compared to levels at the
end of the 20th century due to population growth, increasing energy consumption levels, and
increasing reliance on fossil fuels (EIA 2001).
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Figure 3.8: Historic and Projected Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1970-2030
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Greenhouse gas emissions are certain to further increase as long as current
demographic and energy consumption patterns continue. The potential effects of unabated
greenhouse emissions include increasing global mean temperatures, glacial ice melt, more
volatile weather patterns, and sea level rise. Significantly, a modest increase in global mean
temperature causes more extreme warming near the poles, which already has caused
significant glacier melt in the Arctic and at high elevations around the world. Warming is
already contributing to loss of biological diversity (Parmesan and Galbraith 2004). If these
trends continue, they will cause changes in land use, availability of water, agricultural
patterns, and disease patterns.
The physical effects of climate change and the resulting economic impacts will be
unevenly divided among countries. Wealthier countries are generally expected to have
greater adaptive capability than poorer nations. For example, island nations in the Pacific
and Indian Oceans are vulnerable to moderate sea level rise, which could severely damage
their economies and potentially displace their populations entirely (Pacific Island Regional
Assessment Group 2001).
This next section examines the current scientific evidence concerning some of the most
immediate potential effects.
3.2 Climate Change Primary Physical Effects
Scientific research suggests that a number of physical effects will occur with varying
degrees of likelihood as a result of climate change within this century. This section reviews
current scientific literature and research concerning the following potential physical effects
of climate change:
Higher minimum and maximum daily temperatures;
More intense flooding and drought;
Increased summer drying and more wildfires;
Increased storm intensity; and
Sea level rise.
Notably, this section does not address human health, agriculture or biodiversity
issues. Heat waves, increase in disease vectors and sanitation issues associated with
increasing temperature and precipitation may increase mortality rates by some estimates over
100,000 deaths per year (Gallon 2002) and can dramatically increase heath care costs which
will increase cost to business and to the insurance industry (IPCC 2001; Hayhoe 2004c).
Likewise, climate change's effects on agriculture and loss of biodiversity can adversely
affect populations and disrupt markets and supply chains (Parry 1990; Whittaker 2003).
Agricultural conditions are especially difficult to predict because climate system models are
typically designed to model climate interactions over large areas and are too inexact to
provide reliable estimates for local conditions. Climate change could benefit agricultural
production in some regions and cause tremendous loss for other regions (Watson 2001;
Reilly et al. 1996). However, research indicates that there will be greater uncertainty in crop
yields, changes in growing patterns and selection of crops, and, where water become scarce,
highly adverse conditions for agriculture and affected populations (Watson 2001; Smith et al.
1995). Because this dissertation focuses on climate's potential effects on physical
infrastructure, these issues are not separately addressed in this section.
This section focuses primarily on climate change events that have been deemed by
the IPPC to be "highly likely" (90-99% chance) or "likely" (66-89% chance) to occur within
this century.
The focus on likely and very likely scenarios excludes consideration of abrupt or non-
linear climate change. Omitting abrupt climate change isjustified for several reasons that
should be stated explicitly. The primary reasons are that the research of abrupt climate
change is at an early stage and there is lack of historical data for these events (US NAS
2002). As a result, the scientific community is presently unable to quantify the likelihood of
abrupt climate change, to test hypotheses concerning them, and climate system models do not
include them in their projections (Forest 2006). Accordingly, abrupt climate events are not
addressed in the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix presented in this dissertation.
In contrast, more gradual climate change has been observed and modeled. The
relatively more complete understanding of gradual climate phenomena and scientific
confirmation that gradual climate change is occurringjustify their inclusion in the Climate
Risk Assessment Matrix at this time.
While the omission of abrupt climate change leaves a growing body of important
scientific research unaddressed, this is not meant to suggest that abrupt climate change is not
an important potential risk. Indeed, if abrupt climate change occurs, it would substantially
change the risks identified in this section and Chapter 4. When our understanding of abrupt
climate change improves, their inclusion in a Climate Risk Assessment Matrix would be
highly desirable.
Finally, it is important to note that the model results cited in this section to describe
potential local effects are subject uncertainty. As one attempts to predict future events on
smaller temporal or spatial scales, the accuracy of model results is reduced and the range of
possible outcomes necessarily increases. At these smaller scales, the choice of model and the
assumptions used in its development increasingly influence model results. Further a number
of meteorological, land use, local and other factors outside or not well specified by the
models can influence actual outcomes, and therefore model results represent a subset of
possible outcomes, the proximity of which to the true range of possible outcomes is
unknown. Significantly, models tend to underestimate the observed variability of climate
systems on smaller temporal and spatial scales (Forest 2006). Accordingly, where possible,
several studies or studies relying on multiple models are cited as evidence of potential
climate physical effects.
3.2. 1 Higher Minimum and Maximum Temperatures
Global warming is expected to cause higher temperatures throughout the year, with
the effects increasingly pronounced at distances farther from the tropics. Summer heat waves
are expected to become more common and winters milder.
The effect of higher temperatures will differ by region. The Tyndall Center produced
a country-by-country analysis of past and future mean temperature change based on an
average of five climate system models from leading climate change research centers.
According to this research, during this century, New Zealand is expected to experience the
least temperature increase, from 0.5 to 3.1oC, and Canada is expected to experience the
greatest increases, from 5.3 to 8.80C (Mitchell and Hulme 2000). Table 3.2 below reports
the results of this study for selected countries.
Table 3.2: 21st Century Warming Predictions for Selected Countries
2 1st Century Predicted Warming (*C)
Country
Minimum Annual Mean Annual Maximum Annual
Australia 3.0 4.1 4.8
Brazil 3.4 4.5 5.8
Canada 5.3 6.3 8.8
China 4.5 5.3 7.0
France 2.0 4.1 5.2
Germany 1.7 4.0 5.3
India 3.7 4.4 5.7
Indonesia 2.3 3.3 4.3
Iran 4.8 5.5 7.0
Japan 2.2 3.8 5.2
New Zealand 0.5 2.1 3.1
Russian Federation 5.4 6.7 8.5
South Africa 3.6 4.6 5.7
United Kingdom 1.4 3.1 4.5
United States 4.2 4.9 6.1
Source: Mitchell and Hulme (2000).
A number of regional studies have also been conducted. Hulme (1997) estimates that
the United Kingdom will experience an increase in mean annual temperature of
approximately 1 VC by 2035 compared to the 1961-1990 mean. As a result, summer heat
waves that would normally occur 1-in-300 years (such as the summer of 1995) could occur
1-in-lO years on average during the 2021 to 2050 period.
Stott et al. (2004) estimates that the occurrences of extreme heat waves in Europe are
now twice as likely as a result of human activity. The estimate is based on comparing two
sets of simulated European summer temperatures from a climate model, one set that
incorporated the effect of human contributions to climate change, and another that accounted
only for natural influences on climate. The study estimates that European summers as hot as
2003 will be 100-times more likely by mid-century.
Hayhoe et al. (2004) estimate that by mid-century summer temperatures in California
may increase by 1.1 to 2.2°C under low emission scenarios and by 1.4 to 3.1°C under high
emissions scenarios. Towards the end of the century, summer temperatures are expected to
increase by 2.2 to 4.70C under low emission scenarios and by 4.2 to 8.6°C under high
emissions scenarios. Winter temperatures are expected to increase by 1.1 to 2.2oC by mid-
century and by 2.2 to 3.90C by end of century (Hayhoe et al. 2004a). Extreme heat waves in
California are expected to become more frequent, more intense, and last longer, doubling in
frequency by mid-century and becoming as high as 5 times more common by the end of the
century. In Los Angeles, the heat wave season is expected to increase from 14 weeks per
year during the 1990's to as long as 37 weeks per year by the end of the century depending
upon emissions (Hayhoe et al. 2004b).
The potential effects of heat waves during summer months were demonstrated by the
summer of 2003, which is believed to be the hottest summer in European history. The 2003
summer heat wave is estimated to have caused 22,000-35,000 heat-related deaths across
Europe and more than $12 billion in crop losses (US EPA 2006a).
During the winter months, warmer climate may also cause changes in the
hydrological cycle resulting in less predictable precipitation patterns. In areas where
temperatures are below freezing, changes in the hydrological cycle could produce heavier
snowfall and ice storms (Francis and Hengeveld 1998). Ice storms can produce substantial
damage. For example, a January 1998 ice storm in the northeastern United States and
Canada caused an estimated US$1.2 billion of insured losses (IPCC 2001).
In areas where climate change results in less precipitation and reduced surface-water
supplies, communities will pump more ground water, causing aquifers to deplete, which
could also lead to increasing levels of land subsidence. High population areas such as the
Southern and Western United States may be especially vulnerable to land subsidence (Leake
2006).
3.2.2 More Intense Flooding and Drought
Climate change is expected to cause more intense flooding and drought due to
changes in precipitation and the melting of glaciers and snow pack.
Precipitation events in the middle and high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere have
increased during the past century with a higher incidence of heavy precipitation events (Karl
et al. 1996; Kattenberg et al. 1996; Nicholls et al. 1996).
Figure 3.9: Historic Changes in Global Precipitation (%//century), 1900-1999
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While specific precipitation patterns are difficult to predict, the models generally
show that precipitation will increase at high latitudes and decrease at low and mid-latitudes.
Therefore, in low and mid-latitude regions, evapotranspiration will be greater than
precipitation and there will exist the potential for more severe, longer-lasting droughts in
these areas. Increased volatility in temperature, precipitation, and evapotranspiration will
affect snowmelt, runoff, and soil moisture conditions. Early climate system models predicted
that global precipitation could increase 7-15%, while global evapotranspiration could
increase 5-10% (U.S. Office of Technology Assessment 1993). Some models estimate that
precipitation could increase by as much as 50% in high and low latitudes, and decrease by as
much as 50% in mid-latitudes by mid-century (Rind and Lebedeff 1984; Watson 2001; Titus
1987). Kharin and Zwiers (2005) estimate that 20-year precipitation events will become 10-
year events by the end of the 21st century, and that extreme events are expected to increase
compared to daily mean precipitation.
Figure 3.10: Projected Changes in Global Precipitation
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The effect of climate change on water resources had been modeled for the major river
systems of Asia, Eurasia and the Indian Subcontinent using climate change scenarios based
on Hadley Centre model simulations. The results show that some areas are expected to
experience increases in water availability, while other areas are expected to experience a
reduction in water resources through 2050. Disruption to precipitation patterns and glacier
melt will further exacerbate water resource problems (Arnell 1999).
Table 3.3: Projected Climate Effects on Selected Eurasian River Systems
Annual Flow Projected FlowRiver System Territory Cubic 2050Cubic kmlyear Change 2050
Ganges India 1389 -14%
Yangtze China 1003 +37%
Tigris Iraq, Turkey, Syria 43-52.6 -22%
Euphrates Iraq, Turkey, Syria 28.7-30.5 -25%
Indus China, Pakistan, India 207 -27%
Yellow River China 627 +26%
Yenisey Siberia 630 +15%
Lena Siberia 521 +27%
Ob Siberia 534 +12%
Amur Siberia 346 +14%
Source: IPCC (2001); Tibet Environmental Watch (2006). Note: Yellow River annual flow measured at Tibet.
The Himalayas possess the largest accumulation of glaciers outside the Arctic and
Antarctic. The Himalayas provide approximately 8,600 cubic km of water per year,
supporting the Brahmaptura, Ganges, Indus, Mekong, Salween, Yangtze, and Yellow rivers
(Dyurgerov and Maier 1997). Climate change has been identified as the primary cause of
retreat for an estimated two thirds of Himalayan glaciers (WWF 2005). Snowpack melt
during the summers are expected to increase the severity of summer monsoons, increasing
the likelihood of severe floods on the Indian Subcontinent in the near term. In the long term,
the loss of glaciers will produce drought in areas that depend upon these glaciers for water.
In the Western United States, the snowpack is expected to decline by 25-40% by mid-
century, and by 30-70% under low emissions scenarios and by 70-90% under high emissions
scenarios by the end of the century (Hayhoe et al. 2004d). Loss of snowpack is expected to
create severe water shortages during the summer months. Snowpack provides as much as
75% of water supply in the Western United States (USGS 2006). In California, 80% of
precipitation occurs during the winter, and 75% of water consumption occurs during the
spring and summer. Stream flows fed from the Sierra Nevada are expected to be reduced 10-
25% by mid-century, and 40-55% by end of century (Hayhoe et al. 2004d). At the same
time, California's population is expected to double by mid-century and triple by the end of
the century (Hayhoe et al. 2004d).
In South America, accelerating glacier melt has also been observed in glacier systems
that supply water to Chile, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. A 2003 study conducted
by NASA measured changes in the volume of the 63 largest glaciers of the Patagonian ice
fields. These ice fields are the largest non-Antarctic ice masses in the Southern Hemisphere
and are essential source of water for Chile and Argentina. Based upon a comparison of
conventional topographic data from the 1970s and 1990s with data collected in 2000 by
NASA's Space Shuttle program, the study confirmed that the ice sheets are thinning at an
accelerating rate. Runoff from the ice fields contributed an estimated 0.04 millimeters
(0.0016 inches) per year to sea level rise during the period 1975 through 2000, roughly nine
percent of the total annual global sea level rise from mountain glaciers according to the 2001
IPCC assessment. From 1995 through 2000, however, the rate of runoff doubled, to an
equivalent sea level rise of 0.1 millimeters (0.004 inches) per year. Melting of the
Patagonian ice fields account for almost 10% of sea level rise from 1975 to 2000 (Rignot et
al. 2003).
In Europe, glacier melt has accelerated in the European Alps. Since 1980, 10% to
20% of glacier ice in the Alps has melted. Since 1850, these glaciers have lost about 30% to
40% of their surface area and about half of their volume (Haeberli and Beniston 1998).
In Africa, tropical glaciers on Mt. Kenya (Kenya), Mt. Kilimanjaro (Tanzania), and in
the Ruwensori Mountains (Uganda and Congo) have decreased in area by 60-70% on
average since the early 1900s (Prentice and Karlen 2003).
In all of these cases, glacier melt is expected to contribute to floods in the immediate
future followed by drought and serious water scarcity problems by the middle or end of the
century.
3.2.3 Increased Summer Drying and Wildfires
Hotter and drier summer weather dehydrates forest biomass, increasing the likelihood
of severe wild fires. Extensive research on climate change and wildfire has been conducted
using fire risk assessment models specific to the fuel characteristics and conditions of the
locality coupled with general circulation models of the climate. Models are run using
different greenhouse gas scenarios that incorporate temperature, wind, humidity, and
precipitation variables in order to assess fire danger. Results from recent studies of the
United States, Canada, Russia and Australia are described below.
A recent study of the Western United States concluded that wildfire danger will
increase, especially in the Northern Rockies, Great Basin and Southwest, due to warmer and
drier conditions. The study compared a base period 1975-1996 with a period when carbon
dioxide levels are projected to double from present day, approximately 2070. By 2070, the
number of high-risk days are projected to increase by as much as one to two weeks per year
in much of the Western and Southwestern United States (Brown et al. 2004).
In another study focusing on California and Nevada, warmer and windier conditions
associated with a doubled carbon dioxide scenario will cause more intense and faster
spreading fires. Fires that escape their initial containment limits are projected to increase by
51% in the South San Francisco Bay Area, 125% in the Sierra Nevada, and remain at the
same levels along California's Northern Coast. Contained fires are expected to burn larger
areas in those locations by 41%, 41%, and -8%, respectively. Model results extrapolated for
the entire Northern California region predict the number of escaped fires to double in number
to over 100 per year, and an additional 5,000 hectares to be burned by contained fires
annually (Fried et al. 2004).
A study of Canadian and Russian boreal forests similarly shows increased fire risk.
The study used four leading climate system models and analyzed fire risk assuming a
doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide. The study predicted increased severity of fires
during the summer months of May through August and a longer fire season in both countries
using 1980-1989 as the baseline period. Model results predict that fires in the extreme and
high-risk categories will increase substantially (Stocks et al. 1998; see also Wotton et al.
2004).
A recent study of Southeast Australian wildfires employing two climate system
models modeled risk for seventeen locations in Southeast Australia. The study predicts that
for the locations studied, fire risk could increase 4-25% by 2020 and 15-70% by 2050. For
example, in Canberra, very high or extreme forest fire risk danger days could increase from
the present 23.1 days per year up to 28.6 days per year by 2020 and up to 38.3 days per year
by 2050 (Hennessy et al. 2005).
Figure 3.11: U.S. Forest Fire Damage, 1960-2005
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Source: National Interagency Fire Center, as presented in CERES (2005a).
Significantly, increased severity of forest fires has already been observed. In the
United States, wildfires have doubled in severity of damage since 1960 (CERES 2005a).
3.2.4 Increased Storm Intensity
At the time the 2001 IPPC Third Assessment Report was completed, there was no
consensus regarding likely future occurrences of tropical and extratropical windstorms.
Since 2001, scientific research has not detected an increase in storm and hurricane frequency
from either the historical record or based on climate models. However, several prominent
researchers have recently found correlations between increased surface ocean temperatures,
water vapor and the intensity of storms and hurricanes.
Trenberth (2005) found that the observed increase in sea surface temperatures and
water vapor levels support theoretical and model results predicting more intense storms.
Increased sea surface temperatures and water vapor levels provide more potential energy to
create or intensify storms. Although Trenberth points to model results that predict the recent
shift towards extreme storms and hurricanes, the results are limited by inadequate statistical
evidence to prove that these trends are the result of human influence or will continue in the
future.
Emanuel (2005a, 2005b) examined historical data for storms and has found that since
the 1970's there have been strong statistical correlations between increase in sea surface
temperatures, peak wind speed, and storm life. Emanuel calculates the integral of peak wind
speed over storm life to determine the total power dissipation of a storm. Emanuel's research
predicts that an increase in sea surface temperature of 2oC should produce an increase in
wind speed of 10%, which combined with longer storm life, increases power dissipation by
40-50%. Emanuel estimates that the historical increase in sea surface temperature of 0.50 C
over this century should have increased observed power dissipation by 8-12%, not the 50-
60% increase observed in the North Atlantic and western North Pacific. Emanuel further
notes that monetary losses, which have been observed to increase at a rate approximately the
cube of wind speed, also follow the power dissipation of storms.
Knutson and Tuleya (2004) also found a strong relationship between sea surface
temperature and storm intensity. They used nine leading climate models to produce various
climate states as data for the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory's hurricane prediction
system. The models consistently predict that greenhouse gases will cause a 6% increase in
peak wind speed, 7% increase in average rate of precipitation, and 14% increase in central
pressure fall in cyclones by 2080. The results suggest a gradual increase in the number of
highly destructive Category 5 hurricanes toward the end of the century.
Several prominent researchers have contested the research conducted by Emanuel,
Knutson and Tuleya. Specifically, they have questioned Emanuel's use of the power
dissipation measure, the quality of the underlying data, his manipulation of data which may
have underrepresented the intensity of storms during the first half of the 20th century, and the
strength of the claimed statistical relationship between sea surface temperatures and power
dissipation (Pielke 2005; Landsea 2005).
Michaels et al. (2005) criticized Knutson and Tuleya (2004) for overstating the
potential effect of carbon dioxide on storms. In their models, Knutson and Tuleya (2004)
assumed that carbon dioxide concentrations will increase 1% each year, as opposed to an
increase closer to the historical trend of 0.5% per year. This may have caused the study to
overstate the potential effects of warming. Using historic averages for future carbon
emissions, critics argue that the models should predict wind speeds to increase by
approximately 3%, precipitation to increase by 4%, and central pressure fall to increase by
7% by 2080.
Even in the absence of a proven causal relationship between human activity and
increasing severity of storms, all of these researchers agree that the present level of storm
activity coupled with increasing concentrations of population and infrastructure in coastal
areas will result in storms causing increasing economic losses. The historical pattern of
storm and hurricanes are described more fully in the case studies in Chapter 6 concerning the
effect of storms and hurricanes on the U.S. utility industry and on the insurance industry.
3.2.5 Sea Level Rise
In 2001, the IPCC stated that sea level poses "a major potential risk to coastal zones,
especially if they are associated with an increase in storminess". Thermal expansion has
already raised sea level by 10 to 20 centimeters. The IPPC forecasts potential increases in
sea level from 26 to 72 cm by 2100 with the mid-range estimate at 49 cm (IPCC 2001).
In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment completed a four-year study of the
Arctic, which involved over 300 scientists and employed a number of climate models. The
study found that average temperatures in Alaska and Western Canada have already increased
by approximately 3 to 4VC in the past fifty years, nearly twice the global average.
Temperatures in these areas are projected to rise an additional 4 to 70C by the end of the
century. According to the study, the rising temperatures are likely to cause at least half of the
Arctic Ocean's ice and a significant portion of the Greenland ice sheet to melt by the end of
the century (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004).
Arctic ice concentrations have been consistent with yearly changes in surface
temperatures. In the 1980's, ice concentrations increased and then decreased in the 1990's
consistent with surface temperatures (Cosimo 2004). During the 2002, 2003 and 2004
summers, total Arctic Ocean ice areas have been at or near minimum record levels. The
Arctic's perennial ice cover appears to be decreasing 9-10% per decade while the winter air
temperatures in Alaska and western Canada have increased 3-40C in the past fifty years
(Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004).
Rates of ice sheet melt in Greenland and Antarctica have been shown to correlate
strongly with historical increases in carbon dioxide levels (Alley et al. 2005). Greenland's
melting rate is estimated to have doubled during the 1996 to 2005 period, with losses
reaching as high as 224 +/- 41 cubic kilometers per year. According to NASA's Goddard
Space Flight Center, current loss rates are approximately 30 to 40 cubic kilometers per year
based on the most recent data (Kerr 2006). The Greenland ice sheet alone contains enough
water to raise global sea level by about 7 meters.
The West Antarctic Ice Sheet is approximately 10% of the volume of the entire
Antarctic ice sheet and is estimated to contain enough water that it could cause mean sea
level to rise by 5 meters (Oppenheimer 2004). While the East Antarctic Ice Sheet is
increasing in mass as a result of increased snowfall, the West Antarctic Ice Sheet is losing
mass at a much faster rate, more than offsetting the other's gains. Differing loss estimates for
the Antarctic ice sheets have ranged from 47 cubic kilometers per year to 148 cubic
kilometers per year (Kerr 2006; Velicogna and Wahr 2006). To place these losses in
perspective, Los Angeles consumes approximately 1 cubic kilometer of water per year (Kerr
2006).
As described above in the section "More Intense Flooding and Drought", Patagonian
ice fields are also melting at an accelerating rate, accounting for almost 10% of sea level rise
from 1975 to 2000 (Rignot et al. 2003).
Since the 2001 IPCC assessment, the rate of glacier melt has increased substantially.
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment study predicts that melting glaciers and ice sheets
will have potentially catastrophic consequences on a global scale, resulting in substantial
economic, social, and environmental impact in low-lying areas. Global and Arctic Ocean sea
levels have already risen 10 to 20 cm in the past 100 years. The study estimates that an
additional 50 cm of sea level rise is expected by the end of the century within a 10 to 90 cm
range (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004).
More than 65% of North America's population live in coastal communities
(Changnon 1999). In the United States, a 50 cm rise in sea level would flood low-lying
coastal areas in Florida and Louisiana, causing the coastline to recede 45 meters inland
(Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004). Similar problems are expected in Europe and
Asia (IPCC 2001). Table 3.4 below presents estimates of potential land loss and population
exposure for Asian countries.
Table 3.4: Potential Asian Land Loss and Population Exposure from Sea Level Rise
Sea Level Potential Land Loss Population Exposed
Rise (cm) (km2) (%) (millions) (%)
Bangladesh 45 15,668 10.9 5.5 5.0
100 29,846 20.7 14.8 13.5
India 100 5,763 0.4 7.1 0.8
Indonesia 60 34,000 1.9 2.0 1.1
Japan 50 1,412 0.4 2.9 2.3
Malaysia 100 7,000 2.1 0.05+ 0.3+
Pakistan 20 1,700 0.2 n.a. n.a
Vietnam 100 40,000 12.1 17.1 23.1
Source: IPCC (2001), based
n.a. = not available.
on Nicholls and Mimura (1998); Mimura et al. (1998).
3.3 Summary of Climate Change Risks
The events described above in the preceding sections are all deemed "likely" or "very
likely" by the IPCC in its 2001 assessment, meaning that the IPCC assigned a 66% to 99%
chance of them occurring within this century. Although these events and their impacts are
subject to considerable uncertainty concerning their magnitudes and frequency, they are a
useful starting point for discussion of risks. The potential climate events summarized in
Table 3.5 provide a foundation for Chapter 4's discussion of climate-sensitive financial risks.
Table 3.5: Effects of Potential Extreme Climate Events
Projected Changes Chance Representative Examples of Projected Impacts
during the 21st Century per IPCC
2001
Higher maximum Very Increased incidence of death and serious illness in older age groups
temperatures; more hot Likely and urban poor
days and heat waves over Increased heat stress in livestock and wildlife
nearly all land areas 90-99% Shift in tourist destinations
Increased risk of damage to a number of crops
Increased electric cooling demand; reduced energy supply reliability
Increasing minimum Very Decreased cold-related human morbidity and mortality
temperatures; fewer cold Likely Decreased risk of damage to some crops; increased risk to others
days, frost days, and cold Extended range and activity of some pest and disease vectors
waves over nearly all land 90-99%
More intense precipitation Very Reduced heating energy demand
events Likely over Increased flood, landslide, avalanche, and mudslide damage
many areas Increased soil erosion
Increased flood runoff could increase recharge of some floodplain
90-99% aquifers
Increased pressure on government and private flood insurance
systems and disaster relief
Increased summer drying Likely Decreased crop yields
over most Increased damage to building foundations caused by ground
mid-latitude continental 66-90% shrinkage
interiors and Decreased water resource quantity and quality
associated risk of drought Increased risk of forest fire
Increase in tropical cyclone Likely Increased risks to human life, risk of infectious disease epidemics,
peak wind intensities, mean and many other risks
and peak precipitation 66-90% Increased coastal erosion and damage to buildings and infrastructure
intensities Increased damage to coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs and
mangrove
Intensified droughts and Likely Decreased agricultural and rangeland productivity in drought- and
floods associated with El flood-prone regions
Nino events in many 66-90% Decreased hydro-power potential in drought-prone regions
different regions
Increased intensity of Little Increased risks to human life and health
mid-latitude storms Agreement Increased property and infrastructure losses
between Increased damage to coastal ecosystems
models.*
Source: IPCC (2001). * Since 2001, research has confirmed an increased likelihood of storm and hurricane damage.
Most of the effects of climate change are likely to be adverse. There are a few cases
in which climate change is expected to have beneficial effects. The table below summarizes
expected beneficial and adverse consequences of climate change with respect to
infrastructure.
Table 3.6: Potential Climate Change Effects onInfrastructure
Climate Event Positive/Negative Effect on Infrastructure
Inundation and flooding Negative Damage to physical infrastructure
Sea level rise Negative Sinking of harbor facilities,
coastal structures; greater risks of
storm surge
Rise in sea water Negative Disruption of marine ecosystems
temperature Positive Reduction in freezing in harbor
areas in winter
Rain pattern changes Negative Increased demand on storm-water
system
Indeterminate Changing water demand and
supply
Decrease in freezing Negative Ice roads no longer safe
Positive General improvement in
transportation
Positive Reduction of pavement cost
Reduction of snow Negative Less snow pack water storage
Positive Improve transportation
Positive Reduce maintenance costs
Loss of permafrost Negative Damage to infrastructure
Increase in storm intensity Negative Increase wear on infrastructure
Source: Adapted from Mirza et al. (2005).
Give the increasing likelihood of the climate change risks described in this chapter,
we would expect that lenders and long-term investors in infrastructure would consider these
risks in making investment decisions and would seek to insure against them where possible.
Individuals and firms typically seek insurance for much lower probability risks, such as
house fires, automobile accidents, and medical coverage.
Chapter 4 considers the scientific evidence presented in this chapter in order to develop a
financial risk framework for the purpose of assisting the private sector and government in
evaluating climate change risk. Chapter 5 then evaluates the extent to which private risk
management methods are capable of providing protection against these climate change risks.
4 Climate Risks to Financing Infrastructure
This chapter addresses the question: "What risks does climate change pose to
infrastructure, and how might those risks impair the private sector's ability to finance
infrastructure?"
For purposes of addressing this question, risk is defined as "the possibility of loss,
injury, disadvantage, or destruction" (Webster's 2002).
This is an important question because it has been recognized for some time within the
scientific community that climate change will adversely affect infrastructure (Revelle 1983;
IPCC 1995). However, traditional infrastructure finance analysis has assumed the natural
environment to pose risks that can be identified, allocated and managed by conventional
means.
While the natural environment was understood to pose significant risks to
infrastructure projects, the range of risk was believed to be sufficiently well defined within
an acceptable range so that large-scale infrastructure projects could be financed without
further consideration to long-term climate trends in making investment and risk management
decisions. Recent observed weather patterns exhibiting increased volatility and the
availability of climate models capable of characterizing long-term climate trends require
reevaluating traditional infrastructure finance risk assessment frameworks in light of
evidence from climate science.
In order to address this question, this chapter considers infrastructure finance risks in
light of the climate science presented in Chapter 3 and develops the "Climate Risk
Assessment Matrix". The Climate Risk Assessment Matrix is intended to provide a
systematic method for analyzing climate risk in the context of financing and developing
infrastructure. For investment analysis, it provides practitioners concerned with the risks of
financing long-term infrastructure with a framework that incorporates climate risks. For
policy analysis, the framework demonstrates the difficulties the private sector should be
expected to experience in transitioning to carbon neutral energy infrastructure.
This chapter develops the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix in several steps. The
chapter first presents the traditional infrastructure finance risk assessment framework
commonly used by project developers, lenders, investors, and their advisors in financing
infrastructure projects worldwide. Specifically, this framework is used to identify, allocate,
and mitigate risks of infrastructure projects.
Based on the scientific literature and evidence from climate models presented in
Chapter 3, the chapter identifies specific risks posed by climate and updates and expands the
traditional framework to accommodate these risks. The reevaluation of the traditional
framework demonstrates that some traditional risks are exacerbated by climate and these
enhanced risks will not be provided with adequate visibility within the traditional
infrastructure finance framework. For example, in the traditional framework, the concept of
force majeure is used to analyze a broad set of risks: acts of nature (such as flood, fire,
earthquake), acts of man (riots, war), impersonal acts (financial system collapse), and acts of
government (general strife). Given the increasing importance of climate events, the force
majeure category as a catchall or residual category of risk provides inadequate visibility to
the climate-related risks. The Climate Risk Assessment Matrix proposes several new
categories of risk to explicitly accommodate risks posed by a changing climate and identifies
the climate aspects of each particular risk.
The chapter then compares the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix with responses from
banks and insurance companies participating in the Carbon Disclosure Project. This
comparison verifies that the financial community anticipates that a number of climate risks
will increase in the long-term and that the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix correctly
identified certain risks as critical. A survey of these disclosures also suggests that the
financial community still lacks a framework for systematically analyzing climate risks.
Next, each risk presented in the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix is separately
evaluated, and dynamic interactions among these risks are identified. These interactions
suggest that an increase in one risk may increase the magnitude of other risks, leading to a
general increase in the level of risk due to climate change. This creates the potential for a
cascade effect of increased risk.
Finally, the chapter examines the potential implications of these risks for financing
carbon neutral infrastructure on the scale and the pace intended to adapt infrastructure in this
century. This analysis suggests that the private sector should experience substantial barriers
and delays in developing carbon neutral infrastructure.
4.1 Conventional Infrastructure Finance Risk Assessment Framework
In infrastructure finance, a project is generally analyzed in isolation from other
activities or other assets of a project sponsor. Thus, infrastructure finance requires project-
centered analysis. A proposed project must demonstrate sufficient projected cash flow to be
capable of repaying debt and provide a rate of return to equity investors that is competitive
with other rates of return available in the market for comparable risk, in order tojustify the
investment decision (Nevitt and Fabozzi 2000).
Infrastructure projects typically require large capital expenditures and the resulting
assets have long lifetimes. Privately financed infrastructure projects typically require long
time periods to repay debt, recover investment, and provide a market return to investors. As
discussed further in Chapter 5, debt repayment may require 20-30 years with longer durations
not uncommon (Dealogic 2006b).
As a result of the large capital outlays and long recovery periods, infrastructure
finance relies on quantitative and qualitative risk assessment methods for assessing long-term
risk. The quantitative methods comprise cash flow analysis. The qualitative methods
involve risk assessment for risks that cannot be reliably quantified. The purpose of these
methods is first to identify risks, and then to allocate each risk through the negotiation
process to the party best positioned to address each particular risk. Each party is then
required to mitigate and bear liability for the risks allocated to it as part of its contractual
obligations to the project. In order to minimize the overall risk of the project, each individual
project risk should be separately identified, allocated, and mitigated in this manner.
The conventional infrastructure finance risk assessment framework characterizes risks
by category. Table 4.1 below presents a commonly accepted formulation of the framework.
Table 4.1: Infrastructure Finance Risk Assessment Framework
Risk DescriptionlExample
Supply Risk Supply interruption or input price increase.
Market Risk Price or demand drop.
Foreign Exchange Risk Mismatch revenues and costs due to currency
fluctuation.
Technology Risk Technology failure or inefficiency.
Operating Risk - Management Capacity Failure in management performance.
Operating Risk - Cost Increase in cost of inputs and services.
Environmental Risk Environmental liability or regulation.
Infrastructure Risk Interconnection to other critical infrastructure
(i.e. roads, utilities).
Force Majeure Risk Acts of nature (flood, fire, earthquake), man
(riots, war), government (general strife),
impersonal acts (financial system collapse).
Completion Risk Construction delay, cost overrun, defects.
Engineering Risk Failure in engineering analysis, design, data.
Political Risk War, unrest, nationalization, creeping
expropriation (regulation), change of
government, environmental activism,
corruption.
Participant Risk Competency and financial stability of
participants such as project sponsors, lenders,
equipment vendors, and contractors.
Interest Rate Risk Floating rate interest loan.
Syndications Risk Lead banks ability to sell portion of loan to
other banks.
Legal Risk Enforcement of project contracts.
Source: Tinsley (2000).
The complexity of risk management in an infrastructure development context is
illustrated in Figure 4.1 below which shows the various parties to a typical privately financed
infrastructure project and the contractual arrangements between them. The number of parties
and complexity of these contractual relationships adds to both the cost and time required to
finance and develop infrastructure.
Figure 4.1: Project Finance Participants and Relationships
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Source: Tinsley (2000).
The various contractual arrangements allocate project risk, and obligate each party
responsible for its assigned risks to take appropriate mitigation efforts. In a pure project
financing, lenders are repaid from project revenues and, in the event of loan default, may
only satisfy their claims against the project's assets or continued operation. Pursuant to the
project agreements, lenders typically have limited or no recourse against other financial
assets of project sponsors (Hoffman 2001). Project revenues must be sufficient to repay
lenders, meet the obligations of the project as they come due, and to provide an adequate
return for equity investors. Because projects must succeed on their own without reliance on
the assets of its sponsors, the identification, allocation and mitigation of risks are essential to
the success of privately financed infrastructure.
In order to evaluate the traditional risk assessment framework and to revise the
framework to reflect climate-related risks, the next section considers each traditional risk
category in light of climate change science.
4.2 Reevaluating the Conventional Infrastructure Finance Risk Framework
This section reevaluates the traditional infrastructure finance risks in light of
scientific evidence of climate change. The reevaluation results in the adaptation of the
traditional framework to accommodate climate risks that are expected to increase in this
century, potentially affecting the upcoming generation of infrastructure.
Reevaluating the current framework is necessary for reasons that bear directly on
infrastructure and its financing. First, recent observed weather patterns and projections of
future climate both exhibit increasing volatility and severity. In the past several decades, the
scientific community has discarded its earlier view that climate is "virtually static" (Gibbas
2002). Dynamic weather patterns involve greater risks than the static climate conditions that
are implicit in the traditional framework. Ultimately, changing climate conditions must be
factored into project design, budgeting and management. Second, climate poses a
fundamental problem for infrastructure finance: no party may be best positioned to accept
and mitigate climate risks. Such a situation may hinder the ability of project parties to
successfully complete negotiations and manage risks. Ultimately, these risks must be clearly
identified and given appropriate visibility so that they can be properly addressed.
Accordingly, the revised framework presented in this dissertation provides new
categories of risk in order to elevate the visibility of climate-sensitive risks. For example, the
traditional "force majeure" category subsumes climate-related risks with a number of other
kinds of risks, and thereby fails to provide adequate visibility to climate-related risks. The
Climate Risk Assessment Matrix considers climate in each traditional category of risk and
divides force majeure risks among existing and new risk categories to provide climate risks
appropriate visibility.
Macroeconomic risks, such as foreign exchange and interest rate risks, are excluded
from this presentation of the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix. These risks are important and
may affect the further development of carbon neutral infrastructure. For example, in the case
of nuclear energy, high interest rates coupled with high capital costs, regulatory delays and
public opposition, contributed to the abandonment of plans to further expand the industry.
However, macroeconomic risks are likely to be dependent upon general economic
conditions, which are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Accordingly, there is presently
inadequate basis to determine how climate might affect macroeconomic risks for purposes of
developing the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix.
The analysis of risk in this section provides the foundation for the x-axis of the
revised Climate Risk Assessment Matrix presented in simplified form in Appendix A to this
dissertation. Table 4.2 presents the complete set of risks comprising the x-axis of the
Climate Risk Assessment Matrix, and identifies specific examples of risk within each risk
category. Each risk category is considered in turn in the sections that follow.
Table 4.2: x-Axis of the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix
Risk Potential Cause of Increase in Risk
Supply Risk New technology rare materials/energy
Weather disruption of supply chains
Carbon credits
Market Risk Climate affects short/long term demand/market
Changing consumer attitude and preference
Reputation risk for emissions/environment
Technology Risk Accelerate new carbon neutral technology
More complex carbon neutral technology
More costly technology/infrastructure
Engineering Risk Changing environmental conditions
Increasing complexity of challenges
Increasing scale of climate protection projects
Infrastructure Risk Damage to transmission & distribution
Grid connection of new technologies
Natural support for infrastructure
Uncertain government commitment to support
Environmental Cost recovery for carbon neutral technology
Regulatory Risk Cost recovery for climate-related events
Taxation
Regulation (including competitive effects)
Litigation or liability
Increasing complexity of regulation
Uncertain or fragmented regulation
Increased disclosure obligations
Political Risk Deadlock/uncertainty
Unrest/Violence
Expropriation
Protectionism
Incomplete institutional arrangements
Legal Risk Increased chance of breach of contracts
Increased use of changed circumstances defense
Decreased flexibility once committed to law
Force Majeure Risk Increased chance of severe climate events
Reduced insurance coverage for climate events
Increased chance of financial erosion/collapse
Operating Risk - Cost Climate events increase operations costs
Complex technology increase O&M
Operating Risk - Reduced capacity estimate risk and plan
Management Capacity Increased demands on technical capacity
Climate demand more management resource
Climate reduce ability to pursue strategic plan
Reduced capacity to undertake prevention
Capital Markets/Finance Credit, Default, Collateral Impairment
Risk Financial asset values
Accounting/financial disclosure
Innovation causes capital obsolescence
Market disruption/volatility
Scale/transaction cost
Participant Risk Financial stability/creditworthiness
Inadequate administrative or technical capacity
Governance Risk No party best positioned, willing or capable to accept
and mitigate climate risk.
Source: Author's adaptation based on review of climate change literature.
4.3 Validating the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix
The Climate Risk Assessment Matrix is validated using survey responses of banking,
insurance, and energy firms to the Carbon Disclosure Project. The Carbon Disclosure
Project is sponsored by over one hundred-fifty institutional investors and periodically
surveys Financial Times 500 companies in various industries concerning their strategies for
adapting to climate change and their carbon emissions reductions programs. The Carbon
Disclosure Project survey was used as a method to validate the Climate Risk Assessment
Matrix because of the relevance of its substantive questions and the high response rates
among banks and insurance companies, the primary industries of interest to this dissertation.
At the time of writing, the Carbon Disclosure Project had completed three annual
surveys, which were used in this dissertation. Overall response rates were 47%, 59% and
71% for each of the three surveys, respectively. In the third survey, 50% of the companies
were located in North America, 30% in Europe, and the remainder in Asia, Latin America
and the Middle East. The third survey included sixty-nine banks, 84% of which submitted
responses or information, twenty-seven utilities, 100% of which provided submissions, and
thirty insurance and reinsurance companies, 67% provided submissions (Innovest Strategic
Value Advisors 2005).
For this dissertation, the author reviewed responses by the banking, insurance,
energy, and utilities industries to the Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire. All three
year's of responses were reviewed, or a total of one hundred ninety-eight submissions.
Almost all banks that responded recognized climate change as a risk to their lending
business. All insurance companies surveyed in the Carbon Disclosure Project recognized
climate change as a potential risk to their property and casualty businesses. Utilities and
energy industry respondents similarly recognized climate change as significant to their
business, in some cases presenting opportunities, but in most cases identifying significant
increases in risk.
The banking industry responses were of particular interest because of their role as
lenders and advisors to infrastructure projects. The author tabulated banking industry
responses, the results of which are presented below in Table 4.3. Over three years of
surveys, the Carbon Disclosure Project surveyed sixty-nine commercial banks.7 Of the sixty-
nine lending banks surveyed, forty-seven banks responded by answering the survey or
providing information in one or more years. Responses from these forty-seven banks were
coded and tabulated with respect to specific risks. Most of the responses were coded from
the banks' responses to the first question in the survey: "Do you believe climate change, the
policy responses to climate change and/or adaptation to climate change represent commercial
risks and/or opportunities for your company?" However, survey responses were read in their
entirety and answers were coded from any part of the document or supplemental materials
submitted by respondents. 8
Significantly, banks in the Carbon Disclosure Project surveys specifically identified
most of the risks in the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix, but because the banks were not
responding to the set of risks presented in the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix, some
interpretation was necessary. To be coded affirmatively for a particular risk, a bank must
explicitly identify or discuss the particular risk as a risk in one of its submissions for any of
the three Carbon Disclosure Project surveys. In the case of operating risks, responses were
either counted towards "Operating Risk - Cost" where a cost element was stated, or
"Operating Risk - Management Capacity" where a management element was stated or the
specific reason for identifying operating risk was not stated. Where banks identified both a
cost and management element, both risks were credited. Because this interpretation of
banks' responses is subject to error, it may be more accurate to aggregate both subcategories
of risk. Aggregating both subcategories as "Operating Risk" produces a total of twenty-four
responses, as adjusted to eliminate double counting. On an aggregate basis, it is the fourth
most commonly cited risk, with over 50% of respondent banks identifying it.
In some cases, the coding policy may have led to an underestimate of the banks'
perception of climate risk. There is evidence from bank responses that the banking industry
understands the magnitude of risk presented by climate change, however, if bank responses
were general in nature, it could not be counted affirmatively toward any risk. Table 4.3
below sets forth the tabulation of bank responses counted towards specific risks.
7 The Carbon Disclosure Project did not categorize Citigroup as a bank, possibly due to its
insurance and other business lines. It is included here as one of the sixty-nine banks.
8 Carbon Disclosure Project survey questionnaires and responses are available for review at
the Carbon Disclosure Project's website http://www.cdproject.net/.
Table 4.3: Tabulation of Banking Industry Responses to Carbon Disclosure Project
Risk Examples of Climate Risk Banks Identifying Risk
Supply Risk New technology rare materials/energy ABN, ANZ, Bank of America,
Weather disrupt supply chains Credit Suisse, Hang Seng,
Carbon credits KeyCorp, Bank of Ireland,
HBOS, Hypovereinsbank, KBC,
Toronto-Dominion, WestPac
Market Risk Climate affects short/long term demand/market ABN, ANZ, Banco Itau,
Changing consumer attitude and preference Barclays, CIBC, Citigroup,
Reputation risk for emissions/environment Dexia, HBOS, HSBC, Bank of
Ireland, Dexia, Royal Bank of
Scotland, SocGen
Technology Risk Accelerate new carbon neutral technology ANZ, Dexia, Hypovereinsbank
More complex carbon neutral technology
More costly technology/infrastructure
Engineering Changing environmental conditions
Risk Increasing complexity of challenges
Increasing scale of climate protection projects
Infrastructure Damage to transmission & distribution Banco Itau, Scotiabank,
Risk Grid connection of new technologies Toronto-Dominion, Wachovia
Natural support for infrastructure
Uncertain government commitment to support
Environmental Cost recovery for carbon neutral technology ABN, ANZ, Banco Itau, Bank of
Regulatory Risk Cost recovery for climate-related events Montreal, Barclays, CIBC,
Taxation Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Dexia,
Regulation (including competitive effects) Hang Seng, HBOS, HSBC,
Litigation or liability Hypovereinsbank, PNC,
Increasing complexity of regulation Scotiabank, KBC, Malayan,
Uncertain or fragmented regulation RBC, SocGen, Standard
Increased disclosure obligations Chartered, SunTrust, Svenske
Handelbanken, UBS, Wachovia,
WestPac
Political Risk Deadlock/uncertainty ANZ, Royal Bank of Scotland,
Unrest/Violence Westpac
Expropriation
Protectionism
Incomplete institutional arrangements
Legal Risk Increase chance of breach of contracts Banco Itau, KeyCorp
Increase use of changed circumstances defense
Decreased flexibility once committed to law
Force Majeure Increased chance of severe climate events ABN, ANZ, Banco Itau, Bank of
Risk Reduced insurance coverage for climate event Ireland, Bank of Montreal,
Increase chance of financial erosion/collapse Barclays, CIBC, Citigroup,
Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse,
HBOS, HSBC,
Hypovereinsbank, KBC,
KeyCorp, Lloyds, Malayan,
RBC, Royal Bank of Scotland,
Scotiabank, Standard Chartered,
Toronto-Dominion, Wachovia,
WestPac
Operating Risk - Climate events increase operations costs ABN, ANZ, Banco Itau, Bank of
Cost Complex technology increase O&M America, Citigroup, Credit
Suisse, HBOS, HSBC,
Hypovereinsbank, Malayan,
KeyCorp, KBC, Bank of Ireland,
Royal Bank of Scotland,
WestPac
Operating Risk - Reduced capacity estimate risk and plan ABN, Banco Itau, Banco
Management Increased demands on technical capacity Santander, BBVA, Credit
Capacity Agricole, Scotiabank, SocGen,
Increased demands on management resources Standard Chartered, Svenske
Climate reduce ability to pursue strategic plan Handelbanken, UBS, Unicredito,
Reduced capacity to undertake prevention WestPac
Capital Credit erosion, default, collateral impairment ABN, ANZ, Barclays, Banco
Markets/Finance Financial asset values Itau, Banco Santander, Bank of
Risk Accounting/financial disclosure America, Bank of Montreal,
Innovation causes capital obsolescence BBVA, Citigroup, Credit Suisse,
Market disruption/volatility Scotiabank, HBOS, HSBC,
Scale/transaction cost Hypovereinsbank, Lloyds,
Malayan, RBC, Royal Bank of
Scotland, San Paolo, Standard
Chartered, SunTrust, Svenske
Handelbanken, Scotiabank,
SocGen, Toronto-Dominion,
UBS, Unicredito
Participant Risk Financial stability/creditworthiness See Capital Markets
Inadequate administrative or technical capacity See Management Capacity
Governance No party best positioned, willing or capable to
Risk accept and mitigate climate risk.
Source: Author's tabulation of banks' responses to first three years of Carbon Disclosure Project survey.
Tabulation of bank responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project survey based on the
Climate Risk Assessment Matrix criteria are set forth in Table 4.5 below.
Table 4.4: Carbon Disclosure Project Frequency of Banks' Identification of Climate Risks
Risk Number of Percentage
(Number of banks = 56). Responses Total Responses
Capital Markets Risk 27 57%
Environmental Regulation Risk 25 53%
Force Majeure 25 53%
Operating Risk - Cost and Management Capacity 24 51%
Operating Risk - Cost 15 32%
Market Risk 13 28%
Operating Risk - Management Capacity 12 26%
Supply Risk 12 26%
Infrastructure Risk 4 9%
Political Risk 3 6%
Technology Risk 3 6%
Legal Risk 2 4%
Engineering Risk 0 0%
Participant Risk 0 0%
Governance Risk 0 0%
Source: Author's tabulation of banks' responses to first three years of Carbon Disclosure Project.
One method for evaluating the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix is to assess whether
the importance of risks identified in the framework is consistent with the banks' responses to
the Carbon Disclosure Survey.
The banks' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project survey identified risk clusters
that are consistent with those noted here as critical nodes. The banks focused primarily on
capital markets, regulatory, force majeure, operating, market and supply risks.
Of those surveyed, twenty-seven banks identified capital markets risks as a potential
risk magnified by climate change. Capital markets risks were the most frequently cited risk
of climate change, identified by twenty-seven banks. Within the capital markets risk
category, twenty-four banks identified credit risk, default risk and impairment of collateral as
important capital markets risks.
Following capital markets risks, regulatory and force majeure risks were the second
most commonly cited risks of climate change. Twenty-five banks identified increasing
environmental regulatory risk and increasing risk of force majeure events as effects of
climate change. Banks identifying regulatory risks associated with climate change
commonly cited the costs of regulatory measures to control carbon emissions and potential
liability arising from legal actions.
Of the twenty-five banks that identified force majeure as a risk of climate change,
twenty-one banks identified the potential for increased climate events, and sixteen banks
expressed concern that climate change could lead to curtailment of insurance coverage.
Significantly, all insurance companies that submitted responses to the Carbon Disclosure
Project survey recognized climate change to increase the potential for force majeure events,
causing an increase in risk to their property and casualty businesses.
Fifteen banks in the Carbon Disclosure Project identified operating cost risk as a
potential area of increased risk as a result of climate change. Many of the responses
specifically mentioned increasing costs of energy as a source of risk. Management capacity
risk was identified by twelve banks in the Carbon Disclosure Project as a potential area of
increased risk as a result of climate change. The most common comment concerned the
decreased capacity for management to properly assess risk and to plan.
As noted above, due to difficulties in distinguishing between operating cost and
management capacity risk, these two categories should also be analyzed as an aggregate
category - "Operating Risk". On an aggregate basis, a total of twenty-four banks identified
operating risk as increasing due to climate change. As an aggregate risk, operating risk
becomes the fourth most commonly cited risk, with over 50% of respondent banks
identifying it.
Thirteen banks participating in the Carbon Disclosure Project identified increasing
market risk as a potential result of climate change. Twelve of these banks specifically
indicated that a company's reputation might be adversely affected by being linked with
carbon emissions or environmental damage. Four of the thirteen banks indicated that climate
change could influence consumer preferences or changes in demand.
Twelve banks responding to the Carbon Disclosure Project survey cited potential
supply problems as a risk posed by climate change. Most of these responses related to
increasing cost of energy and electricity. One bank identified vulnerability due to
dependence on imported petroleum as a supply risk issue (See HBOS's responses to Carbon
Disclosure Project surveys).
Notably, only four banks identified infrastructure risk, only three banks identified
technology risk, and no banks identified engineering risk. The comparatively few responses
mentioning technology-related risks may reflect the fact that banks' responses focused on the
more immediate or familiar risks associated with their business or a failure to recognize that
climate change will exert important pressures on technological development. Technology
risk is a traditional risk and its importance has been recently reaffirmed by rating agencies in
connection with IGCC technology (Foster 2005a and 2005b).
Only three banks identified political risk as a concern. One possible explanation is
that banks equated political risk with regulatory risk, the most commonly cited risk, and the
coding of the surveys conflated these risks.
Legal risk was identified by two banks, and participant and governance risks were not
identified by any banks. We know from experience that these risks are important. A
possible explanation is that the omission of these risks may reflect that they are viewed as
secondary to loan default and preservation of collateral.
Bank respondents also made various general statements that were difficult to classify
within any one particular risk category and were therefore not counted toward any of the
above risks. Samples of these statements are given in Table 4.5 below.
Table 4.5: Carbon Disclosure Project Banks Identification of General Climate Effects
Climate Change Impact Carbon Disclosure Project Banks
Agriculture ANZ, Barclays, HSBC, Credit Agricole,
Scotiabank, CIBC, Standard Chartered,
Toronto-Dominion, WestPac
Biodiversity BBVA, SocGen, WestPac
Loss of Operating Capabilities Bank of Montreal
Relocation of Business HSBC
Business Interruption, Commercial Risks CIBC, Toronto-Dominion
Shifts in Weather Dexia
Effects on Industry Standard Chartered
Coastal Zone Business Wachovia
"Impact on all aspects of modern life" HSBC
"One of the most serious problems facing humanity" Mitsubishi
Source: Author's review of banks' responses to first three years of Carbon Disclosure Project survey.
There is evidence that the banks' understanding of climate change improved during
the period of the Carbon Disclosure Project. In some cases, this learning was dramatic.
Several banks responded in the first or second years of the survey that climate change has no
effect on their business or indicated that they had not studied the issue. In subsequent
responses, these banks indicated that they had changed their earlier view and provided
detailed responses comparable with other survey participants (See, e.g. Bank of America and
Bank of Ireland responses).
One of the purposes of the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix is to identify and provide
greater visibility to financial risks associated with climate change. Therefore, although the
banks did not cite some of these risks, it is not appropriate to abandon the less cited
categories. If the omissions are because banks have not completely considered the
implications of climate change, the survey was not structured to specifically identify these
risks, or the risks are outside the scope of their day-to-day credit risk assessment, the
inclusion of these risks in the revised framework may help draw attention to them.
4.4 Climate Risks and Dynamic Interactions
This section examines each risk within the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix
separately based on the most recent scientific data and other evidence currently available. In
addition, it analyzes the interactions among these various risks.
Diagram 4.1 below presents the cumulative potential interactions among the risks
described in this chapter. Participant risk and governance risk are omitted because all other
risks contribute to them.
Diagram 4.1: Potential Climate Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
Diagram 4.1 suggests that the various types of risk interact and increase with climate
change; i.e., there is substantial positive correlation among these risks. Multiple interactions
can occur between many of the risks, with secondary and tertiary effects, and the patterns
become complex. For example, the technology-engineering-infrastructure cluster of risks
increases risks associated with market, supply, capital markets, and operations. Further,
regulatory risk can increase technology cluster risks. Thus, in the case of technology cluster
risks, these risks both affect and are affected by other risks. Of course, the representation of
risk in this section is simplified. Specific interactions depend upon the conditions and facts
prevailing in a particular situation.
We now turn to analysis of each risk and their potential interactions with other risks.
4.4.1 Supply Risk
Supply risk is the potential for disruption of supply or increased cost of inputs.
Climate change can be expected to increase supply risks through several means.
Building a carbon neutral energy infrastructure will require new technologies, which
will require new materials. Technologies such as fuel cells and solar photovoltaic panels
involve materials that are expensive or rare (platinum in the case of fuel cells) or highly
processed (silicon in the case of solar), which add cost and time to the production cycle.
Importantly, while economies of scale may result in decreased costs where materials are
abundant and the major cost is processing them, large-scale production will place increasing
demands on rare commodities. This may lead to increasing costs of rare metals and/or
greater emphasis on their recycling. Where recycling is economically feasible, such as in the
case of platinum, it adds additional cost to materials. Further, a substantial percentage of
metal may be irretrievably lost the in recycling processes.9 Developing country demand for
precious metals at rates of consumption similar to developed countries would ultimately
place limits on technology diffusion for those technologies that require rare inputs (Gordon et
al. 2006).
Changes in technology prompted by climate change may also create shortages of
qualified labor to develop and install new technologies. For solar PV, for example, the cost
of installation and balance of system is approximately the same as the cost of solar panels.
The experience of renewable technology developers shows that issues such as shortages of
labor and changes in work patterns can significantly increase cost and delays in clean
technology projects (Vincent 2006).
Climate change may directly disrupt supply chains for all sorts of commodities or
services, temporarily or permanently. Storms and extreme heat could damage supply
infrastructure on a temporary basis. Increases in sea level, changing water resource patterns,
prolonged extreme heat or repeated storms could cause dislocation of industry and
populations, resulting in the permanent relocation or abandonment of supply infrastructure.
To the extent that supply chains cannot be relocated or require time to relocate, disruption in
supply can occur on a regional or extra-regional level.
Due to the global nature of markets, a disruption in a particular geographic region
could potentially cause supply disruptions with implications for industry in other places.
Hurricane Katrina provides a recent example of supply disruption. In August 2005, Katrina
damaged 167 offshore platforms and 183 pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico, shutting down
approximately 70% of gas production and 90% of crude oil production in the Gulf, which in
the case of oil production, represents about 2% of global production and 20% of U.S. refining
capacity (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2005). As of March 2006, 87 platforms were
still evacuated and approximately 23% of oil production and 14% of gas production
remained unrestored (U.S. Minerals Management Service 2006).
Another example of supply risk is the potential for climate to change the cost of
commodities due to increases in transportation costs. A study of commercial navigation on
the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River system using several climate system models predicts that
a doubling of carbon dioxide would result in lower water levels due to evapotranspiration and
precipitation changes. In turn, this will limit vessel size and the types of commodities that
can be transported. The study predicts prices for grains, cement, salt, iron, coal, petroleum
9 For example, Gordon et al. (2006) estimate that approximately 26% of copper and 19% of
zinc is irretrievably lost in recycling processes.
and other commodities could increase by as much as 40% depending on the climate scenario
and choice of model (Millerd 2005).
Other studies predict that global warming will open new transportation routes through
the Northwest Passage of the Arctic Ocean (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004). By
mid-century, large shipping may be able to navigate the Artic Ocean year-around (Arctic
Climate Impact Assessment 2004), reducing the shipping distance between Asia to Europe
by 9,300 kilometers (5,800 miles) compared to the current route through the Panama Canal.
This could significantly decrease the costs of transportation and commodities.
Supply risks associated with water can also affect manufacturing processes.
Perennial water shortages in Taiwan threatened to disrupt the supply of semiconductors in
2002. Taiwan, which manufactures a large portion of global production in semiconductors,
flat panel displays and printed circuit boards, consumes large volumes of water required to
manufacture these products. The 2002 drought caused the government to institute water
rationing and large firms to adopt conservation measures (Bradsher 2002; Hesseldahl 2002).
Another potential supply risk involves the supply of greenhouse gas allowance
permits for companies subject to mandatory cap and trade regimes. This issue is addressed
further in this chapter in the section "Regulatory Risk" and in Chapter 5 in the section
"Carbon Offsets".
Significantly, twelve banks responding to the Carbon Disclosure Project survey cited
potential supply problems as a risk posed by climate change. Most of these responses
identified potential increases in the costs of energy and electricity as the primary supply risk.
One bank identified vulnerability due to dependence on imported petroleum as a supply risk
issue (See HBOS's responses to Carbon Disclosure Project surveys).
Importantly, supply risk interacts with other risks, such as force majeure, legal,
political and capital markets risks. Supply risk and force majeure events interact to create a
positive feedback loop. As already discussed above, an increase in the risk of a major
catastrophic event (a force majeure risk) potentially increases supply risk. Supply risk also
increases force majeure risk because increasing cost of materials increases replacement cost
following major catastrophic events, an issue discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 in connection
with insurance losses. Supply risk and technology risk interact, as introduction of new
technologies may rapidly shift demand towards new materials, and inadequate supply of
materials can increase the risk associated with new technologies. Supply risk increases legal
risk because tightening commodity markets increase the leverage of producers, thereby
increasing legal risks of contract breach and renegotiation. Legal risk also potentially
increases the likelihood that a company will be unable to obtain supply, particularly if
suppliers perceive an increased risk of default. Thus, there is a positive feedback loop
between supply and legal risk. Supply risk and political risks also interact. In the case of oil,
increases in political risks in producing regions often increase supply risk if markets perceive
these risks to potentially interfere with production or transportation of oil. Tighter oil
markets have provided producing countries with greater leverage to make political and
economic demands. Thus, in the case of oil, there is a positive feedback loop between
political risk and supply risk. The issue of political risk and supply risk will be discussed
more thoroughly in the section below titled "Political Risk'. Finally, supply risk affects
capital markets, operating cost, and management capacity risks. For a particular company
experiencing difficulty in obtaining reliable supply of inputs, capital markets can respond
negatively with respect to that company's value and ability to raise financing. On a systemic
level, increased volatility of prices or disruption of supplies of oil or other key commodities
that co-vary with financial markets could increase the volatility of, or depress, capital
markets. To the extent that commodities are increasingly linked to financial instruments that
are traded in capital markets, capital markets risk can also affect the price of underlying
commodities and the financial condition of companies that trade in commodities-linked
instruments. Thus, there is a positive feedback loop between capital markets risk and supply
risk.
Diagram 4.2 below shows potential supply risk interactions.
Diagram 4.2: Supply Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
4.4.2 Market Risk
Market risk concerns reductions in, or volatility in, the price or quantity demanded of
products. Climate change potentially increases market risks for infrastructure in several
significant ways.
One way that climate change can increase market risk is by affecting a company's
reputation. A company associated with poor environmental practices may potentially lose
market share to competitors with better reputations for care of the environment or as a result
of boycotts (e.g., ESSO in Europe).
Another way that climate change can increase market risk is through short-term or
long-term changes in climate. For example, extreme heat or cold affects demand for utility
services. Utility company revenues are directly affected by climate. Chapter 5 discusses the
use of weather derivatives by utilities and other businesses to address short-term climate
risks. Long-term change in climate, such as gradual warming, will have a more fundamental
effect on the demand for utility services. A recent study of the effects of climate change on
the Boston metropolitan area to year 2050 predicts that climate change will cause slight
decreases in winter demand for electricity and dramatic increases in summer electricity
usage, requiring increased capital investment in peaking facilities that may only be utilized
during the summer period. Although the projection indicates a net increase in overall
electricity demand in the Boston area, low utilization rates of infrastructure to service
summer demand could adversely affect the financial performance of utilities (Kirshen et al.
2004). Other studies have indicated substantial national investment may be required to meet
increased electricity demand as a result of climate changes. These projected increases in
electricity consumption due to climate change are in addition to anticipated growth in
electricity demand resulting from increasing population and electrification (EIA 2005b;
International Energy Agency 2003). One study estimated that the marginal increase in U.S.
electricity consumption resulting from climate change will be from 12% to 22%, requiring
capital investment of an additional $200 to $400 billion in generating capacity from climate
change alone (Linderer 1988; as described in US NAS 1992).
Thirteen banks participating in the Carbon Disclosure Project identified increased
market risk as a potential result of climate change. Twelve of these banks specifically
indicated that a company's reputation may be adversely affected by being linked with
emissions or environmental damage. Four of the thirteen banks indicated that climate change
could influence consumer preferences or changes in demand.
Market risks interact dynamically with force majeure, regulatory, market, legal,
capital markets, management capacity, and operating cost risks. Increases in force majeure,
regulatory, technology, and legal risks potentially intensify market risks. With respect to
capital markets, a reduction in demand for a company's products or services or lower
utilization rates of firm fixed assets could reduce a company's market valuation, leading to
greater difficulty to raise capital through capital markets. With respect to management
capacity and operating costs, reduced demand for a company's products could potentially
require greater management attention and resources to reverse such a trend.
Diagram 4.3 below shows potential market risk interactions.
Diagram 4.3: Market Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
4.4.3 Technology-Engineering-Infrastructure Risk Cluster
Technology risk, engineering risk, and infrastructure risks are all risks related to the
design, implementation, efficiency, and support of large engineering projects. They are
different aspects of risks associated with new technologies and their infrastructure platform.
Due to their close relationship, they are addressed together below.
4.4.3.1 Technology Risk
Technology risk is the risk of technology failure or inefficiency (Tinsley 2004).
Climate change should increase technology risk, especially for new energy technologies.
Attempts to develop carbon neutral infrastructure will necessarily require the
deployment of new technologies. New technologies present important issues such as
whether the particular technology will work, reliability, health and safety, uncertainty
regarding initial capital investment, operation and maintenance costs, comparative
performance to competing technologies, and whether the particular technology will
emerge as an industry standard (US NAS 1979).
For these reasons, banks and credit rating agencies generally resist unproven
technologies, and financing them on a project finance basis is difficult. For example,
integrated coal gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technology is recognized as superior in
terms of efficiency and emissions in comparison to traditional coal-fire electricity generation
technology. Yet, the electric utility industry has been slow to embrace IGCC technology and
only four plants are currently in operation worldwide (Deutch and Lester 2004; Rosenberg
2004). Credit rating agencies have identified technology risk as the reason why IGCC has
not been more rapidly adopted. In comparison to standard coal plants, IGCC plants require
higher capital expenditures and several additional years to build (Bartsch and Muller 2000).
Widespread adoption of IGCC will require industry to address several problems that are
common to new technologies: higher capital costs, construction delays, inexperienced
personnel, and uncertain operating and maintenance costs (Foster 2005a and 2005b).
The inherent bias against new technology among banks and credit rating agencies
means that new technology will be adopted more slowly than is generally anticipated by the
science and engineering community. Furthermore, the economic incentive to commoditize
infrastructure finance projects means that once a technology is embraced by project parties
and rating agencies, the preference for established technology is reinforced by the goal of
reducing the transaction costs of financing infrastructure.
New technologies are also untested with respect to insurance, government regulations,
building codes, and corporate buying standards. Locating trained personnel to install and
maintain new equipment can be difficult. While these issues are routine, they are time
consuming to resolve and adversely affect the economics of new technologies (Vincent 2006).
In general, carbon neutral technologies can be more complex and thus more costly
than older technologies to operate. All else being equal, this makes the older, less costly,
technology less risky from a financial point of view because it offers more predictable overall
revenues. This requires new technology to be proven to a higher standard than may be
feasible prior to its having been in operation on a commercial basis for some years.
Additionally, new technologies often raise the issue of public acceptance, which
presents a threshold issue whether the technology can be practically adopted on a widespread
basis (Schrattenholzer et al. 2005). Nuclear power provides the most dramatic example of
the risks associated with acceptance of technology (Smith, E. 2002; Mehta 2005; MIT 2003).
Offshore carbon sequestration demonstration projects have also experienced public
opposition where such projects have been proposed (de Figueiredo 2003). Even renewable
technologies, such as the proposed project to locate wind turbines off Cape Cod on the
Massachusetts coast, face public opposition, which can slow or prevent energy infrastructure
projects from going forward.
This is not intended to suggest that new technologies will not be adopted. However,
their adoption will be much slower than is commonly assumed by the science and
engineering community, or reflected in technology adoption models used for climate change
research. 10 The goals of satisfying energy demand while reducing greenhouse gas emissions
will place great emphasis on the introduction of new technologies in this century. When
assessing the introduction of new technologies, the science and engineering community
should take into account the time lags and biases exerted through the finance process.
4.4.3.2 Engineering Risk
Engineering risk is the risk relating to gathering accurate and meaningful data and
integrating that data to design appropriate infrastructure (Tinsley 2000).
Climate change will likely increase engineering risk for large infrastructure projects as
changing environment will challenge the ability of engineers to assess project requirements and
design infrastructure. For example, the Canadian government estimates that 5% of infrastructure
construction costs are due to safety for current climate conditions. Estimating the costs of making
structures more resilient to weathering is difficult, but it is believed this cost is increasing.
Significantly, the 5% estimate does not include the added cost of climate change (Auld 2006).
Designing structures that can withstand high impact events is important because the cost
of repair is extraordinarily high. For example, the Norwegian government estimates that the
annual cost of repair due to storm damage is approximately 5% of the annual investment in new
infrastructure (Auld and Maclver 2005). Similarly, retrofitting existing structures for climate
events is extremely expensive and the costs increase with time (Auld 2006; Kirshen 2006).
Climate change is expected to increase risk to infrastructure. For example, one
insurer estimated that a 25% increase in wind strength can increase insurance claims for
building damage by 650% (Coleman 2002). Table 4.6 provides other examples of how slight
changes in weather conditions increase the risk of infrastructure failure.
Table 4.6: Climate Events and Property Damage
Source: Coleman (2002), adapted from Mills et al. (2001).
10 The hybrid car illustrates the longer-than-expected time periods required to adopt new
technologies. A recent study estimated that it will be approximately mid-century before
hybrids are competitive and penetrate the market to significantly reduce U.S. energy
consumption (MIT Laboratory for Energy and the Environment 2005).
Large-scale engineering projects to protect cities along coastal areas provide a cogent
example of how climate change will potentially increase engineering risk. The magnitude
and complexity of such projects alone will necessarily involve substantial engineering risk.
To protect a city from climate risk requires the complex integration of water, energy,
transportation, public health, population growth and socio-economic factors. For example, a
recent study of the potential effects of climate change on the Boston metropolitan area
proposed the introduction of adaptive measures including changes of building codes and
construction of barriers to protect highly developed areas from storm surge. The scope of the
study covered over one hundred towns in the Boston metropolitan area and projections for
climate and economic conditions through 2050 (Kirshen et al. 2004).
Another example of engineering risk is the Venice floodgate project. The City of
Venice regularly floods during the winter period due to storm surge. The problem has been
made worse by subsidence of the city by approximately 4 millimeters per year due to
pumping ground water until the practice was stopped in the 1970's, and increases in sea level
of about 1.6 millimeters per year (Bras 2006). The Italian government is sponsoring the
construction of 79 large moveable floodgates that are projected to require eight years to
construct at an estimated cost of $5 billion (Bras 2006). Critics of the project claim that the
models used to design the floodgates did not take into account the IPCC's most recent
projections for sea level rise (AGU 2002). Proponents of the project believe the floodgates
as originally designed are adequate to withstand a half-meter increase in sea level (Bras
2006; Harleman et al. 2000). They acknowledge, however, that more frequent operation of
the gates and other measures would be needed to protect the city if sea levels continue to
increase beyond that point (Bras 2006)
The City of London is currently assessing the increasing risk of floods due to climate
change and faces similar engineering challenges in designing a floodgate capable of
withstanding future sea level increases and storm surge associated with climate change. A
major flood in London could cause from £12 to £16 billion of damage. The Association of
British Insurers estimates that climate change could increase river and coastal flood risk by a
factor of 8 to 12 times. The Thames Barriers were designed to protect against 7-meter storm
surge, which had a probability of 1 in 2000 years. Increases in sea level are expected to
reduce their protection to 1 in 1000-year flood risks by the year 2030. In response, the City
of London is studying options for upgrading the existing barriers to meet the higher
protection standards (London Assembly 2005).
The Canadian Council of Professional Engineers (CCPE) has specifically identified
engineering risk as a concern raised by climate change. The CCPE is responsible for the
accreditation of Canadian engineering schools and professional requirements. CCPE
believes climate change poses fundamental challenges for the engineering profession,
including the need for engineers to design for uncertain future conditions that will differ
significantly from past experience, and lack of statistically meaningful data to conduct risk
assessment on engineering designs (Auld and Maclver 2006; Auld, Maclver and Klaassen
2006). The CCPE is undertaking a national assessment of public infrastructure vulnerability
to climate change, and is considering changes to codes and standards, professional education
requirements, and accreditation requirements for Canadian engineering programs to prepare
the engineering profession for climate change (Lapp 2006; Canadian Council for
Professional Engineers 2006).
The engineering profession is developing tools and models for assessing the effects of
climate change. Some of these models link a climate system model with engineering
estimation models for planning and design purposes (Arisz and Burrell 2005). Other tools
include infrastructure information databases intended to provide guidance to government
planning and emergency response (Williamson 2005), and support risk assessment efforts to
integrate climate change into infrastructure engineering practices (Bell 2005).
4.4.3.3 Infrastructure Risk
Infrastructure risk is risk that new infrastructure will not interconnect with, or
adequately be supported by, surrounding infrastructure (Tinsley 2000). For purposes of this
analysis, supporting infrastructure includes both man-made and natural infrastructure.
Climate change will require introduction of new technologies, which will increase
infrastructure risk associated with man-made support infrastructure, and result in changes in
natural support infrastructure.
Distributed renewable technologies pose several significant infrastructure risks that
will require changes to the electricity grid and other infrastructure. For example, the
intermittency of wind and solar resources will limit their use unless electricity grids possess
adequate reserve capacity to insure reliable service and safe operating conditions. Additional
reserve capacity may cause generators to incur substantial additional capital costs
(Namovicz, C. 2006), unless existing fossil fuel generation plants are used to provide the
necessary reserve capacity (Lyons 2006).
The upper limit for the percentage of electricity generation from renewable sources is
difficult to predict due to infrastructure risk. Based on experience with geographically
diversified portfolios of wind assets in Canada and models simulating large-scale wind
generation, it appears feasible to meet 10% of electricity demand through wind power in
Alberta, Canada without major technical changes in infrastructure or cost (Milborrow 2004).
Denmark and Northern Germany have reported up to 20% of electricity demand satisfied by
wind, however these regions are integrated with neighboring grids and thus the reported
number does take account of extra-regional reserves. If extra-regional reserves are counted,
the overall wind percentage would be considerably lower (Namovicz, C. 2006). The Energy
Information Administration's NEMS wind model currently uses 40% of total electricity
generation as the upper limit for modeling the potential contribution of wind power.
However, EIA is presently unable to reliably estimate the changes to infrastructure or the
costs required to implement wind technology on such a scale (Namovicz, C. 2006).
Infrastructure issues must be solved to fully integrate renewable technology into the
existing infrastructure. In the meanwhile, the penetration of new technologies may be
slowed due to infrastructure risk.
Another aspect of infrastructure risk is the dependence of infrastructure on natural
infrastructure that could be impaired due to climate change. An example of this is the
potential effects of climate change on hydroelectric power generation due to reductions in
stream flows (US NAS 1979). Regions that are dependent upon hydropower for electricity
and are subject to long periods of drought have already experienced electricity shortages and
blackouts (McCulley and Wong 2004).
Climate changes that create unpredictable precipitation patterns or periods of drought
could adversely affect hydropower electricity generation. Reductions in river flows
disproportionately decrease hydropower production because reduced river flows reduce the
amount of water available to power turbines and reduce water pressure. According to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for the Colorado River's lower basin, a 10% decrease
in runoff reduces power production by 36% (U.S. EPA 2006b). Canadian studies show that
warming, changes in precipitation, and water withdrawals for agriculture and industry during
the past century have combined to reduce summer river flow by 20% to 84% in some
Western Canadian rivers (Schindler and Donahue 2006). As described in the "Supply Risk"
section, this is expected to significantly affect the cost of transportation and commodities,
including electricity generated by hydropower (Millerd 2005).
Technology risk, engineering risk, and infrastructure risk are closely related because
they all concern the ability of firms to design and implement technology appropriate to
changing environmental, regulatory, and competitive conditions. They directly affect the
cost, effectiveness, and the rate of implementation of new technology and infrastructure. As
suggested by the examples of hydropower and wind intermittency in the infrastructure risk
section, these risks may also place an absolute or practical limit on the application of certain
technologies.
In the Carbon Disclosure Project surveys, four banks identified infrastructure risk and
three banks identified technology risk as a concern posed by climate change. No banks
identified engineering risk.
Technology risk, engineering risk, and infrastructure risk interact dynamically with
each other exhibiting positive feedback loops among them. These risks are intensified by
regulatory risk, which exerts pressure to develop new technology. Supply risk also interacts
with the technology-engineering-infrastructure risk cluster, as introduction of new
technologies may rapidly shift demand towards new materials, inadequate supply of
materials can increase the risk associated with new technologies, and increasing
infrastructure risk resulting from loss of natural support systems may cause commodities
prices to increase. In turn, technology, engineering and infrastructure risks contribute to
increased market risk, capital markets risk, operating cost risk, and management capacity
risk.
Diagram 4.4 below shows potential technology-engineering-infrastructure risk cluster
interactions.
Diagram 4.4: Technology-Engineering-Infrastructure Risk Cluster Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
4.4.4 Environmental Regulatory Risks
Environmental regulatory risks are divided into three distinct subcategories of risk:
regulatory risk, recovery risk, and litigation risk. Regulatory risk is the potential for
increased or fragmented regulation relating to climate change. It includes risks associated
with compliance with new and untested regulations. Recovery risk relates to the ability to
recover cost of new technology, environmental remediation or catastrophic losses where the
approval of a regulatory authority is required to increase the price of services provided to
consumers. Litigation risk relates to lawsuits based on climate change.
4.4.4.1 Regulatory Risk
Multinationals face regulatory risk due to climate change in multiplejurisdictions.
Countries that have adopted the Kyoto Protocol and are subject to emissions limits are in the
process of adopting implementing legislation and regulations. Emitters in the European
Union will face higher operations cost due to compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. In the
United States, where there is currently no federal law regulating carbon emissions, and
individual states in the northeast and California are pursuing their own regulations,
regulatory risk takes a different form, presenting uncertainty and the potential for fragmented
regulation.
Regulatory risk affects the cost of plant and equipment in the energy sector. The cost
of complying with environmental regulations accounts for a large portion of the increasing
cost of new electricity generation and capital improvements to existing plants (Joskow and
Rose 1985).
Because regulatory risk is so closely linked to the financial performance of the energy
sector, one might expect any effort to impose additional cost through regulation to be
resisted. This resistance will slow the implementation of best available technologies.
However, an alternative strategy is for industry to seek regulation in a form that is acceptable
to it (Stigler 1971). Industry may seek regulation in order to obtain certainty across multiple
jurisdictions, to preclude more onerous regulation, and to provide a competitive advantage
for companies better positioned to comply with the regulatory scheme. A third strategy is for
the business community to address political and public concern by participating in voluntary
arrangements. Groups like the World Business Council for Sustainable Development have
promoted self-regulation as a means to avoid more onerous government regulation (Hancock
2003).
4.4.4.2 Recovery Risk
Regulated industries in the United States and other countries are often required to
obtain the approval of a governmental entity to increase consumer rates for services. Climate
change can increase recovery risk because it potentially increases the costs of environmental
compliance, preventive expenditures and catastrophic losses. Recovery risk is particularly
significant for the utilities and insurance industries.
Approximately 58% of electricity generation in the United States is regulated and
their rates are subject to approval by governmental entities (Edison Electric Institute 2006a).
A majority of utilities therefore face risk that their applications to regulators for rate increases
will be declined or delayed (Edison Electric Institute 2005).
Utility rate increase applications for catastrophic losses are generally expected to be
approved (Oldack 2006). However, rate applications are a political process and there are real
risks associated with recovering disaster costs through rate cases (Edison Electric Institute
2005). There are similar concerns with recovery of environmental compliance costs (Furey
2006). Additionally, when costs are ultimately recovered, these recoveries are delayed. The
average time to obtain approval to recover costs varies byjurisdiction and is closely watched
by investment analysts and credit rating agencies in evaluating utility companies (Furey
2006; Lehman Brothers 2006).
Difficulty in passing the costs of capital improvements to consumers has limited the
wider adoption of measures that could prevent damage from climate events and mitigate
further climate change. Preventive or mitigation costs may be more difficult tojustify to
regulators than catastrophic losses because they are discretionary in nature and their benefit
may be speculative. Examples of precautionary measures that have not been widely adopted
due to recovery risk include the use of underground transmission lines in the state of Florida
and neighboring Gulf states. Over 80% of U.S. transmission lines are currently
aboveground. The Edison Electric Institute estimates that underground transmission costs
are approximately 10 times greater than the cost of aboveground wires, and have one-third
the failure rate of overhead systems. A study of the issue in North Carolina estimates its
three utilities would require twenty-five years and a 125% rate increase to transition to
underground lines (Utilipoint 2004). An example of mitigation technology that has been
slowed by recovery risk includes IGCC technology. Credit rating agencies have attributed
the slow adoption of IGCC technology in part to uncertainty whether regulators will permit
the increased costs associated with this technology to be passed on to consumers (Foster
2005a and 2005b).
Insurance companies in the United States are regulated by state insurance
commissions and are also subject to recovery risk. All states posses some form of approval
or review process for insurance rate increases (Insurance Information Institute 2004).
Recovery risk can directly affect the availability of insurance to the energy sector, which can
in turn affect the ability to finance energy infrastructure (Spudeck 2006). The case of
insurance will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
Recovery risk is particularly important in the context of climate change because
utilities must recover the capital expenditures required to develop carbon neutral energy
infrastructure, and insurance companies must recover the increasing cost of risk coverage, if
these firms are to play their roles in supporting the successful transition of infrastructure.
Due to the magnitude of the potential costs to the energy and insurance sectors, the
importance of recovery risk will increase with the severity of climate change.
4.4.4.3 Litigation Risk
Increasing scientific evidence of climate change increases the potential for litigation.
At the time of writing, approximately ten climate-related cases have been filed in seven
countries (Climate Law 2006a; Congressional Research Service 2005a).
In the United States, several lawsuits have been filed against utilities due to their
carbon emissions. In July 2004, the attorney generals of the states of Connecticut, California,
Iowa, New York, Vermont, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and the City of New York
filed a suit in United States federal district court seeking to hold a group of power companies
liable for damages caused by their emissions and to enjoin further emissions. The defendant
utilities together account for 650 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year,
constituting approximately 25% of all utility emissions in the United States, and 10% of all
anthropogenic emissions in the United States. The suit is grounded on the federal common
law and various state laws of public nuisance. It alleges that global warming presents an
imminent danger to human health and private and public property, and endangers the
viability of state and city infrastructure in coastal areas (Connecticut et al. v. American
Electric Power Company et al., 2004).
In October 2003, a number of states filed a suit against the United States government
for failing to enforce the U.S. Clean Air Act. The suit contends that the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has failed to meet its mandatory duty to review new sources of
pollution every eight years pursuant to Section 111(b)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act, and in the
case of carbon dioxide, to promulgate regulations that require the latest abatement
technologies available for carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide and particulate emissions. The
states argue that because proven affordable technologies exist that can reduce carbon dioxide
emissions, EPA must promulgate a revised standard and require that abatement technologies
be implemented (Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2006).
Both of the U.S. cases were dismissed at the lower court level and are currently being
appealed (Connecticut et al. v. American Electric Power Company et al., 2005;
Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2006).
In addition to developing U.S. law on the subject of climate change, these cases may
encourage plaintiffs in other countries to file similar suits in their legal systems. Other legal
jurisdictions may be more willing to extendjurisdiction and award damages to local plaintiffs
against foreign companies. Thus, climate litigation represents a significant risk to
multinational companies, particularly the energy industry. In a recent example, a Nigerian
court in April 2006 ordered Shell to stop gas flaring in its Nigerian petroleum operation by
April 2007. A recent study found flaring is the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in
Nigeria and costs Nigeria an estimated $2.5 billion annually due to energy loss and
environmental degradation (Climate Law 2006b). The Nigerian court's ruling is significant
because it shows that developing countries may be fertile ground for climate change suits
against the energy industry.
These cases are important because they demonstrate the use of traditional tort law to
address climate change. However, there will be difficult legal issues that must be addressed
if these cases will affect industry practices. Common law systems do not recognize a cause
of action for general damage to the environment (Hancock 2003). The willingness of courts
to extendjurisdiction over these cases will depend in part on the their perception that these
cases present legal issues, and are not political matters. The determination that an issue is
legal in nature depends in part upon the ability of courts to administer the law in a technical
fashion.
One of the most formidable obstacles to successfully bringing a tort case is proving
causation. The continuing development of climate science and the IPCC's unequivocal
position that human activity is causing global warming is important support for the causation
element. Cases for sea level rise, disruption of water resources due to glacier melt, and
damage to equipment due to permafrost melt may already be provable as a matter of law
(Grossman 2003). However, even if climate damage can be proven, attribution to a
particular defendant remains a difficult legal hurdle. Liability for climate change based on
tort could follow a line of product liability cases that determine liability and fashion a remedy
based upon a company's market share (see Perry 1987).
In addition to domestic tort law, international law may provide a foundation for
climate change claims. International law develops through treaty and customary practices.
Several treaties already recognize transboundary environmental harm as a valid basis for
legal claims. Principle 21 of the United Nations' Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment provides that states possess the "sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within theirjurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
areas beyond the limits of nationaljurisdiction" (United Nations 1972). In disputes between
countries, article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court applies
criminal sanction against states that knowingly and intentionally cause "widespread, long-
term and severe" damage to the environment. Article 130R of the Treaty of European Union
adopts the goal of sustainability, the precautionary principle, and supports the rectification of
environmental damage. These provisions may provide a legal foundation for claims brought
within the European Union based on European Union law.
Customary international law has not yet developed a firm foundation for climate
change claims. However, a clean environment and access to vital resources necessary for
human survival are increasingly recognized in international legal documents and scholarship.
For example, the 1994 Draft Declaration on Principles of Human Rights and the
Environment codified twenty-seven environmental human rights. Numerous scholars have
considered whether environmental norms may rise to the level of fundamental human rights
or international law (Hancock 2003; Hill 2003; Drumbl 1988; Mowery 2002; Vicuna 1998;
Rosencranz 2003). Although not legally enforceable in a court of law, these sources are
considered persuasive evidence concerning the formation of customary international law
(Nijhawan 2003).
Importantly, there is evidence that climate change cases are prompting a change in
social perception. These cases encourage publicity and have prompted institutional investors
to raise climate change as a priority with the companies that they hold in their portfolios
(Baue 2003).
In the Carbon Disclosure Project survey, twenty-five banks identified increasing
environmental regulatory risk as one of the effects of climate change. Significantly, this was
the second most commonly cited risk of climate change.
Environmental regulatory risks interact dynamically with other risks. Political risk
increases environmental risk. Environmental risk increases operating cost risk, management
capacity risk, capital markets risk, legal risk, and new technology risk. As discussed further
below, environmental (in particular the regulatory risk component) is one of the primary
drivers for the adoption of new technology. Regulation also can affect competitive
relationships and therefore can significantly affect market risk.
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Diagram 4.5 below shows potential regulatory risk interactions.
Diagram 4.5: Regulatory Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
4.4.5 Political Risk
Political risk traditionally involves risks associated with war, unrest, expropriation,
creeping expropriation (regulation intended to gradually eliminate an activity or set of
rights), change of government, environmental activism, and corruption.
In the context of climate change, there are several additional types of political risk
that are separately identified and described: deadlock/uncertainty and incomplete institutional
arrangements.
This section will describe the traditional subcategory of unrest in the context of
climate change, and the new categories of deadlock/uncertainty and incomplete institutional
arrangements.
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4.4.5.1 Unrest
This section explores the potential relationship between climate change and political
unrest. In assessing these linkages, it is necessary to consider a broad set of natural resource,
environmental and energy issues that are increasingly associated with climate change. While
this section suggests that climate change potentially increases the chances of political unrest,
it is not intended to deterministically predict the outcomes of political events, which will
depend upon the actions of institutions and individuals, as well as the particular
circumstances.
There are important linkages between water scarcity, fossil fuel production,
environmental pollution, and climate change. For example, the melting of glaciers due to
climate change is expected to intensify water scarcity in the mid to latter part of this century
in many regions of the world that depend on glacier and snowpack for summer water supply.
The problem will affect millions of people in Asia, South America, the Indian subcontinent,
and the Western United States (WWF 2005; Hayhoe et al. 2004b). Increases in sea level
could make the heavily populated coastal areas uninhabitable, causing mass migration (Tol
2002). In turn, these changes could disrupt food supply, lead to famine, disease, and
economic hardship, ultimately threatening political stability (Tol 2002).
Fossil fuel production and consumption is the primary source of greenhouse gas
emissions and many environmental pollution problems. As petroleum supplies tighten,
climate change and environmental issues may lend support to political actors who desire to
withhold oil from the market for economic, political or other reasons.
Political unrest and political risk in general can impair private sector operation in
extractive industries and exacerbate resources supply risk. The politicization of petroleum
markets started with the expropriation of oil concessions by Iran in 1953, Iraq in 1961 and
Libya in 1971. These expropriations prompted other countries to demand increased
participation rights in revenue sharing with private companies, and eventually led to outright
nationalization during the 1970's in Algeria, Nigeria, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia
(Choucri 1976; EIA 1997). The cessation of petroleum exports was first used as a political
instrument in 1973 by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries against the
United States and other western countries that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War with
Syria and Egypt (Yergin 1991; Choucri 1976). Today, the threat of withholding oil
production remains a popular political weapon. In the first half of 2006, governments and
opposition groups have sought to exploit tight oil markets by threatening to cut production in
Venezuela (political standoff with United States), Iran (nuclear standoff), Chad (payment of
revenues), Ecuador (civil unrest), Saudi Arabia (terrorist attack on refinery), Iraq, (civil
unrest and terrorism), and Nigeria (civil unrest) (Financial Times 2006a, 2006b, 2006c,
2006d).
More recently, there is increasing anecdotal evidence that the politics embodied in the
oil nationalization movement may re-emerge in the context of natural resources and climate
change. In the area of water resources, resistance to the privatization of the water system in
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Cochabamba, Bolivia led to the expulsion of a Bolivian subsidiary of the Bechtel
Corporation in January 2005. Under an exclusive franchise arrangement granted by the
Bolivian government to a private international consortium led by Bechtel, Cochabamba's
citizens faced rapid increases in water prices at rates as high as 300%. The rates were so
high that the World Bank declined to support the project (Samii 2005). Resistance to the
project was led by Oscar Olivera, a labor union leader, on the grounds that it violated
fundamental human rights concerning natural resources. According to Olivera,
"The first is a change in the economic model and the second, a change in the
dominant political structure. The economic change fundamentally depends on
reclaiming our homeland, which has been marginalized and handed over to
transnational corporations, and more importantly today in reclaiming our gas
and petroleum as fundamental sources of energy for the rest of the world.
And also, reclaiming water, a collective right, a human right, a right of all
living creatures" (Olivera, 2005).
In May 2006, the Bolivian government announced the nationalization of the
gas industry and ordered the military to seize all production fields. In his speech
announcing the nationalization, Bolivia's President Evo Morales, sounding similar to
Olivera, stated: "The time has come, the awaited day, a historic day in which Bolivia
retakes absolute control of our natural resources. ... The looting by the foreign
companies has ended." Despite the nationalization policy, the Bolivian government
allowed foreign gas companies six months to renegotiate their contracts with the
government and to continue to operate in Bolivia (Zuazo, 2006). As in the case of
petroleum, the control over other natural resources is a method to provide greater
leverage to developing country governments vis-a-vis multinational companies.
Increasingly, there is recognition that exploitation of natural resources often does not
produce any measurable benefits for the general population (Blanco 2005; Ross 2001;
Kutting 2004). Worse, producing countries have generally failed to save and invest profits
from natural resource exploitation for future generations (Davis et al. 2003). If this trend
continues, when water resources become scarce due to population growth and climate
change, the risks of civil opposition in developing countries to multinational corporations
operating in the water, energy and other extraction industries can be expected to increase.
In the area of petroleum, there are numerous recent examples of civil unrest, human
rights abuse, resistance to the operation of foreign energy companies, domestic corruption,
and even war associated with extraction industries. Petroleum and mineral resources played
a significant role in financing wars waged by countries such as Angola, Burma, Congo,
Columbia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Sudan (Human Rights Watch 2004).
Further, the presence of major extractive industries within a country and human rights abuses
by the local government have been shown to correlate strongly. These abuses include
intimidation and violence by security forces, forced labor, failure to protect indigenous
populations, and complicity between industry and the local government at the expense of
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providing citizens with due process of law (Morton 2003; Ross 2001). In some cases, private
firms have been implicated directly in the abuses.11
Increasingly, human rights advocates are recognizing that economic motives,
especially the control of resources, are the motivation for human rights violations and
political violence. According to a recent United Nations study,
"... close examination of present-day intra-state conflict reveals that the underlying
motive for these conflicts, and the players involved, have changed. With the
emergence of national and international non-state actors as central and prominent
players, it is becoming increasingly evident that many of the recent violent conflicts
are provoked by the desire to capture or control strategic resources" (Makkonnen
2002).
Klare (2001) demonstrates how natural resources such as petroleum, minerals and timber
have been a source of actual or potential conflict in the past, and predicts that resource
scarcity will increasingly be a cause of war.
Theorists have suggested that the political stability of producing countries is directly
related to the revenues derived from exploiting natural resources. Noreng (2002) describes a
four-stage evolution for countries that derive primary income from extraction industries:
(1) development of a rentier state and an elite class of insiders who are the principal
beneficiaries, (2) consolidation of elite power at the expense of the local private sector,
(3) elite opposition to demands to share or cede power, and (4) eventual loss of power by
these elites. The second and third phases of Noreng's evolution, consolidation of power and
resistance to ceding power, are often characterized by violence and human rights violations.
If Noreng's hypothesis is correct, as petroleum production peaks in various
producing countries or oil revenues decline for other reasons, we can expect elites in these
states to be weakened, possibly losing power. Noreng contends that historical declines in oil
revenues preceded, and were a partial cause of, the fall of the Shah's government in Iran, and
the implosion of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev period. Both of these governments
were highly dependent on oil revenues (Noreng 2002). Noreng's theory is further supported
by quantitative research that shows a statistically significant positive correlation between
mineral revenues and authoritarian government behavior based on a sample of 113 countries(Ross 2001). This research suggests that oil wealth reinforces a stronger, more authoritarian
state.
While climate change may increase the potential for political violence and unrest, the
actual effect will depend on the actions of political and private institutions in producing and
1 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal (2003) (human rights violations allegedly committed in Burma;
case later settled and dismissed); Bowota v. Chevron Texaco Corp. (2004) (defendant
allegedly transported Nigerian military troops to site of demonstration against defendant's
operations, resulting in deaths of several protesters); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell (2000)(defendant allegedly aided and directed Nigerian government in human rights abuses,
causing wrongful death of two environmental and human rights activists).
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consuming countries. How private sector companies conduct themselves in developing
countries may contribute to their capacity to mitigate political risk. Research shows that
although the presence of major extractive industry correlates with human rights violations,
there is also evidence that corporations can play a positive role in strengthening human rights
principles in host countries (Meyer 2003). Corporations have a role to play in working with
humanitarian organizations and foreign governments to assist in conflict resolution in
countries they are doing business (Nelson 2002). An increasing number of corporations are
adopting codes of conduct that incorporate human rights principles (Wawryk 2003).
Corporations that can credibly offer a better future to a country's population may enjoy
popular support, which can help reduce the risks associated with political unrest.
4.4.5.2 Deadlock/Uncertainty
Responses to climate change may involve politically controversial or unpopular
technologies or policies. Often, these political controversies are the product of competing
interests groups over a particular issue. Nuclear energy, oil drilling in coastal areas, and
petroleum or carbon taxes provide common examples of political deadlock linked to interest
group politics (Mehta 2005; Gramling 1996). Proposals to engineer planetary-wide solutions
to climate change, such as space-based mirrors to reduce albedo or ocean-based carbon
sequestration, would likely produce deadlock if ever proposed (Keith 2002).
Political deadlock can lengthen the time required to adopt new technology. For
private sector companies, the potential for deadlock can affect the cost and profitability of
projects. These considerations can reduce the willingness of private sector companies to
embrace technology or projects that may be subject to deadlock or uncertainty with respect to
government approval, regulation or other issues.
Nuclear energy provides a leading example of deadlock. Nuclear fission is perhaps
the only carbon neutral technology currently deployable on a large scale. Taking into
consideration costs associated with safety, waste and decommissioning, nuclear energy is
slightly more expensive than electricity generated using fossil fuels without carbon
sequestration, and is basically competitive at approximately 7.3 cents/kWh for new baseload
capacity (Tester et al. 2005). Further, the high energy density of nuclear materials makes it
an advantageous substitute for fossil fuel resources. Yet, worldwide, only twenty-four
nuclear power plants are under construction today (Sell 2006). Most U.S. nuclear plants are
expected to be decommissioned by approximately 2050 unless steps are taken to revive the
industry (Golay 2006).
New nuclear plant licensing and siting, environmental regulation, and waste removal
and storage have all been the subject of controversy and litigation in the United States,
Canada, Europe, and many other countries (Mehta 2005). Political opposition to nuclear
technology, licensing delays, and high interest rates in the late 1970's and early 1980's
increased the financing costs of nuclear power technology, causing several companies to
abandon existing nuclear projects and stopped further expansion of the nuclear industry in
the United States and many other countries. Public support for expansion of nuclear power
in the United States has dropped considerably with the maturation of the technology.
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Surveys indicate that only 9% to 37% of Americans support expansion of nuclear power,
depending upon age group (Smith 2002).
Importantly, risks of deadlock continue after introduction of a new technology, as
occurred in the case of nuclear energy. Additionally, these risks may increase for more
complex technologies after the public and politicians have become more familiar with their
risks.
Because climate change will require introduction of new and increasingly complex
technologies, the potential risk of deadlock increases. Deadlock is therefore a very real
possibility that may adversely affect firms that are engaged in energy and environmental
infrastructure projects. Deadlock may significantly slow the introduction of new technology
and policy.
4.4.5.3 Intermittent or Incomplete Institutional Arrangements
The risk of intermittent or incomplete institutional arrangements is closely related to
the issue of deadlock. Intermittency relates to policies that are temporary, subject to
uncertainty as to their continuation, or temporarily suspended and then reintroduced. When
deadlock occurs, the result is often intermittent policy or incomplete policy.
With respect to climate change, examples of intermittent or incomplete arrangements
in the United States include the intermittent provision of U.S. tax credits for renewable
technology, fragmented state laws regarding renewable electricity generation portfolios, and
varied automobile emissions requirements among states.
At the international level, the Kyoto Protocol is the most important example of
incomplete institutional arrangements. The Kyoto Protocol governs carbon emissions until 2012
for industrialized countries that signed and ratified the treaty. The Kyoto Protocol is part of a
framework that was not intended to be complete, but rather was meant to evolve. However, the
lack of participation by the United States and Australia, and the lack of emissions limits on
developing countries including Brazil, China, and India threaten the viability of the arrangement.
Thus, the Kyoto Protocol in an incomplete arrangement in terms of participation, emissions
constraints, and temporal coverage (Wicke 2005; Baumert 2002). The incomplete nature of the
Kyoto Protocol undermines it efficaciousness and creates uncertainty concerning its
continuation.
Negotiations over the future greenhouse gas regime is similarly fragmented,
progressing on potentially competing tracks. Within the UNFCCC, there are two tracks for
discussions concerning post-2012 arrangements: the Kyoto Parties, and a second track that
includes the United States and all other parties in the Framework Convention. Two
significant negotiations are occurring outside the UNFCCC as well. The Gleneagles talks are
held between the G8 countries, Brazil, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Mexico,
Poland, South Africa, and South Korea. Finally, the United States has engaged Australia,
China, India, Japan, and South Korea in talks designed to create a separate Pacific
greenhouse gas reductions agreement (Maynard 2006).
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In the Carbon Disclosure Project, three banks identified political deadlock as a
potential risk resulting from climate change. However, as noted above in connection with
environmental regulatory risk, twenty-five banks identified concerns over regulatory regimes
as a concern raised by climate change. No banks discussed political violence as a potential
risk of climate change.
Political risk interacts dynamically with other risks. Political risk and supply risk
both contribute to each other, forming a positive feedback loop. Political risk increases
regulatory risk. Finally, political risk increases legal risk, capital markets risk, operating cost
risk and management capacity risk.
Diagram 4.6 below shows potential political risk interactions.
Diagram 4.6: Political Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
4.4.6 Legal Risk
Legal risk is the risk that contracts may not be enforceable under applicable law, or
legal liability may arise due to an act or omission constituting a breach of a duty. Legal risk
is likely to increase with climate change. Climate change could be used by parties as
grounds to rely on legal defenses to contract performance, or to pursue release of contractual
obligations through the bankruptcy process. Legal risk may increase due to inadequate
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statutory frameworks for new private contract arrangements entered into pursuant to the
Kyoto Protocol or other climate change regime. Finally, legal risk may also arise in the
fiduciary or corporate context as a breach of a fiduciary obligation to act upon or to disclose
climate change-related risks.
Climate change may enable parties to rely on legal defenses to contract performance,
such as the defense of changed circumstances. The doctrine of changed circumstances
provides a defense to a party that does not meet its contractual obligations where the party
can show it is no longer possible to meet its obligations, and the risk was not foreseen or
assumed by any party (Fuller and Eisenberg 1990). One court described the doctrine of
changed circumstances as follows:
"Impossibility excludes a party's performance only when the destruction of the
subject matter of the contract or the means of performance makes performance
objectively impossible. Moreover, the impossibility must be produced by an
unanticipated event that could not have been foreseen or guarded against in the
contract" (Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Markets, Inc. 1987).
Climate change could provide any number of justifications for a changed
circumstances defense. Catastrophic storms, sea level rise, or extreme heat could destroy
property or render a party unable to perform their contractual obligations.
Bankruptcy also provides a means for parties to pursue release from contractual
obligations withjudicial approval. A company that is unable to meet its financial obligations
as they come due or whose assets exceed liabilities, are eligible to file for protection under the
bankruptcy laws of the United States. Once a debtor has filed for bankruptcy protection, all
otherjudicial proceedings against the debtor are stayed, and other parties must seek approval
from the bankruptcy court to compel the debtor to perform contracts or meet other obligations.
The bankruptcy court may, among other remedies, relieve a debtor from its obligations to
perform under its contracts (Jordan and Warren 1991). Generally, bankruptcy courts exercise
their authority to relieve a debtor from its contractual obligations when it assists the debtor in
reorganizing its business or the debtor is liquidating. The court may award damages for breach
of contract, however, these awards typically compensate creditors with a small fraction of the
value of the contract as most bankruptcy estates have inadequate assets to pay all of their
obligations in full. Additionally, bankruptcy cases typically require over a year to resolve, and
the court awards are often further reduced in value due to collection delays (Fenning and Hart
1996). The bankruptcy laws of other countries vary in detail, but generally follow the same
basic principles as those described for the United States (Riesenfeld 1993).
Inadequate statutory frameworks that govern private contractual arrangements may
also increase legal risk. For example, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol requires
adoption of international standards and domestic legislation implementing the legal
framework to support emissions allowances, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
and Joint Implementation (Freestone and Streck 2005; Rodi 2005). A number of the
challenges faced by governments in adopting domestic regulations to implement the Kyoto
Protocol are discussed in Chapter 5 in the section on carbon offsets programs.
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Adoption of the statutory framework may raise novel legal issues that entail legal risk and
uncertainty. For example, under the Kyoto Protocol, there are legal issues over the ability to
promote the use of CDM over purchases of Russian and Ukrainian emissions allowances in order
to meet emissions targets. Although purchases of Russian and Ukrainian emissions allowances
do nothing to encourage implementation of clean technology or reduction of emissions, to
promote CDM and discourage the use of Russian and Ukrainian allowances may constitute
discrimination and thus violate the Kyoto Protocol and other laws (Kristiansen 2006).
Legal risk may also arise for investment managers and corporate executives in the
climate change context as a breach of fiduciary duty to ascertain or disclose risks associated
with climate change, or to fail to affirmatively act upon such risks. The duty of care for
investment managers, commonly known as the prudent investor rule, imposes "a duty to the
beneficiaries to invest and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light
of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust." This
standard requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution, and is to be applied to
investments in the context of the overall trust portfolio (American Law Institute 1992).
Company boards of directors and top executives are subject to a separate duty of care
that also could apply to their conduct in the context of climate change. According to the
American Law Institute's Principle's of Corporate Governance, the basic objective of the
corporation should be "the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate
profit and shareholder gain" (American Law Institute 1994). In pursuing these objectives, "a
director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's or officer's functions in
good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the
corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected
to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances" (American Law Institute 1994).
As of September 2006, fiduciary legal issues in the context of climate change remain
untested in the courts of anyjurisdiction to the knowledge of the author. However, for over a
decade, investors and their advisors have been considering these fiduciary obligations in the
climate change context. Cogan (1989) was one of the first efforts to understand how the
prudent investor rule applies in the context of climate change and today a number of pension
funds, mutual funds and other institutional investors in the United States and Europe are
urging corporations to disclose and address their climate change risks (CERES 2005b). The
United Kingdom requires pension funds to disclose how environmental considerations are
taken into account in investment decisions (Wheeler and Woodward 2004), and a number of
otherjurisdictions allow for environmental and social considerations to be taken into account
by fiduciaries in making investment decisions without breaching their duties, provided they
comply with fiduciary requirements embodied in the prudent investor rule (Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer 2005). An increasing number of public corporations have been required
by shareholder resolutions to disclose climate risks in annual reports and other public
documents (CERES 2005b; Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 2004).
Significantly, an international investment consultant and a leading international law firm
have issued advice that risks associated with climate change are legitimate issues that
fiduciaries may be required to address in order to comply with their legal duty of care(Mercer 2006; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2005).
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In the Carbon Disclosure Project, three banks identified breach of contract as an
increased concern due to climate change. Twenty-five banks identified default or
impairment of credit as a risk magnified by climate change.
Legal risk interacts dynamically with other risks. Legal risk increases supply risk and
perceived increases in legal risks may also increase supply risk. Thus, supply risk and legal
risk exhibit a positive feedback loop. Force majeure, political, and regulatory risks increase
legal risk. In turn, legal risk increases market risk if the perception that a firm will not perform
its contractual obligations decreases the marketability of its products and services. Finally,
legal risk also increases operating cost, management capacity and capital markets risks.
Diagram 4.7 below shows potential legal risk interactions.
Diagram 4.7: Legal Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
4.4.7 Force Majeure Risk
Force majeure is a generic term that in the traditional framework includes risks
caused by nature (such as flood, fire, earthquake), acts of man (riots, war), impersonal acts
(financial system collapse), and acts of government (general strife).
Because of the increasing importance of climate events, the force majeure category as
a catchall or residual risk category provides inadequate visibility to climate risk.
Accordingly, the revised Climate Risk Assessment Matrix redefines force majeure. The
more narrow definition only includes risks caused by nature and the potential that these risks
may be uninsurable at a commercially reasonable price. The other risks in the traditional
force majeure category are addressed separately. Acts of man (riots and war) and acts of
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government (general strife) are addressed as political risks. Impersonal acts (financial
system collapse) are addressed as capital markets risk.
With respect to force majeure as redefined by the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix,
natural risks are increasingly likely under climate change scenarios. These risks include
severe storms, sea level rise, flooding, and drought. These events can be expected to cause
increased property damage and interruption to business operations.
Well-drafted infrastructure finance documentation includes provisions that govern the
obligations of parties if a catastrophic event occurs. These provisions typically excuse
performance for the traditionally defined force majeure events, including political and
weather events (Hoffman 2001).
An important question is whether these risks will be insurable at a commercially
acceptable price in the future. As described in more detail in Chapter 5 and the insurance
case study in Chapter 6, force majeure events may trigger a curtailment, withdrawal or
increase in the price of insurance coverage. For example, in response to the 2004 and 2005
storm seasons, some insurers have curtailed coverage in the Gulf of Mexico, while others
have increased prices as much as 300-400% (Marsh 2005).
Significantly, all insurance companies that submitted responses to the Carbon
Disclosure Project survey recognized climate change as a potential risk to their property and
casualty businesses. In addition, twenty-one banks identified the potential for increased
climate events as a risk posed by climate change, and sixteen banks expressed concern that
climate change could cause inadequate insurance coverage.
Force majeure risk interacts dynamically with market, supply, legal, political,
operating cost, management capacity and capital markets risks. A force majeure event would
directly affect market and supply risks, disrupting markets in the affected area. For
strategically sensitive areas, such as major oil or gas producing regions, the disruption could
affect global markets and supplies, as occurred as a result of the 2005 Gulf of Mexico
hurricanes. Supply risk also increases force majeure risk because increases in the cost of
materials increase losses from catastrophic events, thereby forming a feedback loop.
Political risks of fragmented regulation or failure to approve rate increases to consumers may
increase force majeure risk by causing further curtailment of insurance. Force majeure
affects legal risks because catastrophic events are often a contractual or common law grounds
for release from legal obligations. Force majeure also directly affects operating risks both in
terms of cost and management capacity, as such events will increase demands on financial
and management resources.
Finally, force majeure events affect capital markets risk. The stock of a company that
suffers a force majeure event that is not fully covered by insurance may potentially decrease
in value and the company's credit rating could potentially be downgraded or placed on
negative credit watch. Importantly, these effects may vary by industry and company.
Following Hurricane Katrina, for example, oil and gas companies that were affected by
Katrina generally did not suffer any credit downgrades directly due to Katrina because of
strong commodity prices and financial results for oil and gas companies, which partly offset
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the damage to production facilities, refineries, and other infrastructure (Standard and Poor's
2006a). In contrast, approximately twenty insurers that were affected by Hurricane Katrina
suffered downgrades or were placed on negative credit watch (A.M. Best 2005a) and other
insurance companies were subject to further credit review (A.M. Best 2005b). Significantly,
increasing capital markets risk may also increase force majeure risk because an increase in
catastrophic losses increases the cost of capital for insurance companies, which in turn
reduces the amount of risk coverage available or purchased, thereby exposing firms to greater
force majeure risks.
Diagram 4.8 below shows potential force majeure risk interactions.
Diagram 4.8: Force Majeure Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
4.4.8 Operating Risk - Cost
Operations of energy companies, utilities and transportation can be disrupted by
climate events, requiring repair and rebuilding at costs exceeding operating and maintenance
budgets many times over.
For the utilities industry, severe weather events are the largest single cause of
disruption and damage to transmission and distribution equipment. Weather accounts for 67%
of utility service disruptions (Edison Electric Institute 1999). In addition, fluctuations in
energy demand caused by weather volatility impose substantial costs by adding and removing
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plants in service. In recent years in areas affected by hurricanes, the losses have sometimes
exceeded the entire annual net profit of companies (Edison Electric Institute 2005).
Another aspect of operating risk is reflected in the cost of more complex technologies.
Carbon neutral infrastructure will require more complex energy generation plants that will be
more costly. More complex plants will also entail increased operating costs. Environmental
improvements to electricity generation historically have accounted for most of the increases in
plant capital costs and operation and maintenance costs (Joskow and Rose 1985). A study of
coal plants showed that supercritical coal-fired electricity generation technology fell into disuse
during the 1980's, probably due to the increased cost of maintenance (Joskow and Rose 1985).
IGCC technology has not been implemented widely partly due to higher levels of capital and
operating costs (Foster 2005a and 2005b). This shows that increasing capital and operating
costs may discourage the use of the most efficient or environmental technologies.
Operating cost risk was identified by fifteen banks in the Carbon Disclosure Project
as a potential result of climate change. Many of the responses specifically mentioned
increased cost of energy as a source of operating cost risk.
Operating cost risk interacts dynamically with every risk within the framework.
Operating cost risk directly increases capital markets risk and management capacity risk.
These risks in turn increase operating cost risk, forming a positive feedback loop.
Significantly, increases in all of the other risks also increase operating cost risk. Therefore,
operating cost is a critical risk for private sector risk analysis.
Diagram 4.9 below shows potential operating cost risk interactions.
Diagram 4.9: Operating Cost Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
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4.4.9 Operating Risk - Management Capacity
The management component of operating risk concerns management capacity and
performance. Climate change can be expected to increase demands on the capacity of
management in several areas: capacity to take preventive action or respond to disaster,
ability to evaluate risk and plan, and demands on management capacity that compete with
attention to ordinary business functions.
Management capacity is a limited resource, even within large companies. The
demands of implementing carbon neutral infrastructure on the scale and timeframe
contemplated in Chapter 2 can be expected to strain management resources. For example,
Chevron, the world's fourth largest energy company by net income, at any given time
considers projects from a pool of a several dozen well studied opportunities, but focuses its
management attention on developing five projects around the world (Steele 2006). Thus, in
the absence of catastrophic events, the selection and development of five projects largely
define the extent of Chevron's management capacity for large infrastructure and strategic
projects.
If climate change causes catastrophic events, management's ability to prepare in
advance and respond effectively will be a critical factor in the amount of losses suffered by a
firm and its customers. Utilities in the Gulf states have developed special expertise in
dealing with catastrophic events, including information and communications capabilities,
disaster management plans, and mutual assistance arrangements. However, recurring severe
storms have stretched the ability of management to respond to crises (Oldack 2006).
Following Hurricane Katrina, utilities and energy companies operating in the Gulf of Mexico
mounted relief and repair efforts that have consumed large portions of management's
attention and resources. For example, initial relief efforts at Shell involved over 5,000
employees, the relocation of over 1,000 employees in the exploration and production
division, and the full-time effort of these employees plus over 500 additional employees and
contract workers from other Shell locations to repair equipment (Fleming 2006; Shell 2006).
In the area of risk assessment and planning, climate change poses challenges to the
ability of management to forecast, budget, and plan. As described further in the utilities and
insurance case studies in Chapter 6, utilities and insurance companies suffered large losses in
the Gulf States that temporarily impaired their financial and management capacity to
continue their regular course of business. In the case of insurance, a number of companies
are curtailing or withdrawing insurance coverage in the Gulf as a result of their losses (Marsh
2005). Further, the insurance industry is reexamining its models to assess risk. Changes to
these models are expected to increase the level of reserves required to be set aside to cover
catastrophes, further contracting the industry's capacity to underwrite risk (Mosher 2006;
Muir-Wood 2006; Martucci 2006; Standard & Poor's 2005b).
Another area where climate could pose risks for management's ability to take
preventive action is in the area of protecting infrastructure. A recent study of the Boston
metropolitan area recommends that highly developed urban infrastructure be protected with
storm and water barriers. Such a program would involve a large commitment of personnel
and financial resources over an extended period of time (Kirshen et al. 2004). Boston's
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recent renovation of its transportation infrastructure known as the "Big Dig" suggests that
large-scale re-engineering of highly developed city infrastructure can be challenging from an
engineering, management, and cost point of view. In 2006, the project is five years behind
schedule and has cost in excess of $14.6 billion, over $12 billion more than originally
planned (Buffa 2006; NPR 2003).
Management capacity risk was identified by twelve banks in the Carbon Disclosure
Project as a potential area of increased risk as a result of climate change. The most common
comment concerned the decreased capacity for management to properly assess risk and to
plan.
Management capacity risk interacts dynamically with every risk within the
framework. Management capacity risk directly increases capital markets risk and operating
cost risk. These risks in turn increase management capacity risk, forming a positive feedback
loop. Like operating risk, increases in all of the other risks also increase management
capacity risk. Therefore, management capacity is a critical risk for private sector risk
analysis.
Diagram 4.10 below shows potential management capacity risk interactions.
Diagram 4.10: Management Capacity Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
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4.4.10 Capital Markets/Finance Risk
Capital markets risk as used in the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix includes risk
associated with raising debt and equity capital in both private and public capital markets.
The traditional infrastructure finance risk framework includes a category called "syndication
risk", which relates to the risk that the lead lenders to a project will be unable to sell interests
in the loan to a syndicate of banks. The syndication risk category reflects the traditional
reliance on lending institutions for raising debt. However, infrastructure finance increasingly
raises capital in the public debt markets as well as traditional lending arrangements. As
climate risk increases, we can expect that project sponsors will increasingly seek to spread
risk to public markets, especially if lenders are less willing to accept risk. This will be
further discussed in Chapter 6's discussion of the use of capital markets and catastrophe
bonds. Accordingly, the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix uses the term "capital
markets/finance risk" to describe the risk associated with raising capital through both public
and private markets.
Capital markets risks are influenced by a number of conventional factors, some of
which may be exacerbated by climate change. One of the principal capital markets risks that
climate may affect relates to accounting and earnings issues. Capital markets respond well to
predictable earnings patterns. Many companies therefore seek to diversify their earning
streams and use derivatives products (including weather derivates) in an effort to smooth
earnings and report stable growth to the markets (Graham et al. 2005). Accounting and
financial disclosure issues are therefore paramount to capital markets risks.
Importantly, the influence of short-term financial reporting and accounting
considerations in funding technology development is pervasive. A recent survey of over 400
corporate executives revealed that meeting public earnings expectations was perhaps the
most important priority for management. Over 80% of those surveyed reported that they
would cut R&D expenses in order to meet quarterly earnings targets. Further, 78% of those
surveyed said they would pass up projects with a positive net present value in order to
achieve smooth earnings numbers (Graham et al. 2005).
Climate change may also increase capital markets risk by increasing loan defaults and
collateral impairment. Disruption to operations impairs the ability of companies to generate
revenues to repay debt. Damage to physical assets impairs the value of collateral that banks
depend upon in lending. Climate change may also increase the risk of collateral impairment
by requiring or encouraging the introduction of new technologies that cause older assets to
become obsolete.
The risk posed by climate change for lending institutions due to default and collateral
impairment is illustrated by the tenure of debt. As described further in Chapter 5, the term of
infrastructure loans are often measured in decades. For infrastructure financings closed in
2005, 55% of infrastructure debt tranches have tenors of ten years or more, and 16% of the
tranches have tenors of twenty years or more. The longest tenor was over fifty years
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(Dealogic 2006b). The longer duration debt has a payment period within the time frame
when increased risk due to climate change is expected to occur.
Credit rating agencies play an important role in monitoring risks associated with
infrastructure project and companies. An adverse credit rating or being placed on credit
rating watch with negative implications can increase the cost of capital for projects and can
trigger a default under lending agreements (Bank of America 2002). A number of insurance
companies were downgraded or placed on credit watch following Katrina, which may have
contributed to the contraction of the insurance market in the Gulf of Mexico (A.M. Best
2005a).
In addition to climate-related risks, the structure of capital markets poses several risks
to financing carbon neutral technology. Renewable technologies and distributed generation
often involve higher transaction costs than traditional energy infrastructure projects when
averaged over total energy capacity (Johnson 2006). The transaction costs and expertise
required to structure a tax-optimal financing arrangement have largely precluded these
projects from obtaining adequate funding until recently. The increase in interest from large
investment banks in renewable technology and the creation of investment funds dedicated to
these technologies is encouraging. Efforts to reduce costs through standardized agreements
and commoditization of projects are methods to address this problem. However, even with
these approaches, renewable technology companies still face the challenge of locating
projects that can be developed on a scale sufficiently large to demonstrate adequate financial
returns. These considerations can be expected to slow the implementation of sustainable
technologies (Colston 2006a; Johnson 2006).
Market volatility and the short-term nature of public debt and equity markets present
potential risks for the development of long-term clean energy technology infrastructure. This
risk will fall most heavily on companies that are new entrants and do not have a revenue
stream from more established technologies. Technology can require decades to develop and
commercialize, and infrastructure can have a lifetime and debt structure in excess of 40
years. In contrast, financial and accounting cycles operate on much shorter time frames,
which subjects new technologies to the volatility of financial markets. For example, most
investment partnerships are designed to operate for a period of 10 to 12 years, and expect to
produce profits from their investments and begin liquidating assets starting in the 5 to 7 year
range (VC Experts 2006a). Executive vesting schedules for most companies typically
operate on a four-year basis (VC Experts 2006b). Corporate profits and losses are measured
and reported quarterly. Mutual funds typically sell 85% of their holdings each year (Motley
Fool 2006). Traders typically seek to close out their positions at the end of each day or by
the weekend at the latest (Page, W. 2006; Miller 2006). The market as a whole has an annual
turnover rate of approximately 150%, over seven times that of the 20% turnover rate of the
1960's and 1970's, and in excess of the high 112% turnover rate of 1929 (Bogle 2001, 2006).
Market volatility also poses risk for firms and new technologies that rely in part upon
the sale of emissions reduction credits under the Clean Development Mechanism or Joint
Implementation programs to finance infrastructure. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5,
fluctuations in the greenhouse gas emissions allowance market can adversely affect firms
attempting to implement clean energy technologies. In May 2006, the value of European
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Union emissions credit prices collapsed, losing over 66% of their value, following the release
of 2005 emissions data confirming that original emissions allocations were too generous
(Reuters 2006). The fact that the carbon market will be subject to the same kinds of
fluctuations as equity markets means that even the Kyoto Protocol's primary mechanism for
promoting greenhouse gas emissions reduction policy is vulnerable to the short-term
volatility of markets.
Figure 4.2: European Union Emissions Allowance Prices, April-May 2006
40
40
35
30 -
S25
20W
15
10
5
n
...
.. .... ... 
..... ..... ..... ..
411/05 5/21/05 7110/05 8/29A05 10/1805 12/705 1/2606 3/17)06 506
- Spot
Source: Point Carbon (2006a).
Short-term financial considerations mismatch the practical realities of science and
technical development. Scientific progress is not a continuous, linear or predictable process
(Kuhn 1972). Science does not accommodate the predictable revenue streams demanded by
public financial markets. In the technology sector, companies that fail typically have little
residual value because most of the value resides in employees, who are dispersed when a
firm closes its doors. As a result, new technology companies often have limited access to
debt financing for operations, and rely primarily on equity financing. These financial factors
can impair the ability of the private sector to implement long-term carbon neutral
infrastructure goals.
In the Carbon Disclosure Project, twenty-seven banks identified capital markets risk
as a potential risk magnified by climate change. Capital markets risk was the most frequently
cited risk of climate change, followed by regulatory risk. Within the capital market risk
category, twenty-four banks identified credit risk, default risk and impairment of collateral as
important capital markets risks.
Capital markets risk interacts dynamically with every risk within the framework.
Capital markets risk directly increases operating cost and management capacity risks. These
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risks in turn increase capital market risks, forming a positive feedback loop. Significantly,
increases in all of the other risks also increase capital markets risk. Therefore, like operating
cost and management capacity risks, capital markets risk is a critical risk for climate risk
analysis.
Diagram 4.11 below shows potential capital markets risk interactions.
Diagram 4.11: Capital Markets Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
4.4.11 Participant Risk
Participant risk relates to the financial, management and technical capacity of project
parties to meet their obligations under project documents.
All of the other risks described in this chapter potentially place increased demands on
the financial and management capacity of project parties. In the case studies on utilities and
insurance, there is strong evidence that climate risk can cause loss of profits, more volatile
earnings streams, downgrades in credit, and in some cases, bankruptcy. In addition, storms
can cause municipalities to lose substantial investment in infrastructure and tax revenues as a
result of natural catastrophes. All of these events contribute to participant risk.
As described above in the section on "Operational Risk - Management", climate
change can be expected to increase demands on the capacity of private sector management.
For example, if climate events or the financial effects of climate events require increasing
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management and financial resources, management's capacity to conduct ordinary businesses
will be reduced.
Similarly, the technical capacity of firms could be challenged by climate events. The
introduction of new technologies may create shortages of qualified personnel within firms.
This will slow the adoption of technology and stretch the management and technical capacity
of firms. As described in the "Engineering Risk" section, the magnitude of protecting urban
areas from climate risk could potentially overwhelm the technical and management capacity
of even the largest engineering firms.
If climate risk increases significantly over this century, the private sector may
experience increasing demands on the financial and managerial capacity of participants in
infrastructure projects. Participant risk may become an increasing issue for private sector
development of infrastructure.
In the Carbon Disclosure Project, no banks specifically identified participant risk as a
risk that would be magnified by climate change. However, twenty-four banks identified
operating risks (including both cost and management capacity) as potentially increasing as a
result of climate change.
Participant risk interacts with all other risks. All risks that are specific to a particular
firm increase participant risk for that firm. Importantly, because of the multiple contributors
to participant risk, private contractual methods such as insurance may not be adequate to
address this risk. For example, in the infrastructure finance field, performance bonds provide
some risk coverage against contractor default. However, performance bonds are only
available for proven technologies for which a replacement contractor can be engaged
(Weissbrodt 2006) and would not fully compensate parties for all damages resulting from the
failure of a party to perform. Ultimately, participant risk reduces the number of parties that
are willing or qualified to undertake infrastructure projects. Because participant risk interacts
with all other risk, the relationships are not presented in a diagram.
4.4.12 Governance Risk
Governance risk is not one of the traditional infrastructure finance risk categories. It
is defined here as the risk that the institutional structure negotiated by the project participants
will not be adequate to manage the project successfully. This is closely related to participant
risk, although the focus is on the capacity of the intuitional framework governing the
participants, as opposed to the participants themselves.
The concept of governance risk is similar to the concerns considered in the new
institutionalism school concerning the design of institutions to manage public or commons
resources (Ostrom 1990; Dolsak and Ostrom 2003). In a study of the financing of large
engineering projects, Miller and Lessard (2000) recognized the importance of the legal
documentation and relationships necessary for the successful completion of infrastructure
finance projects. The formal legal and informal relationships developed over time among
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project participants are essential to the completion of a project, its operation, and if
threatened by financial difficulty, restructuring (Miller and Lessard 2000).
Climate change poses a fundamental problem for infrastructure finance that no party
may be best positioned to accept and mitigate the risks associated with climate. The necessity
to identify, allocate, and manage risk is the essence of modern infrastructure finance. Thus, by
challenging a fundamental tenet of infrastructure finance, climate change may hinder the
ability of the parties to successfully complete negotiations, or to manage unallocated risks
when unanticipated problems occur. Such a situation can lead to aborted or failed projects and
can undermine the effectiveness of the private sector in infrastructure development.
In the Carbon Disclosure Project, no banks specifically identified governance risk as
a risk that would be magnified by climate change. It is not a traditional risk category.
Governance risk interacts with all other risks, particularly force majeure risk. An increase
in the likelihood of force majeure events increases the unwillingness of any particular party to
accept risk. Climate change potentially increases the complex interactions among risks,
frustrating the clear definition and allocation of risks in contracts among project parties. Because
governance risk interacts with all other risks, the relationships are not presented in a diagram.
4.5 Dynamic Interactions Among Climate Risks and Critical Risks
The interactions among risks are important. Diagram 4.12 below presents the
cumulative interactions among the risks described in this chapter. Participant risk and
governance risk are omitted because all other risks contribute to them.
Diagram 4.12: Potential Climate Risk Interactions
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
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The diagram suggests that the various types of risks increase with climate change.
Multiple interactions occur between many of the risks, with secondary and tertiary effects,
and the patterns become complex.
The Carbon Disclosure Project does not ask respondents to rank climate risks or to
assess the relative consequences of these risks. Although a strict ranking of the importance
of individual risks is beyond the scope of this dissertation, several risks can be isolated as
representing critical nodes or system pressure points. Capital markets, operating costs, and
management capacity risks interact with every other risk. Regulatory, supply, market, and
technology cluster risks also interact with a large number of other risks and each other.
The banks responding to the Carbon Disclosure Survey validated these risks as
critical nodes based on the frequency of banks citing these risks. The banks focused
primarily on capital markets, regulatory, force majeure, operating, supply, and market risks.
Summary results of how frequently the banks identified specific risks is set forth below in
Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Carbon Disclosure Project Banks Frequency of Identification of Climate Risks
Risk Number of Percentage
Responses Total Responses
Capital Markets Risk 27 57%
Environmental Regulation Risk 25 53%
Force Majeure 25 53%
Operating Risk - Cost and Management Capacity 24 51%
Operating Risk - Cost 15 32%
Market Risk 13 28%
Operating Risk - Management Capacity 12 26%
Supply Risk 12 26%
Infrastructure Risk 4 9%
Political Risk 3 6%
Technology Risk 3 6%
Legal Risk 2 4%
Engineering Risk 0 0%
Participant Risk 0 0%
Governance Risk 0 0%
Source: Author's tabulation of banks' responses to first three years of Carbon Disclosure Project.
4.6 Implications for Financing Carbon Neutral Infrastructure
The cumulative increase in risk reflected in the financial aspects of infrastructure
development can be expected to cause cost increases, delay and greater uncertainty in the
planning and development of carbon neutral infrastructure.
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To illustrate this, Climate Risk Assessment Matrix risks are grouped and presented
below as follows: capital markets risks, regulatory and political risks, operating risks
(management capacity and operating cost), supply risk, new technology risk, and the
remaining risks as "other climate-sensitive risks". No effort is made to assign a relative
weight to these risks in this dissertation, although this could be a worthwhile area of research
with respect to particular technologies. Diagram 4.13 below illustrates how these risks
potentially affect the finance and development of infrastructure.
Diagram 4.13: Risks and Carbon Neutral Technology and Infrastructure
Other Climate-Sensitive
Risk
Operatng Cost
Risk
Managment apital Marke
Capacit Risk Risks
Source: Author's review of literature. See main text for description.
Capital markets risks and operating risks generally decrease the availability of capital
to both clean and dirty technologies. Thus, increases in these risks are depicted as having a
negative influence on both clean and dirty technologies. However, because new technologies
do not have as well developed operating and cost structures compared to established
infrastructure, capital markets risks might affect new technology more profoundly than
established technology.
Regulatory risk generally favors development and adoption of comparatively cleaner
technologies, and decreases the adoption of older less environmental technologies. Until
policy makers provide guidance as to the details of a policy, however, uncertainty may chill
investment in clean technology, slowing its adoption. Similarly, political risk generally
favors new technologies because political risk issues are closely associated with dependence
upon petroleum. Accordingly, these risks are depicted as increasing the stock of capital for
clean technology and decreasing the stock of capital for dirty technology.
New technology risks favor established technology and discourage adoption of
comparatively cleaner technologies that do not yet possess a proven commercial record.
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Accordingly, new technology risks are depicted as increasing the stock of capital for dirty
technology and decreasing the stock of capital for clean technology.
Supply risks are complex and do not consistently favor either clean or dirty
technology. Supply risks are therefore presented in Diagram 4.13 with specific technologies
or commodities. With respect to supply of silicon, platinum or wind turbine components
(composite materials and gear boxes), supply risk acts as a potential constraint on clean
technology, limiting the sector's ability to absorb new capital. With respect to the supply of
oil and gas, supply risk increases the supply of capital to new technologies.
However, supply risks associated with oil and gas also increase the supply of capital
to oil and gas industries. This is because these are essential commodities to operate existing
infrastructure. Substitution in the near term is not a practicable option. In addition, supply
risk of oil and gas also increase capital to coal-based infrastructure. Because coal is abundant
and cheap, energy supply risks in general will increase capital to coal technology. Therefore,
supply risk has an ambiguous effect on technology adoption and emissions.
The remaining risks are consolidated as "Other Climate-Sensitive Risks". This
includes force majeure, governance, participant, and legal risk. These risks are consolidated
because they contribute to the overall level of risk. Thus, the general category "Other
Climate-Sensitive Risks" is depicted as increasing the critical capital market risks, operating
cost risk, and management capacity risk, which may delay capital flows generally.
While the presentation of risks is clearly a simplification of reality, these risks suggest
that specific risks will influence technology adoption differently. For example, market risks
associated with changes in demand for energy or increases in efficiency could affect the
relative competitiveness of, and investment in, clean or dirty technologies, with the final
result depending upon how specific technologies benefit from these changes. The dynamic
analysis of these risks suggest that the financing process will be subject to various risks
during the next several decades that can be expected to slowdown the adoption of clean
technologies. As demonstrated in this chapter, climate change will increase various disparate
risks, which will affect the development, finance and operation of infrastructure. The
primary effects are greater uncertainty, delay in technology implementation, and increasing
regulatory, capital markets, supply, and operating risks. If there is a significant perceived
increase in uninsured catastrophic risk (force majeure risk as defined in the Climate Risk
Assessment Matrix), the analysis suggests there will be increasing difficulty in allocating this
risk, increasing participant and governance risks. The aggregate effect of the increase in
risks due to climate change is to create friction impeding the efficient operation of markets
for purposes of achieving sustainability goals.
If these risks cannot be managed, and the delays caused to carbon neutral technology
and infrastructure adoption are significant, then these risks could potentially reduce capital to
infrastructure development in general, including carbon neutral infrastructure. This could
impair the private sector's efforts to develop carbon neutral infrastructure on a meaningful
scale within this century.
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4.7 Summary of Analysis and Results
This chapter developed a Climate Risk Assessment Matrix that is based on the
traditional categorization of risk used in the infrastructure finance and development field.
The Climate Risk Assessment Matrix modifies the traditional conceptualization and
categorization of risks in order to show how climate can affect infrastructure investment
decisions. Several traditional categories were divided and redefined, and additional
categories of risk were identified to give greater visibility to climate-sensitive risks.
Responses of banks and insurance companies to the Carbon Disclosure Project show that the
Climate Risk Assessment Matrix is a robust representation of the perceived risks posed by
climate change to infrastructure development.
The Climate Risk Assessment Matrix has applications for practitioners in the
infrastructure development field and for policy analysis. For financial planning and
investment, the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix is intended to give greater visibility to the
effects of climate on business risk in order to better identify, and where possible, mitigate
these risks. Chapter 5 further develops the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix in its analysis of
the private sector's capacity to manage these risks through private contractual methods.
For purposes of policy analysis, the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix suggests various
transmission mechanisms through which climate risks may potentially impair the capacity of
the private sector to adapt infrastructure. These risks should be studied further and
considered in policy analysis.
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5 Private Contractual Methods to Mitigate Climate Risks
This chapter addresses the question: "To what extent can private contractual methods
mitigate risks posed by climate change?"
Private contractual methods provide the private sector with important tools to manage
risk, thereby reducing the potential for market failure, without the need for assistance from
government. This chapter evaluates the ability of several important contractual methods to
manage risks that will be exacerbated by climate change, principally supply risk, market risk,
regulatory risk and force majeure risk.
This chapter evaluates the following kinds of risk management methods:
1. Private Insurance
2. Commodities Derivatives
3. Weather Derivatives
4. Carbon Offsets
5. Catastrophe Bonds
These methods were selected for analysis because they are among the most
commonly used risk management instruments and are available in standard form. As a
result, these instruments involve lower transaction costs and are more widely available to
firms, in comparison to highly negotiated agreements.
Each type of contract is evaluated based on the following six criteria: (a) scope of
risk covered, (b) geographic coverage, (c) contract duration, (d) availability, (e) price, and
(f) market capacity. Based on these criteria, each instrument is then assessed with respect
to its potential for addressing risks associated with climate change.
It is important to note that these risk management methods are perhaps the most
important segments of a larger risk management market. While each instrument is distinct
and mitigates risk differently,12 there is also growing convergence among the instruments
described in this chapter (Banks and Bortniker 2002). Increasingly, these instruments are
used as substitutes for each other or in combination with each other. Further, in the cases of
insurance, weather derivatives, and catastrophe bonds, they are priced in relation to each
other for similar risks, and using similar models. Importantly, the convergence should yield
deeper, more transparent, and more competitive markets for risk coverage.
12 Private insurance and catastrophe bonds shift the risk of loss from one party to another
party in exchange for a premium. Derivatives shift the risk of an event occurring, but often
with the purpose of providing both parties with smoother, more predictable earnings patterns,
and sometimes without the exchange of money until the end of the contract. Carbon offsets
are created by reducing emissions of pollutants and are traded or used to meet regulatory
obligations.
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The evidence presented in this chapter shows that these risk management methods are
currently subject to significant limitations in their ability to address the risks of long-term
climate change. In each of the categories described above (scope of risks covered,
geographic coverage, contract duration, availability, price, and market capacity), these
instruments are shown to fall short in a number of respects that could limit the capacity of
these instruments to address risks presented by climate change.
The evaluation of these contractual methods completes the analysis conceptualized in
the Climate Risk Assessment Matrix presented in simplified form in Appendix A to this
dissertation. This analysis involved the identification of specifics risks, the selection of
instruments or methods to mitigate these risks, and the evaluation of these methods based on
criteria designed to ascertain their ability to address long-term climate risk.
This chapter first explains the importance of these risk management techniques for
infrastructure finance, provides an overview of the results of this chapter's evaluation of the
capacity of these instruments to address climate change risks, and introduces the risk
management survey conducted for this dissertation and explains its methodology. Next, the
chapter analyzes each of the risk management methods based on the six criteria identified
above. The chapter concludes by assessing the ability of these risk management methods to
address the risks associated with long-term climate change. This chapter further develops the
Climate Risk Assessment Matrix and uses the matrix to graphically show the results of the
evaluation of risk management instruments.
5.1 Importance of Risk Management in Infrastructure Finance
Infrastructure projects involve long-term risk. Infrastructure projects are capital
intensive and typically require several decades to recover costs. Over these long time
periods, project sponsors and lenders will be exposed to changing market, supply, and
regulatory conditions. Lenders will typically require project sponsors to hedge project risks
in return for a lower cost of funding (Tinsley 2000; Ali and Yano 2004).
The tenor of debt in infrastructure projects illustrates the risk exposure of lenders.
Table 5.1 below summarizes the tenors of the 487 infrastructure financings completed in
2005. These 487 projects were financed with 808 separate tranches of debt totaling almost
$175 billion. These debt tranches included bridge loans, term loans, construction loans,
revolving credit, and bonds.
Table 5.1: Debt Tenor for Infrastructure Finance Projects Completed in 2005
Debt
Tenor 0-2 3-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50+
(years)
Number
of 53 100 212 181 133 109 15 4 1
Tranches
Source: Dealogic (2006b).
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For 2005, 55% of infrastructure debt tranches have tenors of 10 years or more, and
16% of the tranches have tenors of 20 years or more. The shortest tenor was 3 months and
the longest tenor was 50 years 11 months. The median tranche tenor was 10 years 6 months.
The average project debt was $359 million. The largest tranche was $8.1 billion and the
smallest was $4 million (Dealogic 2006b).
Each project typically combines several debt tranches. For example, a project
financing may involve a short-term construction loan combined with a longer tenor term loan
or credit facility. Thus, a high percentage of the 487 projects potentially involve a tranche
with tenor of greater than 10 years. With debt tenor commonly exceeding a decade and the
average amount of debt over $350 million, lenders and project sponsors are exposed to
substantial risk for prolonged periods of time. In light of the amounts and tenors of capital at
risk, the use of risk management instruments by project sponsors and lenders has become
increasingly important.
5.2 Evaluation of Risk Management Instruments in Light of Climate Change
As discussed in Chapter 4, climate change increases the magnitude of infrastructure
finance risks in such areas as market risk, supply risk, regulatory risk, and capital markets
risks. Significantly, climate change could adversely affect infrastructure now being built
within the "payback" period required to recover debt and return on investment. Thus, lenders
and project sponsors that are currently building projects that require several decades to
recover debt and equity and have a useful life of over half a century should consider risks
posed by climate change in their investment and risk management decisions.
It is not clear that current risk management instruments will be available or adequate
to address future climate change risks. Accordingly, this chapter evaluates several common
risk management instruments based on criteria designed to asses the ability of these methods
to provide a practical solution to the problem of mitigating climate change risks.
These contracts are commonly used to address market, supply, operating, regulatory,
and force majeure risks, as set forth in the table below.
Table 5.2: Third Party Contractual Methods to Address Project Risk
Risk Risk Mitigation Contract
Force Majeure Risk Private Insurance
Supply Risk Commodities or Weather Derivatives
Market Risk Commodities or Weather Derivatives
Operating Risk - Cost Commodities or Weather Derivatives
Environmental - Regulatory Risk Carbon Offsets
Force Majeure Risk Catastrophe Bonds
Source: Adapted from Tinsley (2000); Element Re (2002); European Climate Exchange(2006).
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The Climate Risk Assessment Matrix illustrates graphically the relationship between
specific risks and climate risk management instruments. Figure 5.1 shows that several major
risk categories are covered by one or two kinds of risk management instruments surveyed in
this chapter. However, no risk category is covered by more than two types of risk
management instrument, and all of the risk management instruments are limited to covering a
few categories of risks.
Figure 5.1: Climate Risk Assessment Matrix - Risks Covered
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Importantly, these contractual methods do not address all of the infrastructure project
risks identified in Chapter 4. For example, as reflected in Figure 5.1, none of these
instruments address new technology risk. Table 5.3 presents a summary of other important
risks that are not addressed by the risk management methods covered in this chapter.
In many cases, where no standardized risk management contract is available to cover
a particular risk, project risks are typically allocated to the project parties in the project
documents. As noted, risks that are usually allocated to a project party in project documents
are not considered here because the allocation of these risks will be specific to the parties and
the transaction. This chapter examines risks that are often allocated to a third party using
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standard contracts because none of the project parties are well positioned to accept and
mitigate these risks.
Table 5.3: Other Risks Not Covered by Risk Management Instruments
Risk Risk Mitigation Methods
Technology Risk Project Documentation
Engineering Risk Technology Selection
Contractor Selection
Operating Risk - Project Documentation
Management
Infrastructure Risk Project Documentation
Political Risk Public Insurance
Participant Risk Project Documents
Performance Bonds
Capital Markets Risks Derivatives
Diversification
Structured Finance
Legal Risk Project Documents
Governance Risk Project Documents
Sources: Adapted from Tinsley (2000); Hoffman (2001).
Figure 5.2 below summarizes the results of the evaluation of these risk management
instruments based on the remaining criteria of geographic coverage, contract duration,
availability, price and market capacity. With respect to all of these evaluation criteria, these
instruments are subject to limitations in addressing the longer term risks associated with
climate change. Notably, evidence of the short duration and increasing prices for risk
coverage instruments suggest that traditional risk management methods as presently
structured have limited capacity to address climate change risks.
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Figure 5.2: Climate Risk Assessment Matrix - Other Evaluation Criteria
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The basis for the evaluations summarized in Figure 5.2 is an analysis of public and
private data sets, the models used to design and price these contractual instruments, and a
survey of industry participants in the insurance, derivatives, carbon offsets, and catastrophe
bond markets. We now turn to a summary of the survey methodology and results, and then
to the evaluation of each specific risk management instrument.
5.3 Summary of Risk Management Survey Methodology and Results
In connection with this dissertation, the author conducted surveys of professionals in
the insurance, derivatives, carbon offsets, and insurance-linked securities markets. Appendix
B of this dissertation sets forth a list of firms and other market participants that were
contacted in connection with the survey, and those that responded. Separate surveys were
used for insurance markets and derivatives markets.
The insurance survey requested information about primary property and business
interruption insurance, reinsurance, and catastrophe bonds. The survey focused on insurance
and reinsurance companies, and brokerage firms, but also included other market participants
including credit rating agencies, state insurance regulators, insurance industry associations,
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insurance risk analysis firms, and consultants to the insurance industry. A total of twenty-
nine organizations were contacted, twenty of which participated in the survey for a response
rate of 69%. The form of insurance survey is set forth in Appendix C of this dissertation.
The derivatives survey requested information for several commodities important to
the energy sector (oil, gas, coal, electricity, platinum), weather derivatives, European Union
greenhouse gas emissions allowances, and Clean Development Mechanism certified
emissions reductions certificates. The survey was designed to elicit information about
general market conditions and over-the-counter market transactions ("OTC") that may not be
captured in data provided by the exchanges.'3 The survey focused on brokers, but also
included several utilities and energy companies that trade for their own account, exchange
officials, and risk analysis companies that provide services to the derivatives industry.
Twenty-six organizations were contacted, eighteen of which participated in the survey for a
response rate of 69%. Of the eighteen survey participants, sixteen conduct derivatives
brokerage or trading operations. Of the sixteen brokerage and trading organizations, nine
firms described their commodities derivatives activities, six firms described their weather
derivatives activities, and seven firms described their greenhouse gas emissions trading and
Clean Development Mechanism activities. The form of derivatives survey is set forth in
Appendix D of this dissertation.
The most striking survey result is the short-term nature of risk markets. Most risk
markets focus on risk coverage for a period of one year or less. In the insurance market,
insurance coverage is arranged almost exclusively on a one-year basis. The derivatives
survey confirms that although longer-term contracts are available, most trades are for
contracts that expire within one year. The carbon offsets market similarly focuses primarily
on short-term timeframes, although transactions may extend to the full duration of the Kyoto
Protocol arrangement. Catastrophe bond markets, the notable exception, extend risk
coverage to a little over three years on average.
The short-term focus of the risk markets contrast to infrastructure lending markets,
which commonly feature tenors of ten to thirty years or more. The gaps in risk coverage in
each of the risk management methods are examined in the sections below.
5.4 Private Insurance
Insurance is an essential component of financing infrastructure. Lenders and
customers entering into long-term agreements with project companies will require that
insurance be procured and maintained by the project company, construction company, and
13 The OTC market comprises transactions that are privately negotiated, typically using an
International Swaps and Derivatives Association form agreement modified to the
requirements of the parties. The OTC market represents a substantial portion of the
derivatives market. OTC transactions are often cleared through an exchange. Contracts that
are cleared though an exchange may or may not be reflected in data provided by the
exchange; contracts that are not cleared though an exchange will not be reflected in exchange
data.
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project operator (Hoffman 2001; Tinsley 2000). Inability to obtain insurance would be a
significant impediment to infrastructure finance and development (Safran 2006).
This section covers both primary insurance and reinsurance, focusing primarily on the
U.S. market. Particular attention is devoted to the Gulf of Mexico following the 2004 and
2005 hurricane seasons because this market features highly climate-sensitive insurance risks.
This section evaluates property and casualty insurance and reinsurance based on the
six criteria relating to the scope of risk coverage, geographic coverage, contract duration,
availability, price, and market capacity. The section concludes by assessing the prospects for
insurance to address risks posed by climate change.
Additional information about the property and casualty insurance and reinsurance
industry is located in Chapter 6 in the insurance case study.
The research in this section includes results of a survey of twenty insurance industry
participants, primarily comprising insurance and reinsurance companies, and brokerage
firms, but also credit rating agencies, state insurance regulators, insurance industry
associations, and insurance risk analysis firms.
5.4.1 Scope of Risk Coverage
Property and casualty insurance typically covers losses due to natural catastrophic
events such as flood, wind, earthquake, and fire. Coverage may compensate policyholders
for damage to property, loss of revenues due to business interruption, and loss of life or
injury. Private insurance in the United States typically excludes flood coverage, which is
available through the U.S. government's National Flood Insurance Program.
In response to storms and other catastrophic events in the North Atlantic Basin, the
scope of insurance coverage has been curtailed, particularly in coastal communities along the
East Coast and Gulf Coast of the United States. Following the 2005 hurricane season, Marsh
(2005) reported that insurers are considering the following contractual provisions to limit
their exposure to hurricane and storm risk in the Gulf of Mexico:
*Sub-limits for Gulf of Mexico exposure;
*Exclude Gulf of Mexico from coverage;
*Exclude Gulf of Mexico oil and gas platforms built prior to certain date;
*Exclude business interruption coverage for Gulf of Mexico properties;
SIncrease record retention period and waiting period for business interruption coverage;
*Require complete schedule of all covered Gulf of Mexico property; and
*Exclude "windstorm" coverage in Gulf of Mexico region.
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5.4.2 Geographic Coverage
Insurance is the most common and widely available risk management instrument in
terms of geographic coverage. Global insurers underwrite policies on every continent of the
world. However, insurance coverage is uneven and markets concentrate on developed and
emerging economies. In many developing countries, insurance and reinsurance markets are
underdeveloped (Varangis et al. 2002).
Importantly, insurance coverage may be curtailed or prohibitively priced in locations
where insurance companies are seeking to reduce their exposure. As described in section
5.4.4, hurricane activity in the Gulf of Mexico in 1992, 2004 and 2005 has led to successive
curtailment of insurance in this region. In addition, the survey revealed that some foreign
insurers are reducing their risk to the United States in general due to risks associated with
terrorism.
5.4.3 Contract Duration
Based upon a survey of twenty insurance industry participants, 100% of respondents
reported that primary property and business interruption insurance and reinsurance are
generally underwritten on a one-year basis. Where policies are written for longer contract
durations, these policies typically include a one-year price reset and provisions allowing the
insurer to withdraw coverage. Thus, insurance coverage is only available one year at a time.
The survey further revealed that increasing risk associated with insurance
underwriting, regulatory issues, and increasing demand for insurance have contributed to the
short-term nature of insurance markets.
5.4.4 Availability
Insurance is one of the most commonly available risk management instruments.
However, catastrophic losses have caused insurance companies to withdraw insurance
coverage altogether for certain areas and kinds of risks.
Concerns that hurricanes could become more commonplace farther north along the
U.S. East Coast have caused insurance companies to withdraw coverage in coastal
communities from the Gulf of Mexico as far north as Cape Cod and Long Island (Adams
2006). Since 2004, private insurers have generally eliminated coverage on Cape Cod for
homes over $1 million and many insurers have discontinued coverage altogether. Insurers
that remained in the market increased prices by as much as 200% in 2006. Massachusetts's
state-sponsored insurance plan, which provides insurance as a last resort where private
insurance is unavailable, reports that it now serves approximately one-third of the market,
increasing its coverage from 6,000 Cape Cod homes in 2000 to 43,000 homes in 2006(Smythe 2006).
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Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, private insurers in the State of Florida
withdrew coverage or increased prices, forcing many homeowners to seek coverage from
Florida's state-sponsored insurance program. Further, onshore insurance has been largely
unavailable for utilities in the State of Florida since Hurricane Andrew (Edison Electric
Institute 2005). In December 1995, Florida's public property and casualty underwriting
association had 849,271 policyholders following the 1992 hurricane season; by February
2002, the number had significantly dropped to 116,027 as private insurers reentered the
market for non-wind risks (Hartwig 2002). However, the Florida Windstorm Underwriting
Association still provided wind coverage to 500,000 policyholders as of 2002, due to the
continuing difficulty of obtaining private windstorm coverage in the state (Hartwig 2002).
5.4.5 Price
The price of insurance coverage is influenced by a variety of factors, including
assessment of risks, market conditions (supply and demand), and general price levels.
Insurance companies employ actuarial models to statistically quantify their risks over
a large number of policies based on an assessment of the probability of perils. The risk of
loss due to catastrophic events are estimated using detailed historic weather data,
demographic data, building codes, and engineering data specific to a particular zip code
(Muir-Wood 2006; Siner 2006). Models incorporate future expectations using demographic
and engineering trends, and recently, scientific trends concerning changes in climate (Siner
2006). These models produce a loss exceedance curve, which shows the expected amount of
insured losses from a particular risk and its estimated probability of occurrence. The
exceedance probability is the estimated likelihood that a loss will occur at or greater than a
specified level of loss.
During the past thirty-five years, higher population density and inflation in the cost of
building materials and repair services have significantly increased the magnitude of insured
losses resulting from catastrophic events. According to AIR Worldwide, a leading
catastrophe modeling firm, the costs of building materials have increased 40% in the United
States over the past decade. AIR Worldwide predicts that catastrophe losses will "double
about every 10 years due to increases in the numbers and values of properties at risk" (ISO
2006a).
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Figure 5.3: Global Catastrophic Losses, 1970-2005
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The increasing magnitude of insurance losses has caused increases in the cost of U.S.
property and casualty insurance and reinsurance. Since 1990, the cost of reinsurance has
increased following major catastrophic events. Figure 5.4 below shows large increases occurring
following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and the 2005
hurricane season. Since 1990, U.S. catastrophe reinsurance rates have more than tripled.
Figure 5.4: U.S. Catastrophe Reinsurance Price Indices, 1984-Q1 2006
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2000 2005
Following the 2005 hurricane season, reinsurance rates in the Gulf of Mexico for
offshore energy risks are expected to increase by as much as 300% to 400%; while
reinsurance rates for onshore energy facilities are expected to increase from 10% to 30%
(Frank Crystal 2006). Reinsurance prices for onshore property and casualty, primarily for
homeowners, are expected to increase 30% to 100% (Binnun 2006). A number of survey
respondents confirmed that these estimated cost increases are consistent with their
observations of the market.
Significantly, as a result of hurricane activity during the past fifteen years, offshore
energy companies have large retention rates and thus self-insure a large percentage of their
Gulf of Mexico facilities due partly to insurance prices and unwillingness of insurance
companies to underwrite these risks (Hartwig 2006). Similar to the latest premium increases
following Hurricane Katrina, insurance companies increased premiums and withdrew
coverage for onshore utilities following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Edison Electric Institute
2005).
Analysis of pre- and post-Katrina reinsurance rates reveals that reinsurance prices
increased initially following Hurricane Katrina, and then continued to increase in subsequent
months. Prices for reinsurance in Florida and the U.S. increased on average by 120% and
126%, respectively, by April 2006. Some layers of risk have experienced price increases as
high as 178% for these reinsurance markets (Lane and Beckwith 2006).
Table 5.4: Pre- and Post-Katrina Reinsurance Price Changes
% Changes in ILW Premiums 111106 and 411106 over Pre Katrina 2005
California EarthFlorida Wind US All Natural Perils Quake Nationwide Quake Average by Layer
ILW 1/1/OE 4/1/06 1/1/06 4/1/06 1/1/06 4/1/06 1/1/06 4/1 /06 1/1/06 4/1/06
Strike over pre-K over pre-K over pre-K over pre-K over pre-K over pre-K over pre-K over pre-K over pre-K over pre-K05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05
$5.0 19% 54% 33% 9% 43% 3% 24% 16%
$10.0 27% 83% 26% 85% 13% 75% 8% 59% 18% 76%
$12.5 33% 87% 23% 105% 18% 76% 5% 57% 20% 81%
$15.0 38% 92% 24% 111% 25% 81% 3% 52% 23% 84%
$20.0 32% 132% 0% 133% 23% 100% 12% 85% 16% 112%
$25.0 39% 164% -4% 124% 22% 89% 20% 80% 19% 114%
$30.0 42% 176% -15% 130% 28% 49% 22% 40% 19% 99%
$40.0 56% 178% 0% 157% 29% 44% 29% 43% 28% 105%
$50.0 38% 113% 0% 160% 25% 42% 42% 50% 26% 91%
Average 36% 120% 10% 126% 21% 66% 16% 54% 21% 92%
Source: Lane and Beckwith (2006).
Reinsurance rates are expected to further increase in response to revisions in
catastrophe models used to price insurance. The revised models incorporate expectations
regarding future hurricane activity in the Gulf Coast and Caribbean, European windstorm,
and California earthquake activity (Siner 2006; Muir-Wood 2006). The revised models
reflect increased probability of catastrophic events occurring in high-risk areas by as much as
30% to 60% (Martucci 2006).
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5.4.6 Market Capacity
The capacity of insurance markets to continue to absorb increasing amounts of
catastrophic risk is unclear. The survey conducted in connection with this dissertation
revealed that it is subject to debate within the industry.
The capacity of insurance companies to underwrite risk is influenced by a number of
factors, including premium levels, underwriting losses, investment returns, surplus,
reinsurance markets, regulations, and the ability of the insurance industry to raise capital.
Insurance company earnings are derived from underwriting premiums and investment
profits. Both U.S. primary insurance and reinsurance companies have generally incurred
losses on account of underwriting activity; thus, investment profits account for most
insurance company profits. Since 1975 to 2005, U.S. insurance companies incurred losses
due to underwriting activities every year except in 1977, 1978 and 2004. From 1991 to 2005,
U.S. property and casualty insurers incurred underwriting losses of approximately $298
billion, while net income after taxes during the same period was $313 billion, resulting from
investment activity (Insurance Information Institute 2006a).
The important role of investment returns in supporting the property and casualty
industry suggests that future industry capacity to underwrite risk depends in part upon
investment returns in debt and equity markets.
In 2005, the U.S. property and casualty industry suffered $57.7 billion of onshore
insured catastrophic losses. Foreign reinsurance and other arrangements absorbed $27-32
billion of these losses or about 57-67% (Insurance Information Institute 2006a).
Despite these record losses, policyholder surplus, a measure of the net worth of the
industry, reached a record $427 billion at the end of 2005 (Insurance Information Institute
2006a). In addition, existing and start-up insurance companies have announced plans to raise
an additional $19 billion in capital (Insurance Information Institute 2006a). The record
policyholder surplus, the ability of the insurance industry to pay all claims for U.S.
catastrophic losses, and its ability to attract new capital following the 2005 hurricane losses
suggest that the industry is adequately capitalized.
At the same time that the industry is experiencing high surplus levels, U.S. insurance
and reinsurance companies are curtailing coverage and raising prices for catastrophic events
in high-risk areas. The survey revealed differences of opinion concerning whether market
conditions reflect inadequate capacity or unwillingness to pay a fair price for providing risk
coverage.
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Figure 5.5: U.S. P&C Policyholder Surplus (US$ billions), 1975-2005
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Source: Insurance Information Institute (2006a). Note: 2005 figures are estimated.
According to one view, the insurance industry occasionally experiences periods of
inadequate capacity. Prior to September 11, 2001, the reinsurance market was estimated to lack
approximately $30-55 billion of capacity to meet demand for events that causes $60 to $80
billion in losses (Ganapati, et al. 1999). The survey revealed that following the 2005 hurricane
season, some believed that a global shortage of reinsurance developed for certain risks in certain
areas. For example, in North America, earthquake reinsurance for California and hurricane
cover for the Gulf of Mexico region experienced significant shortages (Loughlin 2006).
The Reinsurance Association of America and the Association of Bermuda Insurers
and Reinsurers conducted a survey of their members regarding supply and demand of
property reinsurance following the January 2006 reinsurance negotiations, during which
approximately 50% of reinsurance contracts were renegotiated. The 2006 survey received
nine responses representing a 32% response rate. The results suggest a potential gap of
approximately $5 billion in reinsurance supply and demand for U.S. catastrophic risks based
on a comparison of the mean response of reinsurance sought and purchased. The dollar value
of reinsurance coverage sought versus actually purchased was broad, which might further
suggest that less insurance was available at acceptable prices than would otherwise be
demanded. Survey respondents estimated that approximately $42 billion (mean response) of
reinsurance coverage would attach in the event of a major U.S. catastrophe. This coverage is
augmented by other forms of reinsurance such as catastrophe bonds (RAA/ABIR 2006).
Table 5.5: RAAIABIR Property Reinsurance Survey Results (US$ billions), 2006
Median Mean Range
Reinsurance Sought 38.5 36 15-62.5
Reinsurance Purchased 35 31.5 12.5-47.5
Maximum excess of loss reinsurance
coverage that would attach
Source: RAA/ABIR (2006).
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Others expressed the view that adequate reinsurance capacity almost always exists
and that pricing is the primary issue. Following a major catastrophe, catastrophe reinsurance
coverage can be extremely expensive, and in the highly regulated U.S. retail insurance
market, there is no certainty that insurers will be able to pass the increased cost of
reinsurance on to customers (Hartwig 2006). As a result, insurance companies may be
unwilling to pay the price demanded by reinsurance companies for reinsurance coverage. In
turn, insurance companies have less capacity to underwrite primary insurance policies.
This dissertation's survey confirmed that a number of insurance and reinsurance
companies are curtailing coverage in the Gulf of Mexico in order to reduce their exposure to
the region. Some survey respondents noted that revised catastrophic loss models and concern
over credit rating agency reviews may be partly responsible for the curtailment. According
to Standard & Poor's, revised models estimate that the probability of catastrophic events
occurring in high-risk areas has increased by 30% to 60% (Martucci 2006). Various survey
respondents identified the lack of support by regulators to approve premium increases as a
significant cause of insurance curtailment. A number of European industry participants
further noted that the fragmented nature of state insurance regulation in the United States and
the local political pressures that prevent pricing risk fairly have caused them to reduce
exposure to the U.S. market.
According to the Florida State Office of Insurance Regulation, demand for
reinsurance has increased by 120% from 2005, yet supply of reinsurance has contracted to
80% of 2005 levels, resulting in a substantial gap (Binnun 2006). Approximately fifteen
primary insurance companies have withdrawn or curtailed insurance coverage in Florida
following the 2005 season (Binnun 2006; Spudeck 2006). Although smaller regional
companies have entered the state, regulators expressed concern that they may be forced to
limit the underwriting activity of these smaller insurers due to concerns over their ability to
pay claims, thereby leading to a further shortage in primary coverage (Binnun 2006).
The Gulf of Mexico insurance market has experienced shortage before the 2004 and
2005 hurricane seasons. Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, eleven insurance companies
became insolvent as a result of insured losses in the region (Hartwig 2005). Companies that
remained in the region formed separately incorporated regional companies to limit their
exposure to the region (Binnun 2006). Insurance companies withdrew insurance from utility
transmission and distribution assets in the Gulf Coast area altogether (Edison Electric
Institute 2005).
Significantly, the contraction of the insurance market in the Gulf of Mexico is
occurring at a time when public insurance funds have exhausted their reserves. As a result of
the 2005 hurricane season, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, a state-sponsored reserve
fund for large catastrophic events, has exhausted its reserves, and the Citizens Property
Insurance, a state-sponsored company that provides insurance to areas that the private sector
will not cover, has incurred a deficit. Both Florida entities are raising capital through public
bond issuances (Binnun 2006; Bushouse 2006). The National Flood Insurance Program has
similarly exhausted funds allocated to it by Congress (Insurance Journal 2006). State
catastrophe insurance funds in Louisiana and Mississippi are similarly facing financial
difficulties (CERES 2006).
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U.S. property and casualty markets are experiencing a period of record policyholder
surplus, increasing prices, and curtailment of insurance in high-risk areas. The survey
revealed that curtailment is likely occurring because insurers are seeking to reduce their
exposure to high-risk areas motivated by concerns over futures losses and credit ratings.
These factors explain why even in an industry where policy surplus is increasing and insurers
are raising substantial amounts of new capital, market capacity may be limited for high-risk
areas and events.
5.4.7 Prospects for Addressing Climate Change
The short-term nature of insurance markets and the inability to predict weather events
suggest that these markets will not accept climate risk beyond one year in the future. As
such, insurance instruments as currently available have limited ability to address risks posed
by climate change.
To the extent that climate change increases the unpredictability of weather, and
makes weather more destructive by the severity and frequency of catastrophic events, we can
expect insurance companies to continue to respond by increasing prices and limiting
exposure to high-risk areas and perils. For some geographic areas, this may result in local
shortages of insurance, as have already been observed in U.S. coastal areas from the Gulf of
Mexico to as far north as Cape Cod.
The implications of climate change for the insurance market are described in further
detail in Chapter 6 in the case study on the effects of catastrophic events on the insurance
industry.
The summary of survey results for private insurance is set forth in Table 5.6 below.
Table 5.6: Private Property & Casualty Insurance Summary
Criteria Direct Insurance Reinsurance
Scope of Risk Covered Exclusions of flood and Exclusions of flood and
some coastal areas. some coastal areas.
Geographic Coverage Worldwide, except Worldwide, except
undersupply in undersupply in
developing countries. developing countries.
Contract Duration 1 year 1 year
Availability Curtailment in high- Curtailment in high-risk
risk areas. areas.
Price Increases in high-risk Increases of 30% to
areas. 400% in high-risk areas.
Market Capacity Reduced capacity for Reduced capacity for
high risk areas. high risk areas.
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5.5 Commodities Derivatives
This section evaluates commodities derivatives based on the six criteria relating to the
scope of risk coverage, geographic coverage, contract duration, availability, price, and
market capacity. The section concludes by assessing the prospects for commodities
derivatives to address risks posed by climate change. This section focuses on oil, gas,
electricity, and platinum futures contracts. Gold futures contracts are also included in the
survey for comparative purposes. Although gold is not a metal used in energy applications, it
is the most widely traded metal and illustrates the potential capacity of commodities futures
markets.
This section presents results of the derivatives survey relating to commodities
derivatives. Of the sixteen derivatives brokers and dealers surveyed, nine respondents
described their commodities derivatives operations.
5.5.1 Scope of Risk Coverage
Hull (2003) defines a derivative as "a financial instrument whose value depends on
(or derives from) the values of other, more basic underlying variables. Very often the
variables underlying derivates are the prices of traded assets."
Derivatives are therefore intended to hedge the risk of price movements in the
underlying asset. Derivatives are useful for addressing market and supply risks, as well as
operating cost risk more generally.
For example, electricity generators commonly use commodities derivatives to reduce
market and supply risk by entering into contracts to sell electricity and/or buy fuel. A
common trade for an electricity generator is to match a sale of electricity with a purchase of
gas, at prices that provide a profit margin for a portion of their generation. A utility might
seek to execute matched trades in electricity and gas futures to lock in 70-90% of its
generation profit margin for the next year, 60-80% of its profit margin for two years in the
future, and 30-40% of its profit margin for three years or more in the future (Collins 2006).
5.5.2 Geographic Coverage
Derivatives markets can be accessed globally. Because the vast majority of
derivatives contracts are settled financially and do not result in physical delivery of the
underlying commodity, they can be employed by parties anywhere in the world (Tippee
1993). For example, only about 1% of NYMEX metals contracts result in physical delivery
(Karr 2006).
However, to obtain an effective hedge, firms must use a derivative product whose
price changes in a manner that correlates strongly with the risk the party is attempting to
hedge. Some contracts cover only certain geographic areas. For example, the great variety
of crude oil contracts makes this market a truly global market. In contrast, New York
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Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) natural gas futures contracts are settled based on continental
U.S. prices at Henry Hub in Texas and may be unsuitable for firms in other places.
Similarly, electricity futures contracts are presently only available for the United States and
Europe. Thus, firms are subject to constraints based on the availability of contacts; if there is
no contract for the desired asset, the firm must construct an approximate hedge based on
substitute assets, which may provide less risk coverage or require more cost and effort to
maintain the hedge.
5.5.3 Contract Duration
The contract durations for commodities derivatives contracts are relatively short-term.
Crude oil, natural gas, and gold futures contracts have expiration dates four to six years in the
future. Heating oil and platinum futures contracts have expiration dates a year to a year and a
half in the future.
The table below shows the open interest in selected commodities futures contracts
traded over the NYMEX at the close of business on April 19, 2006. Open interest is an
important measure of liquidity in a market. Open interest is the total number of long
positions outstanding in a futures contract, which is equal to the number of short positions.
Outstanding contracts are those that have not expired, been exercised, or fulfilled by delivery
(Hull 2003).
Table 5.7: Selected NYMEX Futures Contracts Open Interest, April 2006
Open Interest
(as a percentage of total open interest)
90 days 90 days 1-2 2-3 3+
Total Longest - 1 year year year yearsCommodity Open Duration
Interest May to August May May May
July 2006 2006 to 2007 to 2008 to 2009 to
April April April end
2007 2008 2009
Light Sweet 1,002,719 Dec 2012 44.6% 28.1% 13.7% 5.2% 8.4%Crude Oil
Heating Oil 174,402 Oct 2007 67.4% 30.9% 1.7% N/A N/A
Natural Gas 710,064 Dec 2011 23.0% 39.9% 19.2% 8.2% 9.6%
Platinum 9,559 Jan 2007 1% 99% N/A N/A N/A
Gold 353,757 Dec 2010 71.7% 19.1% 6.6% 1.7% 0.8%
Source: New York Mercantile Exchange, as of close of market on April 19, 2006.
Despite the availability of multi-year contracts for some of these contracts, the
majority of open interest occurs within 90 days or the upcoming season in the case of heating
oil, and over 90% of open interest is within three years or less for all these commodities.
Thus, exchange-traded futures markets are liquid primarily in short-term time frames.
143
The volume of open interest in these contracts also affects their overall liquidity. The
crude oil and natural gas markets are many times larger than all other markets. The market
for platinum, a metal important for the production of catalytic converters and fuel cells, is
small by comparison.
The survey conducted in connection with this dissertation surveyed derivatives
traders and brokers at sixteen firms; nine firms described their trades in commodities
derivatives. The survey captured OTC trades that would not be reflected in the above
exchange-traded data. Because OTC contracts are privately negotiated, these contracts may
extend beyond the duration of the standardized exchange-traded contracts.
The survey results show that longer duration trades do occur in the OTC market.
However, the survey confirms that the OTC markets follow the same short-term patterns that
occur in the exchange-traded market. Like the exchange-traded futures market, the vast
majority of OTC trades are for contracts with durations within one year. The notable
exception is coal, which has tended to be a longer-term market. However, deregulation and
the expiration of longer-term supply contracts is causing coal to move towards a shorter-term
market (Gottlieb 1998). The table below summarizes the results of the surveys.
Table 5.8: Commodities Derivative Survey Results
Longest % % % % TradeKnown Trade Trade % Trade Trade
Commodity Duration 90 days 90 days- 1-3 years 3-10 10+
(years) or Less 1 Year years years
Oil 10 50-90 10-50 0-30 0-20 0
Gas 20 40 30 30 Few Few
Coal 20+ 0 40-50 30-55 0-20 Few
Electricity 10+ 50-60 20-25 10-20 5 0
Platinum 3 60-75 15-40 0-10 0 0
Source: Author's survey.
Note: % trades are ranges of all survey responses for each duration period.
In addition to exchange data and survey data, surveys of national banks conducted by
the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency also show that a majority of derivatives held by banks
are short-term in nature, mostly less than one year in duration, and the vast majority less than
three years in duration (U.S. Comptroller of the Currency 2005).
An interview with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange provides an explanation for why
the exchange-traded and OTC markets follow the same short-term trend. The exchange
typically offers standardized contracts for whatever duration the market is interested in trading.
Thus, the dominance of short-term durations in standardized exchange-traded contracts reflects
demand and supply in the overall market including the OTC market (Smith 2006).
Survey responses revealed several explanations for the market's preference for short-
term agreements. Several survey respondents noted that greater price visibility for the
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underlying commodities in the near-term reduces the risk of trading in short-term
agreements. Survey respondents also cited constraints upon a trader or trading firm's ability
to accept long-term risks. Few traders are authorized to take long-term risks that may exceed
their tenure at their firm and could potentially become a long-term financial burden if trades
result in continuing losses over an extended period. From the perspective of the
clearinghouse and its member trading firms, short-term trades are preferable because they
reduce their exposure to their client's credit risk. Exchange members act as primary
guarantors to the clearinghouse for trades it places on behalf of its clients. If a client
defaults, the clearinghouse would make payment and then seek indemnification from the
member trading firm, which would in turn seek payment from its client. If a member of an
exchange defaults, all member firms would then share in the loss pro rata (Lichtenstein 2006;
Yeres and Little 2000). Bankruptcies of prominent derivatives trading firms such as Drexel
Burnham, Barings, and Enron have served to reinforce conservative practice among members
of exchanges to avoid long-term credit exposure, thereby reinforcing the trend towards
shorter-term trades (Lichtenstein 2006; Miller 2006; Zhang 1995).
Credit rating agencies also reinforce the short-term nature of markets because their
ability to assess future credit risk is limited. According to one credit rating agency, it is
difficult to assess the credit risk of a company beyond 3-5 years in the future (Furey 2006).
Because ratings are unavailable beyond this short time frame, private sector firms are
generally unwilling to extend credit for long-term trades.
Finally, the liquidity of the short-term markets reinforces the preference for short-
term contracts. Survey respondents noted that liquidity is essential for speculators. Even for
firms that are engaged in derivatives trading to hedge their positions, liquidity is highly
desirable as hedged positions need to be continuously monitored and changed as necessary.
The survey responses are consistent with the findings of other researchers who have
interviewed officials of oil exporting countries who are potentially positioned to enter into
long-term contracts in commodities derivatives markets. These officials have expressed
reluctance to enter into long-term contracts because these contracts could encumber their
successors and open them to criticism if markets change (Verleger 1993; Daniel 2001).
5.5.4 Availability
Derivatives are traded in standardized contracts on over forty exchanges around the
world (Hull 2003). Derivatives contracts include futures, options (calls and puts), and swap
agreements. Assets underlying these contracts include crude, refined petroleum products(heating oil and gasoline), natural gas, electricity, and precious metals (gold, silver, copper,
aluminum, platinum and palladium). Weather indexes are also increasingly the underlying
variables of derivatives contracts.
Because most derivatives are settled financially and do not result in physical delivery
of the underlying asset (Tippee 1993), they are available to a broad group of end-users.
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5.5.5 Price
This section explains the pricing of futures and options and models the price of a
hypothetical option on a futures contract using Derivagem, a version of the Black-Scholes
model that accompanies Hull (2003). The pricing experiment provides insight regarding the
short-term nature of commodities derivatives markets. It also provides insight into the
potential effects that climate change could have on derivatives markets, depending upon
climate change's effects on the underlying commodities.
Futures are priced based on the current spot price S(t) of the underlying commodity,
discounted into the future at the prevailing risk free interest rate r. The risk free interest rate
reflects the financing cost of the underlying commodity. In practice, futures contract pricing
also reflects future expectations of the price of the commodity, which is reflected in its
current spot price S(t). The value of a futures contract F(t) purchased at time twith maturity
at time Tis expressed as:
F(t) = S(t)- er(Tr-
In contrast to options pricing, a futures contract price does not include a premium for the risk
associated with uncertainty in price movements in the underlying commodity because both
parties remain subject to the risk of commodity movements under these contracts.
Options pricing is based on the Black-Scholes options model. Under the Black-
Scholes model, five factors determine the price of an option: time to contract expiration Tin
years, the right to buy or sell the underlying asset in the future at price K, the current price of
the underlying asset S, the constant risk-free interest rate r, and the historic or implied
(expected) volatility of the underlying asset a (Hull 2003). The equations below are the
Black-Scholes equations for call and put options, respectively:
C(S,T) = SN(d,) - Ke- rTN(d2)
P(S,T) = Ke- rTN(-d 2 ) - SN(-d,)
where
In(SIK) + (r + a 2 / 2)T0=
d2= d, - a-T
and N(x) is the cumulative distribution function for a variable that is normally distributed
with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.0 (Hull 2003).
Options provide the holder with the right but not the obligation to purchase (a call) or
sell (a put) an asset at a predetermined price. An option contract therefore provides certainty
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to the party holding the option and resembles an insurance contract. The party selling the
option is paid a premium in exchange for accepting the risk associated with changes in the
price of the underlying assets. The premium is determined by the duration of the contract
and the volatility of the underlying asset. A longer duration contract offers greater insurance
value. Similarly, greater volatility of the underlying asset also increases the value of the
insurance provided by the option. Finally, the greater the price of the underlying asset, the
greater the potential magnitude of price changes in the underlying asset, which also increases
the value of the insurance feature of an option. Thus, the price of an option increases as
duration, volatility and the price of the underlying asset increases.
Because options contracts are priced based on the expected price movements of an
underlying asset, as opposed to the purchase price of an asset, they are less expensive
compared to futures contracts and they allow the trader to leverage cash assets much more
effectively (Kline 2001). Importantly, because options and futures contracts can be used to
construct a portfolio having the characteristics of either kind of instrument, these instruments
present arbitrage opportunities and their prices move in relation to each other (Hull 2003).
To illustrate how the price of an option is affected by the time to maturity and
volatility, eight scenarios are presented in Table 5.9 below comparing the price of a European
call option on a generic futures contract. Four time frames are compared: 180 days, 1 year, 2
years, and 3 years. These time frames are tested at both 20% and 40% volatility levels for
the underlying asset. All other variables were identical (strike price = 100, current
underlying price = 100, risk-free rate = 5%).
Table 5.9: Options Pricing Comparison - Effects of Duration and Volatility
20% Volatility 40% Volatility
180 Days $5.5 $10.97
1 Year $7.58 $15.08
2 Years $10.18 $20.15
3 Years $11.84 $23.32
Source: Author's calculations using Derivagem software from Hull (2003).
The increase in duration from 180 days to 3 years at 20% volatility produces a 115%
increase in the price of the call option. The differences in the price of the option between different
maturities increases at a similar rate for the option priced at 40% volatility. When volatility
increases from 20% to 40%, the price of the same option doubles in cost for each time to maturity.
Increases in duration and volatility together can dramatically increase the price of
options. For example, an increase from 180 days to 3 years combined with an increase in
volatility from 20% to 40% results in a 324% increase in the cost of the option. The
increased cost of longer-term derivatives, especially in periods of high volatility, will tend to
limit the use of longer-term duration instruments.
In addition to duration and volatility, an increase in the price of the asset underlying
the derivative also increases the cost of the derivatives contract. To illustrate this
relationship, Table 5.10 below compares the price of a European call option on a generic
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futures contract at two different asset price levels. In the first four scenarios, the asset price
and strike price are both set at 100. In the second set of scenarios, the asset price and strike
price are both set at 200. Comparisons are made for maturities at 180 days, 1 year, 2 years,
and 3 years. In all cases, the difference between the strike price and the underlying asset
value is zero; thus there is no difference in the intrinsic value of the option. The risk-free rate
is constant (5%) and volatility is 20% for all scenarios below.
Table 5.10: Options Pricing Comparison - Effects of Inflation of Asset Prices
Asset Price = 100 Asset Price = 200
Strike Price = 100 Strike Price = 200
Volatility = 20% Volatility = 20%
180 Days $5.5 $11.00
1 Year $7.58 $15.15
2 Years $10.18 $20.35
3 Years $11.84 $23.67
Source: Author's calculations using Derivagem software from Hull (2003).
The increase in underlying asset price causes a significant increase in the price of the
option. For all scenarios, doubling the asset price and strike price results in a 100% increase
in the cost of the option. This price increase reflects the model's assumptions that at higher
asset valuations, the same stochastic change in asset value on a percentage basis results in a
larger change in the absolute price of the asset, and thus more risk associated with the
underling asset. In turn, this increases the insurance value of the option contract.
Again, if duration, volatility and price levels increase, the cost of options will increase
dramatically. Table 5.11 below compares the price of options for which the asset price and
strike price have increased from 100 to 200 and volatility has increased from 20% to 40%, for
180 days, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years. The risk-free rate is 5% for both scenarios. Comparing
the 180 day, 20% volatility, price level = 100 instrument to the 3 year, 40% volatility, price
level = 200 instrument, the aggregate increase in the price of the option is approximately 748%.
Table 5.11: Options Pricing Comparison - Duration, Volatility, and Inflation
Asset Price = 100 Asset Price = 200
Strike Price = 100 Strike Price = 200
Volatility = 20% Volatility = 40%
180 Days $5.5 $21.94
1 Year $7.58 $30.16
2 Years $10.18 $40.30
3 Years $11.84 $46.64
Source: Author's calculations using Derivagem software from Hull (2003).
These experiments with the Black-Scholes options pricing model suggest how climate
change could potentially affect the prices of commodities derivatives. As discussed in
Chapter 4, climate change is expected to increase the demand for certain commodities, such
as electricity during the summer (Kirshen et al. 2004), and platinum for fuel cell technology,
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potentially leading to periodic or perennial supply shortages. In turn, climate change could
result in an increase in the volatility of commodities prices and/or a general increase in the
price level of commodities.
If climate change results in increasing commodity prices or increasing volatility of
commodity prices, the cost of options and hedging in general will increase. As a result,
hedging on a long-term basis will be increasingly expensive. This should result in contract
durations in the derivatives markets remaining short-term under climate change conditions.
5.5.6 Market Capacity
The capacity for future growth of the commodities derivatives markets is a complex
issue and is therefore presented from several perspectives: demand and supply for
derivatives, credit and regulatory constraints, and the structure of underlying commodities
markets.
One perspective expressed by several survey participants is that although further
increases in risk should increase demand for these products, the number of credit-worthy
counterparties willing to engage in transactions will likely limit market capacity.
Credit risk is a significant factor that may affect the growth capacity of derivatives
markets. Credit risk is reflected in the availability of credit available from banks to its
customers to purchase derivatives or the amount of credit exposure a counterparty or
exchange member is willing to take on behalf of a client. Two factors may result in less bank
credit being available for derivatives trades. First, continuing consolidation in the banking
sector often produces reductions in overall credit availability to any given company. A larger
consolidated bank may have less flexibility to extend credit under its internal credit policies
or external regulatory capital requirements than would be available in the aggregate by two
independent banks (Hyman 2006). Second, the introduction of risk-based regulatory capital
requirements under the Basel Capital Accords sponsored by the Bank for International
Settlements requires more frequent reporting and mark-to-market for derivatives, and
increases regulatory reserves with respect to derivatives products purchased by clients
(Hyman 2006; Gutierrez 2005; Bank for International Settlements 2005).
Regulators have also expressed concern regarding the high concentration of
derivatives financing by a few U.S. banks. According to the U.S. Comptroller of the
Currency, five U.S. banks account for 96% of the total notional amount of derivatives in the
U.S. commercial banking system. The notional amount of derivatives held by these banks
exceeded their assets by a factor of seven to forty-seven times. At end of December 2005, JP
Morgan had a net value of just over $1 trillion and held derivatives with notional value of
over $48 trillion on its books (U.S. Comptroller of the Currency 2005). Regulators have
expressed concern that at these concentrations, the withdrawal of a single large dealer could
destabilize the entire derivatives market (Hyman 2006).
The Bank for International Settlements, which monitors over-the-counter derivatives
contracts held by banks, reports that notional amounts of all types of OTC contracts
149
excluding credit derivatives stood at $285 trillion at the end of December 2005 (Bank for
International Settlements 2006a).
While the magnitude of these numbers are staggering, is important to note that the
actual amount of value at risk is only a percentage of the notional amount. Of the $285
trillion notional amount held by banks and other financial institutions potential liability at the
end of 2005 was only $9 trillion (Bank for International Settlements 2006a). 14 Further, the
Comptroller of the Currency estimates that as much as 85% of the credit risk associated with
these contracts is reduced through bilateral netting procedures among banks (U.S.
Comptroller of the Currency 2005). In addition, credit risk can be further reduced by
collateral arrangements between the underwriting bank and the derivatives customer (Ross
2006; Upper 2006). Further, the risk in any single bank's portfolio will be diversified and no
single event should threaten the value of their entire position (Upper 2006).
Even with these reductions in credit exposure, the amount of potential credit risk is
still considerable. Distress in financial markets have resulted in spikes in derivatives losses
in 1997-1999 as a result of the Asian currency crisis and devaluation of the Russian ruble,
and in 2001-2002 following the stock market drop and the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks (U.S. Comptroller of the Currency 2005). To place these losses in perspective, they
amounted to less than 1% of bad loans losses during the respective periods (Wilhelm 2006).
Notwithstanding these concerns, to the extent derivatives are used to hedge a firm's
risk, they also decrease the overall credit risk associated with lending to that borrower. Thus,
depending upon how brokers and banks manage their credit exposure to clients, derivatives
should reduce overall credit risk. The present large volume of derivatives does not present
any evidence of a limit having been reached. Significantly, the market continues to grow
rapidly (Bank for International Settlements 2006a).
Another view is the physical assets upon which they trade limit the capacity of
commodities derivatives markets. Under this view, the degree to which futures and options
contracts are currently used as a percentage of trade in a commodity may provide some
perspective on the potential future growth capacity of commodities derivatives.
Table 5.12 below sets forth the open interest in standard exchange traded futures
contracts for oil, gas, platinum and gold on the major world commodities exchanges, and
data on the annual global production or demand for these commodities. Options are not
included in the table because options are typically written on futures contracts, and thus
would cause double counting. These numbers also do not include the OTC markets due to
incomplete information. However, it should be noted that the OTC market for some of these
instruments may be several times larger than the open-interest in the exchange-traded market(Daniel 2001).
14 Notional amount is the nominal face value of a derivatives contract and is not the amount
at risk. For example, in the case of an interest rate derivative, the actual obligation is
calculated as a percentage of the notional amount. Thus, the actual risk is lower than
reported notional amounts.
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Table 5.12: Selected Futures Contracts as Percentage of Global Commodities Trade
ProductionSize of Each ProductionTraded asOne Year Futures Contract, as Annual Global
Commodity Contract Open Quoted by Production or Exchange-TradedInterest Exchanges Demand
(conversion) FuturesContracts
NYMEX 728,976 1,000 bbl 29,072,250,000 bbl 3.97%
Oil ICE 401,916 1,000 bbl
Tokyo 270,630 50 kI (307.6 bbl)
Gas NYMEX 446,630 10,000 million btu 92 tcf 4.85%
NYMEX 9,559 50 toz 6,700,000 toz 13.59%Platinum Tokyo 26,892 500 g (16.1 toz)
NYMEX 321,211 100 toz 83,400,000 toz 39.87%
Gold Tokyo 14,762 1 kg (32.2 toz)CBOT 4,916 100 toz
CBOT Mini 4,949 33.2 toz
Sources: Dailyfutures.com (May 16, 2006); Tokyo Commodities Exchange (May 17, 2006); Chicago
Board of Trade (CBOT) (May 17, 2006); International Commodities Exchange (ICE) (May 17,
2006); New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) (April 19, 2006); EIA (2005b); CIA Factbook
(2006); Flood and Morrison (2006).
With the exception of gold, only 4% to 14% of global production in these
commodities are traded on a futures basis over exchanges. In contrast, 40% of global annual
gold production trades over futures exchanges.
The differences between gold and the other commodities might be explained by the
different structure of these commodities markets and the unique role gold has played in
international finance. Unlike the other commodities, gold is held by many governments and
central banks as a store of value and is traded widely to settle financial obligations. In
contrast, petroleum, gas, and platinum are primarily consumed immediately.
Another explanation for the low trading volumes of the other commodities is that the
production of these commodities is highly concentrated. In general, the greater concentration
of production of a commodity, the stronger the position of producers of the commodity.
Further, the greater influence a producer has over price, there is less need for the producer to
use derivatives products to protect revenues (Daniel 2006; Verleger 2006).
Market concentration appears to provide a plausible explanation for the relative
volumes of trade occurring in exchange-traded commodities futures. In the case of platinum,
approximately 90% of all platinum production is located in South Africa and Russia, and
there are only ten significant platinum mining companies in the world (UNCTAD 2006). In
the case of oil, OPEC countries in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, do not enter into
exchange-traded futures agreements (Daniel 2006). Significantly, the number of oil
exporting countries is finite and expected to decrease as countries such as the United
Kingdom, Yemen and other countries switch from being oil-exporting countries to oil-
importing countries during the first several decades of the 21st century.
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If market concentration and the volume of trade in commodities over derivatives
markets are negatively correlated, the reluctance of producers to enter into long-term
contracts should intensify for commodities that producers expect to enjoy increasing market
power. This conclusion is consistent with the results of the survey conducted in connection
with this dissertation and the work of other researchers who have interviewed oil producers.
Other researchers have found that oil producers are generally unwilling to enter into long-
term contracts for fear of failing to capture potential profits if market conditions change
(Verleger 1993; Daniel 2001).
5.5.7 Prospects for Addressing Climate Change
The commodities derivatives market is short-term in nature. The short-term nature is
reinforced by credit risk, the desire for liquidity, and the unwillingness of producers, brokers,
and exchanges to accept long-term risks that can encumber their organizations.
Options pricing is highly sensitive to the contract's duration, and the volatility and
price level of underlying assets. If climate change is accompanied by increases in the
volatility or price level of commodities, long-term price insurance through options contracts
would become prohibitively expensive.
There is no clear limit to the capacity of these markets to grow. However, continued
growth of these markets will not likely produce long-term derivatives arrangements. If
concentration of production of commodities affects the capacity of futures markets, one
would expect that the scarcer a commodity becomes, the more difficult it will be to enter into
long-term contracts. This is the opposite of what firms might desire from the perspective of
managing longer-term risks of climate change with respect to commodities supply risk.
Climate change does potentially present concerns about the stability of these markets.
Given the volume of trading in these markets and the potential for disruption due to global
financial crisis, climate change could potentially disrupt these markets. I could not locate
any research on the potential effects of climate change on derivatives markets. This could be
an important area of inquiry.
The short-term nature of commodities derivatives markets limits their usefulness in
mitigating long-term trends influenced by climate change. As discussed in Chapter 4,
climate change and the need to transition infrastructure could increase supply and market
risks. If a firm were to seek to mitigate these risks through the use of derivatives, most firms
would be limited to short-term contracts, with the greatest liquidity for contracts of less than
one year in duration under current market conditions.
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Table 5.13 below summarizes the findings of this section for commodities
derivatives.
Table 5.13: Commodities Derivatives Summary
Scope of Risk Coverage Price movements in commodities, which affect
supply, market, and operating cost risks.
Geographic Coverage Oil and platinum are global.
Gas is U.S.
Electricity is U.S. and Europe.
Contract Duration Most liquidity within 1 year.
Availability Broad range of energy, precious metals, and
Agricultural commodities.
Price Increases with market volatility, duration, and
rice level of underlying asset.
Market Capacity Exchanges handle 4-14% trade in most
commodities. OTC market is even larger.
5.6 Weather Derivatives
This section evaluates weather derivatives based on the six criteria relating to the
scope of risks covered, geographic coverage, contract duration, availability, price, and market
capacity. The section concludes by assessing the prospects for weather derivatives to address
risks posed by climate change.
This section presents the results of the derivatives survey with respect to weather
derivatives. Of the sixteen derivatives brokers and dealers surveyed, six respondents
described their weather derivatives operations. In addition, interviews were conducted with
firms and universities engaged in developing models for weather derivatives.
5.6.1 Scope of Risk Coverage
Weather derivatives are used by companies to maintain smooth earnings that would
otherwise be subject to fluctuations due to weather events that affect the revenues or
expenditures of a company. Derivatives are traded for temperature, snowfall, rainfall, sun,
and wind. Their use is growing as stock market analysts increasingly expect management to
protect company earnings against weather-related fluctuations.
Weather derivatives are used predominantly by the utilities industry. According to a
2005/2006 survey of the industry, energy and utilities accounted for 46% of weather
derivatives transactions, agriculture 12%, retail 7%, construction 5%, transportation 4%, and
various industries accounted for the remaining 26% of weather derivatives transactions
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006).
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The buyer of a weather derivative pays a premium to the seller in return for an
agreement by the seller to pay the buyer an amount determined by reference to a weather
index on a specific date or dates if the index is above or below specified levels. Indexes may
be based on average temperature, precipitation or other weather event in a single or multiple
locations over a specified period.
A contract for "heating degree days" (HDD) or "cooling degree days" (CDD)
provides an illustration of the scope of risk coverage of a weather derivative contract.
Obligations under HDD and CDD contracts are calculated as the cumulative difference over
a calendar month of the daily average of the high and low temperatures of each day measured
on a midnight to midnight basis at a designated weather station against the contract
temperature of 650F (180C in Europe and Japan). Thus, the daily calculation for these
contracts is based on the following formulas:
HDD = Max {0, 65*F - daily average temperature}
CDD = Max {0, daily average temperature - 650F}
For example, if the average of a particular day's maximum and minimum temperature is
350F, the day's HDD is 30 and the CDD is 0. HDD and CDD are then cumulated for each
day in the calendar month and then multiplied by $100 to determine the contract payout
(Arditti et al. 1999).
5.6.2 Geographic Coverage
Geographic coverage of exchange-traded instruments is limited to major cities in the
U.S., Europe and Asia. At the time of writing, most weather derivative contracts have been
traded in the United States. The survey revealed that some firms have been able to obtain
satisfactory weather data for other regions. For example, OTC weather derivatives have
included transactions in Africa (Lacey 2006).
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange develops exchange-traded instruments based on
demand and the availability of weather data for specific locations. The geographic focus of
the weather derivatives market on the United States, Europe and Asia is partly influenced by
the availability of reliable weather data. Weather derivatives underwriters look for a long
history of continuous weather data collection in the same locations using well-maintained
equipment operated by a trained staff. A historical record of data is highly desirable because
it assists underwriters in identifying where data is missing, changes in collection methods or
locations, and erroneous data points. Using the historical record, underwriters may create a
complete data set by interpolating data temporally or spatially (Boissonnade et al. 2002;
Henderson et al. 2002).
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Figure 5.6: Number of OTC Weather Contracts by Region, 2000/1-2005/6
E
D
J
U
U
U
Source: Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2006).
5.6.3 Contract Duration
An analysis of exchange-traded and OTC weather derivatives reveal that these
contracts are short-term in nature.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) introduced exchange-traded weather
futures and options on futures in 1999. The table below shows the various standardized
exchange-traded weather derivatives offered by CME.
Table 5.14: Chicago Mercantile Exchange Standard Weather Futures
Weather Number of Longest Year ofPeriods DurationType Cities Available Introduction
US: 18HDD Seasonal
CDD Europe: 9 Monthly1 Year 1999Asia: 2
Amsterdam SeasonalFrost 1 Year 2005
only Monthly
New YorkSnow Boston Monthly 1 Year 2006
Boston
Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange (2006).
The longest duration of each type of CME weather derivative contract is one year.
The greatest liquidity for these contracts is in the first month or season of these contracts.
Approximately 70% of volume in CME weather derivatives is options on futures. These are
predominantly traded as 5-month seasonal contracts and 90-95% are traded for the immediate
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season. Of the futures contracts, over 80% of trades are for monthly contracts. Of the
monthly futures contracts, 90-95% of trades are for the upcoming month, until the latter part
of a month, at which point the volume of trades shift to the next month (Smith, D. 2006).
The survey of derivatives brokerage firms confirmed that short-term trends also
dominate the OTC market. The six firms that traded in weather derivatives reported that the
vast majority of OTC trades are for durations within one year. Table 5.15 below summarizes
the results of the surveys.
Table 5.15: Weather Derivative Survey Results
Longest Trades 1
Known Trades 3+ GeographicWeather Risk Year orDuration Less 1-3 years Years Coverage
(years)
HDD/CDD 3-10
Frost 3-5
Wind 3-5 US80-95% 5-20% 0-1% US, Europe,Precipitation 3-5 Asia
Snow 3-5
River Flow 3
Source: Author's survey.
Five of the six weather derivatives firms surveyed indicated that 80-95% of trades are
for contracts with durations of one year or less. The one exception is a firm that specializes
in long-term contracts that reported 50% of its trades involve contracts of one to three years
in duration. Another firm commented that the most liquidity is within the first season up to a
year; beyond eighteen months the OTC market is generally illiquid.
5.6.4 Availability
Weather derivatives are traded over exchanges and the OTC market. The use of
weather derivatives has increased steadily. According to an annual survey conducted by
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, the notional value of weather derivatives contracts in the 2005/6
survey exceeded $45 billion. This is a growth rate of 500% since the previous record-
breaking year (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006; O'Hearne 2006).
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Figure 5.7: Notional Value Weather Risk Contracts (US$ millions), 2000/1-2005/6
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The majority of weather derivatives are temperature contracts, primarily "heating
degree day" (HDD) for winter months, and "cooling degree day" (CDD) for summer months.
The focus on temperature contracts is partly due to difficulties in accurately measuring other
types of weather events such as wind, rain and snow, which tend to vary greatly by location
(Ruck 2002; Smith, S. 2002). For example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange does not offer
an exchange-traded precipitation agreement because there is less demand for these contracts,
which is partly due to difficulties in measuring precipitation (Smith S. 2006).
Figure 5.8: OTC Weather Risk Contracts by Type, 2000/1-200516
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The survey revealed that the OTC market for non-temperature contracts are thinly
traded and the number of non-temperature trades varies greatly depending upon the
specialization of the particular trader or brokerage firm.
Weather derivatives have several advantages and disadvantages compared to
insurance that also bear on their availability. While insurance is more familiar and offers the
ability to tailor contracts to the specific insured's assets, insurance requires proof of damage
or loss to an insurable interest. In contrast, weather derivatives do not require any loss event
or even ownership of an insured asset, which makes them available to anyone and easier to
settle. Because weather derivatives contracts are highly standardized and their payout does
not depend on the characteristics of the purchaser, they do not pose problems of asymmetric
information or moral hazard that are associated with insurance and can be easily transferred
or assigned with greater ease than insurance contracts. In addition to these considerations,
tax and accounting rules may favor one form of risk management over the other (Roberts
2002).
5.6.5 Price
This section illustrates the pricing of weather derivatives using Risk Management
Solutions' Climetrix weather derivatives model. The model is used to show how data
selection and adjustment, weather volatility, and contract duration affect the price of weather
derivatives contracts. The pricing experiment provides insight regarding the short-term
nature of weather derivatives markets and how climate change could affect these markets.
Weather derivatives are priced based on three factors: actuarial weather probabilities,
a subjective opinion of anticipated weather in the relevant period, and supply and demand for
weather derivatives and other weather risk management contracts (Dischel 2002). However,
the relatively thin market for weather derivatives has resulted in trades being priced based
primarily on actuarial pricing methods, as opposed to supply and demand (Henderson 2002).
Accordingly, this section focuses on actuarial methods for pricing derivatives.
Weather derivatives are priced using models that incorporate aspects of actuarial
models used to price insurance. Similar to commodities derivatives, the cost structure of
weather derivatives reinforces the short-term nature of this market.
Pricing a weather derivative using the Climetrix model involves four distinct steps.
The first step is selecting the number of years of weather data to be used in pricing the data.
The selection of the number of years affects the pricing of the derivative (Jewson 2004).
Interviews revealed that firms typically price derivatives using ten or thirty-year data sets as
these periods reflect a notable increase in warming (Siner 2006). Years that are deemed
anomalous may be omitted from the model data.
The second step is to adjust ("detrend") the data to correct for the gradual increase in
temperature that has been observed during the last half century. Detrending may be required
both as a result of global warming and local heat island effects for urban areas that have
developed over the data period. Detrending changes the average temperature for the selected
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data set, by adjusting the observed temperature over the entire period upward as if the
recently observed increase in temperature had prevailed during the entire data period. By
changing the mean of the data, the choice of detrending methodology has a significant effect
on the price of the derivative, more significant than the choice of the probability distribution.
For example, if fifty years of data are selected, detrending would adjust the average
temperature upward for the entire data set based on the increase in average temperature
observed during the last five years of the set. Although the average moves up, the observed
weather pattern during the selected period remains the same. The Climetrix model provides
various standard statistical methods to "detrend" the data. The loess (linear) method
estimates trends over the period by placing the most weight on the data points that are closest
in time to the point being estimated (Brix et al. 2002). Thus, it has the desirable
characteristic of weighting the most recent years most heavily. It is a method frequently used
in the industry and was selected in the examples below (Hamlin 2006; Siner 2006).
Figure 5.9: Example of Detrended Data versus Original Data
o ........._ i.. .... ...... i ;.... . .. .. .... .. ... . . ... .- .
- -,. , ......-...
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 i 1988 19990 192 19 9 199 8 19 8 2 80 29 204
Source: RMS Climetrix model provided by Hamlin (2006). Note: The bottom line is original data;
the top line is detrended data.
A complement to detrending data is to combine historical weather data with forecasts
using the same information obtained through the detrending exercise. This can be done by
modeling future periods by extrapolating recent observed trends into the future and then
combining the historical data with extrapolated data based on weightings that reflect the
degree of skill and confidence in the extrapolated data (Shorter et al. 2002). Back-testing
shows that extrapolating trends over the past twenty years have rendered superior results to
pricing based only on historical data (Jewson et al. 2002). These extrapolations work best
over longer periods, such as five to ten years, as opposed to shorter time frames (Hamlin
2006).
The third step involves simulating data to fit a standard probability distribution
function selected from a range of options. One option includes fitting simulated data to a
non-parametric "kernel" distribution (Hamlin 2006). If a blended historical and forecast
method is used, an overall probability distribution function is achieved by combining both
historical and forecast components that are blended based on the weightings assigned to them
by the modeler (Shorter et al. 2002). The selection of the probability distribution function
plays a central role in the pricing of the derivative because the selection affects the standard
deviation of the data (Hamlin 2006). In turn, a larger standard deviation increases the
volatility of the underlying variable.
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In the final step, the type of contract is specified. Based on the above input, the
model produces an ensemble of model runs, which provides a representation of the range of
market values for the underlying derivative.
The decision to detrend the data changes the mean of the data set. The selection of
the probability distribution function affects the standard deviation of the data. These are
analogous to changing the asset/strike price and the volatility in the Black-Scholes options
pricing model described in the commodities derivatives section. Similar to the variables in
the Black-Scholes model, changing these variables affects the price of the weather derivative.
To illustrate how these variables affect the price of weather protection, Table 5.16
below shows the pricing for a call option on a cooling degree-days contract for the city of
New York (La Guardia) for the period May 1, 2006 to September 30, 2006 with strike of
1,380 cooling degree days, which pays out $5,000 per degree above 1,380, with a $1 million
payout limit. Ten, thirty and fifty years of data were used without any omission of years.
Table 5.16: Call on CDD, New York CitylLa Guardia, May 1 to September 30, 2006
Model Index Profit
Standard Daily Mean StandardMean Deviation Volume Price Deviation
Unadjusted 10 Year 1,228.550 163.073 13.184 73,500 232,427
Historical (Burn)
Unadjusted 30 Year 1,165.883 164.632 13.310 42,167 162,712
Historical (Burn)
Unadjusted 50 Year 1,120.930 170.660 13.797 25,300 126,904
Historical (Burn)
Index 10 Year Loess (lin), 1,343.433 174.739 14.127 267,752 360,247
Detrend, Kernel, No Forecast
Index 10 Year Loess (lin), 1,343.294 166.296 13.444 220,393 339,670
Detrend, Normal, No Forecast
Index 30 Year Loess (lin), 1,288.684 157.701 12.749 130,700 262,356
Detrend, Kernel, No Forecast
Index 30 Year Loess (lin), 1,288.588 145.884 11.794 112,476 243,788
Detrend, Normal, No Forecast
Index 50 Year Loess (lin), 1,293.339 164.191 13.274 151,587 290,753
Detrend, Kernel, No Forecast
Index 50 Year Loess (lin), 1,293.269 150.910 12.200 125,197 258,603
Detrend, Normal, No Forecast
Index 50 Year, No detrend, 1,122.028 184.453 14.912 35,928 146,236
Kernel, No Forecast
Index 50 Year, No detrend, 1,121.937 169.595 13.711 22,418 111,104
Normal, No Forecast
Index 30 Year, Loess(lin), 1,303.107 157.701 12.749 150,873 279,770
Detrend, Kernel, Trend
Forward 2 Years
Source: RMS Climetrix model.
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Comparing the model results shows that selecting a data set containing fewer years
renders a higher number of CDDs due to recent warming and urbanization trends. Based on
ten years of unadjusted (not detrended) historical data, the mean number of CDD was
1,228.55. Based on fifty years of unadjusted (not detrended) historical data, the mean
number of CDD is 1,120.93. The historic data suggest approximately 2-degree day warming
per year. Based on the ten-year data, the option would price at $73,500, compared to only
$25,300 based on the fifty-year data.
As noted above, the detrending adjusts the entire data set as if the recently observed
increase in temperature had been observed over the entire data set. As a result of detrending
the data, the average temperature increases, thereby increasing the likelihood that the mean
cooling degree-days will be higher and more demand for cooling will exist. In turn, this
causes an increase in the price of the derivative because the increase in the mean expected
number of cooling degree-days increases the expected payout to the purchaser of the
instrument, as compared to an analysis done without detrending the data.
Comparing historical unadjusted data to detrended data of the same periods shows the
effects of detrending. Ten-year detrended data using loess(lin) renders 1,343.433 CDDs, and
fifty-year detrended data renders 1,293.269 CDDs, in each case using a non-parametric
(kernel) probability distribution. The fifty-year distribution reflects the strong effects of
detrending over a longer period. Here, the number of CDD increased by 173 CDD from the
fifty-year unadjusted data to the fifty-year detrended data. Detrending increases the price to
$151,587 based on fifty years of detrended data (kernel distribution), compared to $35,928
based on fifty years of undetrended simulated historical data (kernel distribution), or
compared to $25,300 based on fifty years of undetrended actual historical data.
Selection of the probability distribution function also has a significant effect on the
pricing of weather derivatives because the distribution function affects the observed volatility
of the weather data. For example, compare the thirty-year detrended non-parametric (kernel)
distribution with a standard deviation of 157.701 and the thirty-year detrended normal
distribution with a standard deviation of 146.884, a difference of approximately 12 CDD in
standard deviation. The only difference between the two runs is the choice of probability
distribution function: a non-parametric kernel distribution fitted to the data versus the
normal distribution. As a result of the increase in standard deviation, volatility increases,
which causes the price of the call under the kernel distribution with the larger standard
deviation to be $130,700 versus $112,476 under the normal distribution, a difference in price
of over $18,000.
All of the prior examples are weather derivatives for the immediate future. Pricing
longer-term risk increases the price of the derivative. In order to price a long-term call
option, the model extrapolates the prior observed increases in temperature forward for the life
of the option. This increases the option price because the expected average number of CDD
would change based on the projected increase in warming. Also, increasing the duration of
the option would increase the cost.
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Pricing the same call option for the same period two years in the future demonstrates
the increased cost of attempting to use options for periods beyond the immediate future.
Based on thirty years of detrended data, an option two years in the future would cost
$157,873 compared to $130,700 for the same option for the present year. The increase in
cost is due both to the increase in mean CDD and the increase in volatility (standard
deviation).
The above analysis demonstrates the potential effects of climate change for a call,
put, or an instrument based on a call or a put. The same effect can be demonstrated for a
swap contract. Swaps are the most common form of weather derivative. In a typical swap
contract, no money is exchanged at the time of entering into the contract, but rather two
parties exchange promises and then the contract is settled at the time of expiration (Hull
2003).
Swaps are structured using the mean and standard deviation of the underlying
index or asset that is the subject of the swap. For example, consider a temperature swap
in which the parties agree to compensate each other based on an index of weather
temperatures for a particular location. The historical ten-year mean temperature in the
location is 39.3°F and the bid-ask spread is 0.4oF with a $10,000 payoff per degree away
from the relevant strike price. The long strike will be 39.3+0.2 = 39.5°F and the short
strike will be 39.3-0.2 = 39.1 0F (Shorter et al. 2002). If the average temperature for the
contract period was observed at 400F, then the holder of the long position would be paid
by the holder of the short position an amount equal to (40-39.5) * $10,000 = $5,000.
If the parties were aware that temperatures are increasing, the mean of the contract
must be increased (e.g., through extrapolation of trends) so that the expected value of the
swap at the time it is entered into is zero and the contract is priced fairly. Thus, as climate
change is factored in, swaps will migrate upward in range along with average temperatures.
As greater volatility is observed in historical temperatures, traders may also adjust the bid-
ask spreads to reflect the changing variability of temperature. Without these adjustments, the
contract would favor the holder of the long position, who would be more likely to receive the
payoff from the contract. With these adjustments, the contract is priced fairly if the expected
value of the contract is estimated accurately. However, on the whole, a fairly priced swap
still offers less protection to firms that lose revenues under climate change conditions
because swaps become unavailable (without paying a premium) at lower temperature ranges
as average temperature increases.
The results described here are consistent with the calculations performed by Stern
(1992, 2005) who demonstrated the effect of increases in temperature on the price of weather
derivatives. Stern priced a hypothetical set of one hundred year call options on a global
mean temperature futures contract using the Black-Scholes pricing model in order to
demonstrate the cost of climate change to the private sector. The price of the derivative
represents the cost of insurance to protect a firm against losses in revenue resulting from
diminishing economy-wide industrial output due to increases in temperature. Temperature
and volatility were based upon recent United Kingdom Metrological Office data. The 1992
run used temperature and volatility data based on then observed temperatures, and the 2003
run used updated temperature observations, which reflected an increase in global mean
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temperature of approximately 0.150C and a similar level of temperature volatility compared
to the 1992 temperature and volatility data. All other variables remained the same in both
model runs. Comparison of the two runs shows that the price of the hedge increased from
$12 for every $100 of future revenue to $14.79 for every $100 of future revenue. Stern runs
the same calculations over the period circa 1860 to 2003 to show that the cost of protection
gradually and then rapidly increased as temperatures increase over the period. From 1860 to
1960, the option increases in price from approximately $1 to $2 per $100 of future revenue.
From 1960 to 2003, the price increases from $2 to almost $15 per $100 of future revenue.
Since all other variables were the same in all model runs, the increase in the cost of the
insurance provided by the option reflects the increase in global mean temperature.
The survey indicates that when faced with uncertainty or inadequate data, weather
derivatives underwriters will further increase the price of derivatives contracts, sometimes by
a large margin. In some cases, traders indicated that these price increases ruin the economics
of hedging (Ricker 2006). Thin trading markets also mean that there may be inadequate
competition to exert downward pressure on prices (Henderson 2002). Thus, high risk
premiums may lead to wide bid-ask spreads rendering it uneconomical to hedge in light of
the probable payoff versus the probable revenue decline (Dischel 2002; Brix et al. 2002).
While excessive risk loading may result in pricing beyond the ability of end-users to
afford, it is important to balance the cost of the instrument against the certainty it provides
that a minimum level of capital will be available in future periods (Dischel 2002). The
additional cost of climate insurance will likely be passed on to consumers by firms that are
able to do so (Forrest 2002). Firms that cannot pass on costs could experience reduced profit
margins or forgo insurance. The cost of climate risk, or alternatively the cost of insurance
against climate risk, will become increasingly expensive to society (Stern 1992, 2005).
Test runs of the Climetrix model confirm that increases in volatility, average
temperature, and contract duration result in increasing cost of hedging using weather
derivatives. This is consistent with Stern (1992, 2005) who shows that increasing
temperature increases the cost of a hypothetical derivative designed to address the economic
effects of global warming.
5.6.6 Market Capacity
As noted above, the 2005/6 Pricewaterhouse Coopers survey results indicate that the
notional value of weather derivatives contracts exceeded $45.2 billion, a growth rate of
approximately 500% since the previous 2004/5 survey (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006). To
place the weather risk market in perspective, the notional value of annual weather derivatives
trades is compared with the estimated portion of annual GDP that is subject to weather risk.
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, approximately 70% of U.S.
companies are subject to weather risk and $1 to $2 trillion of the approximately $9 trillion
U.S. GDP is weather sensitive (US NAS 1998; Chicago Mercantile Exchange 1999; Nicholls
2004).
163
At $45 billion notional value, the weather derivatives market protects up to 0.5% of
U.S. GDP, or put another way, up to 2.25% of U.S. GDP that is weather sensitive. However,
the actual level of protection provided by these instruments may be different than indicated
by the notional amount. There is not enough data to determine the precise level of protection
as a percentage of economic activity.
Comparing the weather derivatives market to the broader derivatives market also
provides a useful perspective. The Bank for International Settlements reports that all types of
OTC derivatives contracts excluding credit derivatives held by banks exceeded $285 trillion
in notional amounts at the end of 2005 (Bank for International Settlements 2006a). This
figure is only a portion of derivatives as it excludes exchange-traded derivatives and credit
derivatives. Yet, it shows that the present weather derivatives market is merely 0.016% of
this segment of the derivatives market.
The small size of the weather derivatives market compared to non-weather
derivatives markets and its rapid growth over the past five years suggest that the weather
derivatives market has tremendous growth potential. A larger market should increase
competition and may lead to the development of new derivatives instruments. However, as
demonstrated by other markets, larger volume does not necessarily produce long-term
hedging arrangements capable of addressing climate change risk.
5.6.7 Prospects for Addressing Climate Change
Because weather derivatives are intended to manage weather risk, these instruments
could potentially play an important role in addressing risks associated with a changing
climate for agriculture and industry (Hess et al. 2002).
The dramatic increase in trading in weather derivatives makes these products a
substantial new market for mitigating risks. The notional value of these contracts have
increased to provide short-term protection to approximately 0.5% of U.S. GDP or 2.25% of
U.S. GDP that is climate sensitive. In evaluating the capacity of the weather derivatives
market to absorb weather risk, it appears that these markets have great growth potential.
Balanced against the growth of the weather derivatives market, one must also
consider that climate risk is also increasing and poses great challenges for weather risk
management firms to estimate and underwrite contracts to provide protection against climate
change risk.
While climate change may increase the demand for weather derivative products, there
are several factors that may limit the ability of these products to address the long-term risks
posed by climate change. These factors are the short-term nature of the market, price
considerations, credit exposure, difficulties in modeling long-term climate trends, and
difficulty determining whether a specific weather event is related to climate change. There is
evidence that contracts will become more expensive for buyers and might shorten in duration
due to price or credit exposure considerations or difficulties in modeling longer durations.
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As demonstrated by exchange data and the survey responses, the market for weather
derivatives is predominantly short-term, under one year in most cases. The short-term nature
of the market limits the usefulness of weather derivatives contracts for climate change. As
contracts expire, new climate conditions will be priced into replacement contracts due to their
short-term nature. Further, if climate is expected to change in a non-linear manner (as has
been observed in recent temperature patterns), there is no evidence to suggest that the
duration of contracts would increase beyond those currently available in the market.
The price of hedging risk using weather derivatives is a critical limiting factor in their
practical application for addressing climate change. Climate change is expected to continue
to cause increases in global mean temperature and may increase the variability of weather
patterns. As demonstrated using the RMS Climetrix weather derivatives pricing model,
increasing the mean and volatility of temperature increases the cost of weather derivatives.
In the short term, the arrangement is simply a transfer of wealth between buyer and seller of
the contract or results in less protection being provided due to the inability of a buyer to
afford the cost of insurance. Stern (1992, 2005) demonstrates how the cost of hedging is
increasing at an increasing rate over time as a result of increases in global mean temperature.
In the long term, the cost to society increases substantially.
The inability to model future climate conditions beyond several years into the future
will likely limit the duration of weather derivatives contracts. Present weather models are
generally used to forecast one year ahead, and sometimes two to three years in the future at
the most. Similarly, when data is unavailable or there is little confidence in the ability to
forecast future conditions based on available data, the cost of derivatives likewise becomes
prohibitively expensive, potentially ruining the economics of putting a hedge in place (Ricker
2006).
The shortcomings of models can be addressed through contract terms that limit the
scope of a derivative's coverage. Contracts can use moving averages and caps on payouts.
However, all of these measures to address model risk ultimately shifts risk back to the
purchaser of the derivative and reduces the scope of risk covered.
Alternatively, when an event becomes a near certainty to occur, the price of insuring
against the event through a third party becomes prohibitively expensive and firms are forced
to self-insure or go out of business. Several survey respondents acknowledged that a
derivative cannot protect a company whose business is fundamentally unviable due to
climate (Lichtenstein 2006; Ricker 2006). This is entirely consistent with the view that the
purpose of weather derivatives is to protect revenue streams from volatility for the duration
of the contract, not to offer insurance against long-term trends in the weather.
Several examples illustrate this point and demonstrate that weather derivatives are
intended to protect against volatility, not against a general climate trends. A ski resort that
has purchased HDD contracts to offset losses in revenues due to warm weather will
eventually be unable to afford the insurance policy offered by a derivative if there is
inadequate snow to operate the business. Similarly, consider a hydropower plant that enters
into a river flow contract to compensate for decreases in river flow that adversely affect
business operations. If climate change severely threatened water resources in the area, such a
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contract would eventually serve little purpose if the river flow is reduced to a level that
consistently impairs the cash flows of the hydropower plant.
Long before these climate events occur, however, it is likely that no counterparty
would enter into, and no broker would exchange-clear, a long-term contract with a party
whose business is severely threatened by climate change. The reasons are that the cost of the
derivative would become prohibitively expensive for these companies as weather changes. A
company without a viable line of business would present too great a credit risk to a
counterparty or brokerage house. Eventually the hypothetical ski resort and the power plant
would be unable to afford insurance or stay in business.
Another important reason why weather derivatives may be unable to address long-
term climate risk is that no firm is well positioned to accept such risks. Even if a firm is
willing to accept these risks, the creditworthiness of the seller would become an important
consideration. Even if such a long-term contract were entered into, the volume of such
contracts would likely be small. Significantly, the survey revealed that the present market
could not support a long-term contract intended to address climate change. In the few cases
where respondents believed the market might develop a long-term contract, no survey
respondent could identify a potential private party that would be sufficiently creditworthy to
supply a long-term contract against climate change risk.
In summary, evidence suggests that the ability of weather derivatives to address long-
term risks associated with climate change is limited due to the short-term nature of these
markets, increasing costs, credit risk of counterparties, and inherent difficulties in forecasting
future weather patterns. Balanced against this, these markets are in their infancy and it
remains to be seen whether an innovative structure can be developed that provides protection
against long-term climate change.
Table 5.17 below summarizes the findings of this section with respect to weather
derivatives.
Table 5.17: Weather Derivatives Summary
Scope of Risk Supply, market, operating cost. Protects against volatility not
Coverage general climate trends.
Geographic Mostly U.S., Europe, some Asia.
Coverage
Contract Duration 1 Year; mostly upcoming season.
Availability Temperature derivatives are most commonly available contract.
Price Increases with weather volatility, contract duration, and global
mean temperature.
Market Capacity Increasing but still a small percentage of overall GDP at risk.
Large growth potential.
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5.7 Carbon Offsets
Carbon offsets are market-based instruments that provide financial incentives to
support the adoption of technology to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas
emissions through the creation and trading of emissions allowances. Offsets programs have
been developed for various other pollutants, including nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides,
volatile organic compounds, and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (Haites 2005; Wilder 2005; Ali
and Yano 2004).
This section examines the carbon offsets programs developed under the Kyoto
Protocol from the point of view of their ability to reduce regulatory risk. Specifically, it
looks at the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). It evaluates EU ETS and CDM based on the six criteria
relating to the scope of risks covered, geographic coverage, contract duration, availability,
price, and market capacity.
Brokers or traders at sixteen firms were surveyed in connection with this dissertation;
seven firms described their business in the EU ETS and/or CDM markets. In addition to the
survey of brokers and traders, interviews were conducted with six additional firms engaged
in advising or verifying the results of CDM projects.
5.7.1 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
The Kyoto Protocol created three flexible mechanisms for emissions reductions using
carbon offsets: emissions trading, CDM, and Joint Implementation (JI) projects.
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a system for trading
assigned amount units (AAUs) and other permitted emissions reductions credits. These other
reductions credits are certified emissions reductions certificates (CERs) issued pursuant to
CDM projects, emissions reductions units (ERUs) issued pursuant to JI projects, and removal
units (RMUs) issued to countries participating in the development of domestic sinks.
Currently, only participating European Union countries may conduct trades through the EU
ETS. Starting in 2008, the EU ETS is expected to be available to all Kyoto Protocol
countries (European Union 2003).
The EU's emissions trading scheme supports both a spot market and futures market
for European Union Allowances (EUAs), which are the European Union equivalent of
AAUs. AAUs, CERs, ERUs and RMUs entitle the holder to emit one tonne of carbon
dioxide equivalent and are fungible with each other for meeting emissions reductions limits,
subject to restrictions on banking emissions.
Developed countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol accepted binding commitments
to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases during the 2008 through 2012 period to meet
an aggregate reduction of 5% below 1990 emissions. Developed countries subject to
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emissions limits are obligated to set a maximum amount of emissions per compliance period,
and then allocate allowances to regulated emitters within their territory for each compliance
period. At the end of a compliance period, each emitter must surrender allowances equal to
their allowances. If total emissions during a period exceed their AAUs, the emitter must
purchase additional allowances (AAUs, CERs, ERUs or RMUs) and may be subject to a
penalty. If total emissions are lower, the emitter may sell excess AAUs.
5.7.1.1 Scope of Risk Coverage
Market-based instruments such as cap-and-trade are intended to provide firms with
greater flexibility in, and reduce the cost of, meeting regulatory obligations to reduce
emissions of pollutants. From a policy point of view, these programs are intended to achieve
the desired level of emissions reductions at reduced cost to society because reductions can be
achieved by firms that have the lowest marginal cost of abatement. For emitters that have a
low marginal cost of reducing emissions, they provide an economic incentive to reduce
emissions below the mandatory level than would otherwise occur under a traditional
command-and-control regulatory regime and to resell these credits to other emitters. From
the point of view of an emitter purchasing emissions allowances, they provide a method to
mitigate regulatory risk. Thus, EUAs traded under the EU ETS only address regulatory risk
under the Kyoto Protocol.
5.7.1.2 Geographic Coverage
The European Union developed the EU ETS to implement its obligations under the
Kyoto Protocol. The trading system operates on a trial phase from January 1, 2005 to
December 31, 2007 among European Union member states. From 2008, the EU ETS is
expected to be available to all Kyoto Protocol countries (European Union 2003). However
the arrangements for the inclusion of other Kyoto Protocol countries have not been settled at
the time of writing (Mosher 2006; Reilly and Paltsev 2006).
5.7.1.3 Contract Duration
An analysis of the European Climate Exchange's Carbon Financial Instruments (ECX
CFI) futures contracts reveals that liquidity in this market is mostly short-term. As of April
2006, 100 metric tonnes of carbon contracts were available for quarterly delivery through
March 2008, and then annual delivery from 2008 through 2012 (European Climate Exchange
2006).
Open interest in ECX CFI futures contracts is most liquid in the first year. At the
time of analysis, 79% of open interest in exchange-traded EUAs was for delivery by
December 2007, the time period during which regulatory certainty is greatest. Survey
responses confirm the OTC EUA market follows the same short-term pattern as the
exchange-traded futures markets.
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Table 5.18: Open Interest in European Climate Exchange CFI Contracts, April 2006
Period Open Interest Percentage
June, September, December 46%
2006
March, June, September, 32%
December 2007
March, June, September, 17%
December 2008
December 2009 3%
December 2010 1%
December 2011 1%
December 2012 1%
Source: European Climate Exchange, April 13, 2006.
These statistics reflect the short-term nature common to most trading markets as well
as the fact that supply and demand in EUA markets is strongly influenced by regulatory
considerations.
The significant volume of trades for the 2008 to 2012 period may be influenced by
European Union rules that impose a penalty of E100 per tonne for failure to meet obligations
in the first commitment period from January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2012 (European
Union 2003; Parsons 2006).
5.7.1.4 Availability
From 2008, the European Union trading scheme is expected to be available to all
Kyoto Protocol countries. Currently, only carbon dioxide emissions from large point sources
in energy generation and energy-intensive industries, such as oil refineries, cement, iron and
steel production, are subject to emissions limits and participate in the EU ETS (European
Union 2003). Other countries are presently developing trading systems for greenhouse gases
pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol but these systems are not in operation at the time of writing
(Haites 2005; Wilder 2005; Ali and Yano 2004). The arrangements for the inclusion of other
Kyoto Parties, additional greenhouse gases, broader industrial sectors, and for linking among
national trading systems have not been settled at the time of writing (Mosher 2006; Reilly
and Paltsev 2006).
Trading EUAs is primarily conducted through brokered transactions over the OTC
market. In 2005, OTC trades accounted for an estimated 80% of combined OTC and
exchange trades (Point Carbon 2006b).
Several organized exchanges also trade EUAs. The European Climate Exchange is
the largest exchange, representing 63% of exchange-traded emissions contracts. This
exchange trades standardized futures contracts for delivery of EUA (Point Carbon 2006b).
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5.7.1.5 Price
Prices for EUAs fluctuate based on supply and demand. The announcement of the
first verification of European Union national emissions levels in May 2006 caused the EU
ETS market price of carbon to drop by over 67% because verified emissions were 41 million
metric tonnes of carbon dioxide, or approximately 2 /2% lower than expected (European
Commission 2006; Timmons 2006).
Figure 5.10: European Union Emissions Allowance Prices, April-May 2006
0
4/105 5/21/05 7/10105 8M905 10/18/05 12f705 1/2/06 3/1706 5806
-- Spot
Source: Point Carbon (2006a).
This first emissions report represents a transition from the top-down system of
emissions estimation to verified plant-level data. Subsequent plant-level assessments should
presumably report carbon emissions levels that are more consistent with expectations in
future assessments.
However, in the near future, the structure of this market will continue to evolve,
which will subject prices to uncertainty. Eventually, trading will include other greenhouse
gases regulated by the Kyoto Protocol. Their introduction will involve uncertainty as
allocations and emissions reporting will be tested in a live trading market. The change from
top-down to bottom-up emissions assessments and technical difficulties in assessment could
potentially disrupt markets if assessments are out of line with expectations.
In addition, in 2008 the European Union plans to open its trading system to other
Kyoto Protocol countries' emissions. Consistency and integrity among countries in reporting
emissions could pose potential issues for these markets. Institutional arrangements for
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ensuring the quality of emissions monitoring and reporting are still under development and
remain untested (IETA 2005; Kruger and Pizer 2004; Mullins 2005).
To the extent excess emissions allowances held by Eastern European countries enter
the market, these excess allowances will affect prices and the operation of the EUA market,
the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation programs. The Kyoto
Protocol did not place explicit limits on the entry of excess allowances, however, parties are
required to limit their use of tradable allowances to levels that are "supplemental" to
"significant" domestic measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Marrakech Accords
2001).
The European Union has been particularly active in seeking to promote domestic
reductions through the supplementarity provision. However, there are differences of opinion
among European officials whether a quantitative limit on trading allowances (Woerdman
2002, 2004). Economic analysis suggests that restrictions on trading reduce efficiency
because it prevents reductions from taking place at the lowest marginal cost among a broader
set of trading countries (Eyckmans and Cornillie 2002; Zhang 2000). Restricting the trading
of permits could also reduce the demand for tradable allowances, which could significantly
reduce the price of carbon, thereby creating disincentives for firms to implement cleaner
technology (Ellerman and Wing 2000).
While it is not clear how the supplementarity restriction will be implemented by
Kyoto Parties, it will influence how Eastern European excess allowances compete with
EUAs and other forms of AAUs, CERs, ERUs and RMUs. The EIA projects that
approximately two-fifths of the required Kyoto Protocol emissions reductions could be met
by Eastern European excess allowances (Lashof and Fiedler 2006). Others have estimated
that the Russian Federation alone could supply as much as 70% of emissions allowances
(Gusbin et al. 1999; Ciorba et al. 2001).
If Eastern European countries that were not part of the Soviet Union are permitted to
trade their excess allowances, an estimated 172 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide
equivalent per year would enter the market (Blanchard 2005). Eastern European countries
that are now part of the European Union have already been subject to restrictions on their
ability to trade excess allowances (European Commission 2006).
Most excess emissions allowances are held by Russia and Ukraine. Russian and
Ukrainian excess emissions are expected to exceed 791.5 million metric tonnes of carbon
dioxide per year by 2010 from fossil fuel emissions alone. Table 5.19 below sets forth EIA's
estimate of projected Russian and Ukrainian carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel
consumption, and the resulting estimated excess carbon dioxide allowances.
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Table 5.19: Russia and Ukraine Projected CO2 Allowances (metric tonnes)
Russia Ukraine Total Projected Excess
Year Emissions Emissions Emissions Allowances
1990 2,347,000,000 674,400,002 3,021,400,002
2002 1,522,000,000 426,024,926 1,948,024,926 1,073,375,075
2010 1,732,000,000 497,898,263 2,229,898,263 791,501,738
2015 1,857,000,000 539,804,109 2,396,804,109 624,595,893
2020 1,971,000,000 568,392,418 2,539,392,418 482,007,583
2025 2,063,000,000 599,999,369 2,662,999,369 358,400,632
Source: Adapted from EIA (2005b). Note: Ukraine is 17.76% of former Soviet Union projections.
These projections only take account of excess allowances from carbon dioxide emissions from fossil
fuel consumption. Other greenhouse gas sources may increase the allowances.
These projections are only for carbon dioxide emissions from energy production and
consumption. Other greenhouse gases are expected to produce additional allowances for
Eastern European countries in excess of 100 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide
equivalent per year. Again, a majority of these excess allowances will belong to Russia and
Ukraine (Rolfe 2000).
If Russian and Ukrainian excess allowances enter the market in 2008, they would
exert significant downward pressure on EUA prices. To place this in perspective, if the
791.5 million tonnes of Russian and Ukrainian fossil-fuel excess carbon dioxide allowances
enter the market, this additional supply would be approximately twenty times larger in
volume than the May 2006 41 million tonne over-allocation of carbon dioxide that caused the
price of EUAs to drop by over 67%.
The May 2006 EUA price collapse exposed a number of shortcomings of the current
trading scheme that directly affects prices of EUAs. As of May 2006, national emissions
reporting was conducted annually and there was no coordination among reporting countries.
Further, there is little monitoring of individual country emissions reporting efforts. The drop
in carbon prices has prompted some analysts to suggest that information disclosures should
be more frequent, standardized and coordinated in order to improve the quality of
information provided to the market (Parsons 2006). Finally, although EUAs are not
presently regulated as either a security or a commodity, the large capital flows into EUA
markets and the potential for manipulation of emissions data and markets suggest that
regulation of these instruments may be demanded by investors.
5.7.1.6 Market Capacity
The potential market capacity of the EU ETS will be a determined by regulation. As
described in the prior section on price, if the emissions allowances held by Eastern European
countries, Russia and the Ukraine are permitted to enter the market, these allowances could
represent a very large increase over the existing number of EAUs currently trading in the EU
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ETS. This would adversely affect the ability of the EU ETS to accomplish its primary goal
of reducing overall greenhouse gas emissions.
5.7.2 Clean Development Mechanism
The Clean Development Mechanism provides another means for emitters to meet
greenhouse gas emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Under the CDM, project
sponsors earn tradable certified emissions reductions certificates (CERs) by developing
projects in non-industrialized Kyoto Protocol countries that reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.15 CERs, like AAUs, ERUs and RMUs, entitle the holder to emit one tonne of
carbon dioxide equivalent and are fungible with each other for meeting emissions reductions
limits, subject to restrictions on banking emissions.
The CDM project cycle is a multi-step process. First, project parties prepare a project
proposal, which sets out the design of the project in a document called the Project Design
Document. The Project Design Document is then evaluated by a Designated Operational
Entity (DOE), a private third party certified by the CDM Executive Board, that validates the
project's design and estimates the project's expected contribution to emissions reductions.
During this phase, the project parties procure an environmental impact assessment, obtain the
approval of the host government, and circulate the Project Design Document for public
comment. The Project Design Document is then submitted to the CDM Executive Board
who reviews it for compliance with CDM requirements. Projects involving new
methodologies will also be required to obtain approval of the specific methodology. If
approved, the project is registered with the CDM. Registered projects then implement a
monitoring plan approved by the CDM Executive Board. Under the plan, a DOE
periodically verifies the actual emissions reductions of the project. Based on the DOE's
written certification of the emissions reductions, the CDM Executive Board instructs the
CDM Registry Administrator to issue the appropriate number of CERs to the project for each
particular verification period (Yamin 2005).
This section analyzes CDM CERs based on the six criteria relating to the scope of
risks covered, geographic coverage, contract duration, availability, price, and market
capacity.
5.7.2.1 Scope of Risk Coverage
CDM CERs entitle the holder to emit one metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent
for meeting emissions reductions limits under the Kyoto Protocol. CDM CERs can be traded
to other emitters to their meet Kyoto Protocol emissions limits. Thus, CERs only address
regulatory risk under the Kyoto Protocol.
15 In contrast, JI allows industrialized country emitters to earn tradable emissions reductions
units (ERUs) by participating in projects in other industrialized countries. At the time of
writing, standards for JI programs were in the early development stage.
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5.7.2.2 Geographic Coverage
The CDM allows project sponsors to earn CERs by developing projects in non-
industrialized Kyoto Protocol countries that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The CERs are
used in industrialized Kyoto Protocol countries that are subject to an emissions limit. Thus,
the scope of geographic coverage of CERs are those countries that have ratified the Kyoto
Protocol and are subject to emissions limits.
5.7.2.3 Contract Duration
Interviews conducted by the author and industry reports (Point Carbon 2006b)
confirm that CDM projects have generally sold CERs for delivery though 2012, reflecting the
duration of the regulatory regime rather than the potential duration of CER contracts.
Although there is little activity beyond 2012, some survey respondents and other
commentators have confirmed that purchasers of CERs have entered into options agreements
for CERs to be produced in the post-2012 period (Michaelowa 2005a).
The survey revealed that because CDM projects require a minimum of approximately
eighteen to twenty-four months to register and verify the CERs, most activity in the CDM
market is for future delivery of CERs starting approximately two years ahead of time.
5.7.2.4 Availability
The availability of CERs depends directly upon the performance of CDM projects
and the price of other emissions allowances. This section discusses the availability of CERs
and project performance. The next section discusses how price affects the availability of
CERs.
At the time of writing, CERs have not been exchange-traded due to lack of supply
and uncertainty concerning the legal arrangements required to support these instruments.
CERs have been traded in limited amounts on the OTC market. Based on survey responses,
acquirers obtain CDM CERs primarily through investing in or developing their own projects.
In order for CERs to be issued, the emissions reductions are first "validated", which is
an estimate made at the design stage for purposes of approving the project methodology. The
emissions reduction estimate forms expectations regarding the project, including the
expectations of investors and those who are considering purchasing the CDM CERs
produced by the project. After the project has begun operation, a DOE periodically verifies
the project's actual emissions. The verification determines the actual number of CERs to be
issued for each verification period.
As of August 9, 2006, thirty-five CDM projects had produced verified CERs.
Comparing validation estimates against verified CERs provides useful information for
evaluating the accuracy of validation estimates and project performance. Because sales of
CERs have already commenced and verified CERs affect the cash flows and legal obligations
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of CDM projects, the ability to accurately predict a project's CERs is important to the
success of the CDM.
Table 5.20 below compares validation estimates and verification results for the thirty-
five CDM projects that had issued CERs as of August 9, 2006. The comparison suggests that
validation procedures tend to overestimate the number of CERS that will ultimately be issued
by a project. Significantly, these results reflect a broad range of CDM projects.
Table 5.20: CDM Validated versus Verified Emissions Reductions, August 2006
Country Project Validation Validation Verified Verification Error
Type ktCO2/yr Date ktCO2/yr Until (%)
Brazil Landfill gas 701.7 1/1/04 46.0 12/31/04 -93.45%
Brazil Hydro 42.0 1/27/03 43.1 3/31/06 2.50%
Brazil Biomass 9.0 4/23/01 7.9 10/30/05 -11.89%
Brazil Biomass 34.7 7/1/02 18.0 12/31/05 -48.07%
Brazil Biomass 17.2 5/7/03 15.1 11/30/05 -11.95%
Brazil Biomass 10.2 5/5/02 10.4 11/30/05 1.94%
Brazil Biomass 57.3 7/1/01 46.0 12/31/05 -19.74%
Brazil Agriculture 5.1 7/1/04 0.8 10/31/06 -84.02%
Chile Agriculture 78.7 1/1/01 71.3 12/31/04 -9.35%
Chile Agriculture 84.0 5/1/02 81.2 4/30/05 -3.30%
Chile Agriculture 247.4 1/1/03 194.8 4/30/05 -21.29%
China Landfill gas 214.5 5/1/05 25.0 5/29/06 -88.34%
Guatemala Hydro 36.9 6/29/02 31.7 12/31/05 -13.91%
Guatemala Hydro 12.7 6/29/02 14.6 12/31/05 14.43%
Honduras Hydro 17.8 8/1/04 17.5 12/31/04 -1.47%
Honduras Hydro 37.0 6/1/03 1.1 5/31/05 -97.02%
India Hydro 23.0 7/1/04 6.0 3/31/06 -73.84%
India Hydro 27.0 11/20/04 12.8 3/31/06 -52.43%
India Hydro 21.0 4/26/03 18.6 3/31/06 -11.46%
India Hydro 19.1 4/1/02 17.8 3/31/06 -7.14%
India HFC 3393.0 10/1/05 1674.0 4/30/06 -50.66%
India HFC 3834.4 7/1/04 2519.6 4/30/06 -34.29%
India Efficiency 24.4 8/1/03 25.4 12/31/05 3.93%
India Efficiency 19.8 9/1/02 20.0 12/31/05 0.64%
India Biomass 31.4 8/1/03 25.2 6/30/05 -19.73%
India Biomass 22.0 9/15/03 24.9 3/19/04 13.10%
India Biomass 17.4 6/1/04 11.6 12/31/05 -33.45%
India Biomass 63.9 1/1/04 27.9 12/31/05 -56.43%
India Biomass 14.7 12/1/01 14.4 12/31/05 -2.64%
India Biomass 43.9 5/1/05 46.3 3/31/06 5.50%
India Biogas 36.0 8/1/03 35.0 12/31/05 -2.71%
Mexico Agriculture 121.7 6/1/05 10.3 12/31/05 -91.57%
Mexico Agriculture 210.5 6/1/05 2.6 1/31/06 -98.78%
Mexico Agriculture 127.9 9/1/05 6.9 1/31/06 -94.63%
South Korea HFC 1400.0 1/1/03 893.7 3/31/06 -36.16%
TOTALS 11,057.5 6,017.3 -45.58
Source: Adapted from UNEP Risoe Centre (2006b).
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The data shows that validation estimates overestimated the number of CERs produced
by the first thirty-five projects by approximately 46% on average, with almost a quarter of
these projects overestimating the number of CERs actually produced by 75% or more. The
standard deviation of estimation error for the population of thirty-five projects is 36.87%. 16
It should be noted that some of the early projects were validated after operation. In
some cases, these projects did not invest in monitoring equipment until after the CDM
Executive Board approved their registration. The first Chilean methane plant that produced a
project error of approximately 10% was validated after the plant began operation under a
special accommodation for early CDM projects that is no longer available. Although the
validation occurred during operation, it was based on an estimate of emissions reductions and
was subject to error (Esparta 2006). Omitting this plant from the data increases the -45.58%
average error by less than a percent. Similarly, the first Honduran hydroelectric plant is a
phased plant, and thus the validation and verification figures fail to take into account the time
delay to complete subsequent phases (Colston 2006a). Omitting this project reduces the
average error by less than a percent. Omitting both of these projects, the total error for the
thirty-three remaining projects remains substantially unchanged at -45.67%.
The large error rate for estimating the issuance of CERs greatly increases the supply
risks associated with sourcing CERs and increases the risk of investing in CDM projects
generally. One major Canadian electric generator that has committed itself to meeting its
requirements for allowances through CDM and JI projects expressed concern that the
availability of CDM CERs will be inadequate to meet the company's needs. This company
has adopted a 25-year plan to achieve zero net emissions by 2024 and has developed
considerable experience assessing approximately a dozen CDM projects. Due to financial
and other risks associated with CDM, the company has undertaken only one CDM project.
Given Canada's role as an energy-exporter in such carbon intensive areas as tar sands, the
company expects that CDM may not provide a realistic method for meeting its supply
requirements for emissions allowances (Page, B. 2006).
The CDM validation/verification error has significant implications for CDM. As of
August 9, 2006, there were 961 CDM projects that had estimated their emissions reductions
through the validation process and will eventually verify their CERs. The other 961 projects
may show error rates of similar magnitude to the first thirty-five projects that are analyzed
here.
Interviews were conducted with firms involved in the CDM process in order to
ascertain the reasons for the high error rate produced by validation/verification procedures.
Interviews were conducted with three firms that are approved by the CDM Executive Board
as DOEs. Collectively, these firms are involved in the validation or verification of 83% of
the approximately 740 CDM projects that were registered as of May 1, 2006, when the
interviews were conducted (UNEP RISOE 2006a). In addition, interviews were conducted
16 The standard deviation was calculated based on the ratio of annual verified emissions
reductions over annual estimated emissions reductions, using all thirty-five data points.
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with four firms that invest in and/or act as project consultants to approximately 30% of all
CDM projects then listed with the CDM Executive Board.
Surveys of these CDM participants revealed that a variety of factors potentially
contribute to the validation/verification error for CDM projects. These firms identified the
following factors as contributing to the high error rate:
Inadequate Technology or Measurement Methodology
Environmental Fluctuations
Supply and Demand Fluctuations
Delays in Project Completion or Operation
Use of Conservative Assumptions in Verification Procedures
Inadequate Guidance or Changes in Validation or Verification Procedures
The leading explanation of validation/verification error was inadequate technology or
methodology to measure emissions reductions. For example, with respect to methane landfill
projects, several respondents identified the primary cause of error to be lack of adequate
technology to measure low concentrations of gases over large areas. Survey respondents
noted that measurements are typically not conducted under ideal conditions (as assumed in
the standard methodologies) and very little is known about the quality of waste in landfill
sites, which affects decomposition rates and the selection of appropriate methods for
analyzing data. Further, models and assumptions used for estimation are often not reliable or
appropriate for local conditions (Betzenbichler 2006; Van Der Linden 2006; Eddy 2006).
With respect to environmental conditions, the performance of projects that depend
upon wind, precipitation, river flow, or heat (as in the case of decomposition of waste) will
be affected by fluctuation in weather conditions. These factors will significantly influence
the outcome of verification results (Telners 2006; Van Der Linden 2006).
Supply and demand conditions will influence the verified results of projects whose
performance is linked to market conditions. For example, electricity generation projects are
verified based on the actual amount of electricity supplied to the grid. Similarly, HFC plants
are typically swing production plants so their verification results are directly affected by
demand for their products (Van Der Linden 2006).
Delay of project completion or operation can significantly affect the economic
feasibility of a project and its verification results (Betzenbichler 2006). In particular,
hydroelectric plants are highly sensitive to construction delays (Colston 2006a; Van Der
Linden 2006).
Several firms identified the use of inappropriate assumptions in the validation stage
and conservative assumptions in the verification stage as potential factors influencing
validation/verification error. Several respondents noted that CDM methodologies often use
generalized IPPC estimates that do not take local conditions into account. For example, the
use of IPCC estimates for methane projects fails to take into account local agricultural
conditions (Telners 2006). Several respondents noted that because the validation stage
involves estimation, it is inherently subject to error, and one respondent noted that project
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sponsors are often optimistic in the validation stage (Esparta 2006). Others suggested that
firms conducting the verification may use conservative assumptions in accordance with best
practices recommended by ISO and other organizations, thereby further increasing the
difference between validation estimates and verification results (Hardy 2006).
With respect to the adequacy of guidance and procedures, several respondents noted
that the CDM Executive Board has not provided adequate guidance for validation and
verification procedures. CDM methodologies have been frequently revised, which has
contributed greatly to uncertainty. One respondent noted that some of these methodologies
have been revised five or six times already since their inception and that CDM guidelines do
not specify exactly what steps need to be taken to validate or verify emissions (Van Der
Linden 2006). Another respondent indicated that CDM rules which prohibit direct contact
between project sponsors and reviewing personnel has slowed approvals and prevented
project sponsors from receiving timely or detailed guidance (Esparta 2006).
There were some differences in opinion whether seasonal patterns and the timing of
the verification could influence validation/verification error. One firm that focuses on
agriculture projects believes that the seasonal nature of agriculture and the timing of
verification could contribute to validation/verification error (Eddy 2006). Another believed
that the CDM methodologies adequately allow for adjustments for seasonal variation, and the
use of continuous or frequent monitoring should correct for seasonality (Van Der Linden
2006).
Finally, CDM participants were asked their opinion as to whether they expected
estimates would improve in the future. Respondents generally believed that results should
improve, while at the same time acknowledged that estimation error is likely to continue due
to the inherent nature of prediction. One respondent stated that we would continue to see
estimation error especially for projects that are influenced heavily by outside factors, such as
supply and demand, as in the case of HFC projects. In general, respondents believed that the
variability is inherent in the design of the CDM validation and verification arrangement:
validation estimates are made based on theoretical engineering estimates, whereas the
verification is based on actual plant operations.
Some respondents suggested specific aspects of CDM that can be improved to reduce
validation/verification error. One respondent suggested more detailed methodology
regarding monitoring requirements should improve data collection and the consistency in
assumptions used at the validation and verification stages (Betzenbichler 2006). 7 Several
respondents emphasized that proven technologies should exhibit less variability between
17 The World Resources Institute, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development,
the International Organization of Standardization (see First Environment 2006), the
American Petroleum Institute, and the California Climate Action Registry are developing
guidance for estimation and measurement of emissions reductions. All of these standards are
voluntary methods intended to help define best practices.
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validation estimates and verification results (Telners 2006; Hardy 2006; TransAlta 2006). 18
Finally, one respondent indicated that training and assistance locating qualified people to
carry out estimates for each methodology would help reduce error (Eddy 2006).
5.7.2.5 Price
Interviews with industry participants revealed that CDM CERs are priced based on
the spot and futures prices of EUAs, the rules regarding their use, the risks of the particular
project producing the CERs, expectations regarding supply and demand for CERs, and
competition from other sources of carbon offsets.
The starting point for pricing a CER is the spot and futures prices of EUAs as this
market is the most highly liquid and provides near-term price visibility. The recent drop in
EUA prices in May 2005 placed downward pressure on CER prices and has slowed CDM
activity considerably. As a result, many CDM projects are no longer financially competitive
(Colston 2006a).
The rules regarding CERs also affect their price. Under the Kyoto Protocol, CDM
CERs and JI ERUs may be used in future compliance periods up to a maximum of 2.5% of a
party's assigned amount of emissions (Kyoto Protocol Decision 19, 1997). However, Article
12(10) of the Kyoto Protocol ensures that CERs and ERUs obtained prior to 2008 can be
fully banked for use in the 2008-2012 compliance period. In contrast, AAUs are fully
bankable without limitation starting during the 2008-2012 compliance period (Kyoto
Protocol Decision 19, 1997). The European Union has allowed its member states to decide
whether unused EUAs acquired during the 2005-2007 trial phase can be carried over and
used to meet emissions limits in the first commitment period in 2008-2012 (European
Commission 2003). Potential temporary restrictions on the ability to bank EUAs for the
2008-2012 period enhance the value of CERs relative to EUAs during the trial phase.
The imposition of penalties by the European Union provides some level of price
support for EUAs and CERs (Parsons 2006). The European Union imposes penalties for
failure to deliver adequate EUAs of £40 per tonne of carbon dioxide in the trial phase which
runs from January 1, 2005 until December 21, 2007, and E100 per tonne in the first
commitment period from January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2012 (European Union
2003).
CDM CER prices are also influenced by the perceived quality of the project and
project sponsors. As described above, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
delivery of verified CERs, which increases supply risk for the purchaser of CERs. One way
to address this risk is to price CERs differently based on the stage of the project; sales early
in the process prior to final approval receive a much lower price than those sold post-
18 Greater reliance on proven technology in CDM reflects the same bias toward proven
technology that is identified in Chapter 4 in the technology risk analysis. This may result in
CDM playing less of a role in developing innovative new technology.
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verification. The creditworthiness of the seller also significantly affects the price of CERs
(Milborrow 2006).
Finally, CDM CERs are priced based on expected supply and demand for carbon
offsets. CERs must compete against supply from various other sources, including JI ERUs,
RMUs, and excess AAUs. Over-allocation presents one of the most serious threats to the
viability of the CDM. Over-allocation has occurred in both the European Union and Eastern
Europe.
The May 2005 verification of emissions showed that the over-allocation of carbon
dioxide emissions allowances to European Union countries was approximately 41 million
metric tonnes (European Commission 2006; Timmons 2006). The announcement of these
excess emissions allowances reduced the price of carbon by over 67%, thereby making CDM
projects less competitive.
To place the European Union over-allocation in perspective, CDM projects that had
filed with the CDM Executive Board as of August 9, 2006 represented 169,934,000 metric
tonnes of validated carbon dioxide emissions reductions per year (UNEP Risoe Centre
2006b). The European Union carbon over-allocation displaces one quarter of the total
amount of these estimated CDM emissions reductions. However, if the verification process
results in a lower issuance of CERs, as has been observed in projects verified to date, the
displacement could be considerably higher. If the validation/verification error of the first
thirty-five projects is representative of the other 961validated and unverified CDM projects
filed as of August 9, 2006, the expected number of CDM CERs to be issued would be
approximately 92.4 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per year. The May 2006 over-
allocation would displace 44% of the expected CERs from the CDM projects validated as of
August 9, 2006.
If Russian and Ukrainian excess allowances enter the market in 2008, they would
exert even greater downward pressure on CERs and AAU prices. To place this in
perspective, if the 791.5 million tonnes of Russian and Ukrainian annual excess allowances
produced from fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions enter the market, this additional supply
would be approximately twenty times larger in volume than the May 2006 41 million tonne
over-allocation of carbon dioxide that caused the price of EUAs to drop by over 67%. The
same 791.5 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per year would be almost five times
greater than the validated annual emissions reductions of the 996 CDM projects filed as of
August 9, 2006, and almost nine times greater than the expected annual volume of CERs to
be issued by these CDM projects assuming that validations continue to overestimate actual
issuances of CERs by a 46% error margin.
In addition, other greenhouse gases are expected to produce additional allowances for
Eastern European countries in excess of 100 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide
equivalent per year, a majority of which will belong to Russia and Ukraine (Rolfe 2000).
These excess emissions allowances are approximately 60% of validated CDM emissions
reductions as of August 9, 2006, and slightly more than the number of CERs expected to be
issued assuming validation estimates continue to exhibit an error rate of 46%. To the extent
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these other gases are permitted to enter the market, the resulting excess AAUs from Eastern
Europe will place additional downward pressure on the price of CDM CERs.
A number of studies have estimated future carbon prices, with the results varying
widely based on differing assumptions and models. These assumptions include different
estimates of future economic growth, oil prices, cost of emissions abatement, the rules
concerning the availability of Eastern European excess emissions allowances, the rules
concerning trading across emissions sectors and countries, and banking of emissions. One
1999 study that compared the results of eleven leading models predicted prices would range
below £20 to £100 per tonne of carbon dioxide in order to achieve 5% emissions reductions
from 1990 levels. Seven of the eleven models surveyed predicted the price would range from
£20 to £35 per tonne of carbon dioxide for a 5% reduction of 1990 levels in a market in
which the United States participated (Weyant and Hill 1999; Reilly and Paltsev 2006). More
recent studies have predicted median prices to range from under 1El to under £6 per tonne of
carbon dioxide if trading across sectors and countries is permitted under the EU ETS (Reilly
and Paltsev 2006; Pew Center 2005; See 2005). The study which predicted that carbon
dioxide prices should be under 1El per tonne was based on analysis of the current EU ETS
regime and assumed that emitters will find relatively inexpensive methods to meet target
reductions in the 2005-2007 period (Reilly and Paltsev 2006).
These estimates are well below observed trading prices in the £15-40 range. Again,
the imposition of a £40/tonne penalty for failure to meet targets during the 2005-2007 period
may have supported the price at the observed levels (Parsons 2006). Alternatively, these
studies may underestimate the cost of reducing emissions (Reilly and Paltsev 2006).
The availability of a large number of low-cost allowances will lower the price of
carbon and potentially increase the volatility of the price of carbon dioxide emissions
allowances. In turn, this will make more costly CDM projects unattractive financially and
will increase the risks of CDM projects in general. Overall, the oversupply and low price of
emissions allowances coupled with higher CDM risks will likely reduce the use of CDM.
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5.7.2.6 Market Capacity
Market capacity for CDM CERs will depend in large part upon price levels as
described in the prior section, and how risks and barriers to the development of CDM
projects are addressed. This section addresses risks and barriers.
The survey conducted in connection with this dissertation revealed that CDM project
risks, the additionality requirement, and regulatory uncertainty are critical areas that must be
addressed successfully in order for CDM CERs to become an important source of emissions
allowances. In turn, this will determine whether CDM will achieve its goals of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and promoting sustainable development in developing countries.
5.7.2.6.1 CDM Project Risks
This section summarizes various risks associated with the issuance of CERs in CDM
projects. If CERs are part of a project's financing, a number of special risks need to be
addressed by project parties and reflected in project documents. The risks associated with
the issuance of CERs are in addition to other risks that are associated with infrastructure
projects generally, as described in Chapter 4.
The CER portion of a project entails substantial risk for project sponsors, investors
and project customers that rely on the issuance of CERs either as a source of project revenues
or as a source of emissions allowances. As described above, the actual number of CERs that
a CDM project produces depends upon the verified performance of the project.
Issuance of CERs requires approvals of the host government and the CDM Executive
Board, and the successful completion and operation of the project. Purchasers of CERs
should be concerned about the financial stability and performance of the project and the
ability to take legal title to the CERs. These considerations favor project sponsors with
established records, countries with legal systems that will enforce CER and other project
contracts, national regulatory systems that will provide the necessary project approvals in a
timely manner, and technologies that are reliable.
As with the risks discussed in Chapter 4, CDM risks should be separately identified,
allocated, and mitigated. In addition to allocation and mitigation in the project documents,
some private contractual methods may be available to address CDM risk. Swiss Re currently
offers products that insure against the risks of a CDM project's failure to deliver promised
CERs (CERES 2006), and other insurers are considering providing similar products (Gooch
2006).
Table 5.21 below summarizes various risks associated with the CDM aspects of
projects.
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Table 5.21: CDM Project Risks
Risk Examples
Market and Supply Risks Immature market; affected by AAU prices, energy
prices, and weather conditions.
Technology Risk Clean technologies still developing; uncertain costs
and benefits.
Certification/Verification Risk Variation in validation and verification procedures.
Proving additionality requirement.
Difficulty in monitoring emissions reductions.
Failure to deliver promised CERs due to
validation/verification estimation error.
Regulatory Risk CDM methodologies still developing and untested.
Kyoto Protocol only extends to 2012.
Potential for commodities or securities regulation.
Political Risk Host government must approve the project under
domestic laws for sustainability.
Accounting/Disclosure Risk No standard or oversight for reporting national
emissions or CDM results.
Conflicts of interest among project parties.
Credit Risk Counterparty credit risk (no exchange clears CERs).
Default Risk Failure to deliver CERs due to financial or technical
failure.
Legal Risk No legal standards for CDM.
No case law in any country.
Complex national and international law issues.
Capital Markets/Finance Risk Significant volume needed for economies of scale.
Source: Adapted from AgCert (2006); TransAlta (2006); Hoyte (2006); Fussell (2006);
Colston (2006b); Wilder et al. (2005).
Two of the risks associated with CDM, the additionality requirement and regulatory
uncertainty, are addressed in greater detail in the next two sections. These risks were
identified in a majority of interviews as significant shortcomings of CDM.
5.7.2.6.2 Additionality
The additionality provision of the Kyoto Protocol requires that project sponsors prove
that the project would not have occurred in the absence of the financial incentives created by
the CDM. The additionality requirement was introduced to encourage actual emissions
reductions to take place by preventing a windfall to projects that would have been
implemented in any case. Additionality is also a means of limiting the supply of CERs,
which is intended to maintain their price, and thus the viability of the CDM (Michaelowa
2005b).
Brokers, investors and advisors to CDM projects interviewed in connection with this
dissertation were in general agreement that the requirement of "additionality" is cumbersome
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and possibly counterproductive.19 Various respondents observed that the additionality
requirement introduces a degree of uncertainty into the process that increases costs and time
to complete projects. Others noted that is could lead to manipulation of data in order to
demonstrate the desired result.
Importantly, the additionality requirement does not address project quality. Several
CDM participants commented that the quality of some of the projects undertaken were
dubious. For example, HFC projects have been criticized as giving credit for shifting
emissions away from ozone depleting HFCs that are banned under the Montreal Protocol
towards a milder greenhouse gas that is to be phased out by 2040.
If projects reduce greenhouse gas emissions, there seems to be little purpose in a
requirement that adversely affects the development of CDM projects by increasing
uncertainty, delays and costs. Interview results suggested that more emphasis on projects
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions in lieu of the additionality criteria would be
appropriate.
5.7.2.6.3 Regulatory Uncertainty
Regulatory uncertainty has adversely affected the CDM at several levels. Because the
Kyoto Protocol is only in force until 2012, there is uncertainty regarding the future of CDM.
The short time horizon for CDM through 2012 reduces incentives to invest in developing CDM
methodologies (Eddy 2006; Page, B. 2006). One project sponsor noted that if there was
greater commitment to the Kyoto Protocol by his own government, he believes his firm would
be much more aggressive in developing CDM and JI projects (Page, B. 2006).
Uncertainty regarding CDM standards and methodologies is another source of
regulatory uncertainty. All firms surveyed identified that uncertainty in standards and
methodology were causing significant delays and additional cost. For example, the cost of a
new methodology is typically recovered by its application in multiple projects. Interviewees
stated that the cost of developing a methodology is approximately $150,000 (Colston 2006a;
Eddy 2006; Hardy 2006). Further, the time required to develop new methodologies is
substantial. Methodologies have required an average of 280 days for approval, based on a
total of fifty-six approved methodologies as of May 1, 2006 (UNEP Risoe Centre 2006a).
Yet, a number of methodologies are under revision and review, some of which have been
revised multiple times (Van Der Linden 2006). Several firms expressed concern that these
problems could undermine the viability of CDM.
Significantly, because CDM projects require a minimum of approximately eighteen to
twenty-four months to register and verify the CERs, CDM regulatory requirements need to
be clarified well in advance of the upcoming compliance period to ensure a large volume of
CDM activity (Milborrow 2006).
19 Michaelowa (2005b) describes the additionality and baseline determination methods.
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Finally, the price of CDM CERs will also be affected by the rules concerning trading
emissions between countries. In addition to the European Union, a number of countries are
developing emissions trading regimes in anticipation of the 2008-2012 compliance period
(Haites 2005; Wilder 2005). The regulatory arrangements for linking these national trading
systems, the rules concerning the supply of gases, and the excess AAUs that will enter the
market will affect the viability of CDM (Haites 2005).
5.7.3 Prospects for EU ETS and CDM to Address Climate Risk
AAUs traded in the EU ETS and CDM CERs are intended to address twin goals of
promoting carbon emissions reductions and providing flexible instruments for firms to
manage regulatory risk associated with carbon emissions limits. CDM is particularly
important because it is intended to achieve emissions reductions in developing countries that
are among the most populous and have some of the fastest growing economies in the world,
such as Brazil, China, and India.
Both EU ETS and CDM are in the development stage and both must overcome
several significant hurdles before they are viable mechanisms. Specifically, policymakers
must address the issue of regulatory uncertainty concerning the future of the Kyoto Protocol
arrangements after 2012.
With respect to CDM CERs, the potential low cost of competing excess emissions
allowances and the cost and time required to produce CERs could undermine the CDM as
both a policy instrument and a means for managing regulatory risk. Significantly, the failure
of the CDM to supply a reliable stream of CERs can be expected to increase reliance on
excess emissions allowances. Finally, the CDM Executive Board must provide clear
standards and methodologies for CDM projects if CDM is to be successful.
AAUs and CDM CERs in their current state have limited potential to address climate
change unless the issues described in this section are successfully addressed. Table 5.22
summarizes the conclusions of this section regarding AAUs and CDM CERs.
Table 5.22: EUA and CDM Summary
Carbon Offsets AAUs CDM CERs
Scope of Risk Coverage Regulatory Regulatory
Geographic Coverage EU countries until 2008, then Annex I parties invest in non-
all Kyoto Parties Annex I countries.
Contract Duration 46% for 2006 AAUs; 49% for Mostly for 2008-2012 compliance
2007; 6% for 2008- 2012. period.
Availability Abundant, excess allowances. Limited; supply risk.
Price Volatile. Subject to supply, Volatile. Depends on project,
reporting, regulatory issues. sponsor, AAU prices.
Market Capacity Abundant, excess allowances. Limited, unless barriers removed.
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5.8 Catastrophe Bonds
This section examines catastrophe-linked debt securities, commonly known as
catastrophe bonds. Because of the recent introduction of these instruments, the section first
provides an overview of the fundamentals of catastrophe bonds. Next, it evaluates these
instruments based on the six criteria relating to scope of risks covered, geographic coverage,
contract duration, availability, price, and market capacity. Finally, the section concludes by
evaluating the prospects for catastrophe bonds to address risks associated with climate
change.
The research in this section presents the results of a survey of twenty insurance
industry participants. Survey respondents were primarily insurance and reinsurance
companies, and brokerage firms, but also included credit rating agencies, state insurance
regulators, insurance industry associations, and insurance risk analysis firms.
5.8.1 Catastrophe Bond Fundamentals
Catastrophe bonds are an alternative method of accomplishing the objectives of
raising capital and shifting underwriting risk to a third party. Thus, catastrophe bonds are a
substitute for reinsurance because they shift the risk of loss of a specified catastrophic event
in whole or in part to purchasers of the bonds. Insurers are increasingly issuing catastrophe
bonds to supplement reinsurance because of the limited capacity in the reinsurance markets
for high-loss events in densely populated regions at an acceptable price range.
Catastrophe bonds are typically floating-rate bonds with higher than normal returns
for bonds of their rating. The principal repayment obligation is waived in whole or part if
one or more natural catastrophes occur as specified in the bond documents.
From an investor's perspective, catastrophe bonds may be a desirable component of a
portfolio because their returns are not correlated with general economic conditions, the
returns on other fixed income securities, or the insurer's claim adjustment practices. The
correlation of catastrophe losses and annual percentage changes in the S&P 500 equity index
have been demonstrated to be close to zero (r=-0.05, t= -0.33) between 1949 and 1996
(Canter, Cole and Sandor 1997).
Catastrophe bonds are structured using a special purpose vehicle that holds the bond
proceeds and a premium paid by the insurance company for the reinsurance aspect of the
bond. These assets are invested and the proceeds pay interest on the bonds. This structure
shields the bondholders from the credit risk associated with the insurance company. At the
maturity date of the bond, the principal is repaid to the bondholders unless a triggering event
occurs, in which case all or a portion of the assets are paid to the ceding insurance company
to cover the cost of the losses.
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5.8.2 Scope of Risk Coverage
The catastrophe bond market typically focuses on high-loss, low-probability risks, such
as for a 1-in-100 year event (Schupp 2005: Lane and Beckwith 2006; Khater 2006). The only
exception is the Spring 2006 launch of Successor by Swiss Re, a three year catastrophe bond
that includes approximately $30 million of risk coverage in the 1-in-10 and 1-in-15 year event
layers, which commands a generous 30-40% yield (Khater 2006). The Successor transaction is
an experiment and the acceptance of this practice may depend upon whether losses are
sustained by the bondholders in the upcoming hurricane season (Khater 2006).
Catastrophe bonds have been offered predominantly for United States, European and
Japanese risks, primarily for earthquake and hurricanes. Catastrophe bonds can be structured
to diversify risk based on multiple locations, seasons and perils. Bonds may also combine
put and call options within the structure to limit the risk of the loss to all or certain layers of
bondholders as a means of further reducing risk. For example, a bond typically features
multiple tranches, each of which represents different levels of risk. A more secure tranche
could guarantee the entire return of principal and a portion of interest even if a trigger event
occurs, whereas a less secure tranche that commands a higher yield could be subject to
forfeiture of all principal and interest (Caifa 2002; Martucci 2006; Ali and Yanos 2004).
In general, bondholders are not willing to accept more frequently occurring risks
because investors are only interested in the return on the bond and are not accustomed to
accepting the risks associated with underwriting insurance. Further, unlike reinsurance
companies, bondholders have no incentive to accept greater risks in order to maintain
relationships with clients (Schupp 2006; Roberts 2002). The acceptance of remote risks may
account for the fact that only one catastrophe bond has ever been fully triggered (Hoffman
2006). Because investors are unwilling to accept more frequent risks common in an insurer's
portfolio, catastrophe bonds presently have a limited ability to mitigate insurers' more
regular risks.
Catastrophe bonds are typically structured to forgive all or a portion of principal
based on one of the following kinds of triggers: (a) the insurer's actual losses, (b) an index
of industry losses, usually determined by a third party, (c) anticipated losses based on model
calculations derived from inputting parameters of actual catastrophic events that occur during
a specified period into a computer model specified by the bond, or (d) the occurrence of a
natural event meeting specified parameters, such as windspeed (for a hurricane bond) or
ground acceleration (for an earthquake bond). With respect to parametric bonds described in
(c) and (d), confirmation of the occurrence of the trigger typically requires multiple
observation stations to provide weather data, which is used as input for a specified algorithm
that determines whether the trigger is activated (Standard & Poor's 2004).
Recent trends in catastrophe bond terms have moved away from indemnifying the
insurer's actual losses and towards an index or parametric risk trigger. As described above,
indemnity-based catastrophe bonds forgive bond principal based on the actual losses of the
insurer, which in turn depends upon the insurer's underwriting and loss adjustment practices.
Indemnification bonds tend to be more expensive because these provide more certainty to
insurance company and less certainty to investors.
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In contrast, index bonds are based on an index of industry loss, as opposed to the
insurance company's actual practices and obligations. This method limits the exposure of
bondholders to the insurance company's particular portfolio of risks, which simplifies the
risk analysis.
The table below shows the trends in catastrophe bond terms through 2005.
Table 5.23: Catastrophe Bond Triggers, 1997-2005
Indemnity Parametric PCS (Index) Modeled
Year Principal Amount (US$ millions) and Number of Transactions
1997 $431.0 3 $90.0 1 $112.0 1 $0.0 0
1998 $846.1 8 $0.0 0 $0.0 0 $0.0 0
1999 $602.7 7 $100.0 1 $0.0 0 $282.1 2
2000 $507.0 4 $303.0 2 $150.0 1 $179.0 2
2001 $150.0 1 $270.0 2 $265.0 2 $281.9 2
2002 $355.0 2 $631.5 3 $200.0 1 $33.0 1
2003 $260.0 2 $1,119.8 4 $350.8 1 $0.0 0
2004 $227.5 1 $267.8 2 $547.5 2 $100.0 1
2005 $859.4 4 $491.7 3 $0 0 $640.0 3
TOTAL $4,238.7 32 $3,273.8 18 $1,624.5 8 $1,516.0 11
Source: Guy Carpenter (2006).
As the risk of loss associated with catastrophic events increases and credit rating
considerations require larger reserves and more reinsurance, demand for catastrophe bonds
are expected to increase (Schupp 2006; Standard & Poor's 2006). This can be expected to
favor bondholders who desire to accept less risk, thus reinforcing the move towards
catastrophe bonds featuring index or parametric triggers (Schupp 2006). Insurers also expect
to see an increasing number of bonds feature multiple triggers, which reduces the risk
substantially for bondholders (Challoner 2006; Mistry 2006).
5.8.3 Geographic Coverage
Catastrophe bonds have been offered predominantly for United States, European and
Japanese risks, primarily for earthquake and hurricane perils. Table 5.24 below summarizes
catastrophe bond risk capital coverage by geography and risk. Note that because some
catastrophe bonds cover multiple perils, the table below double counts the capital available
for multiple perils in each applicable risk category.
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Table 5.24: Catastrophe Bonds Principal Amounts by Risk (US$ millions), 1997-2005
Year U.S. U.S. European Japanese Japanese Other
Earthquake Hurricane Windstorm Earthquake Typhoon
1997 112.0 395.0 0.0 90.0 0 36.0
1998 145.0 721.1 0.0 0.0 80.0 45.0
1999 327.8 507.8 167.0 217.0 17.0 10.0
2000 486.5 506.5 482.5 217.0 17.0 129.0
2001 696.9 551.9 431.9 150.0 0.0 120.0
2002 799.5 476.5 334.0 383.6 0.0 0.0
2003 803.8 416.1 474.1 691.2 277.5 100.0
2004 803.3 660.8 220.3 310.8 0.0 0.0
2005 1,269.0 994.0 830.1 138.0 0.0 405.0
TOTAL $5,443.7 $5,229.7 $2,939.9 $2,197.5 $391.5 $845.0
Source: Guy Carpenter (2006). Note: for catastrophe bonds covering multiple perils, the table double
counts the capital available for multiple perils in each applicable risk category.
The placement of catastrophe bonds for U.S., European and Japanese risks probably
reflects the fact that these regions possess the most developed insurance markets and bond
markets (Bank for International Settlements 2006b).
5.8.4 Contract Duration
Catastrophe bonds first appeared in 1997. From 1999 to April 2006, approximately
122 catastrophe bond tranches have been issued representing approximately $8.5 billion
principal amount (Standard & Poor's 2006c). Of these transactions, the shortest tenor was 1
year and the longest tenor was 5 years. The average tenor was 3.1 years and the average
tranche was approximately $70 million. The table below summarizes the tenors for the 122
catastrophe bond tranches issued from 1999 through April 2006.
Table 5.25: Catastrophe Bond Tenors, 1999-April 2006
Tenor 12 13-24 25-36 37-48 49-62(months)
Number of 7 22 18 55 20Transactions
Percentage 5.74% 18.03% 14.75% 45.08% 16.39%
Source: Standard & Poor's (2006c).
Catastrophe bonds offer the longest tenor of any risk product surveyed in this
dissertation. Yet, even with catastrophe bonds, there is a clear mismatch between the risks
assumed by lenders and the risks covered by the risk markets. To illustrate, 100% of
catastrophe bond transactions have tenors of less than 5 V2 years. In comparison, 55% of
infrastructure finance debt tranches in 2005 had tenors of greater than 5 /2 years; and 25%
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had tenors in excess of 10 years. Some debt tranches had tenors in excess of 50 years
(Dealogic 2006b).
5.8.5 Availability
The transaction costs of issuing catastrophe bonds and the recent record of
catastrophe events potentially limit the availability of catastrophe bonds. As noted in the
prior section, catastrophe bonds may be structured to indemnify the insurer's actual losses or
to compensate the insurer based on an index or parametric risk trigger. In the survey of
insurance companies, several insurers noted that they expect that indemnity bonds will be
difficult to obtain following Hurricane Katrina (Schupp 2006). Several interviewees noted
that the only catastrophe bond that has been fully triggered is an indemnity-based bond,
which was triggered by Hurricane Katrina (Hoffman 2006; Schupp 2006). As a result of the
large payout on this bond, the industry is expected to move towards index or parametric
triggers. These bonds offer lower transaction costs and shield bondholders from risk
exposure to the issuer's underwriting and loss adjustment practices.
5.8.6 Price
Catastrophe bonds are priced based on actuarial risk models, expectation of future
weather patterns, and supply and demand conditions. The risk of loss associated with
catastrophic events are typically modeled using historic weather data, demographic data,
building codes, engineering data specific to a particular zip-code, and expected trends based
on scientific and demographic data (Standard & Poor's 1999; Muir-Wood 2006; Siner 2006).
These models produce a loss exceedance curve, which shows the expected amount of insured
losses from a particular risk and its estimated probability. The exceedance probability is the
probability that a loss will occur at or greater than a specified level of loss.
Consider an example of a hypothetical catastrophe bond having a principal amount of
$500 million. The bond principal is forgiven if a catastrophic event occurs that causes in
excess of $10 billion of industry loss based on the issuer's percentage of industry market
share until losses reach $15 billion. Assume further that the issuer has 10% market share and
thus the entire $500 million principal amount is forgiven when $15 billion of industry losses
are reached. The probability of a $10 billion loss event is 4% and the probability of a $15
billion loss event is 2%. The expected loss probability for this particular catastrophe bond is
deemed to be 3%, which is the average loss for the $10-15 billion range according to the
model. The bond is priced by comparing the 3% event probability to historic default rates of
corporate bonds of similar tenor, and the corresponding corporate default rating is assigned to
the catastrophe bond. For example, one-year corporate bonds having a default rate ranging
from 1.35% to 7.25% are assigned a Ba to B rating. Because the 3% event probability
triggering non-payment on the catastrophe bond falls within this range, the catastrophe bond
could be assigned a similar rating of Ba to B. The prevailing yields in the corporate bond
market for the particular rating would then be used as the basis for pricing the catastrophe
bond (Cole and Chiarenza 1999).
190
Figure 5.11: Catastrophe Bond Exceedance Curve
Source: Cole and Chiarenza (1999).
Credit rating agencies rate catastrophe bonds based solely on the probability of the
occurrence of the natural catastrophic event that triggers the loss of principal. Catastrophe
bonds are generally rated BBB+, which isjust below investment grade, except for bonds that
feature triple-event triggers, which may receive an investment grade rating (Standard &
Poor's 2004).
Table 5.26: Catastrophe Bond Ratings by Principal Amount (US$ millions) and
Number of Transactions, 1997-2005
B BB BBB A AA AAA
$1,068.6 12 $7,198.7 78 $1,371.3 15 $211.5 3 $0 0 $105.9 5
Source: Guy Carpenter (2006).
Significantly, catastrophe bonds are one of the first risk transfer instruments used by
the insurance industry that provide price visibility for property and casualty risk. Analysis of
the catastrophe bond secondary market prior to and following Hurricane Katrina reveals that
yields demanded by bondholders have increased rapidly immediately following the 2005
hurricane season. The yields on bonds that are linked to wind or hurricane events have
increased by as much as 150% to 200% over LIBOR. Yields on bonds that feature multiple
triggers have increased as hurricanes during the 2004 and 2005 seasons have reduced or
removed the additional triggers (Lane and Beckwith 2006).
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Following Hurricane Katrina, revised catastrophe bond models estimate that the
probability of occurrence some catastrophic events had increased by 30% to 60% (Martucci
2006). As a result, eighteen outstanding catastrophe bonds that were rated using old models
were placed on credit watch with negative implications (Standard & Poor's 2006b; Martucci
2006). These revised models are expected to cause further increases in prices and/or
potentially reduce demand for catastrophe risk bonds (Martucci 2006).
Anecdotal evidence from the dissertation survey further suggested that prices have
increased dramatically. Swiss Re's $950 million Successor catastrophe bond launched in
Spring 2006 covered a portfolio of perils including U.S. hurricane, European wind,
California earthquake, and Japan earthquake. The catastrophe bond provided approximately
$200 million in coverage for Florida, including a working layer for 1-in-15 year events with a
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yield of 30% to 40%. The respondent believed a 40% yield is the extent of what the market
can absorb (Khater 2006). Considering that a 100% yield would equate to the issuer
suffering the entire loss of principal, there appears to be little likelihood that catastrophe
bond yields can continue to increase beyond those offered in the Successor transaction for
working risk layers.
5.8.7 Market Capacity
In 2005, eighteen catastrophe bond transactions were completed for a total of $1.7
billion principal amount raised, at an average transaction size of $96 million per tranche or
approximately $200 million per bond (Standard & Poor's 2006c; Clarke 2006). In 2005,
approximately $4.9 billion principal in catastrophe bonds was outstanding. Of this, $3.08
billion was available for U.S. hurricane and earthquake risk (Clarke 2006).
To place these figures in context, it is useful to compare the size of the catastrophe
bond market to the overall insurance markets, recent catastrophic losses, and to the
infrastructure lending markets.
At the end of 2005, the U.S. property and casualty insurance industry possessed a
policyholder surplus of $427 billion (Insurance Information Institute 2006a). In 2005,
outstanding U.S. catastrophe bonds were 0.7% of the net value of the industry. In other
words, this market is presently very small in size relative to the U.S. property and casualty
insurance industry.
In 2005, U.S. onshore insured catastrophe losses exceeded $57.7 billion (Insurance
Information Institute 2006a). Outstanding U.S. catastrophe bond principal at the end of 2005
was equal to approximately 5.3% of insured losses (Insurance Information Institute 2006a).
In 2005, foreign reinsurance and other arrangements covered $27-32 billion of U.S.
catastrophe losses (Insurance Information Institute 2006a), representing capacity
approximately ten times larger than the U.S. catastrophe bond market (Insurance Information
Institute 2006a).
Prior to September 11, 2001, the reinsurance market was estimated to lack
approximately $30-55 billion of capacity to meet demand for events that causes $60 to $80
billion in losses (Ganapati et al. 1999). The $4.9 billion principal in outstanding catastrophe
bonds in 2005 would have met 9% to 16% of the estimated shortfall.
One of the arguments in favor of catastrophe bonds is that it allows the insurance
industry to diffuse risk beyond the industry, thereby expanding the capacity of the insurance
industry to underwrite risk. It is difficult to evaluate the role of catastrophe bonds versus
reinsurance because insurance companies do not release details of their reinsurance and
retrocession practices. However, the insurance industry survey revealed that the reinsurance
companies purchase many of the catastrophe bonds (Schupp 2006; Mistry 2006; Challoner
2006). In addition, the issuers of catastrophe bonds are expected to retain a portion of the
bonds in their own portfolios to align their interests with those of the purchasing bondholders
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(Mistry 2006; Challoner 2006). It is therefore unclear what percentage of catastrophe bond
risk is actually transferred out of the insurance industry.
In comparison to the infrastructure lending market, the catastrophe bond market is
approximately 1% of the size of the infrastructure lending market in 2005. In comparison to
the $1.7 billion raised in catastrophe bonds in 2005, 487 infrastructure projects were financed
with $175 billion of debt the same year.
Other factors suggest that the catastrophe bond market is unlikely to increase to the
size of the reinsurance market. Bondholders have little incentive or expertise to accept the
risks typically accepted by reinsurance companies (Schupp 2006; Roberts 2002). Further,
catastrophe bonds are expensive to issue with high transaction costs. Recent market
conditions suggest that their success will depend greatly upon offering high yields to
bondholders, making them expensive alternatives (Martucci 2006).
At the same time, the capital markets have tremendous capacity to accommodate new
securities products. At the end of 2005, the global value of all debt securities outstanding
was estimated to be $58.6 trillion (Bank for International Settlements 2006b). The $4.9
billion principal in catastrophe bonds outstanding in 2004 represents 0.0084% of the broader
global bond market. If pricing is adequate and innovative transparent structures can be
developed that lead to wider acceptance of these instruments by investors, there is practically
unlimited capacity in capital markets for catastrophe-linked securities.
5.8.8 Prospects for Addressing Climate Change
Survey respondents were asked to comment on how climate change might affect the
catastrophe bond market. Responses varied but there was general agreement that demand for
reinsurance will increase so there will be more demand for catastrophe bonds. However, a
key issue will be the price and the terms of these bonds.
One survey respondent noted that it is an open question how fragile the catastrophe
risk market is because of perceptions that global warming could increase the severity of
storms and the magnitude of losses. The respondent noted that although Hurricane Katrina
increased the demand for catastrophe bonds, he believed a series of major events would not
be salutary for this market, resulting in either more expensive pricing or less capacity
(Schupp 2006). Based on discussions with catastrophe bond investors during Spring 2006
investment road shows, one modeling firm which handles approximately 60-70% of
catastrophe bond issuances expressed the view that a high loss year in 2006 would likely
close the market entirely and an low loss year would cause dramatic growth. This respondent
believed that catastrophe bond yields as high as 40% on recent transactions for working
layers had reached the maximum return that is economically feasible for issuers, and thus the
market could not continue to increase prices to attract further investment (Khater 2006).
In summary, evidence from the reinsurance market suggests that climate change
would potentially reduce capacity, increase cost, and/or cause more strict terms in the
catastrophe bond market. Catastrophe bonds use reinsurance underwriting models for setting
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price and bond terms. Because these markets are substitutes for each other, these markets
influence each other (Standard & Poor's 2005b). Thus, increases in cost or curtailment in
coverage in the reinsurance market will favor bondholders in the catastrophe bond markets.
As described above, the survey revealed that the 2005 hurricane season has already caused
prices to increase and catastrophe bond terms to become more restrictive.
Table 5.27 below summarizes the findings of this section with respect to catastrophe
bonds.
Table 5.27: Catastrophe Bonds Summary
Scope of Risk Coverage Force Majeure
Geographic Coverage Primarily United States, Europe, and Japan.
Contract Duration 3.1 year average; 5 year longest duration in market.
Availability Typically remote risk (e.g., 1-in-100 year event).
Primarily for earthquake, hurricane, windstorm.
Price Mostly sub-investment grade. Increases with reinsurance prices.
Market Capacity Uncertain due to current high yields and future loss patterns.
5.9 Limits of Private Contractual Methods for Addressing Climate Change
This chapter has evaluated the use of insurance, commodities and weather
derivatives, carbon offsets, and catastrophe bonds for mitigating climate-sensitive risks.
Each private contractual method was evaluated based on the following six criteria: (a) scope
of risk covered, (b) geographic coverage, (c) contract duration, (d) availability, (e) price, and
(f) and market capacity.
Based on this evaluation, the evidence suggests that the ability of these private
contractual instruments to address climate risk is currently limited, and that climate change
could potentially widen gaps in risk management. Using the Climate Risk Assessment
Matrix, we can summarize the results.
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Figure 5.13 shows the scope of risks covered by each kind of risk management
instrument for selected climate-sensitive risks. No risk category is covered by more than two
types of risk management instrument, and all of the risk management instruments are limited
to covering a few risks.
Figure 5.13: Climate Risk Assessment Matrix - Risks Covered
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Figure 5.14 summarizes the evaluation of these risk management instruments based
on the remaining criteria of geographic coverage, contract duration, availability, price, and
market capacity. With respect to all of these evaluation criteria, these instruments possess
limitations in addressing the longer term risks associated with climate change.
Figure 5.14: Climate Risk Assessment Matrix - All Other Evaluation Criteria
RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS
Risks
Covered
Geographic
Coverage
Duration
Availability
Price
Market
Capadly
Importantly, these contractual methods do not address all of the infrastructure project
risks identified in Chapter 4. For example, as reflected in Figure 5.13, none of these
instruments address new technology risk. Other risks not covered by these instruments are
not shown in Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14. Table 5.28 presents a summary of other important
risks that are not covered or are incompletely covered by the risk management methods
described in this chapter.
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Table 5.28: Other Important Risks Not Covered by Risk Management Instruments
Risk Mitigation Methods
Technology Risk Project documentation
Engineering Risk Technology selection
Contractor selection
Operating Risk - Management Project documentation
Operating Risk - Cost Project documentation
Derivatives for supply or weather-related operating costs
Environmental Risk Emissions allowances for emissions cap-and-trade programs
Structured finance for cost recovery
Infrastructure Risk Project documentation
Political Risk Public insurance
Participant Risk Project documents
Performance bonds
Capital Markets Risk Derivatives (for certain risks)
Structured finance (for certain risks)
Legal Risk Project documentation
Governance Risk Project documentation
Source: Adapted from Tinsley (2000); Hoffman (2001).
Climate change will likely increase the demand for risk products. However, despite
this growth potential, there is evidence that increases in climate risk will further limit the
ability or willingness of risk underwriters to cover the long-term risks posed by climate
change. This could potentially result in private contractual methods for addressing climate
change risks becoming practically unavailable at an affordable price. The research presented
in this chapter suggests that the following issues are likely to limit the availability or
effectiveness of risk management methods in the future: short-term nature of risk markets,
price considerations, difficulties in modeling long-term climate trends, and credit risk.
The short-term nature of risk markets is critical in assessing the ability of these
markets to provide protection against climate change. Property and business interruption
insurance and reinsurance are almost exclusively contracted for a period of one year. For
most derivatives, a majority of the open interest is for contracts within one year. Catastrophe
bond tenors average 3.1 years.
The short-term nature of risk markets limits the usefulness of risk management
instruments for climate change. Changes in climate will be priced into short-term contracts
as old contracts expire and new contracts are entered into, resulting in changed terms to
reflect the change in conditions. There is no evidence to suggest that the duration of
contracts would extend beyond those currently available in order to accommodate increasing
climate change risks. There is evidence, however, that contracts would become more
restrictive in their terms or unavailable altogether if climate risks increase in the future.
Pricing is another critical factor that will limit the potential application of risk
management instruments to addressing climate change. For insurance markets, increasing
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volatility and severity of weather events will increase the cost of insurance and will likely
lead to further curtailment of coverage in terms of scope of risks covered and geographic
coverage. With respect to weather derivatives, increases in weather volatility and average
temperature will increase the cost of the most widely traded temperature derivatives. To the
extent that climate change causes or is accompanied by increasing commodities prices or
greater volatility in commodities prices, commodities derivatives will become increasingly
expensive. For catastrophe bonds, increasing frequency or severity of catastrophic events
will likewise cause increases in premiums or potentially reduce demand for catastrophe
bonds as these markets migrate towards even more remote levels of risk.
Importantly, prices among these markets move together because these products are
substitutes for each other, present arbitrage opportunities, and are priced using models that
contain similar components. Insurance, derivatives, and catastrophe bonds are substitute
products for risk coverage and are often used together to create back-to-back hedges for the
same underlying risk. Further, the models underlying insurance, weather derivatives and
catastrophe bonds are similar in nature. As a result of their substitutability and the
commonality of the models used to price them, price increases in one market are likely to
trigger price increases across the entire spectrum of products.
Ultimately, if adverse climate events become a near certainty to occur, the price of
insuring against such events using third party contracts becomes prohibitively expensive and
firms could be forced to self-insure or go out of business.
Limitations in models used to price risk contracts reinforce the short-term duration
and high cost of risk coverage. All models possess a limited ability to estimate future risks.
For example, insurance and weather derivatives models are generally not used beyond three
years, and most are used to price products no more than one year into the future (Muir-Wood
2006). The inability to model future climate conditions beyond several years into the future
will likely limit the duration of weather risk contracts. Further, longer durations are
prohibitively expensive, as demonstrated in this chapter using commodities and weather
derivatives pricing models. When data are unavailable or there is little confidence in the
ability to forecast future risks based on available data, the cost of risk instruments becomes
prohibitively expensive, potentially ruining the economics of putting a hedge in place (Ricker
2006).
To an extent, the shortcomings of models can be addressed through contract terms
that limit the scope of coverage. Contracts can use moving averages and caps on payouts.
However, all of these measures to address model risk ultimately shift risk back to the
purchaser of the instrument by reducing the scope of covered risks.
Finally, credit risk places limits on the abilities of parties to underwrite climate risk.
Even if a firm is willing to underwrite these risks, the creditworthiness of the seller would be
an important consideration for the brokerage house (in an exchange-cleared contract) or the
purchaser (in an OTC trade). Even if such a contract were entered into, the volume of such
contracts would likely be small unless the seller can demonstrate its ability to meet potential
claims. Ultimately, credit risk reflects the fact that no party is well positioned to accept the
risks posed by climate change. Significantly, nobody interviewed could identify a potential
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seller of long-term climate risk instruments that would be sufficiently creditworthy. It
remains to be seen whether an innovative structure can be developed that provides protection
against climate change backed by a creditworthy seller.
The gap in coverage for climate-sensitive risks is already apparent in infrastructure
lending markets. Loan tenors for infrastructure projects typically range from 10 to 30 years,
and some as long as 50 years. In contrast, most risk markets operate on a seasonal or year-to-
year basis, except for catastrophe bonds, which have an average tenor of 3.1 years. Along
coastal areas, private insurance coverage is becoming increasingly expensive or unavailable. If
the gap in risk coverage widens, infrastructure could become more difficult to finance,
including infrastructure intended to support the goals of carbon neutrality.
Importantly, if private insurers are unwilling or unable to insure long-term climate
risks, there will be a need for government insurance programs to provide risk coverage.
While an evaluation of government insurance programs are outside the scope of this
dissertation, it is important to recognize that these programs often fail to adequately price risk,
which several survey respondents noted can adversely affect private sector insurance
markets.20 Significantly, government programs in Florida, other Gulf Coast states, and the
U.S. National Flood Insurance Program have experienced significant financial difficulties as a
result of under pricing risk coverage followed by larger than expected catastrophic losses
(Binnun 2006; Bushouse 2006; Insurance Journal 2006; CERES 2006). Expanding
government insurance programs that compete with private sector insurers and place a burden
on the tax base would represent a failure of both the private sector and the government to
provide a long-term solution. At the same time, the absence of insurance coverage could
adversely affect economic growth and, when a natural catastrophe occurs in an area without
insurance, potentially produce severe economic and humanitarian crises. Efforts by both the
private sector and government should focus on innovation of risk management solutions to be
offered by the private sector. Any expansion of government insurance should be carefully
designed to minimize potential adverse consequences for private markets.
With respect to EUAs traded on the EU ETS and CDM CERs, the viability of these
instruments to address regulatory risk and to promote carbon reductions will require
policymakers to successfully address several design flaws in these programs, including the
problem of excess allowances. If we are going to succeed in addressing climate change, we
will need highly effective mechanisms to mobilize private sector resources to build carbon
neutral infrastructure. It is therefore essential that programs such as CDM and JI are highly
effective in attracting and deploying resources for high quality infrastructure projects.
The development of new risk management methods for addressing climate change will
be an important area of future research. Chapter 7 of this dissertation makes several
recommendations for enhancing the capacity of the risk markets and the Clean Development
Mechanism to support development of carbon neutral technologies and infrastructure.
20 At the time of writing, the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program is in the process of
revising its flood risk maps for the entire country. The revised maps are expected to expand
the areas deemed at risk for floods and to change the statistical designations of areas to
reflect increased risk.
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6 Case Studies
This chapter presents three case studies that provide an empirical basis for further
analysis of the private sector's capacity to finance and develop carbon neutral energy
infrastructure. The three case studies are (i) the capacity of capital markets to supply
adequate investment capital to develop a portfolio of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure
providing 10-15 TW of power within a 50-year period, (ii) the effects on the electric utility
industry of increasingly intense storms and hurricanes in the Eastern United States from 1990
to 2005, and (iii) the effects on the insurance industry of the increasing losses caused by
natural catastrophic events from the 1970's to 2005, especially in connection with
underwriting risks for energy infrastructure.
These case studies were selected because they represent three segments of the
economy that are critical to developing carbon neutral infrastructure. The private sector's
ability to address climate change will depend upon the capacity of the energy and insurance
industries, and capital markets to support the development of carbon neutral infrastructure.
At the same time, these parts of the economy are each expected to be adversely affected by
the risks associated with climate change.
Each case presents a distinct financial aspect of climate change. Accordingly, these
cases are evaluated based on the particular financial implications of climate change for each
industry, and not on a standard set of criteria. This approach was selected in order to provide
a representation of important financial aspects of climate change, without attempting to
impose a rigid set of standard criteria. Table 6.1 sets forth the variables examined in
evaluating each of the case studies.
Table 6.1: Case Study Variables
Capital Markets
Projected Capital Costs of
Carbon Neutral Electricity
Historic U.S. Electricity &
Energy Capital Expenditure
Projected Global Electricity
Expenditure
Required Growth of
Renewable Energy
Size of U.S. and Global
Capital Markets
Internal Funds
International Disparities
Capital Market Volatility
Capital Markets Growth
Effect of Storms and Catastrophic
Hurricanes on Utilities EventslInsurance
Recent Storm History of Recent Catastrophic Events
U.S. Atlantic Coast and Insured Losses
Economic Damage Financial Effects on
Insurance Industry
Financial Effects on Effect on Insuring Energy
Utilities and Energy Sector
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Potential Cost of Waiting
6.1 Capital Markets Capacity to Finance Carbon Neutral Electricity Infrastructure
This case study compares a set of cost estimates for developing 10-15 TW of carbon
neutral electricity infrastructure over a fifty-year period to the capacity of capital markets to
finance this infrastructure. The estimates presented in Chapter 2 for 10 TW of carbon neutral
electricity generation are expanded to include supporting carbon sequestration, energy
storage and replacement infrastructure. This chapter also presents a 15 TW carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure estimate as a high-consumption scenario, roughly the electricity
portion of the projected amount of energy required to stabilize atmospheric carbon dioxide
levels within the 350 ppm to 550 ppm range by 2050 (Hoffert et al. 2002). The cost
estimates for 10 TW and 15 TW of carbon neutral electricity generation represent an
approximate range of projected electricity demand over the next 50-year period.
The electricity sector's contribution to global warming and the capital-intensive
nature of electricity infrastructure make the finance and development of carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure an important and potentially difficult financial challenge. Electricity
generation accounts for 40% of global carbon dioxide emissions (International Energy
Agency 2003). According to the International Energy Agency's 2001-2030 projections for
conventional energy investment, electricity infrastructure investment should account for at
least 60% of all energy and utilities capital expenditure, and could be as high as 70% if
investment in fuel infrastructure for power generation is included (International Energy
Agency 2003). Further, electricity generation, transmission and distribution are the most
capital intensive economic segments of the economy, requiring two to three times more
capital expenditure compared to manufacturing industries (International Energy Agency
2003).
This case study compares the estimated costs of 10 TW to 15 TW of carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure to historic utility and energy industry capital expenditure levels; the
International Energy Agency's (IEA) projected conventional electricity infrastructure capital
expenditure levels; required increases in capital investment in renewable energy technologies;
the capacity of capital markets in the public debt and equity, venture finance, and bank
lending segments; and savings and GDP projections. Following these comparisons, the case
study examines several important issues affecting the capacity of capital markets to supply
the required capital on a global scale over such a time period. These issues are the disparities
among capital market capacity of different countries, the volatility of capital markets, the
financial effects on utilities firms, the potential growth of capital markets, and the timing of
introducing an aggressive carbon neutral energy program.
This case study contributes to the dissertation's analysis of the private sector's
capacity to finance and develop carbon neutral energy infrastructure. It provides a
preliminary assessment of the capacity of the private sector generally, and capital markets
specifically, to provide the capital and resources to implement carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure. Finally, it also provides a foundation for further research on the finance of
carbon neutral infrastructure.
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This is the first study known to the author that considers the capacity of the capital
markets to finance renewable energy infrastructure on a global scale. In 2003, the IEA
completed the first study estimating the cost of conventional global energy infrastructure
requirements from 2001 to 2030. The study included electricity, oil, gas, coal, and an
alternative scenario featuring limited investment in renewable technologies.
The IEA estimated that from 2001 to 2030 global energy consumption will increase
by two thirds, and that projected electricity demand will increase to approximately 7.2 TW,
requiring the addition of 4.7 TW of electricity generation capacity (International Energy
Agency 2003). Their estimates roughly correspond to the fifty-year 10 TW carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure goal adopted in this case study.
The IEA study differs from the present case study in several important respects. The
IEA focused almost exclusively on conventional energy infrastructure. Also, the IEA study
assumed that investment risks in the 2001 to 2030 period remain similar to past risks,
although it acknowledged that environmental regulation could substantially change the risks
posed to energy investment (International Energy Agency 2003). Accordingly, the IEA
study did not address the issue of climate change or estimate the cost of carbon neutral
energy infrastructure.
The IEA used a predictive model integrating conventional energy infrastructure
demand, costs, and macroeconomic factors. In contrast, the present case study examines the
technology and costs necessary to develop carbon neutral infrastructure and compares its
costs to capital markets activity. Unlike the IEA model, this case study is not intended to
predict future investment levels. Rather, it is designed to assess the private sector's capacity
to finance carbon neutral electricity infrastructure. Because long-term projections are
extremely difficult to make with confidence, this case study focuses on the costs of starting a
carbon neutral infrastructure program and current levels of capital investment, rather than
attempting to predict future levels of economic and capital markets activity. The case study's
focus on years 1-20 of a 50-year carbon neutral infrastructure program is described more
fully below.
The IEA study compared projected investment to global savings and GDP. In
contrast, this case study focuses on comparison of hypothetical investment in carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure to historic and projected levels of utility industry infrastructure
investment and capital markets capacity. Comparison to historic and projected levels of
investment in the utility sector and capital markets activity is appropriate because it provides
important perspective on the feasibility of raising the investment capital necessary to develop
carbon neutral infrastructure from the perspective of firms and capital markets. As noted
above, this case study also examines the I EA's savings and GDP projections to supplement
the capital markets analysis.
This case study makes a number of assumptions with respect to cost estimates, capital
markets data, and supply chains that should be noted.
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The cost estimates for 10 TW to 15 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure are
subject to the detailed assumptions set forth in Chapter 2 in the section describing these cost
estimates.
Most of the analysis in this case study compares capital markets capacity to the
financial requirements to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure within a
50-year period. The choice of 10 TW for global electricity infrastructure is a reasonable,
perhaps conservative, projection of electricity growth within 50 years based upon the
International Energy Agency's estimate of 7 TW of conventional electricity generation by
2030 (International Energy Agency 2003). The 15 TW estimate for carbon neutral electricity
generation provides a high-consumption estimate of potential electricity demand by 2050 for
purposes of comparison.
The cost estimates for carbon neutral electricity infrastructure are based on electricity
generation only, and do not account for additional costs associated with other energy sectors,
such as transportation. Approximately 10 TW of carbon neutral energy by 2050 is required
to stabilize carbon dioxide levels at the 550 ppm level (Hoffert et al. 2002). In order to
stabilize carbon dioxide levels at 450 ppm to 350 ppm, we would be required to develop an
estimated 20 TW to 30+ TW of carbon neutral energy during the same period (Hoffert et al.
2002). This would require increasing the estimated infrastructure investment levels and
would involve the other sectors of the energy industry, such as transportation and liquid
fuels. Also, these estimates do not include the costs associated with climate change itself.
The future capacity of debt and equity markets to raise the necessary capital depends
upon a number of macroeconomic factors beyond the scope of this case study. In addition,
the capital markets data used here may not capture all transactions, notably private
transactions, transactions structured in forms that are not easily classified as either debt or
equity (such as certain forms of leases), and may include transactions that overestimate
capital raising activity such as exchanges or conversions of debt and equity to the extent
these transactions do not raise additional capital. In addition, the use of this data is subject to
further assumptions that are noted below in the specific section presenting the particular
capital markets data.
The analysis assumes that supply chains are capable of providing the labor and
material required to build 10 TW to 15 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure within
50 years. Meeting this goal would require society to mobilize large numbers of people and
material, an assumption that may not be realistic and is worthy of further study. The IEA
study specifically identified supply chains as a potential barrier to meeting future energy
demand in its study of conventional energy (International Energy Agency 2003).
As a result of these assumptions, the analysis presented in this case study should be
regarded as a rough comparison of the relative magnitudes of estimated future capital needs
and historical capital markets activity levels.
Several points concerning the comparisons made in this case study should be
explicitly stated.
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Because the case study focuses on capital markets for electricity infrastructure,
comparisons are made to projected and historical utility industry infrastructure investment.
However, the case study also compares investment levels to the broader energy sector and, in
some cases, economy-wide statistics. These broader economic sectors do not typically invest
in electricity infrastructure and have different characteristics and risks. Therefore,
comparisons to the broader energy markets and economy-wide statistics are intended to
provide additional perspective on the capacity of the capital markets only.
Capital markets data is presented for both U.S. and global markets. Comparisons to
this data should be matched to the proportionate share of energy infrastructure investment
typically raised in the U.S. or global capital markets. Accordingly, where U.S. capital
markets data is used, comparison is made with the costs of energy infrastructure financed in
U.S. capital markets. Because the U.S. capital markets support investment in energy
infrastructure in the United States and other countries, U.S. capital markets' share of energy
infrastructure investment should be greater than the U.S. share of global energy consumption,
which is approximately 25% (Tester et al. 2005). In this case study, U.S. capital markets are
assumed to account for 35% of global capital raising activity. This assumption is based on
equity and debt market capitalization data. The New York Stock Exchange, American Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ together accounted for 34.7% to 52.0% of global public equity
market capitalization during the 1990 to 2005 period, with an annual average of 43.6% over
that period, and their year-end 2005 capitalization accounting for 38.2% of global public
equity market capitalization (World Federation of Exchanges 2006). Similarly, global bond
market data for 2005 shows that approximately 40.5% of domestic and international bonds
outstanding were issued by U.S. resident issuers (Bank for International Settlements 2006c).
Significantly, these figures do not capture government investments that are not reflected in
exchange or banking data. The 35% figure was selected to account for such omissions in
data and to provide a conservative estimate of the U.S. capital markets share of global capital
markets activity. Significantly, the 35% figure is identical to a McKinsey estimate for the
U.S. share of global financial capital as of 2004, which included banking and government
financial stock (McKinsey Global Institute 2006). Accordingly, this case study compares
U.S. capital markets activity to 35% of global carbon neutral electricity infrastructure
investment requirements where U.S. market data is used.
Finally, most of the analysis in this case study focuses on the required investment
during years 1-20 to develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure. The focus on the first
twenty years isjustified for two reasons. First, any fifty-year cost estimate for infrastructure
is highly speculative. Learning effects could reduce the cost estimate. Conversely, changes
in the cost of materials or other economic factors could increase the estimate. Further,
capital markets capacity becomes difficult to estimate, making the comparisons less
meaningful over longer time frames. Second, the initial levels of capital investment required
in years 1-20 is adequate to illustrate the degree to which capital markets can support starting
a carbon neutral electricity infrastructure program. Significantly, the high initial costs of
starting such a program may be the leading reason why an effort to build carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure has not yet been undertaken on a large scale.
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6.1.1 Projected Capital Requirements for Carbon Neutral Electricity
To develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure using the portfolio of
technologies described in Chapter 2, global investment for electricity generation
infrastructure during years 1-20 starts at $1.5 to $2.8 billion per day. Replacement costs
would increase capital investment starting in year 21 from $2.2 to $3.5 billion per day, in
year 31 from $2.3 to $4.5 billion per day, and in year 41 from $2.9 to $5.0 billion per day. If
reserves are not set aside for future carbon sequestration costs, carbon sequestration capital
costs associated with coal-fired generation start at approximately $40 million per day and
increase to $2.0 billion per day by year 50. Additional investment for storage to supplement
intermittent wind and solar generation would add an estimated $63 million per day.
Table 6.2: 10 TW Years 1-50 Global Daily Investment with CCS, Energy Storage, and Solar
and Wind Equipment Replacement (US$ millions)
Generation Storage Average
YearGeInvestment Capacity Carbon Total InvestmentInvestment Investment Sequestration
Investment
1-20 1,475.7 - 2,770.5 416.8 1,955.4 - 3,250.2
21-30 2,194.3 - 3,489.1 61,012.2 3,269.4 - 4,564.2
31-40 2,341.4 - 4,498.7 1,409.1 3,813.4 - 5,970.7
41-50 2,864.0 - 5,021.3 1,806.1 4,733.0 - 6,890.3
Source: Author's calculations. Note: Estimates are for
its notes for costs and assumptions used in estimates.
actual capacity. See Table 2.10 and
Hoffert et al. (2002) estimate that 10 TW of energy by 2050 would stabilize carbon
dioxide levels at the 550 ppm level. Achieving 450 ppm or 350 ppm stabilization levels would
require approximately 25 TW and 30+ TW of energy. Using 10 TW to 15 TW as a rough
approximation of the electricity component of these latter two stabilization scenarios, we
derive the cost for 15 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure by increasing the 10 TW
cost estimate presented in Table 6.2 by 50%. As explained above, 10-15 TW of carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure within 50 years is comparable to the IEA's 7 TW projection for
electricity demand by 2030. The results are presented for years 1-20 in Table 6.3 below.
Table 6.3: 10-15 TW Years 1-20 Global Daily Investment with CCS and Energy Storage
(US$ millions)
Storage AverageActual Generation StoCage Carbon Total
Capacity Investment Capacity Sequestration InvestmentInvestment Investment
10 TW 1,475.7 - 2,770.5 62.9 416.8 1,955.4 - 3,250.2
15 TW 2,213.6 - 4,155.8 94.4 625.2 2,933.1 - 4,875.3
A ., , , , .. .-. • • • • . ....Source: Autnor s calculations. See
in estimates.
Table 2.10 and its notes for costs and assumptions used
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For purposes of comparison to global capital markets data, Table 6.4 presents
annualized global required investment estimates for 10 TW and 15 TW of carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure.
Table 6.4: 10-15 TW Years 1-20 Global Annual Investment with CCS and Energy Storage
Actual Total Investment
Capacity (US$ billions)
10 TW 713.7 - 1,186.3
15 TW 1,070.6 - 1,779.5
Source: Author's calculations. See Table 2.10 and its notes for costs and assumptions used
in estimates.
Where carbon neutral investment levels are compared to U.S. capital markets data,
only 35% of estimated global required investment is used for purposes of evaluating the
capacity of United States capital markets. Table 6.5 below adjusts the annual global required
investment estimate to match the share expected to be raised in U.S. capital markets. For
purposes of comparison with U.S. capital markets activity, the U.S. capital markets share of
10 TW year 1-20 estimated annual required investment is $249.8 billion to $415.2 billion,
and the U.S. capital markets portion of the 15 TW year 1-20 estimated annual required
investment is $374.7 billion to $622.8 billion.
Table 6.5: U.S. Capital Markets Share of 10-15 TW Years 1-20 Global Annual
Investment with CCS and Energy Storage
Actual Estimated Annual Investment
Capacity (US$ billions)
10 TW 249.8 - 415.2
15 TW 374.7 - 622.8
Source: Author's calculations. See Table 2.10 and its notes for costs and assumptions used
in estimates.
Note that Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 do not include replacement costs for wind and solar
equipment because replacement costs for these technologies are assumed to start in year 21
and year 31, respectively.
6.1.2 Capital Expenditures in the U.S. Utilities and Energy Sectors
To assess the capacity of capital markets to supply the investment capital necessary to
develop 10 TW to 15 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure within a fifty-year
period, this case study first compares the required investment to past capital expenditures in
the utilities and energy sectors.
Table 6.6 below shows capital expenditures by utilities and energy companies in the
S&P 500 Index, a leading indicator of the U.S. equities markets. The five-year annual
average capital investment during the 2001 to 2005 period is $52.9 billion for the utilities
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sector, $20.3 billion for the energy sector, and $73.2 billion for the combined utilities and
energy sectors.
Table 6.6: S&P 500 Utilities and Energy Sector Capital Expenditures, 1994-2005
S&P 500 Sectors (US$ billions)
Combined
Utilities Energy Utilities &
Energy
1994 14.8 10.3 25.1
1995 18.4 12.0 30.4
1996 21.2 18.1 39.3
1997 28.7 21.1 49.8
1998 36.9 16.1 53.1
1999 47.7 14.7 62.3
2000 73.0 13.1 86.1
2001 91.2 18.4 109.6
2002 73.7 18.2 92.0
2003 34.3 18.0 52.3
2004 28.6 20.6 49.2
2005 36.6 26.4 63.1
Source: Factset (2006).
Compared to the approximately $250 to $415 billion annual capital expenditures that
would be required in years 1-20 to be raised in the U.S. capital markets to develop 10 TW of
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure, the U.S. utilities sector would need to increase
annual capital expenditures by a factor of approximately 5 to almost 9 times based on the
most recent 5-year average. Achieving a goal of 15 TW of carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure would increase the investment figure by 50%. Further, in years 21 to 50,
required investment must increase further due to increasing costs of carbon sequestration and
replacement of infrastructure.
Comparing required investment for 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure
to the combined U.S. utilities and energy sector average annual capital investment of $73.2
billion for the 2001 to 2005 period only slightly improves these figures. With the inclusion
of energy sector capital expenditures, the years 1-20 annual capital investment must increase
by a factor of over 3 to 6 times to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity. However, as
required investment estimates are for electricity infrastructure, it is more accurate to make
comparisons with utilities industry expenditures.
6.1.3 Projected Global Capital Expenditures for Conventional Electricity Sector
This section compares the estimated global investment required for 10 TW of carbon
neutral electricity infrastructure to the I EA's projected investment in conventional electricity
infrastructure for the 2001 to 2030 period.
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The IEA projects that global conventional energy investment during the 2001 to 2030
period should be $16 trillion. Of this amount, approximately $10 trillion to $11 trillion is for
electricity infrastructure (International Energy Agency 2003).
The IEA's 30-year conventional electricity infrastructure investment figure is most
appropriately compared to thirty years of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure investment.
Table 6.7 sets forth the 30-year carbon neutral electricity infrastructure estimates for 10 TW
and 15 TW of power.
Table 6.7: 10-15 TW Years 1-30 Global Annual Investment with CCS, Energy Storage,
and Wind Equipment Replacement (US$ billions)
Actual Year 1-20 Annual Year 21-30 Annual Total 30 Year
Capacity Investment Investment Investment
10 TW 713.7 - 1,186.3 1,193.3 - 1,665.9 26,207.7 - 40,385.0
15 TW 1,070.6 - 1,779.5 1,789.9 - 2,498.9 39,311.5 - 60,579.0
Source: Author's calculations. See Table 2.10 and its notes for costs and assumptions used
in estimates. Note: solar equipment replacement is assumed to start in year 31; these costs
are therefore omitted in this table.
For 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity, the 30-year global estimated capital
investment would be from $26.2 to $40.4 trillion. This is an increase of approximately 162%
to 304% over the IEA's $10 trillion conventional electricity infrastructure estimate.
The IEA estimates that its 30-year $10 trillion conventional electricity sector
infrastructure investment target represents an increase of almost three times in real terms
investment in the electricity sector during the past thirty years (International Energy Agency
2003). The cost of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure is therefore a substantial increase
in real terms over both historical and projected conventional energy investment levels.
6.1.4 Required Growth of Renewable Energy Technology Sector
This section compares global required investment to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure over a 50-year period to current levels of investment in renewable
energy technology. This comparison provides a perspective on the growth required in the
renewable energy technology sector to develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure.
For 2004, annual global investment in wind, solar, geothermal, small hydropower and
biomass energy technology was approximately $30 billion (REN21 Renewable Energy
Policy Network 2005). This figure does not include investment in large hydropower, nuclear,
carbon sequestration, and IGCC technology. Annual investment in hydropower and nuclear
is estimated to be approximately $20-25 billion and $7 billion, respectively (see Table 2.7
and Table 2.8). Investment in carbon sequestration and IGCC is currently insignificant.
Aggregate annual renewable energy technology investment, including large hydropower and
nuclear energy, is approximately $62 billion.
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Figure 6.1: Global Annual Investment in Renewable Energy, 1995-2004
solar thermal, geothermal, small hydropower, biomass power and heat.
includes wind, solar PV,
The global annual investment required to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure during years 1-20 of a 50-year build-out is approximately $714 to $1,186
billion per year. Thus, current carbon neutral energy investment must increase by a factor of
approximately 12 to 20 times in order to meet required annual investment levels during the
first twenty years of such a program.
6.1.5 U.S. Public Debt and Equity Capital Markets Activity
This section compares the estimated required investment in carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure to the level of public debt and equity transactions in the U.S. capital markets.
Comparisons are made to the following capital markets segments: (a) utility and energy
sector, (b) oil and gas sector, (c) combined oil and gas, utility and energy sectors ("all
energy"), and (d) all industry sectors.21
Table 6.8 presents data for U.S. public debt and equity transactions for the years 1993
to 2005 for the utility and energy, oil and gas, and all energy sectors.
21 The utility and energy sector figures includes all energy capital markets transactions except
oil and gas industry transactions. All industry sectors include all economic sectors (including
service industries) that raise public debt and equity in U.S. capital markets.
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Table 6.8: U.S. Public Debt and Equity Transactions - Energy (US$ millions), 1993-2005
Year Oil & Gas Utility & Energy All EnergyDebt Equity Total Debt Equity Total Total
1993 9,421.3 8,207.1 17,628.4 52,126.5 3,140.5 55,267.0 72,895.4
1994 5,249.0 5,239.2 10,488.3 12,957.2 2,485.7 15,442.8 25,931.1
1995 6,199.4 4,661.0 10,860.3 11,828.2 2,544.3 14,372.5 25,232.8
1996 10,542.7 7,361.3 17,903.9 13,002.7 3,694.5 16,697.2 34,601.1
1997 14,495.5 7,966.8 22,462.3 21,046.1 5,952.6 26,998.7 49,461.0
1998 22,799.7 7,267.0 30,066.7 33,914.2 9,787.2 43,701.4 73,768.1
1999 22,441.2 5,201.7 27,642.9 39,226.7 8,871.2 48,097.9 75,740.8
2000 14,037.9 10,047.8 24,085.6 38,130.0 11,611.9 49,741.9 73,827.6
2001 31,993.8 8,050.1 40,043.9 72,088.0 21,007.5 93,095.5 133,139.4
2002 23,568.9 5,446.7 29,015.6 48,926.5 20,243.4 69,170.0 98,185.5
2003 15,749.6 13,960.8 29,710.4 60,639.5 12,777.7 73,417.2 103,127.6
2004 15,467.3 13,636.0 29,103.3 42,141.0 9,596.4 51,737.4 80,840.7
2005 12,313.3 19,882.1 32,195.4 34,250.4 7,511.2 41,761.6 73,957.0
Source: Bernstein Research (2006).
Table 6.9 presents data for U.S. public debt and equity transactions for all industrial
sectors during the 1993 to 2005 period.
Table 6.9: U.S. Public Debt and Equity Transactions - All Industries (US$ millions),
1993-2005
All Industry SectorsYear Debt Equity Total
1993 294,175.66 111,832.80 406,008.46
1994 164,838.68 68,854.56 233,693.24
1995 209,592.68 96,889.28 306,481.96
1996 299,816.42 139,715.04 439,531.46
1997 430,857.92 146,061.58 576,919.50
1998 577,757.80 147,432.30 725,190.10
1999 546,737.49 196,370.79 743,108.28
2000 504,329.62 230,808.81 735,138.43
2001 784,797.56 214,449.36 999,246.92
2002 592,229.74 142,591.38 734,821.12
2003 703,920.94 166,265.07 870,186.01
2004 733,962.93 176,269.98 910,232.91
2005 682,124.58 160,965.98 843,090.56
Source: Bernstein Research (2006).
For purposes of comparison, Table 6.10 presents 3-year, 5-year, and 10-year averages
for U.S. public debt and equity transactions for the four economic segments.
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Table 6.10: U.S. Public Debt and Equity Transactions - Averages (US$ millions), 1996-2005
Periodtility & Oil & Gas All Energy All IndustryEnergy Sectors
3 years (2003-2005) 55,638.74 30,336.37 85,975.10 874,503.16
5 years (2001-2005) 65,836.33 32,013.72 97,850.04 871,515.50
10 Years (1996-2005) 51,441.88 28,223.00 79,664.88 757,746.53
Source: Author's calculations based on Bernstein Research (2006).
Table 6.11 compares the 5-year average for the four U.S. capital markets segments to
the U.S. capital markets share of required annual investment in carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure for years 1-20.
Table 6.11: U.S. Public Debt and Equity Average (2001-2005) versus U.S. Capital
Markets Share of 10-15 TW Years 1-20 Global Annual Investment in Carbon Neutral
Electricity Infrastructure
Actual Capacity Utility & Ga All Energy All Industry
Target Energy Oil & Sectors
10 TW 3.8 to 6.3 7.8 to 13 2.5 to 4.25 0.29 to 0.48
15TW 5.7 to 9.5 11.7 to 19.5 3.8 to 6.4 0.44 to 0.72
Source: Author's calculations. See Table 6.5 and Table 6.10 for data used in this table. Note: The
table presents the results of the comparison as a multiple indicating how many times investment in the
particular capital markets segment must increase (if greater than 1) over the 5-year average in order to
supply the annual investment target for carbon neutral electricity infrastructure. A multiplier of less
than 1 indicates that the volume of investment for the particular capital markets segment is greater than
the target investment.
Combined annual capital markets activity for all energy segments are presently
inadequate to supply the capital necessary to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure; public debt and equity transactions must increase by at least a factor of 2.5 to
4.25 times over current levels to achieve the target investment amount during years 1-20.
The utility and energy segment alone must increase by 3.8 to 6.3 times over current levels to
achieve the target investment during years 1-20.
Importantly, the proceeds of public debt and equity transactions are used for more
than capital investment. For example, they may be used for recapitalization of existing debt,
transaction costs, operating expenses, and compensation. As a result, these estimates likely
underestimate the magnitude of the required increase in capital markets activity.
Only the capital resources of the entire U.S. capital markets are adequate to supply
the capital required to meet the investment targets required for 10 TW of carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure. If the proceeds of all U.S. public debt and equity transactions were
available to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity during years 1-20 of the build-out, it
would require approximately a third to a half of all capital currently raised in U.S. capital
markets. However, in years 21-50, assuming that the proceeds of all U.S. public debt and
equity transactions are available to develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure, the entire
proceeds of U.S. public debt and equity transactions would be inadequate and would have to
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increase by a factor of up to 2.9 times over their 5-year average (2001-2005) in order to
supply the required investment capital. Such demand for capital would likely have
deleterious effects on interest rates and draw resources from other essential industries.
6.1.6 U.S. Private Equity Transactions - Venture Finance
Venture finance provides funding to start-up companies, typically focusing on new
technologies or innovative ideas that have large growth potential. The U.S. venture capital
market is the largest and most developed. However, the level of venture finance activity in
the energy industry has typically been low. Table 6.12 below shows that investment levels
reached $1.1 billion in 2005, less than 0.26% to 0.44% of the U.S. capital markets share of
required annual year 1-20 investment to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity capacity.
Table 6.12: U.S. Energyllndustrial Venture Capital Fund Capital, 2004-2005
Year Number of Funds Total Capital Raised(US$ millions)
2004 12 241.20
2005 16 1,096.3
Source: Thomson Venture Economics (2006).
Importantly, the explosive growth of venture finance activity in the energy industry
reflects its relative inexperience in this sector. From 2004 to 2005, venture finance
investment levels in energy technology increased 355%. Prior to 2004, activity was
insignificant (Thomson Venture Economics 2006). Historically, very few venture firms are
involved in the energy field (see Gompers et al. 2006).
Table 6.13 presents U.S. venture finance activity from 1996 to 2004 for all sectors of
the economy. The five-year annual average (2000-2004) is $41 billion. Even if all venture
finance capital was raised for the purpose of supporting the electricity sector, it would
amount to only 10% to 17% of the U.S. capital markets share of required annual year 1-20
investment to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure.
Table 6.13: U.S. Venture Finance Transactions (US$ millions), 1996-2004
Year Number of Transactions Total Investment
1996 2,613 11,513.5
1997 3,184 14,907.2
1998 3,689 21,346.7
1999 5,613 54,603.6
2000 8,073 105,892.1
2001 4,619 41,015.3
2002 3,050 21,580.3
2003 2,847 18,946.2
2004 2,876 20,940.6
Source: VC Experts (2006c).
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It is important to note that venture capital is subject to several important limitations
that make it unsuitable for sustained investment in infrastructure. First, venture finance
investment is not usually employed for established technologies. Venture capital is based on
a strategy of high risk and large returns, not the approximately 10% return on investment
typically earned in the U.S. electricity sector (International Energy Agency 2003). Further,
venture funds seek rapid returns; the target investment return period for venture capital is
typically less than seven years (VC Experts 2006a). This makes venture capital more
appropriate for new inventions, rather than for supporting sustained investment in long-term
infrastructure.
Second, venture finance investment and portfolio companies are highly volatile.
From a peak in 2000, venture finance investment dropped by almost 80% in 2004 (VC
Experts 2006c). Another important aspect of volatility is the high failure rate of start-up
companies. Gompers et al. (2006) estimate that venture companies have a success rate of
approximately 50% to 60%.22 A recent survey of new companies based on U.S. government
economy-wide employment data suggests that the figure is slightly lower, below 50% after
four years of operation (Knaup 2005).
Finally, while the skill set of venture capital funds and their portfolio companies are
critical to developing new technology, including in the renewable energy area, these firms
typically lack the skills and resources required to finance and develop large-scale
infrastructure. Only large firms with strong balance sheets, established customer bases, and
stable revenues have been able to attract the capital necessary to finance electricity
generation infrastructure (International Energy Agency 2003).
6.1.7 U.S. Private Equity Transactions - Energy and All Sectors
In addition to venture finance transactions for start-up firms in new technologies,
established energy firms also engage in private equity transactions. Unlike venture capital
firms, established energy firms possess the expertise and resources necessary to develop
energy infrastructure.
The five-year annual average (2001-2005) for energy-related private transactions is
$2.7 billion, almost three times higher than investment levels for energy investment by
venture finance firms. However, this is still only 0.65% to 1.08% of the U.S. capital markets
share of required annual year 1-20 investment to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure.
22 The estimate may overstate success rates if the study omits start-ups that fail before they
are reflected in the data.
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Private Equity Transactions - Utilities, Energy, Oil and Gas, 1996-2005
Average Total
Number of Transaction InvestmentYear InvestmentTransactions Size(US$(US$ millions)
1996 53 7.54 399.58
1997 64 10.23 654.57
1998 110 15.95 1,754.06
1999 68 20.41 1,387.81
2000 142 14.71 2,089.17
2001 140 8.38 1,173.62
2002 99 13.29 1,315.89
2003 137 24.48 3,353.86
2004 187 24.27 4,539.29
2005 173 18.16 3,141.15
Source: Thomson Investment Analytics (2006).
Even considering all U.S. private equity transactions for all sectors combined, the
five-year annual average (2001-2005) of $55.45 billion is only 13% to 22% of the $250 to
$415 billion annual capital expenditure that would be required to be raised in the U.S. capital
markets to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure in years 1-20.
Table 6.15: U.S. Private Equity Transactions - All Sectors, 1996-2005
Average Total
Number of TransactionYear InvestmentTransactions Size
(US$ millions)millions)
1996 3,730 6.50 24,257.49
1997 4,376 6.43 28,131.83
1998 5,443 8.12 44,175.68
1999 6,562 13.53 88,812.49
2000 9,509 15.21 144,667.48
2001 6,086 10.37 63,099.68
2002 4,104 11.46 47,047.08
2003 3,942 15.80 62,278.92
2004 4,186 12.79 53,533.86
2005 4,462 11.49 51,288.68
Source: Thomson Investment Analytics (2006).
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Table 6.14: U.S.
6.1.8 U.S. and Global Bank Lending
This section compares bank lending activity to investment levels required to develop
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure.
Table 6.16 below presents lending by U.S. domestic banks, foreign bank branches,
and Edge Act banks located in the fifty U.S. states and the District of Columbia that report to
the Federal Reserve Bank. The table presents lending by these banks to domestic and
international borrowers for all sectors of the economy, which is comprised of the following
categories: commercial and industrial, real estate, consumer loans, loans to purchase
securities, and other loans and leasing. The commercial and industrial and other loans and
leasing categories include loans and leasing arrangements to the electricity sector and are
therefore presented separately.
Table 6.16: U.S. Bank Lending (US$ billions), 2001-2005
Year All Sectors Commercial and Other Lending and
(as of December) Industrial Leasing
2001 3,934.2 1,026.0 425.4
2002 4,166.7 962.4 403.6
2003 4,404.1 902.3 425.3
2004 4,858.7 927.8 471.1
2005 5,449.4 1,044.1 524.6
3 Year Average
Annual Growth 348.4 47.3 33.1
(2003-2005)
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2006).
The three-year average annual increase (2003-2005) in loans to all sectors of the
economy is $348.4 billion, of which $80.4 billion is commercial and industrial and other
lending and leasing combined.
Comparing the 3-year average annual increase in lending by the U.S. bank lending
sector to the U.S. portion of required annual investment for years 1-20 to produce 10 TW of
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure demonstrates that lending markets are not currently
large enough to provide the required capital. Over the 2003-2005 period, lending to the
combined commercial and industrial and other lending and leasing categories grew by only
$80.4 billion each year, only 19% to 32% of the U.S. capital markets share of the required
$250 to $415 billion annual investment for 10 TW of electricity infrastructure in years 1-20.
Even the $384 billion average annual growth in lending for all sectors of the economy might
be inadequate to supply the U.S. capital markets share of the required capital, depending
upon actual costs given the estimated range of $250 to $415 billion per year.
Importantly, comparisons based on U.S. bank lending data overestimate the amount
of credit available to the electricity sector due to the composition of the data. The "all
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sectors" category and the "industrial and commercial" and "other lending and leasing"
subcategories supply capital to many other segments of the economy. These loans also
provide capital for more thanjust capital investment. In addition, this data does not make
any distinction between short and long-term lending.
Global debt issued by power projects from 1991 to 2002 confirm that current levels of
lending to the global electricity sector would also be inadequate to provide the capital
necessary to develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure. Electricity project debt peaked
in 2001 at approximately $130 billion, and then dropped by 40% in 2002 (International
Energy Agency 2003). Global lending levels for electricity are far short of the estimated
years 1-20 global annual investment of $714 to $1,186 billion required to develop 10 TW of
carbon neutral electricity over a 50-year period. At the peak of lending in 2002, global
lending only provides approximately 11% to 18% of required global carbon neutral
electricity investment.
6.1.9 Global Bond Markets
This section examines the capacity of global bond markets to supply the required
capital to develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure. Because this section considers
global bond markets, it uses global investment levels for carbon neutral electricity. Table 6.4
above presents the global annual investment required for years 1-20 to develop 10-15 TW of
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure. To develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity
capacity, the required global annual capital investment is estimated to be $713.7 billion to
almost $1.2 trillion during years 1-20.
Global bonds outstanding reached approximately $58.9 trillion in 2005 for
government, financial institution, and corporate issuances combined. However, 2-year
average annual growth (2004-2005) in global bond issuances was only $4.1 trillion for all
issuers.
Table 6.17: Global Bonds Outstanding and 2-Year Average Growth (US$ billions), 2004-2005
December 2003 December 2004 December 2005 Annual AverageGrowth
International 11,705.7 13,945.7 14,634.5 1,464.4
Domestic 39,042.6 43,787.8 44,314.6 2,636.0
Total 50,748.3 57,733.5 58,949.1 4,100.4
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2006c).
Comparing the $4.1 trillion annual average increase in global bond issuances to the
required global annual investment to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure shows that carbon neutral energy investment would consume 17.4% to 28.9%
of annual growth in global bond issuances during years 1-20 of a 50-year build-out.
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Table 6.18: Global Bonds Annual Average Growth in All Issuances (2003-2005) versus
10-15 TW Years 1-20 Global Annual Investment in Carbon Neutral Electricity
Infrastructure
Required Annual Annual Minimum Maximum
Generation Investment Average Percentage PercentageUS$billions Growth Bonds of New of New
(US$ billions) Issuances Issuances
10 TW 713.7- 1,186.3 17.4% 28.9%4,100.415 TW 1,070.6 - 1,779.5 26.1% 43.4%
'
Source: 
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Up to now, no distinction has been made between bond issuances by governments,
financial institutions, and corporations. Table 6.19 below shows the total principal amount of
bonds outstanding of each of these types of issuers as of December 2005.
Table 6.19: Global Bonds Outstanding by Issuer (US$ billions), December 2005
International Domestic Total Percentage
Government 1,437.0 21,618.5 23,055.5 39.1%
Financial 11,105.9 17,546.4 28,652.3 48.6%
Corporate 1,547.2 5,149.7 6,696.9 11.4%
Int. Organizations 544.4 N/A 544.4 0.9%
Total 14,634.5 44,314.6 58,949.1 100%
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2006c).
Government and international organization issuances accounted for 40% of global
bonds outstanding at the end of 2005. If the government and international organization
issuances are excluded from the analysis, approximately 26.8% to 44.6% of average annual
increases in private sector bond issuances would be consumed by developing 10 TW of carbon
neutral electricity infrastructure during years 1-20 if bonds were the only source of capital. If
only corporate issuances are considered, further excluding financial institution bond issuances,
the approximately $228.8 billion average annual increase (2004-2005) in corporate issuances
must increase by a factor of 3 to 5 times in order to provide the required investment capital to
develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure in years 1-20.
Table 6.20: Global Bonds Annual Average Growth in Corporate and Financial
Issuances (2004-2005) versus 10-15 TW Years 1-20 Global Annual Investment in
Carbon Neutral Electricity Infrastructure
Average Annual Minimum Maximum
Actual Required CorporatelFinancial Percentage Percentage
Capacity $ billions) Bond Growth of New of New
(US$ billions) Issuances Issuances
10TW 713.7 - 1,186.3 26.8% 44.6%2,660.115 TW 1,070.6 - 1,779.5 40.2% 66.9%
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2006c); Table 6.4, Table 6.17, and Table 6.19.
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The above analysis does not take into consideration the tenor of bonds. Short-term
tenors are not appropriate for financing long-term infrastructure projects. Data is not
available for the tenor of new bond issuances. However, data is available for bonds
outstanding that mature within a year or less. As of December 2005, $10,625.6 billion of
domestic bonds and $2,422.5 billion of international bonds had maturities of one year or less
(Bank for International Settlements 2006c). Thus, approximately 22% of outstanding bonds
mature within one year. To the extent that new bond issuances possess short tenors, they
reduce the capacity of the global bond market to finance carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure.
6.1.10 Internal Funds
In addition to capital markets, the availability of funds generated by utility firms from
operations will be essential to their ability to develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure.
Banks may require as much as 50% of the required investment to be provided by the project
sponsors in the form of equity and will require firms to show adequate assets and revenues to
support loan repayment.
Currently, the financial condition of utilities on a global basis suggests that they
would experience difficulty raising the required amount of investment capital from profits to
develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure on the scale contemplated here. According
to the IEA, utilities in OECD countries that have liberalized electricity markets face
increasing competition, less certain revenue streams, lower profit margins, and in many cases,
large operating losses and debt (International Energy Agency 2003). Utilities in developing
countries, especially state-owned utilities, similarly face severe financial difficulties
(International Energy Agency 2003).
Further, utilities would also face limits on their ability to obtain loans due to
adequacy of assets. According to the IEA, electricity generation and downstream gas are the
only two industries in which debt/equity ratios exceed 50%, meaning that debt exceeds
equity (International Energy Agency 2003).
Significantly, the financial condition of utilities may already be limiting their ability
to raise the capital necessary to support conventional infrastructure development. Electricity
reserve margins have declined in liberalized electricity markets, reflecting underinvestment
in electricity infrastructure (International Energy Agency 2003).
To place into perspective the degree to which electricity utilities can finance carbon
neutral infrastructure from internally generated funds, we compare the required investment to
develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure to earnings figures for utilities.
The Edison Electric Institute tracks the combined financial results for sixty-five U.S.
shareholder-owned electric utilities and six additional regulated utilities that serve the United
States market, together representing approximately 60% of U.S. power generation. During
the 2004-2005 period, the annual average earnings, after adding back depreciation and
amortization expenses, totaled $56.9 billion (Edison Electric Institute 2006b).
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Table 6.21: U.S. Shareholder-Owned Electric Utility Earnings (US$ millions), 2004-2005
Earnings Item 2004 2005
Earnings Excluding Non-Recurring 23,264 27,667
and Extraordinary Items
Depreciation & Amortization 30,460 32,482
Total 53,724 60,149
Source: Edison Electric Institute (2006b).
In order to compare the annual earnings of these U.S. shareholder-owned utilities to
required investment levels to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure, it is
necessary to match the earnings figure with the proportionate level of carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure investment that corresponds to 60% of the U.S. electricity utility
sector. Assuming U.S. electricity consumption is approximately 25% of global demand
(Tester et al. 2005), the U.S. portion of global annual investment to develop 10 TW of carbon
neutral electricity infrastructure is 25% of $713.7-1,186.3 billion during years 1-20, or
$178.4-296.6 billion per year during years 1-20. Further taking into consideration that the
$56.9 billion average annual income figure represents only 60% of U.S. power generation,
the annual investment to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure for 60%
of the U.S. electricity industry is $107.1-177.9 billion.
Comparing $56.9 billion of earnings before depreciation and amortization to the
$107.1-177.9 billion annual investment target suggests that internal funds are available to
support carbon neutral infrastructure development. However, the entirety of profits would
not be available to reinvest in operations because management must provide a competitive
return to shareholders in order to maintain the share value of these firms and to attract
additional capital.
6.1.11 International Disparities
Up to now, the case study has examined the capacity of capital markets from a global
and U.S. capital markets perspective. No distinction has been made among countries or
regions with respect to the ability to access capital markets due to different risk profiles, and
economic and investment conditions.
Different nations have different risk profiles. Countries that have deregulated
electricity markets or are considering deregulation provide firms with less certainty in
regulatory frameworks and revenues. Similarly, disparate national environmental regulations
can create significant differences in the competitive positions of utilities (International
Energy Agency 2003). For example, in the United States, environmental regulations
introduced in the 1960's and 1970's have been one of the most important sources of capital
cost increases in electricity generation (Joskow and Rose 1985).
The greatest difference among countries, however, is between developed and
developing countries. The IEA predicts that approximately 60% of projected conventional
220
energy investment during the 2001-2030 period will occur in non-OECD countries
(International Energy Agency 2003). Yet, developing countries possess fewer financial
resources and poor conditions to raise the required investment for either conventional energy
infrastructure or carbon neutral energy infrastructure.
Developing countries that are politically or economically unstable face higher risks
associated with exchange rates, inflation, and political conditions. These countries typically
have underdeveloped private sectors. Countries with high external debt levels will face
limits on their ability to attract the necessary capital to finance carbon neutral infrastructure.
With the exception of China and India, total external debt of non-OECD countries typically
exceeds 40% of GDP, with transition economies in Asia approaching 60%, and African
countries exceeding 80% of GDP (International Energy Agency 2003).
Figure 6.2: External Debt by Region, 2001
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Source: World Bank (2003), as presented in International Energy Agency (2003).
Domestic savings is the single most important source of funds for infrastructure
finance in industrial countries (International Energy Agency 2003). In contrast, domestic
savings rates are also among the lowest in developing countries. For example, Africa's
savings rate is under 10% of GDP, and the savings rates of Latin American and most
transition economies on average range from 15% to 20% of GDP (International Energy
Agency 2003). Oil producing countries of the Middle East, Russia and China have
exceptionally high savings rates, exceeding 30% of GDP on average in Middle East countries,
and approaching 40% of GDP in Russia and China. In addition, China's government sector
has been the largest supplier of capital in that country for infrastructure projects
(International Energy Agency 2003).
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A comparison of domestic savings to domestic investment in Figure 6.3 shows that
developing countries generally spend more than they save as a percentage of their GDP.
With the exception of OECD countries, China, Russia, and some countries in the Middle East,
most countries spend more on domestic investment than they save (International Energy
Agency 2003). Countries that do not have adequate savings face potential difficulties
financing energy infrastructure on a conventional or carbon neutral basis.
Figure 6.3: Domestic Savings and Investment by Region, 2000
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Source: World Bank (2003), as presented in International Energy Agency (2003).
Capital markets development also differs greatly among countries. A recent
McKinsey study estimates that 80% of the world's financial capital is located in North
America, Japan, and Europe (McKinsey Global Institute 2006). Debt markets in these three
areas are the most developed, accounting for 89% of all international bond issuances by
nationality of issuer, and 94% of domestic bond issuances (Bank for International
Settlements 2006b). Further, debt markets in developing countries typically are dominated
by short-term debt, which is poorly suited for long-term energy projects (International
Energy Agency 2003). Similarly, equity markets in non-OECD countries are much smaller
than in OECD countries. As measured by the value of listed shares divided by GDP, non-
OECD equity markets are 20-40% of the size of OECD equity markets (International Energy
Agency 2003).
As a result of the relative weaknesses in the economies and capital markets of
developing countries, developing countries have experienced difficulty attracting the level of
investment achieved in OECD countries for infrastructure investment in general, and the
capital-intensive power sector in particular. In 2002, non-OECD countries attracted only
25% of foreign direct investment (International Energy Agency 2003). Private investment in
developing countries peaked at $52 billion before the Asian currency crisis in 1997, and then
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dropped to $17 billion in 2002. Similarly, private investment for power projects in
developing countries reached over $40 billion in 1997, and then dropped to approximately $5
billion in 2002. These levels fall far short of the IEA's projections for conventional energy
investment in non-OECD countries.
The burden of energy infrastructure investment is expected to differ greatly among
countries. According to IEA projections for the 2001 to 2030 period, conventional energy
investment in OECD countries will average 0.5% of GDP and 2.5% of total domestic
investment. In contrast, in Africa, Russia and other transitions economies, conventional
energy investment will range from 3.5% to 5.5% of GDP and from 20% to over 30% of total
domestic investment (International Energy Agency 2003).
6.1.12 Capital Market Volatility and Effects on Firms
The magnitude and duration of capital investment required to develop carbon neutral
energy infrastructure raises important issues concerning the volatility of capital markets and
the capacity of firms to attract and absorb these levels of investment for sustained periods.
Capital markets are volatile and are subject to dramatic swings between periods of
investment, speculative activity, and recession. The technology and broadband build-out of
the late 1990's to early 2000's provides the most recent example of the potential effects of
rapid growth in investment activity over a short time period. At the peak of investment in
2000, the computer, electronics and telecommunications sectors raised over $201 billion in
U.S. public capital markets. From 1994 to 2000, annual capital raised in U.S. public debt and
equity markets for these sectors increased by 702%. Table 6.22 below shows public debt and
equity transactions in the United States for these sectors from 1993 to 2005.
Table 6.22: U.S. Public Debt and Equity Transactions - Computer, Electronics and
Telecommunications Industries (US$ millions), 1993-2005
Computer & Telecommunications Total Number ofYear Electronics
Debt Equity Debt Equity Capital Transactions
1993 4,672.05 10,629.00 35,617.47 9,562.50 60,481.02 442
1994 2,276.45 6,627.31 12,706.21 3,585.35 25,195.32 299
1995 2,810.72 22,592.61 22,469.96 11,514.79 59,388.08 536
1996 8,205.36 20,771.45 22,898.79 14,883.23 66,758.83 701
1997 10,688.73 19,451.26 38,992.73 10,234.30 79,367.02 613
1998 15,840.39 17,972.58 68,746.53 28,554.88 131,114.38 537
1999 14,184.82 57,876.62 50,610.17 47,178.56 169,850.17 659
2000 16,234.91 89,659.68 49,713.98 46,218.24 201,826.81 552
2001 16,357.99 32,222.07 94,223.35 33,222.99 176,026.40 274
2002 17,233.78 10,573.16 29,978.10 13,433.50 71,218.54 153
2003 13,864.37 24,251.12 39,562.72 12,074.21 89,752.42 275
2004 9,227.10 17,855.47 37,997.32 10,141.58 75,221.47 247
2005 14,481.01 19,275.29 18,257.20 8,415.84 60,429.34 168
Source: Bernstein Research (2006).
223
The large dollar volume and number of transactions in these sectors resulted in
speculative investment activities and stretched the capacity of regulators to monitor financial
markets. The results were a dramatic drop in stock market levels following the 2001 peak
and a series of accounting and financial scandals. The NASDAQ Composite lost 78% of its
value, falling from 5,046.86 points on March 11, 2000, to 1,114.11 points on October 9th,
2002 (Investopedia.com 2006).
Figure 6.4: NASDAQ, September 2000-July 2006
Source: NASDAQ (2006).
Based on the relative volume of investment, the potential for boom-bust cycles to
threaten the stability of capital markets supporting carbon neutral electricity infrastructure is
even greater than in the technology and broadband build-out. Compared to the almost $202
billion of public debt and equity raised in the computer, electronics, and telecommunications
sectors at the peak of investment in 2000, the U.S. capital markets share of annual investment
required to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure is much higher,
ranging from $249.8 to $415.2 billion annually during years 1-20, and then increasing
through years 21-50.
224
It is important to consider the effect of these investment levels in relation to the
ability of individual firms to attract and invest capital. For electricity infrastructure, the
appropriate analysis focuses on utilities as these firms will be primarily responsible for the
investment necessary to develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure and must recover the
costs of this investment from their customer base.
Compared to the investment levels required for carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure, relatively small increases in capital expenditures adversely affect the financial
performance of utilities. According to a study of the financial performance of forty-one
regulated utilities conducted by Lehman Brothers, periods of high capital expenditure depress
stock prices, making it more difficult for utilities to raise financing through equity offerings.
Potential delays in obtaining regulatory approval to recover capital expenditures further
exacerbate the negative effects of heavy investment in the utilities sector (Lehman Brothers
2006).
Figure 6.5: Price-to-Book Ratios - Utilities versus S&P 500, 1972-January 2005
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Source: Factset, as presented in Lehman Brothers (2006).
Significantly, based on this analysis, Lehman Brothers concluded that a $15 billion
increase in capital expenditure over a two year period would be sufficient to depress the
financial performance of the U.S. utilities sector (Lehman Brothers 2006). The five-year
average (2001-2005) of annual utility and energy capital expenditures for firms in the S&P
500 Index is $52.9 billion (Factset 2006). Current investment levels are therefore much
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smaller than the $250 to $415 billion required to be raised annually by utilities in U.S. capital
markets to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure within a 50-year period.
Increased investment levels will also subject firms to greater financial risk associated
with interest rates. Because the utilities industry is one of the most capital intensive
industries (International Energy Agency 2003), capital expenditures in the utilities industry
closely track interest rates and are highly cyclical. Figure 6.6 below shows the relationship
between interest rate cycles and utility investment activity as reflected by the number of
filings by utilities to recover the cost of capital investment (Lehman Brothers 2006).
Figure 6.6: Interest Rates Cycles and Utility Rate Cases, Q1 1980-2006
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Source: Lehman Brothers (2006).
The volatility and cyclicality of investment suggests that investment in carbon neutral
infrastructure will be difficult to maintain over a 50-year period on a consistent basis. This
will undoubtedly slow the introduction of carbon neutral energy infrastructure.
Significantly, to the extent that the development of carbon neutral infrastructure
involves the replacement of capital equipment, the early retirement of this equipment will
further adversely affect the financial condition of utilities. These effects are not reflected in
the prior analysis, which is of past financial performance data on a business-as-usual basis.
Stranded cost recovery and accounting treatment for equipment that is deemed prematurely
obsolete would be important for managing the financial consequences of a carbon neutral
energy infrastructure policy.
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6.1.13 Relative Contributions of Capital Markets Segments
Each segment of the capital markets would potentially contribute to the development
of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure, but no single segment is capable of financing
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure alone. This section tabulates the potential
contribution of each segment of the capital markets in order to provide an overall picture of
the capacity of capital markets to finance carbon neutral electricity infrastructure. This
section conducts this analysis in terms of the utilities segment of the U.S. capital markets, all
sectors of the U.S. capital markets, and global bond markets.
Table 6.23 compares the utilities segment of the U.S. capital markets to the U.S.
capital markets share of global annual investment required to develop 10 TW of carbon
neutral electricity infrastructure during years 1-20, which is $250 to $415 billion per year.
We compare required investment to the aggregate of capital expenditures levels
among U.S. utilities, increases in utility sector public debt and equity transactions in U.S.
capital markets, venture finance and private equity investment in energy, and increases in
U.S. bank lending to the industrial and commercial sectors.
Internally generated funds of U.S. shareholder-owned utilities averaged $56.9 billion
per year during the 2004-2005 period, after adding back depreciation and amortization
expenses (Edison Electric Institute 2006b). However, because profits are essential to
attracting further investment, these will not be counted as available for reinvestment for
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure. In fact, utilities must generate additional profits to
maintain profit levels in order to successfully develop carbon neutral infrastructure.
Table 6.23: U.S. Capital Markets Utilities Sector versus U.S. Capital Markets Share of 10
TW Years 1-20 Global Annual Investment in Carbon Neutral Electricity Infrastructure
(US$ billions)
U.S. Capital Percentage of RequiredMarketsU.S. Capital Markets - Average Sare of Investment
Sources of Funds Annual GlobalPotentially Available to New
Utilities Industry Capital 10 TW Minimum MaximumInvestment Investment Investment
Years 1-20
U.S. Utility Capital 52.9 21.2% 12.7%
Expenditures (2001-2005)
Public Debt & Equity- 65.8 26.3% 15.8%
Utilities (2001-2005) 249.8 - 415.2
Venture Capital (2005) 1.1 0.4% 0.3%
Private Equity (2001-2005) 2.7 1.1% 0.7%
Bank Lending (2003-2005) 80.4 32.2% 19.4%
TOTAL 202.9 81.2% 48.9%
Source: Factset (2006); Bernstein Research (2006); Thomson Venture Economics (2006); Thomson
Investment Analytics (2006); Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2006); Author's calculations.
227
To meet required investment levels during years 1-20 to develop 10 TW of carbon
neutral electricity infrastructure, the total capital potentially available to the utilities sector as
presented in Table 6.23 will be consumed and must increase by at least $47 billion to $213
billion, an increase of 25% to 100%, depending upon the actual costs of development.
These are substantial increases given Lehman Brother's assessment that that a mere
$15 billion increase in capital expenditure over two years could adversely affect the financial
performance of the U.S. utilities sector (Lehman Brothers 2006). The five-year average
(2001-2005) of annual utility and energy capital expenditures for firms in the S&P 500 Index
is $52.9 billion (Factset 2006). Current investment levels represent only 12.7% to 21.2% of
required investment to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure during
years 1-20. The required increase in investment represents an increase in capital
expenditures by a factor of 5 to almost 9 times.
Importantly, these figures likely overstate the total capital available to the utilities
sector for capital improvements. For example, the bank lending data includes all U.S.
commercial and industrial lending, not only lending to the utilities sector. Further, utilities
use the proceeds of capital markets transactions for a wider variety of purposes than capital
expansion.
Nevertheless, the overall utilities sector tabulation suggests that while challenging,
the amount of investment capital required to develop carbon neutral infrastructure may be
feasible.
To further explore the potential feasibility of raising the required capital, Table 6.24
compares the U.S. capital markets share of required global investment to develop 10 TW of
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure to U.S. capital markets activity for all industrial
sectors.
Table 6.24: U.S. Capital Markets All Sectors Activity versus U.S. Capital Markets
Share of 10 TW Years 1-20 Global Annual Investment in Carbon Neutral Electricity
Infrastructure (US$ billions)
rage U.S. Capital Percentage of RequiredAverage Markets Share Investment
U.S. Capital Markets - Annual of Global
All Industries New 10 TW
Minimum Maximum
Capital Investment Capital Investment InvestmentYears 1-20
Public Debt & Equity 871.5 348.9% 209.9%
(2001-2005)
Private Equity (2001-2005) 55.45 249.8 - 415.2 22.2% 13.3%
Bank Lending (2003-2005) 348.4 139.5% 83.9%
TOTAL 1,275.3 510.5% 307.2%
Source: Bernstein Research (2006); Thomson Investment Analytics (2006); Federal Reserve Board of
Governors (2006); Author's calculations.
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Comparison of required investment levels to all U.S. capital markets suggests that
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure investment would become a very large portion of
U.S. capital markets activity, consuming almost one-fifth to one-third of increases in U.S.
capital markets activity by dollar volume. To place this in perspective, from 1990 to 2005,
the utility sector accounted for 5.9% of U.S. public equity transactions and 7.4% of U.S.
public debt transactions (author's calculations based on Bernstein Research 2006). Such a
large increase in the volume of capital devoted to carbon neutral electricity infrastructure
would draw resources from other industries, raising concerns about the stability of such
capital flows and the effects on other sectors of the economy.
Finally, Table 6.25 compares global bond markets capacity to the global investment
required to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure during years 1-20.
Table 6.25: Average Annual Growth in All Global Bond Issuances (2004-2005) versus
10 TW Years 1-20 Global Annual Investment in Carbon Neutral Electricity
Infrastructure (US$ billions)
Annual Global Percentage of Required
Global Bonds Average Required Investment
Growth in Investment
Issuances 10 TW Minimum Maximum
(2004-2005) Years 1-20 Investment Investment
Corporate and 2,660.1 26.8% 44.6%Financial
Government, 713.7 - 1,186.3
Corporate and 4,100.4 17.4% 28.9%
Financial
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2006c); Author's calculations.
The global debt securities market comparison confirms that carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure would consume a large portion of growth in global capital markets activity.
Global investment levels required to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure during years 1-20 would consume from 27% to 45% of growth in corporate
and financial debt issuances. Including the government sector, required investment would
consume 17% to 29% of growth in all global debt securities issuances.
6.1.14 Growth Potential of Capital Markets
The foregoing analysis raises the question whether the capital markets can grow to
supply the levels of investment required to develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure.
Historically, the capital markets have demonstrated their capacity for tremendous
growth. A recent McKinsey study estimates that the total value of the world's financial
assets (including bank deposits, government debt securities, corporate-debt securities, and
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equity securities) have grown from $12 trillion in 1993 to $136 trillion at the end of 2004, an
average increase of $11.3 trillion per year during this period (McKinsey Global Institute
2006). Extrapolating the 11-year historic growth rate, the study predicts that global financial
assets will exceed $228 trillion by 2010 (McKinsey Global Institute 2006).
The estimated global annual investment required to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral
electricity infrastructure is $714 billion to $1,186 billion per year during years 1-20 of a 50-
year build-out, or approximately 6.3% to 10.5% of historic annual increases in global wealth.
Carbon neutral electricity infrastructure investment levels would be higher than EIA
projections for conventional electricity investment during the period 2001 to 2030. IEA
estimates that OECD investment in conventional electricity infrastructure will average 0.5%
of GDP and 2.5% of total domestic investment, and that Africa, Russia and other transitional
economies will invest from 3.5% to 5.5% of GDP and from 20% to over 30% of total
domestic investment (International Energy Agency 2003). lEA acknowledges that these
conventional investment targets would be difficult for many countries to meet. Meeting
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure investment targets would be even more difficult.
In addition to the growth of capital markets generally, it is important to consider the
development of capital markets in the utilities and energy sector in particular. The data in
Table 6.8, reproduced as Figure 6.7, sets out U.S. public debt and equity transactions in the
utilities and energy, and oil and gas sectors. Capital markets activity in the utilities sector has
not followed a stable upward trajectory during the past decade. In contrast, capital markets
activity in the oil and gas sector has increased in a comparatively more stable manner.
Figure 6.7: U.S. Public Debt and Equity Transactions, 1993-2005
Source: Bernstein Research (2006).
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The volatility of U.S. public debt and equity transactions in the utilities sector reflects
uncertainty during the past decade due to regulatory changes, the Enron collapse, instability
of California's electricity sector, and overall economic conditions associated with the decline
of the technology sector in 2001. Significantly, electricity utility industries in many other
countries also face uncertainty from deregulation, tightening profit margins, and difficult
competitive environments (International Energy Agency 2003).
Recent U.S. capital markets data suggests that capital markets activity in the utilities
sector is inadequate to sustain the required levels of investment on a consistent basis to
develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure.
6.1.15 Waiting and Its Potential Costs
This section considers the timing to implement a carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure program on the scale contemplated by this case study. It considers the issues
of the time required for technology adoption, the ability of the capital markets to provide the
investment in the near term, and the potential cost of waiting to implement carbon neutral
energy infrastructure.
The ability of the capital markets to provide the level of investment required to
develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure and the ability of firms to absorb these levels
of investment will partly depend upon the maturity of the technologies. Because several of
these technologies such as solar photovoltaic and carbon sequestration have yet to be
perfected, the time period for their adoption will take decades. A recent study of hybrid
vehicles illustrates the delays in technology adoption. According to the study, hybrid
vehicles will require approximately thirty-five years from their introduction into commercial
production before they become economically competitive with other technologies, and gain
the market position required to significantly reduce U.S. energy consumption (MIT
Laboratory for Energy and the Environment 2005). Studies of solar PV technology similarly
estimate that this technology should become cost competitive with other technologies starting
at approximately mid-century (Nemet 2006b).
Economists and technologists have emphasized that waiting to implement a program
of carbon neutral infrastructure and technology allows society to benefit from advances in
technology, which potentially reduce the costs of addressing climate change (Webster 2000).
But waiting to transition our infrastructure also involves potential costs that are difficult to
estimate. In addition to the damage to the environment that will occur, the scale of
transforming infrastructure also increases as we delay.
The amount of physical infrastructure has been increasing over the past fifty years
and, if this trend continues, will increase the magnitude of the challenge society faces when it
does eventually attempt to develop carbon neutral infrastructure. Figure 6.8 shows the net
stock of U.S. private power generation, transmission and distribution assets in the United
States, on a replacement cost basis. As demonstrated by these figures, the net stock of
electricity infrastructure steadily increased throughout the second half of the last century.
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Given the increasing rate of infrastructure development, waiting to develop carbon neutral
infrastructure could substantially magnify the challenge we face as a society.
Figure 6.8: Real Value of U.S. Electricity Industry Fixed Assets, 1925-2005
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006)
Finally, the issue of petroleum resource scarcity must be considered given the time
frame required to develop carbon neutral energy infrastructure. As described in Chapter 2, a
number of studies have predicted that the time until global conventional petroleum
production peaks is likely within this century, depending upon global economic growth rates,
conventional petroleum resources, petroleum consumption rates, and advances in petroleum
exploration and production technology (Wood et al. 2004; Campbell and Laherrere 1998;
Deffeyes 2001). The timing of peak petroleum production is important because it could
potentially disrupt the economy and preclude a smooth transition to carbon neutral
infrastructure.
6.1.16 Capital Markets Case Study Main Findings
The capital markets case study compared estimates for the cost of developing 10 TW
to 15 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure during years 1-20 of a 50-year
development program with historical capital expenditures in the utility industry, projected
conventional electricity investment levels, and recent U.S. and global capital markets activity
levels.
Based on these comparisons, the capital markets case study presents four primary
findings. First, it reveals that the magnitude of required investment to achieve carbon neutral
232
1,600
- 1,400
o
N 1,200
1,000
o 800
6 600
a 400
ha 200
0
1925 1945 1965 1985 20051905
electricity infrastructure within a 50-year time frame will potentially exceed the capacity of
capital markets. Second, while private sector resources are essential to develop carbon
neutral electricity infrastructure, private sector resources are limited and likely to be
inadequate to successfully develop carbon neutral infrastructure without government support.
Third, the stability of capital markets and firms are important conditions for the development
of carbon neutral energy infrastructure. Finally, the magnitude of the task of implementing
carbon neutral infrastructure is likely to increase in the future, and policymakers should
consider the early initiation of such a program.
The investment levels required to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure may be difficult to raise in capital markets. The required investment levels
during years 1-20 of a 50-year program exceed current capital expenditures in the utilities
and energy sector by a factor of 5 to almost 9 times. If all growth in U.S. capital markets
activity in the utilities sector were devoted to the development of carbon neutral electricity
infrastructure, the available capital would still fall short by as much as one-half of the
required level of investment to be raised in U.S. capital markets. If all capital currently
raised in U.S. capital markets were devoted to this effort, the U.S. capital markets share of
investment for developing 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity would consume an estimated
one-fifth to one-third of growth in U.S. capital markets activity.
While the private sector's resources are essential to developing carbon neutral energy
infrastructure, they are also likely to be inadequate. This is evident in the analysis of the
global bond markets, where the government sector accounts for approximately 40% of all
issuances. Further, in developing countries where private capital markets are
underdeveloped, government financing for carbon neutral energy infrastructure will be
essential. The private sector will require both government policy support and financial
resources in order to develop carbon neutral energy infrastructure.
Given the magnitude of required investment, the financial stability of firms and
capital markets become important issues if addressing climate change requires the private
sector to develop carbon neutral energy infrastructure. Evidence suggests that periods of
high capital expenditure depress stock prices, making it more difficult for utilities to raise
financing through equity offerings. Increased exposure to interest rate risk and potential
delays in obtaining regulatory approval to recover capital expenditures further exacerbate the
negative effects of utilities sector capital expansions (Lehman Brothers 2006).
Under these conditions, the stability of firms is especially important because higher
than normal levels of investment must be sustained for many decades to successfully develop
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure. Market volatility and the short-term nature of public
debt and equity markets present potential risks and delay for the development of carbon
neutral infrastructure.
Finally, delaying the implementation of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure will
likely increase the magnitude of the challenge and may eventually place it beyond society's
capacity to implement at some point in the future. The scale of the challenge increases with
the further development of conventional energy infrastructure. The long-time frame and
inevitable delays involved in implementing a large-scale change in infrastructure suggest that
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commencing early and gradually increasing our capacity to develop carbon neutral energy
infrastructure is preferable to indefinitely delaying starting such a program.
6.2 Storm Effects on Utilities and Energy Sector
The second case study examines the financial effects of storms and hurricanes on
energy infrastructure, especially utilities located on the East Coast of the United States during
the past fifteen years. Storms and hurricanes have caused tremendous physical damage to
energy infrastructure, disrupting service, causing economic losses, and harming the financial
stability of utilities in the region.
The financial well-being of utilities following these events is central to the issue of
how climate risk may affect the capacity of private sector institutions to develop carbon
neutral energy infrastructure. Because utilities make investment decisions regarding choice
of generation technology, and must recover capital costs from consumers, utilities play a
critical role in transforming energy infrastructure. To the extent that storms or hurricanes
weaken the financial position of utility companies, these events adversely affect their ability
to adapt our energy infrastructure because catastrophic losses make it more difficult to
finance energy infrastructure in storm-prone areas of the United States.
The case study is organized in the following sections: (a) an overview of storm and
hurricane history on the East Coast of the United States from 1990 to 2005, (b) economic
damage caused by storms and hurricanes, and (c) the financial effects of storms and
hurricanes on utilities and other energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico region.
6.2.1 Storm and Hurricane History of the United States Atlantic Coast 1990-2005
The North Atlantic Basin is one of the most active storm and hurricane regions of the
world. Because storms are particularly strong over warm water, storms and hurricanes
commonly affect the states along the U.S. Gulf Coast, the Carolinas, and on rare occasions
reach New England states. The Atlantic storm season typically begins in June and ends in
November.
Storms with winds in excess of 38 mph are given names to raise public awareness,
and in excess of 73 mph are deemed hurricanes. Hurricanes are rated on the Saffir-Simpson
hurricane scale, which ranks hurricanes from 1 to 5 based on wind speed. Importantly,
because the scale does not take into account rainfall or location, lower category hurricanes
can be more damaging than higher category hurricanes depending upon precipitation and
location.
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Table 6.26: Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale
Central Pressure Wind Storm
Category Speed Surge Damage
(Millibars) (Inches) (Mph) (Feet)
1 >979 >28.91 74-95 4-5 Minimal
2 965-979 28.50-28.91 96-110 6-8 Moderate
3 945-964 27.91-28.47 111-130 9-12 Extensive
4 920-944 27.17-27.88 131-155 13-18 Extreme
5 <920 <27.17 156+ 19+ Catastrophic
Source: Simpson (1974).
Historical data shows that storms and hurricanes have been increasing in frequency
during the past 150 years, with a marked increase since 1985. The increase in major
hurricanes also suggests that they have been increasing in severity during the same period.
Table 6.27: Average Annual Number of Storms by Period, 1851-2004
Average Average Average Annual
Annual Number Annual Number ofPeriod Total Years
of Tropical Number of Major
Storms Hurricanes Hurricanes
1851-2004 154 8.5 5.2 1.8
1944-2004 61 10.3 6.0 2.6
1955-2004 50 10.3 5.9 2.4
1965-2004 40 10.6 5.9 2.2
1975-2004 30 10.8 6.0 2.3
1985-2004 20 11.5 6.4 2.6
1990-2004 15 12.2 6.7 2.9
1995-2004 10 13.9 7.8 3.8
Source: Blake, Jarrell, Rappaport and Landsea (2005).
Storm and hurricane activity is concentrated along the Gulf Coast and southern states.
Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina experience the
highest incidence of storms and hurricanes.
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Table 6.28: Hurricane Direct Hits on U.S. Coastline Texas to Maine, 1851-2004
Area Catego Number Major1 2 3 4 5 All Hurricanes
U.S. 109 72 71 18 3 273 92
Texas 23 17 12 7 0 59 19
Louisiana 17 14 13 4 1 49 18
Mississippi 2 5 7 0 1 15 8
Alabama 11 5 6 0 0 22 6
Florida 43 32 27 6 2 110 35
Georgia 12 5 2 1 0 20 3
South Carolina 19 6 4 2 0 31 6
North Carolina 21 13 11 1 0 46 12
Virginia 9 2 1 0 0 12 1
Maryland 1 1 0 0 0 2 0
Delaware 1 1 0 0 0 2 0
New Jersey 2 0 0 0 0 2 0
Pennsylvania 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
New York 6 1 5 0 0 12 5
Connecticut 4 3 3 0 0 10 3
Rhode Island 3 2 4 0 0 9 4
Massachusetts 5 2 3 0 0 10 3
New Hampshire 1 1 0 0 0 2 0
Maine 5 1 0 0 0 6 0
Source: Blake, Jarrell, Rappaport and Landsea (2005).
Improvements in communication, building codes, and other mitigation measures have
reduced the number of deaths from storms and hurricanes. The deadliest hurricanes have occurred
in the early part of the last century with the single exception of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Table 6.29: Ten Deadliest U.S. Hurricanes, 1900-2005
Rank Hurricane Year Category Deaths
1 Texas (Galveston) 1900 4 8000-12,000
2 FL (Lake Okeechobee) 1928 4 2500-3000
3 Hurricane Katrina 2005 4 1300+
4 Florida Keys 1935 5 408
5 Hurricane Audrey (LA, TX) 1957 4 390
6 Florida 1926 4 372
7 LA (Grand Isle) 1909 3 350
8 Florida Keys/Texas 1919 4 287
9 LA (New Orleans) 1915 4 275
10 TX (Galveston) 1915 4 275
Source: Blake, Jarrell, Rappaport and Landsea (2005), as updated for 2005 based on NCDC (2006).
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6.2.2 Economic Damage Caused by Storms and Hurricanes
Storms and Hurricanes are among the most economically costly natural catastrophes.
They cause approximately 66% of economic losses and 79% of insured losses for all natural
catastrophe events.
Figure 6.9: Natural Perils and Losses by Type, 1950-2004
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Source: American Re (2005), in CERES (2005a).
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Storms and hurricanes are inflicting increasing economic losses both because of their
increasing severity and the increasing density of infrastructure. As shown in Table 6.30
below, of the twenty costliest U.S. storms since 1900, ten have occurred since 2000, and all
of them since 1970.
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Figure 6.10: U.S. Hurricane Losses, 1915-2000
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Source: Meade (2004).
Table 6.30: Twenty Costliest Mainland U.S. Tropical Cyclones, 1900-2005
States 2004 Dollars forRank Name Affected Year Category Damage (U.S.) 2003 and BeforAffected 2003 and Before
AL, FL, LA,1 Katrina AL, FL, LA, 2005 4 $100,000,000,000MS
2 Andrew FL, LA 1992 5 $26,500,000,000 $43,672,000,000
3 Charley FL 2004 4 $15,000,000,000
4 Ivan AL, FL 2004 3 $14,200,000,000
5 Wilma 2005 3 $10,000,000,000
6 Frances FL 2004 2 $8,900,000,000
7 Rita 2005 3 $8,000,000,000
8 Hugo SC 1989 4 $7,000,000,000 $12,250,000,000
9 Jeanne FL 2004 3 $6,900,000,000
10 Allison TX 2001 Storm $5,000,000,000 $5,829,000,000
Mid-Atlantic11 Floyd NE US 1999 2 $4,500,000,000 $5,764,000,000
12 Isabel Mid-Atlantic 2003 2 $3,370,000,000 $3,643,000,000
13 Fran NC 1996 3 $3,200,000,000 $4,525,000,000
14 Opal FL, AL 1995 3 $3,000,000,000 $4,324,000,000
15 Frederic AL, MS 1979 3 $2,300,000,000 $6,291,000,000
16 Agnes FL, NE U.S. 1972 1 $2,100,000,000 $11,290,000,000
17 Alicia TX 1983 3 $2,000,000,000 $4,384,000,000
18 Dennis 2005 3 $2,000,000,000
19 Bob NC, NE U.S. 1991 2 $1,500,000,000 $2,593,000,000
20 Juan LA 1985 1 $1,500,000,000 $3,105,000,000
Source: Blake, Jarrell, Rappaport and Landsea (2005), updated for 2005 hurricane season based on NCDC(2006). Note: 2004 US$ based on U.S. Department of Commerce implicit price deflator for construction.
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The 2005 hurricane season illustrates the potential economic damage caused by
storms and hurricanes. Risk Management Solutions estimated that total losses from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita totaled approximately $140 billion. Of that amount,
approximately $40 to $67 billion was insured. The Congressional Budget Office estimated
that damage to physical infrastructure totaled $70 to $130 billion (U.S. Congressional Budget
Office 2005).
Table 6.31: Estimated Capital Stock Destroyed by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
RangeType RangePercentage(2005 US$ billions)
Housing $17 to $33 24%-25%
Energy Sector $18 to $31 24%-25%
Other Private Sector $16 to $32 24%-25%
Government $13 to $25 19%
Consumer Durable Goods $5 to $9 7%
TOTAL $70 to $130
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2005).
In addition to the immediate loss of physical assets, storms inflict ongoing economic
losses to localjobs and state and municipal tax revenues, and have adverse national and
regional macroeconomic effects. As a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, an estimated
293,000 to 480,000jobs were lost. In Louisiana, two thirds of the population, representing
70% of the tax base, lived in the federal disaster zone, which caused a loss of state tax
revenues of approximately $1 to $3 billion (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2005).
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that Hurricane Rita would continue to
affect the national economy through 2007. Table 6.32 shows the estimated economic effect
of Hurricane Katrina on GDP.
Table 6.32: Estimated Net Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Real GDP (2005 US$ billions)
2005 2006 2007
2nd Half 1st Half Half 1st Half 2 nd Half
Energy Production -18 to -28 -8 to -10 -5 to -7 -5 to -7 -5 to -7
Housing -1 to -2 -2 to -4 -1 to -3 0 to -2 0 to -2
Agricultural -1 to -2 0 0 0 0
Production
Replacement 6 to 12 16 to 34 16 to 35 16 to 35 12 to 25
Investment
Government Spending 6 to 10 12 to 18 14 to 20 10 to 16 7 to 11
Energy Prices Effect -6 to -10 -5 to -7 -2 to -5 -1 to -3 0 to -2
on Consumption
Other Consumption -8 to -12 -2 to -4 -1 to -3 -1 to -3 0 to -2
Real GDP -22 to -32 11 to 27 21 to 37 19 to 36 14 to 23
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2005).
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Federal disaster relief payments have been rising steadily during the past thirty years.
While there is some debate whether the increases in payments are influenced by political
considerations, the increasing economic effects of natural disasters are clearly a primary
factor. The U.S. federal government allocated approximately $62 billion for relief efforts
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2005). One
analyst estimated that total federal relief spending could reach as high as $150 billion, which
would incur additional interest expense of $80 billion, for a total increase in government
spending of $230 billion over the next ten years (Horney et al. 2005).
Table 6.33: Federal Disaster Relief Payments (2005 US$ millions), 1974-2007
1974 100 200 233 433 1,412 250 816
1975 100 150 50 200 591 206 609
1976 187 187 0 187 517 362 999
1977 100 100 200 300 770 294 754
1978 150 115 300 415 997 461 1,108
1979 200 200 194 394 876 277 616
1980 194 194 870 1,064 2,175 574 1,173
1981 375 358 0 358 668 401 746
1982 400 302 0 302 526 115 201
1983 325 130 0 130 217 202 337
1984 0 0 0 0 0 243 391
1985 100 100 0 100 156 192 299
1986 194 100 250 350 533 335 511
1987 100 120 bO 120 178 219 325
1988 125 120 0 '120 173 187 269
1989 200 100 '1,108 1,208 1,674 140 194
1990 270 98 "1,150 1,248 1,668 1,333 1,781
1991 270 0 0 0 0 552 711
1992 '184 185 4,136 t4,321 5,429 902 1,134
1993 292 292 2,000 "2.292 2,816 2,276 2,796
1994 '1,154 226 "4,709 4,935 5,935 3,743 4,502
1995 320 320 '3,275 3,595 4.235 2,116 2,492
1996 320 222 '3,275 '3.497 4,042 2,233 2,581
1997 320 '1,320 '3,300 4,620 5,248 2,551 2,898
1998 "2,708 320 "1,600 1,920 2,155 1,998 2,242
1999 -2,566 1,214 q1, 130  2,344 2,597 3,746 4,149
2000 2,780 '2,780 0 2,780 3,019 2,628 2,853
2001 2,909 300 '5,890 6,249 3,217 3,413
2002 "1,369 664 '7,008 '12,160 12,677 3,947 4,114
2003 1,843 800 "1,426 "2,199 2,255 8,541 8,761
2004 1,956 1.800 "2,275 "2,042 '2,068 Y3,044 '3,082
2005 2,151 2,042 '8,500 10,542 10,542 Y3,363 Y3,363
Total 24,240 16,360 48,988 72,099 84,455 50.648 60,224
Sources: Congressional Research Service (2005b). Note: 2005-2007 are estimates based on federal
government allocation of $62 billion for disaster relief resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Estimates do not include interest payments, possible further allocations, or other catastrophic events
that may occur in 2006 and 2007.
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6.2.3 Financial Effects of Storms and Hurricanes on Utilities and Energy Sectors
Storms and hurricanes presently pose the single most significant climate risk to
utilities. Damages include loss of revenues due to service disruption and destruction of
capital assets, particularly transmission and distribution equipment. Weather-related
incidents account for almost two-thirds of utilities service disruptions in North America.
Figure 6.11: Causes of North American Electricity Service Disruption, 1982-2002
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Source: North American Electric Reliability Counsel, in CERES (2005a).
A recent survey of fourteen utilities covering eighty-one major storms from 1994 to
2004 shows that the financial effects of storms on electric utilities is substantial and
increasing. Figure 6.12 below shows that the costs of these eighty-one storms have increased
throughout the period surveyed.
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Figure 6.12: Major Storm Costs (2003 millions US$), 1994-2004
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Source: Edison Electric Institute (2005). Note: figure shows eighty-one storms surveyed. Some
storms have been grouped for a total of fifty-five data points.
The cost of these storms averaged $87.31 per customer per year from 1994 to 2004
(Edison Electric Institute 2005). Figure 6.13 shows that annual costs were highly variable,
making estimation for planning and rate case purposes difficult.
Figure 6.13: Major Storm Costs per Customer (2003 US$), 1994-2004
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Source: Edison Electric Institute (2005). Note: figure shows eighty-one storms surveyed. Some
storms have been grouped for a total of forty-four data points. Costs per customer are calculated
using peak number of customers per year.
Importantly, the cost of storms may significantly affect earnings. Figure 6.14 shows
that storms costs for the eighty-one storms surveyed from 1994 to 2004 have cost an average
of 13% of net income for the fourteen utilities surveyed. In some years, storm costs
approached or exceeded net income for several of the utilities.
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Figure 6.14: Ratio of Storm CostlNet Operating Income (2003 US$), 1994-2004
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Source: Edison Electric Institute (2005). Note: figure shows eighty-one storms surveyed. Some
storms have been grouped for a total of fifty-five data points.
Utility transmission and distribution systems are especially vulnerable to storms.
Figure 6.15 shows that costs of the eighty-one storms included in the Edison Electric Institute
study exceeded the annual transmission and distribution budget of the utilities surveyed by as
much as 300%.
Figure 6.15: Storm Costs as % of T&D Expenses (2003 US$), 1994-2004
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Source: Edison Electric Institute (2005). Note: figure shows eighty-one storms. Some storms have
been grouped for a total of fifty-five data points.
Importantly, among the fourteen utilities surveyed, only one maintained cash reserves
to cover the costs of storm damage; the other companies maintained unfunded accounting
reserves (Edison Electric Institute 2005).
The 2005 hurricane season caused record damage to utility infrastructure in the Gulf
Coast region. Utilities estimate that lost revenues and the cost of repairing transmission and
distribution equipment totaled approximately $2.5 billion (U.S. Congressional Budget Office
2005). The 2005 storms forced one utility, Entergy New Orleans, a wholly owned subsidiary
of Entergy, to file for protection under Chapter 11 (reorganization) of the federal bankruptcy
laws.
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In addition to the loss of capital assets and reserves, storms may also damage the
credit rating of energy companies. For example, as a result of the 2004 storms, credit rating
agencies placed Progress Energy on negative credit watch for concern that the storms could
hamper its ability to pay debt obligations in a timely manner and potential delays in obtaining
regulatory approval to recover the cost of repairing storm damage (Edison Electric Institute
2005).
In addition to utilities, other energy infrastructure was also affected by the 2005
storms. A large percentage of United States oil and gas infrastructure lies in the Gulf of
Mexico and southern United States, and was heavily damaged during the 2005 hurricane
season.
Figure 6.16: Existing and Projected U.S. Liquid Natural Gas Infrastructure, 2005
p pdnekltoh
Source: Kiley (2006).
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused an estimated $17 to $31 billion in losses to capital
stock in the energy sector, approximately 25% of all capital stock losses (U.S. Congressional
Budget Office 2005) (See Table 6.31). In the oil and gas production sector, these hurricanes
destroyed or damaged 167 offshore platforms and 183 pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico. The
hurricanes shut down approximately 70% of gas production, and 90% of crude oil production
in the Gulf of Mexico. This caused the loss of about 2% of global oil production, and about
20% of U.S. oil refining capacity (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2005). As of March
2006, 87 platforms were still evacuated (Minerals Management Service 2006). By late June
2006, ten months after Hurricane Katrina, approximately 15% of oil production and 11% of
gas production remained unrestored (Financial Times 2006e).
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Figure 6.17: Gulf of Mexico Oil and Gas Fields, 1947-2005
Source: Mineral Management Service as presented by Kiley (2006).
Further, the energy sector is expected to bear the largest portion of continuing losses
resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Year 2006 revenue losses are expected to be
approximately $13 to 17 billion, and year 2007 losses $10 to 14 billion (U.S. Congressional
Budget Office 2005) (See Table 6.32).
In addition to these financial effects, storms and hurricanes also adversely affect the
ability of the utilities and energy industries to obtain insurance, an important requirement of
banks to finance infrastructure. The effect of storms and hurricanes on the ability of utility
and energy companies to obtain insurance is addressed in the next case study.
6.2.4 Utility and Energy Storm Damage Case Study Main Findings
This case study examined the increase in storm and hurricane activity in the Eastern
United States and Gulf of Mexico during the past fifteen years and the losses they have
caused to the utilities and energy industries.
The case study analysis demonstrates that storm damage has various negative
financial effects on the utilities and energy industries. These negative effects include the
immediate loss of revenues due to disruption, damage to capital stock, increasing demands
on cash or accounting reserves, large increases in future capital expenditure, potential delays
in recovering lost revenues or capital expenditures through the regulatory approval process,
and potential downgrade by credit rating agencies. In turn, these factors adversely affect the
ability of these firms to raise debt and equity in capital markets.
Climate change is believed by some in the scientific community to have contributed
to the observed recent increase in the number of storms and hurricanes and the resulting
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losses. If changing climate increases the frequency or intensity of storms, and the resulting
losses to these firms, it could significantly increase operating costs for utilities and energy
companies in affected areas. Importantly, the increasing costs and other negative effects on
financial performance could potentially undermine the capacity of utilities and energy
companies to finance carbon neutral energy infrastructure.
6.3 Natural Catastrophic Events Effects on Insurance Industry
The third case study examines the effects of natural catastrophic events on the
willingness or ability of insurers to provide property and casualty insurance.
Insurance is critical for financing and developing infrastructure. Lenders require
insurance as a condition to financing infrastructure. Lenders typically require that a physical
asset be insured at a level adequate to repay debt or replace the asset. The inability to obtain
insurance for a particular geographic area or type of activity could adversely affect society's
ability to finance capital-intensive infrastructure.
The case study is organized in the following sections: (a) insurance industry
fundamentals, (b) overview of natural catastrophes and insured losses during the past several
decades, (c) financial effects of natural catastrophic events on the insurance industry, (d)
natural catastrophes' effects on insuring utilities and other energy infrastructure in the Gulf
of Mexico.
6.3.1 Insurance Industry Fundamentals
Primary insurance is offered by insurance companies to businesses and consumers.
With respect to primary insurance, the dissertation surveyed property insurance, which
includes weather risks such as fire, flood, and earthquake, and business interruption
insurance.
The availability of primary insurance is directly affected by conditions in the
reinsurance market. Reinsurance is a method by which insurance companies transfer a
portion of their primary underwriting risks to other insurance companies. Reinsurance
allows the ceding insurance company to underwrite larger risks than would otherwise be
allowed due to regulatory or credit rating requirements concerning adequacy of reserves.
Reinsurance may be structured to transfer a pro-rata share of premiums and liabilities for all
or a specified subset of policies or risks unwritten by a ceding insurer, transfer liabilities in
excess of the amount of risk retained by the ceding insurer for a fee, or require single or
multiple events to trigger the reinsurance obligation. Unlike primary insurance, reinsurance
is not regulated, however the reinsurance market is analyzed by credit rating agencies, which
effectively places limits on reinsurance companies' capacity to underwrite risk.
Assessing risk in connection with underwriting activities is a critical function of
insurance companies. For a risk to be insurable, several criteria must be satisfied: (a) the
timing or occurrence of losses must be uncertain; (b) the amount and rate of losses must be
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capable of being estimated accurately on a macro scale: and (c) the event must be
catastrophic, meaning that it is far from the mean based on historical observed weather
patterns by some measure, usually by several standard deviations.
Insurance companies use actuarial models to statistically quantify their risks over a
large number of policies based on an assessment of the probability of perils. The risks of loss
of catastrophic events are estimated using detailed historic weather data, demographic data,
building code and engineering data specific to a particular zip code (Muir-Wood 2006; Siner
2006). Models incorporate future expectations using demographic and engineering trends,
and recently, scientific trends concerning changes in climate (Siner 2006). These models
produce a loss exceedance curve, which shows the expected amount of insured losses for a
particular risk and the estimated probability of occurrence. The exceedance probability is the
probability that a loss will occur at or greater than a specified level of loss.
Actuarial models are used to set premiums, to determine appropriate levels for
reserves, to purchase reinsurance, to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements,
and to demonstrate adequate capitalization to regulators and credit rating agencies. These
models also provide guidance for setting contractual terms to limit potential underwriting
losses.
6.3.2 Recent History of Natural Catastrophic Events and Insurance Losses
During the past thirty-five years, the number of catastrophic events and the magnitude
of damage caused by them have increased dramatically, causing record losses for insurance
companies. The increase in damages is influenced by the increased number and severity of
events, but also by increasing price levels (inflation), population, levels of wealth, and
reliance on physical infrastructure.
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Figure 6.18: Number of Natural Catastrophic Events, 1970-2005
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Figure 6.19: Natural Catastrophe Insured Losses (2005 US$ billions), 1970-2005
Source: Swiss Re (2006b).
Annual average damage from natural catastrophes has risen by 475% from the period
1995 to 2004, as compared with the period 1974 to 1983 (Frank Crystal 2006). While
absolute monetary losses resulting from natural catastrophes have been much higher in
industrialized countries, loss of life and economic effects as a percentage of GDP are higher
in developing countries (Gurenko 2004).
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Storms and hurricanes are an important segment of natural catastrophe losses,
accounting for approximately 78% of all insured losses due to natural catastrophes (Insurance
Information Institute 2006a).
Figure 6.20: U.S. Insured Catastrophic Losses by Category, 1985-2004
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Damages from storms and hurricanes have been increasing, following the same
upward trend for natural catastrophes. From 1949 to 1999, hurricanes caused U.S. insured
property losses totaling $37.9 billion, or $87.8 billion adjusted for inflation, population and
wealth levels. Of that amount, 52% of losses, or $45.7 billion on an adjusted basis, occurred
during the eleven-year period from 1989 to 1999. From 1989 to 1999, U.S. insured losses
from hurricanes averaged $4.2 billion per annum on an adjusted basis, in contrast to average
adjusted losses of $1.1 billion per annum from 1949 to 1988 (ISO 2006b). From 2000 to
2005, U.S. insured losses due to hurricanes have averaged in excess of $21 billion per year
(Insurance Information Institute 2006b).
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6.3.3 Financial Effects of Natural Catastrophes on Insurance Industry
Natural catastrophes adversely affect the insurance industry's profitability, capacity to
underwrite risk, rate of insolvencies, and credit ratings. This section examines each of these
aspects of the insurance industry's financial position.
The combined ratio is an important measure of insurance company performance and
profitability with respect to underwriting operations. The combined ratio is the ratio of
losses plus expenses over earned premiums for a particular period:
Combined Ratio = (Losses + Expenses) *100
Earned Premiums
A combined ratio of 100 or more indicates an underwriting loss; a ratio of less than 100
indicates a gain; and a ratio of 100 is the breakeven point for underwriting business. The
combined ratio only measures underwriting performance and does not take into account other
aspects of insurance company profits, such as investment of assets (Frank Crystal 2006).
Figure 6.22 below shows the aggregate combined ratios of reinsurance companies and
property and casualty insurers. The relatively higher combined ratios of reinsurance
companies reflect that reinsurers bear most of the cost of catastrophic events. In 2001, the
attacks on the World Trade Center increased the combined ratio of the reinsurance segment
of the industry to a peak of 162.5 (Frank Crystal 2006).
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Figure 6.22: Combined Ratio of P&C Reinsurers v. P&C Insurers and Reinsurers,
1999-2004
Source: I-rank L;rystal (ZUUb).
The U.S. property and casualty insurance industry has
each year from 1975 to 2005, except in 1977, 1978, and 2004
Institute 2006a).
incurred underwriting losses
(Insurance Information
Figure 6.23: U.S. P&C Underwriting Gain/Loss (US$ millions), 1975-2005
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Despite persistent underwriting losses, the U.S. property and casualty insurance
industry has remained profitable due primarily to investment income. From 1991 to 2005,
U.S. property and casualty insurers incurred underwriting losses of approximately $298
billion, while net income after taxes during the same period was $313 billion, as a result of
investment activity (Insurance Information Institute 2006a).
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Figure 6.24: U.S. P&C Net Income After Taxes (US$ millions), 1991-2005
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Source: Insurance Information Institute (2006a).
U.S. insurance companies typically invest up to 7% in equities, 70% to 90% in fixed
income instruments, and the remainder in cash (Frank Crystal 2006). Some insurance
companies and reinsurance companies, however, invest 20% to 35% of their assets in
equities, with one company planning to invest as much as 50% of its assets in equities (Credit
Suisse First Boston 2005).
The capacity of insurance companies to meet policy obligations and to continue to
underwrite risk is measured by their reserves and surplus accounts. Reserves are funds
expensed from the surplus general funds of an insurance company to pay for actual or
anticipated claims. When reserves are inadequate to meet claims or drop below levels
required by applicable insurance regulations, surplus must be further reduced to increase
reserves. Thus, surplus serves as the measure of the insurance industry's capacity to
underwrite additional risk. Surplus funds may be increased by policy premiums,
investments, and new capital (Frank Crystal 2006).
Insurance companies are highly vulnerable to stock market performance for funding
reserves and maintaining surplus capacity (Frank Crystal 2006). If climate change adversely
affects the macro economy, it could potentially threaten the insurance industry's practice of
funding reserves from investment returns. With the drop in stock prices since first quarter
2000, insurance companies have had to increase premiums and focus on improving
underwriting performance (Frank Crystal 2006).
Figure 6.25 below shows recent reserve trends for the insurance industry. It is
important to note that industry reserves are not an indication of any particular company's
ability to meet obligations and that reserves for individual companies must be examined.
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center reduced aggregate industry
surplus by 7% (Frank Crystal 2005a). Following September 11, insurance companies sought
to increase surplus (Frank Crystal 2005b). To place losses in perspective, Hurricane Katrina
reduced industry surplus by 15% (Frank Crystal 2005a).
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Figure 6.25: Insurance Company Reserve Trends, 1994-2004
Source: Irank Crystal (2006).
Significantly, since the 1970's, U.S. catastrophic losses have grown ten times faster
than property/casualty premiums (CERES 2005a). GDP and population growth also lag
catastrophe losses (CERES 2005a), making it increasingly difficult to spread the risk of
growing catastrophe losses across the economy and population.
Figure 6.26: U.S.
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Source: CERES (2005a). Note: GDP, population and premiums are indexed to 1971 losses.
Loss cost, premium, and GDP data reflect values in year incurred.
Insolvencies among insurance companies are not common, but are influenced by
catastrophic events. Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, approximately a dozen insurance
companies became insolvent due to losses incurred in Florida (Binnun 2006). Insurance
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company insolvencies in general, including those resulting from Hurricane Andrew and other
catastrophic events, have typically been limited to smaller, less diversified companies that
provide only a single kind of insurance and/or operate in a single state or region (Hartwig
2006).
From 1993 to 2004, the twelve-year property and casualty insurance industry average
insolvency rate was 0.71% of the total number of companies (Insurance Information Institute
2006a). Because these insolvencies are almost exclusively smaller insurance companies
(Hartwig 2006), they represent a much smaller portion of the industry on a policy surplus
basis.
6.27 1993 2004
1.33%
1.20%
1.02% 1.03%
0.79%
0.58%
0.28%
0.21%o 0.23%
I
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003E 2004
Source: Insurance Information Institute (2006a).
6.34 2000 2004
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
30 30 38 21 10
Source: Insurance Information Institute (2006a)
While only 3% of insurance company insolvencies are attributed to natural
catastrophes, over 50% are attributed to inadequate reserves. As described above, adequacy
of reserves are strongly influenced by loss history and capital markets performance. A.M.
Best estimated that at year-end 2004 the property casualty industry was inadequately
reserved by $59 billion (Credit Suisse First Boston 2006). Explanations for the under
reserving include optimistic evaluations of potential liabilities and short-term management
incentives to maintain the stock prices of their companies (Credit Suisse First Boston 2006).
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Credit rating agencies play an important role in monitoring the financial health of the
insurance industry. Credit rating agency monitoring is especially important for reinsurance
companies, which are not regulated by any government authority. Lower credit ratings affect
the ability of insurance and reinsurance companies to attract capital, to compete for business,
and influence the cost of capital. Importantly, crediting ratings should also provide an early
indication of insolvency.
Figure 6.29: Insurance Company Upgrades and Downgrades, 1993-2000
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Catastrophic events may increase the chances of insurance company downgrades.
Following Hurricane Katrina, Standard & Poor's placed ten insurance and reinsurance
companies on negative credit watch as a result of loss estimates (Insurance Journal 2005).
6.3.4 Natural Catastrophe Effects on Insuring Energy Sector
In recent years, insurance and reinsurance companies have responded to the financial
effects of storms and hurricanes by increasing premiums, tightening contractual terms, or
withdrawing insurance from high-risk areas altogether.
The increasing magnitude of insurance losses has caused increases in the cost of both
U.S. property and casualty insurance and reinsurance. Since 1990, the cost of reinsurance
has been gradually increasing, with large increases occurring following major catastrophic
events. Figure 6.30 below shows large increases occurring following Hurricane Andrew in
1992, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and the 2005 hurricane season.
Following the 2005 hurricane season, the cost of insurance for offshore energy
infrastructure reportedly increased 300% to 400%, while onshore rates increased 10% to 30%
(Frank Crystal 2006). Since 1990, U.S. catastrophe reinsurance rates have more than tripled
(Lane and Beckwith 2006).
Figure 6.30: U.S. Catastrophe Reinsurance Price Indices, 1984-Q1 2006
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Source: Lane and Beckwith (2006).
In addition to increased rates, insurers also have curtailed coverage of insurance in
high-risk areas following natural catastrophes. In 1992, following Hurricane Andrew,
insurance companies withdrew insurance from utility transmission and distribution assets in
the Gulf Coast area (Binnun 2006). Following the 2005 hurricane season, insurers are
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considering a number of contractual provisions to limit their exposure to hurricane and storm
risk in the North Atlantic Basin, including:
*Sub-limits for Gulf of Mexico exposure;
*Exclude Gulf of Mexico from coverage;
*Exclude Gulf of Mexico platforms built prior to certain date;
*Exclude business interruption coverage for Gulf of Mexico properties;
*Increase record retention period and waiting period for business interruption coverage;
*Require complete schedule of all covered Gulf of Mexico property; and
*Exclude "windstorm" coverage in Gulf of Mexico region (Marsh 2005).
The withdrawal of insurance coverage for the energy sector in the Gulf Coast is part
of a larger trend of curtailing insurance coverage in coastal areas along the East Coast.
Insurance coverage is increasingly difficult to obtain in Florida (Binnun 2006; Spudeck
2006), Cape Cod and Long Island (Adams 2006), Rhode Island, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina (CERES 2006). Some large insurers have curtailed coverage or stopped
underwriting coastal insurance along the entire East Coast (CERES 2006). As a result, state-
sponsored insurance programs are serving an increasing portion of the consumer market in
these coastal areas (Smythe 2006; Hartwig 2002).
Hurricanes and other catastrophic events may also affect other lines of insurance
coverage. Hurricane Katrina released over seven million gallons of petroleum into the Gulf
of Mexico, approximately two-thirds the amount of oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez in Prince
William Sound, Alaska in 1989 (Marsh 2005). The large volume of environmental debris
and drinking water contamination will increase insurance losses and possibly result in
curtailment or price increases for other lines of infrastructure insurance (Marsh 2005).
6.3.5 Insurance Case Study Main Findings
The insurance case study examined how catastrophic losses have affected the
insurance industry during the past several decades. The insurance case study shows that the
insurance industry has experienced increasing losses due to natural catastrophes, which in the
case of storms has resulted in curtailment of coverage and increases in premiums.
Unavailability of insurance coverage could potentially adversely affect lending activity in
certain regions, and thereby reduce the resources available for the development of carbon
neutral energy infrastructure in affected areas.
During the last several decades, the insurance industry has experienced continuing
losses on account of underwriting activities for property and casualty insurance. These losses
are the result of increasing frequency and severity of natural catastrophic events as well as
increases in the density of infrastructure in high-population areas and the cost of replacing
such structures. Storm activity accounts for approximately 78% of insured catastrophic
losses (Insurance Information Institute 2006a). With respect to storm activity in particular,
increasing losses have already caused curtailment of, and increasing prices for, insurance
coverage along coastal areas in the United States.
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If climate change causes further increases in the severity or frequency of storms,
resulting in increasing losses, it could potentially lead to inability to obtain property and
casualty insurance for highly vulnerable areas. In turn, if insurance coverage is unavailable
in certain regions or coastal areas, private lenders may decline to lend to infrastructure
projects in these areas. Because a majority of the population lives in coastal areas
(Changnon 1999), the inability to obtain insurance could lead to difficulties in financing
infrastructure in critical high-population areas.
6.4 Case Studies Conclusions
This chapter has presented three case studies, each focusing on a particular aspect of
financing energy infrastructure in light of risks associated with a changing climate.
The capital markets case study examined the magnitude of investment required to
develop 10-15 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure within a 50-year time frame.
Comparing the required investment levels based on estimates developed for the case study to
historical, projected, and current capital markets activity in the energy and utilities sector,
reveals that efforts to develop carbon neutral electricity infrastructure will potentially exceed
the capacity of capital markets. Given the magnitude of required investment, the financial
stability of firms and capital markets become important issues if society addresses climate
change by developing carbon neutral energy infrastructure.
The utility case study examined the increase in hurricanes and storms in the Eastern
United States and Gulf of Mexico during the past fifteen years and the losses they have
caused to the utilities industry and energy infrastructure. Climate change is believed by some
in the scientific community to have contributed to the observed increase in the number of
hurricanes and storms and the resulting losses. If changing climate does increase the losses
caused by storms, climate change could significantly increase the costs for utilities and
energy companies in affected areas. If the affected infrastructure is a critical energy supply
node, as in the case of the Gulf of Mexico, catastrophic storms associated with climate
change could affect global energy markets. Importantly, the increasing costs associated with
these storms could potentially adversely affect the financial condition of utilities and energy
firms in storm-prone areas, and undermine their capacity to finance carbon neutral
infrastructure.
The insurance case study examined how this essential industry to financing
infrastructure may be affected by catastrophic losses. The insurance case study suggests that
if climate change is accompanied by increasing catastrophic losses, the insurance industry
will likely be characterized by increasing costs of coverage, curtailment in coverage based on
location or activity, and continuing losses by insurance companies on underwriting activities,
especially in regulated markets. The insurance case study results are significant because they
suggest that businesses and households face increased costs for insurance and the potential to
be inadequately insured for catastrophic events. Importantly, if insurance coverage for
energy infrastructure projects is unavailable in certain regions or coastal areas, private
lenders may decline to provide insurance coverage to these projects.
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The results of these case studies suggest that the utilities and energy industries face
increasing risks that may become uninsurable, and that the capital requirements for the sector
as a whole will increase dramatically in order to develop carbon neutral infrastructure. The
conflict between increasing risk and increasing need for capital creates the potential for
failure by the private sector to develop carbon neutral infrastructure within a time frame
calculated to prevent long-term damage to the earth's atmosphere and other natural systems
due to climate change. Potential policy measures to prevent market failure are further
discussed in Chapter 7.
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7 Results and Policy Recommendations
This final chapter summarizes the dissertation's primary findings, makes several
recommendations for policy based on the research, and suggests areas for further study.
7.1 Primary Findings
The main findings of the dissertation are as follows:
Private Sector Role Critical. Increasingly, the private sector is responsible for
financing and developing infrastructure. Further, financial and other demands on the
government sector are expected to increase during this century. Thus, the private sector will
be an essential partner in addressing climate change.
Magnitude of Transition is Large. The magnitude of the transition to carbon neutral
infrastructure is of such a scale that achieving it within half or even an entire century will be
difficult. This is in contrast to prior research (e.g., US NAS 1992) that had assumed that
infrastructure could be changed within one-lifetime of infrastructure (e.g., 50 years for power
plants). Based on the analysis presented in Chapter 6, developing 10 TW of carbon neutral
electricity over a 50-year period would require global annual investment of $714 billion to
$1,186 billion during the first twenty years, and then would further increase during the next
thirty years as capital equipment is replaced. To meet this goal, over 562 MW of actual
generation capacity must be added each day, which would require construction of 1,287 MW
of new nameplate capacity per day taking capacity factors into account, based on the
technology wedge portfolio described in Chapter 2. Such large-scale development presents
challenges from the point of view of construction times, supply chains, risk, and financial
requirements.
Time To Prevent Potentially Dangerous Greenhouse Gas Concentrations is Limited.
The timeframe for developing carbon neutral energy infrastructure will require decades and
will be influenced by a number of factors, including economic conditions, technology
development, and public policy. Given these long development periods, the timeframe to
initiate a program to develop long-term solutions to climate change becomes urgent.
According to most IPCC SRES scenarios, we are likely to reach carbon dioxide
concentrations of approximately 550 ppm by mid-century, which the IPCC assigns a likely or
very likely chance of causing potentially dangerous conditions, including health effects,
increased potential for famine, and potentially significant sea level rise (IPCC 2001).
Further, if the potential adverse economic effects that could accompany peak production of
conventional oil are considered in the timing of the transition to carbon neutral energy
infrastructure, then the timeframe for this transition is likely within this century and
potentially within the first half of this century (Wood. et al. 2004).
Long-Term Sustained Effort Required. Sustained financial and policy commitment is
essential for supporting carbon neutral energy infrastructure. Technology requires decades to
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develop and commercialize, and infrastructure often has lifetimes and debt structures in
excess of thirty years or more. In contrast, business and government operate on much shorter
time frames. For example, in the case of financial markets, investment partnerships operate
for less than a decade before liquidating investments (VC Experts 2006a), executives are
typically compensated with stock options on a four-year vesting schedule (VC Experts
2006b), corporate profits and losses are measured and reported quarterly, and traders
typically close out their positions at the end of each day or by the weekend (Page, W. 2006;
Miller 2006). Political cycles are only slightly more stable, with the U.S. Senate, President,
and Congress running for re-election on six, four, and two year terms, respectively.
Any successful effort to address climate change through the development of carbon
neutral energy infrastructure will require sustained, long-term effort spanning decades. In
turn, this will place increased emphasis on the financial and public policy commitment
required to support transformation to carbon neutral energy infrastructure.
Climate Change Risks to Infrastructure Increasing and Complex. The risks associated
with climate change will likely increase during this century. In turn, the changing nature of
risk could have profound effects on the risk profile of large engineering infrastructure
projects, especially in the capital-intensive electric and energy sectors. As demonstrated by
the analysis in Chapter 4, there are substantial positive correlations among different kinds of
risks. Multiple interactions can occur between many of the risks, with secondary and tertiary
effects. These risks potentially adversely affect both individual firms and the systemic risks
of financial markets. Ultimately, these risks could increase both the capital and financing
costs of, and adversely affect the private sector's ability to undertake, infrastructure
development, including carbon neutral energy infrastructure.
Risk Management Markets and Methods Inadequate. Current private sector risk
management methods are currently inadequate to address the risks associated with climate
change. The study of private contractual methods in Chapter 5 evaluated insurance,
commodity and weather derivatives, carbon offsets, and catastrophe bonds based on six
criteria: (a) scope of risk covered, (b) geographic coverage, (c) contract duration,
(d) availability, (e) price, and (f) market capacity. It found that all of these risk management
instruments do not provide full protection against common risks that will likely increase due
to climate change. Significantly, their short-term durations of generally one-year or less, but
in no cases greater than five years, limit their ability to address long-term climate risk. Risks
beyond this timeframe are generally considered too uncertain or costly to underwrite. In the
case of insurance products, there is already evidence that increased risks associated with
climate have caused curtailment of coverage and increased cost of risk coverage in certain
coastal areas. As a result, risk management markets and methods are presently inadequate to
address the risks posed by climate change.
Capital Markets Capacity Limited and Volatile. Development of carbon neutral
energy infrastructure within a time-frame intended to prevent potentially dangerous levels of
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations will challenge the capacity of capital markets to
provide the required investment capital and the ability of firms to raise and absorb such
investment levels. As demonstrated in the case study in Chapter 6, the level of required
capital investment to develop 10 TW of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure within a 50-
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year period would require from $714 billion to $1,186 billion annually during the first twenty
years, which would then further increase over the 50-year period. Compared to capital
expenditures by utilities included in the S&P 500, the U.S. share of carbon neutral electricity
would require increasing capital expenditures by a factor of approximately 5 to 9 times
during the first twenty years of investment, and further increasing thereafter. The U.S.
capital markets portion of the required investment for carbon neutral electricity infrastructure
during the first twenty years would consume approximately 30% to 50% of all capital raised
from U.S. public debt and equity transactions for all economic sectors of the U.S. economy.
The financial stability of capital markets and the ability of firms to recover capital investment
through operations become major issues for private sector efforts to develop carbon neutral
energy infrastructure within the time frames contemplated by this dissertation.
The next section examines the issue of what government policies are necessary or
desirable in order to support the private sector playing a dynamic role in addressing climate
change through developing carbon neutral infrastructure.
7.2 Policy Recommendations
This section recommends several policies based on the research presented in the
dissertation. The policy recommendations focus on government policy that is essential to
promoting private sector solutions to climate change. As these recommendations are limited
both by the scope of the research presented in the dissertation and by their focus on
promoting private sector solutions, they are not intended to provide an exhaustive treatment
of all potential approaches to addressing climate change.
Recovery Risk. The most significant policy recommendation is that government must
address recovery risk associated with capital expenditures for utilities and other firms
engaged in developing carbon neutral energy infrastructure. Recovery risk is a prominent
risk in both the utilities and insurance case studies. In the case of utilities, the risk that
regulators will not permit recovery of capital expenditures and catastrophic losses, or that
such recoveries will be delayed, may significantly depress capital investment in carbon
neutral electricity technologies. In the case of insurance firms, the risk that regulators will
not allow recovery for the cost of providing risk coverage could lead to curtailment of
insurance in high-risk areas. For areas where catastrophic insurance is unavailable, lenders
and other investors may be unwilling to provide financing, as insurance is a standard
condition of infrastructure financings.
With respect to developing carbon neutral electricity infrastructure, the German
Renewable Energy Sources Act adopted in 2000 provides an example of one policy approach
for addressing recovery risk. The law provides that electricity generated on a renewable
basis will be sold to the regional transmission organization at a guaranteed price for a period
of years set by a government committee to insure repayment of capital expenditures, debt,
and a market return on investment. Electricity from different technologies is sold at different
guaranteed prices based on the economics of the particular technology at the time of
construction. The committee periodically adjusts guaranteed prices downward for new
projects based on improvements in technologies in order to capture cost reductions for the
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benefit of consumers. The costs of renewable electricity are spread among the consumer
base by the regional transmission utility, which charges a uniform price for all electricity
(United Nations Development Programme et al. 2004).
In contrast, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) provides an example of an
arrangement that is intended to increase the implementation of renewable technologies but
raises its own set of recovery risks. As described in Chapter 5, the CDM requires that project
sponsors prove that projects would not have been implemented but for the CDM
arrangements, and comply with standards that are often changing and unclear. Further, the
certified emissions reductions certificates (CERs) issued pursuant to the CDM are subject to
dilution in value due to over-allocation of emissions allowances under the Kyoto Protocol.
These various issues have created uncertainty for the ability of investors to recover their
investment through the sale of CERs. If CDM is to play a role in directing much needed
resources towards renewable technologies in developing countries, the process must be
streamlined and greater certainty needs to be provided to investors so that their investment
and a market return will be recovered.
In summary, adequate recovery of costs is the single most important element for the
private sector to supply the levels of investment required to transition society to carbon
neutral energy infrastructure.
Government Policy. If we are to succeed in developing carbon neutral energy
infrastructure, government policy must provide strong incentives for the private sector to
develop carbon neutral energy infrastructure and to minimize risks. This includes providing
signals as to what infrastructure government intends to support, certainty in cost recovery for
large investments made in approved technologies, market-based programs such as cap-and-
trade that feature aggressive mandatory caps on emissions, 23 and commercially competitive
returns for developing carbon neutral infrastructure. In addition to addressing recovery cost,
government regulation and tax mechanisms must be an important part of supporting the
development of carbon neutral infrastructure. Regulation coupled with strong financial
rewards for developing carbon neutral infrastructure are essential if we are to accomplish
societal goals of sustainable development through the private sector.
Financial Market Stability. The capital markets must play an essential role in any
private sector effort to develop carbon neutral energy infrastructure. Governments must
tailor fiscal and regulatory regimes to accommodate a rapid expansion of capital markets
activity in carbon neutral energy infrastructure. As demonstrated in the capital markets case
study presented in Chapter 6, the level of required capital investment to develop 10 TW of
carbon neutral electricity infrastructure within a 50-year period would require from $713
billion to $1,186 billion annually for the first twenty years alone, requiring utilities to
increase capital expenditures by approximately 400% to 700% compared to current levels.
23 The problems of excess inventories of emissions allowances are discussed in Chapter 5 in
the section on carbon offsets. See also Kosobud et al. (2004) for a description of how
regulations have been primarily responsible for reductions in VOCs while excess emissions
allowances have resulted in the Chicago-area VOC cap-and-trade system being ineffectual
thus far.
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Such an increase in capital investment activity within one sector of the economy would
potentially adversely affect the financial condition of utilities and could destabilize financial
markets.
Higher levels of investment will place greater emphasis on the efforts of government
regulators and self-regulatory organization (e.g., exchanges and professional accreditation
organizations) to insure transparent and properly functioning capital markets. The recurrence
of accountability and transparency issues in financial markets during periods of increased
investment activity underscores the importance of these issues. The development of carbon
neutral energy infrastructure will require sustained investment over a long period, and
financial and accounting scandals of the kind experienced in the past could potentially set
society back many years in this undertaking.
Aggressive Government and Corporate Planning. The nature and magnitude of the
problems presented by climate change requires aggressive government and corporate
planning. Government can and should respond to the risks presented by climate change by
developing infrastructure guidelines for changing conditions and planning purposes. With
respect to the development of carbon neutral energy infrastructure, the magnitude of the
transformation is of such a scale that coordinated leadership and planning between the
private and public sector is essential to its successful completion.
Attention to Areas of Potential Market Failure. Government policymakers should
focus on the potential for markets to fail as a result of, or in addressing, climate change. The
dissertation's research suggests two specific areas where market failure might occur:
insurance and capital markets.
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the private sector currently lacks risk management
instruments that are designed to address potential risks associated with climate change. As
climate risks increase, we should expect increasing costs associated with risk coverage and
curtailment of coverage in areas where insurance is not adequately priced to cover this risk.
The insurance markets have already shown evidence of a potential gap in the amount of risk
coverage available at a price that businesses and households are willing or able to pay.
The other potential area of market failure is the capital markets capacity to provide
the required levels of investment for infrastructure intended to address climate change. The
level of investment required over a multi-decadal period is so great that the potential failure
of capital markets to provide adequate capital should be anticipated and planned for if the
development of carbon neutral energy infrastructure is pursued. Importantly, any expansion
of the government's role that may adversely affect the operation of the market should be
undertaken carefully.
Barriers to the goal of encouraging investment in renewable technology should be
removed wherever possible, and polices that would promote introduction of carbon neutral
energy infrastructure should be given the highest priority in government circles for
consideration and adoption.
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7.3 Areas for Further Research
The research presented in the dissertation could be advanced and expanded in several
areas. Four areas are emphasized here.
First, further efforts to develop the specific details of technology-oriented approaches
to climate change are particularly valuable in assessing the viability of these approaches.
This dissertation developed a portfolio of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure
technologies. The portfolio of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure and the comparison to
capital markets activities presented in Chapter 6 could be expanded to include the
transportation and other energy sectors. Proven technologies such as biofuels, coal-to-
liquids, and gas-to-liquids are now ripe subjects for this kind of analysis. Further research
examining some of the assumptions made in constructing the portfolio, such as the capacity
of supply chains to meet the challenges posed by developing carbon neutral infrastructure,
would make a substantial contribution to assessment of the private sector's capacity to
address climate change.
Second, to the knowledge of the author, the financial risks identified in Chapter 4
have yet to be reflected in any climate modeling efforts. These risks potentially influence the
speed at which technology will be adopted in the future. Accordingly, further study of risk
by climate modelers, particularly in relation to adoption of technology, could potentially
increase the realism of these models in their assumptions about the ability and willingness of
the private sector to adopt carbon neutral technology.
Third, as suggested by the financial risks analysis in Chapter 4, the financial
instruments assessment in Chapter 5, and the insurance case study in Chapter 6, climate
change poses a number of risks that are not presently addressed by risk management
instruments. The absence of risk management instruments for addressing risks posed by
climate change exposes the private sector to potentially significant risks that could adversely
affect firms and their capacity for adjusting to climate change. Accordingly, the study of risk
management tools for mitigating climate risk is a critical area for further research.
Finally, further research in the area of conservation could provide important insights
into measures that can be taken to decrease the future magnitude of the transformation of
energy infrastructure. Similarly, research in the area of distributed generation could assist
our understanding of ways to more widely disperse the burden of transforming energy
infrastructure. The dissertation research suggests that the challenges of developing carbon
neutral energy infrastructure eventually may grow beyond the financial, engineering, and
management capacity of the private sector to develop within the time required to prevent
potentially dangerous levels of greenhouse gas concentrations.
The carbon neutral electricity portfolio presented in Chapter 2 and the capital markets
case study presented in Chapter 6 puts into perspective the magnitude of the challenges
society faces in pursuing a solution to addressing climate change for the electricity sector.
Importantly, the case study contemplates that only limited conservation efforts will be
undertaken in the form of one technology wedge of greater efficiency, and shows that
attempts to build our way out of the climate change problem by developing infrastructure that
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is both capable of meeting future projected energy demand and is carbon neutral is a costly
and uncertain task.
Importantly, as carbon-intensive infrastructure increases, the size of the transition
increases, requiring more capital investment and longer transformation periods. Weighing
expected future technology learning curves against demographic and economic trends
suggests that the potential complexity of this challenge could very well increase. Given the
magnitude and risks of this task, we should acknowledge the limits of, and actively
reconsider, approaches to solving energy and environmental problems that are exclusively
based on mega-engineering projects.
Conservation could increase the time, material and financial resources we have for
transforming infrastructure and ultimately addressing climate change. At the same time,
conservation has potential economic costs, raises difficult equity and distribution issues, and
requires a society-wide shift in values. These are challenging issues that should become a
part of mainstream research if we are to employ conservation as a policy measure in
connection with engineering approaches to address energy and environmental challenges.
7.4 Conclusion
This dissertation has examined the capacity of the private sector to finance and
develop carbon neutral energy infrastructure in order to provide a long-term solution to one
important cause of climate change. The dissertation has identified the financial risks
associated with climate change and evaluated private sector risk management methods for
mitigating risks associated with climate change. The dissertation has developed a portfolio
of carbon neutral electricity infrastructure technologies and assessed the financial costs
associated with implementing this infrastructure. The dissertation has examined the capital
markets, utilities and insurance sectors to assess the extent to which these critical segments of
the economy can support the transformation to carbon neutral electricity infrastructure and
withstand the risks associated with climate change.
Based on the research presented in the dissertation, the financial risks and costs of
developing carbon neutral electricity infrastructure within a time period intended to prevent
potentially dangerous levels of greenhouse gas concentrations are of such a magnitude that
there is substantial risk that the private sector could fail in this undertaking. At the same
time, private sector financial and management resources are essential to successfully
transforming energy infrastructure to a carbon neutral basis. If society is to pursue carbon
neutral infrastructure, government policy must support the financial recovery of firms
engaged in developing carbon neutral infrastructure, the financial stability of capital markets,
and the mitigation of risks associated with climate change.
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APPENDIX A
CLIMATE RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX
The Climate Risk Assessment Matrix is developed in Chapter 4 this dissertation.
Appendix A contains the basic matrix without any evaluative data for the risks or risk
management methods. Chapter 5 evaluates the risk management methods based on the
evaluation criteria identified in the matrix. Revised Climate Risk Assessment Matrices that
show the results of the evaluation are presented in Chapter 5.
RISK MANAGEMENT METHODS
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APPENDIX B
RISK MANAGEMENT SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
Organizations listed below were contacted in connection with the insurance and
derivatives survey described in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Organizations marked with an
asterisk (*) provided information in response to the applicable survey questionnaire. Some
firms provided information for more than one line of risk management product.
I. INSURANCE SURVEY (Insurance and Catastrophe Bonds)
Insurance and Reinsurance Companies
AIG
Allianz
Allstate
American Re (a division of Munich Re)*
Aviva*
AXA Re*
Benfield
GE Insurance
Swiss Re*
Lloyds*
Millea Tokio Marine
XL Group*
Zurich Financial Services*
Insurance Brokers
Aon*
Arthur Gallagher*
Frank Crystal & Co.*
JW Bond Consultants*
Guy Carpenter*
Marsh
Insurance Regulators
Florida*
Credit Rating Agencies
Fitch*
Moodys
S&P*
A&M Best*
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Modeling Firms
AIR
Eqecat*
Risk Management Solutions*
Other
Association of British Insurers*
Insurance Information Institute*
II. DERIVATIVES SURVEY (Commodities and Weather Derivatives, Carbon Offsets)
Derivatives Brokers and Underwriters
ABN AMRO
Accord Energy
AXA Re
Carbon Credit Capital*
Constellation Energy*
Coriolis Capital*
CTA Miller*
DE Shaw*
Ecosecurities*
DTE Energy
Evolution Markets*
GuaranteedWeather
Goldman Sachs*
Hess Energy Trading Company
Merrill Lynch
Morgan Stanley*
Optiver*
NatSource*
Sempra
Societe Generale (Fimat)*
Swiss Re*
TFS*
Transalta*
XL Group*
Other
Chicago Mercantile Exchange*
Risk Management Solutions*
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APPENDIX C
FORM OF INSURANCE SURVEY
This form was used to conduct surveys of insurance organizations described in Chapter 5.
Date:
Name:
Email:
Firm:
Title:
Phone:
Division:
INSTRUCTIONS
The survey of insurance companies has been prepared in connection with a Ph.D.
dissertation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concerning the private sector's role
in infrastructure development in light of potential risks due to weather and commodities.
Survey Format
The Survey consists of two parts. The first part asks about your firm's risk
assessment practices. The second part asks about insurance products that your firm provides
or brokers.
Survey Responses Confidential and Reporting
Your submissions will be held in confidence and survey results will be reported in
summary format only without attribution to source. Participants will receive summary results.
Part I: Climate Risk Programs
Has your firm developed a climate risk program? (Y/N)
Does your firm presently consider climate risks in future investment or operational
decisions? (Y/N) If yes, please describe:
Has your firm withdrawn insurance or other risk management products coverage due to
climate risks? If so, please describe where and why?
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How far into the future does your firm typically forecast?
For general business purposes: For climate risk assessment:
30 days 30 days
60 days 60 days
1 year - 2 years 1 year - 2 years
2 years - 5 years 2 years - 5 years
5 years - 10 years 5 years - 10 years
11 years - 20 years 11 years - 20 years
If over 20 years: _ If over 20 years:
Describe how climate affects your company' s ability to implement its strategic plan or costs?
How does your firm deal with the inherent uncertainties posed by climate risk?
How have you reflected climate risks in your modeling efforts?
With respect to catastrophic losses due to climate, how have your models performed during
the past 10-year period, 5-year and 1-year periods compared to prior periods?
How do extreme market conditions impact your models (do they work within certain ranges),
your risks (can you cover)?
What methods do you use to cover your own firm's Climate risks?
Diversification
Reinsurance
Special Purpose Vehicles/Corporate Structures
Securitization/Capital Market Transactions
Other:
How far out into the future can you hedge your firm's climate risk?
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APPENDIX D
FORM OF DERIVATIVES SURVEY
This form was used to conduct surveys of derivatives organizations described in Chapter 5.
Date:
Title:
Phone:
Division:
Bank Insurance Company
Risk Management Company Broker
Utility Oil/Gas Renewable
INSTRUCTIONS
The survey has been prepared in connection with a Ph.D. dissertation at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology concerning the private sector's role in
infrastructure development in light of potential risks due to weather and commodities.
Respondents
Please direct survey to officer or employees familiar with your firm's risk
management practices.
Survey Format
The Survey consists of two parts. The first part asks about risk management
products that your firm buys or sells for its own account, and brokers or arranges for third
parties. Leave sections that do not apply to your firm blank.
The second part asks how you might design a risk management program for three
hypothetical situations. If no hedge is possible, please indicate.
Survey Responses Confidential and Reporting
Your submissions will be held in confidence and survey results will be reported in
summary format only without attribution to source. Participants will receive summary
results.
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